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FOREWORD
My basic academic aim in this dissertation is to have my readers begin to think deeply about anonymity. It
is a subject you might not have thought about before, until that is, the advent of a full blown digital age
barely a decade past. (The anonymous discourse o f the World Wide Web is a dissertation in its own right.)
The preliminary and highly selective nature o f this study (signaled by my use o f “Toward” in all title
headings)prevents me from moving beyond the origins o f anonymity as the dark side o f an all-pervasive
author-fiinction that I have bowed down to almost slavishly in the case of Foucault who, in having asked,
"What is an Author?, led me to answer "Anonymous."
This answer, and its attendant question, "What is Anonymous?" make very little sense. Foucault didn't
write "What is an Author?' anonymously. Nor could I seriously consider writing this dissertation on
anonymity anonymously. As a pragmatic fact o f life, this dissertation would not have any being if its writer
were anonymous. Who could defend a dissertation anonymously? Whoever gave academic credit to
Anonymous? Who has a transcript or curriculum vitae on file labeled Anonymous? The answer to all these
questions is: Nobody. It is sheer absurdity to speak o f the identity, authority, or community o f someone
named Anonymous.
The anonymous narrator in Texts fo r Nothing asks—"What matters who's speaking?" This question by an
"absent character" is authorized into existence not by Anonymous, but by a Nobel Prize winning AUTHOR
named Beckett who compels another major AUTHOR, Foucault, to ask "What is an Author?" And still I
answer: "Anonymous"—or more suggestively: The Anonymous Function.
What is the Anonymous Function? Whatever the answer to that question, it would seem to reduce
significantly the absurdity o f mentioning identity, authority, and community. The answer will require that
my reader be someone whose erudition is willing to run from (pun intended) the dialectical reasoning of
philosophy into (but mostly around) all kinds o f hybridized disciplinary “studies” (cultural, fem inist,
com position). For the sake o f some measure o f simplicity, I place anonymity in a subordinate binary
relation to each o f the dominant discourses o f identity, authority, and community. The reality o f their
relations, however, is an “allatonceness” (Ann Berthoff) that baffles my attempts at a clear analysis.
v
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I try to keep these dominant discourses artificially segregated and subordinated within the confines of
specific chapters to get some control over anonymity’s discursive complexity. I believe my readers will
begin to see their discursive synthesis, however, in what I contend amounts to The Composition o f
Anonymity.
As certain as I am o f the author-function being ultimately subordinate to the anonymous function, I am
utterly uncertain of the audience function—o f why and how I should tell you, my reader, to pay attention to
what I have to say about anonymity. Thus, I present the following epigraphs as a way to evoke my feelings
and intuitions about the passions that compose the meaning and action o f anonymity in the world. If these
epigraphs don’t move your curiosity, as they do my own, then no amount o f academic embellishment can
fill the absence between us. The presence o f that absence is what I mean by the composition of anonymity—
or rather, how anonymity composes us— in the reader, writer, and the written.

vi
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JULIET

O Romeo, Romeo! wherefore art thou Romeo?
Deny thy father and refuse thy name;
Or, if thou wilt not, be but sworn my love,
And I'll no longer be a Capulet.
ROMEO
[Aside] Shall I hear more, or shall I speak at this?
JULIET
'Tis but thy name that is my enemy;
Thou art thyself, though not a Montague.
What’s Montague? it is nor hand, nor foot,
Nor arm, nor face, nor any other part
Belonging to a man. O, be some other name!
Whafs in a name? that which we call a rose
By any other name would smell as sweet;
So Romeo would, were he not Romeo call'd,
Retain that dear perfection which he owes
Without that title. Romeo, doff thy name,
And for that name which is no part o f thee
Take all myself.
ROMEO
I take thee at thy word:
Call me but love, and I'll be new baptized;
Henceforth I never will be Romeo.
JULIET
What man art thou that thus bescreen'd in night
So stumblest on my counsel?
ROMEO
By a name
I know not how to tell thee who I am:
My name, dear saint, is hateful to myself,
Because it is an enemy to thee;
Had I it written, I would tear the word.
William Shakespeare (or Edward DeVere?)
*******
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I'm NobodyI Who are you?
Are you—Nobody—Too?
Then there's a p a ir o f us?
Don't tell! they'd advertize—you know!
How dreary—to be- Somebody!
How public—like a frog—
To tell one's name—the livelong June—
To an admiring Bog!
Emily Dickinson

The Unknown Citizen
(To JS/07/M/378
This Marble Monument
Is Erected by the State)
He was found by the Bureau o f Statistics to be
One against whom there was no official complaint,
And all the reports on his conduct agree
That, in the modem sense o f an old-fashioned word, he was a
saint,
For in everything he did he served the Greater Community....
The Press are convinced that he bought a paper every day
And that his reactions to advertisements were normal in every
way.
Policies taken out in his name prove that he was fully insured,
And his Health-card shows he was once in hospital but left it
cured.
Both Producers Research and High-Grade Living declare
He was fully sensible to the advantages of the Instalment Plan
And had everything necessary to the Modem Man,
A phonograph, a radio, a car and a frigidaire.
Our researchers into Public Opinion are content
That he held the proper opinions for the time o f year;
When there was peace, he was for peace; when there was war, he went.
He was married and added five children to the population,
Which our Eugenist says was the right number for a parent o f his generation.
And our teachers report that he never interfered with their
education.
Was he free? Was he happy? The question is absurd:
Had anything been wrong, we should certainly have heard.
W.H. Auden

What if it turns out, Tim, that anonymity is
finally an issue o f masking?
Robert J. Connors
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ABSTRACT
THE COMPOSITION OF ANONYMITY:
TOWARD A THEORY, HISTORY, AND PEDAGOGY
by
Timothy Thomas Dansdill
University o f New Hampshire, May, 2001

In keeping with its recognized function o f non-identity through the suppression o f proper name recognition,
anonymity is not recognized as “essential” to nominalist consciousness or to intersubjective action through
language. The founding philosophical discourses of identity, authority, and community reveal an
“anonymous function”—a transgressive discourse o f impersonation, authenticity, and immunity—which this
dissertation traces in phenomeonlogy, discourse theory, poetics, rhetoric, and composition.
The first two chapters draw from phenomenology (Schutz and N atanson), and discourse
th e o ry (Foucault), to propose a theory o f anonymity as integral to any understanding of personal identity
across the entire performative range o f self/other orientations. Chapter three draws on literary theory and
history (Forster, Foucault, and Docherty) to propose a history o f anonymity that reverses the dominant
position accorded to author-ity and the author-function. Three ancient texts— The Book o f Genesis; the Epic
o/Gilgamesh; and The Odyssey demonstrate the “anonymous function.” Chapter four adapts Blanchot and
Bakhtin to suggest a rhetoric o f anonymity in which audience and community function anonymously.
“Contact zone” theory and practice (Pratt, Bizzell, Miller, hooks) is then reviewed and redescribed to
propose in chapter five a pedagogy o f anonymity—one devoted to merging composition-rhetoric’s
conflicting demands for “structure” and “agency” in student writing. Anonymous composition logically
extends the rhetorical mandate o f the course evaluation exit document. 20 pieces o f anonymous student
writing on identity politics are analyzed for functions o f impersonation, veracity, and immunity.

xi

R e p ro d u c e d with perm ission of the copyright owner. F urther reproduction prohibited without permission.

INTRODUCTION

Prologue
"Why Anonymity?" asked Diane. She directs the daycare center where my children now spend their days.
She was down on the rug with a girl I immediately recognized as my soon to be five year old daughter,
ClydaJane. Diane has been working with pre-school children for about as long as I've been alive. She asked
that question with a clearly ironic smile spreading from the comers o f her mouth when she saw that I
realized she was calling out each letter o f my daughter's name. She paused, with emphasis, while
ClydaJane wrote with a crayon across the top of a picture she had ju st drawn. Her question froze me, even
though that Why part fires and consumes any inquiry.
So I laughed, loving the irony o f it all. I finally answered, still in the ironic mode we are both
comfortable in, but this time emphasizing a double entendre I did not expect her to pick up on: "Because
Nobody seems interested in answering that question." "Gotta write about something," Diane said. "Bingo.
Ditto." said I, as ClydaJane held up her written name proudly and said: "See, Daddy, I did it again." And I
hugged her tight, proud o f her pride—her growing authority—in self-identification, and delighted that the
little discourse community we initiated a year ago on a piece o f paper I have on the wall above my writing
desk is repeating and proliferating itself in this larger community o f discourse.
Yes, indeed, Why anonymity? Because anonymity, in keeping with its recognized function o f non
identity through the suppression o f proper name recognition, is not generally taken into account when we
try to understand the actions o f language—speaking/listening and writing/reading. The function of
language itself, being both social and anonymous, subordinates the presence of anonymity. It makes what
we call the “social construction” o f identity, authority, and community the dominant account o f how
human beings rationalize a universe o f discourse whose vast centripedal and centrifugal forces subject,
project, and interject meaning through spoken and written utterances.
This dissertation turns these presuppositions o f nominalist consciousness on their head in order to
explore and propose the anonymous construction and function o f discourse. The beginning o f an answer to
all these can be found in the mode o f inquiry itself. The subject o f any extended inquiry is generally, and
1
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generously, available through the most cursory search o f a library's catalogs. Electronic indexes and
databases now enable the curious researcher to conduct a series o f three discrete "Searches"—by Author,
Title, or Subject. One also has the option to Search Everything. Given my subject, a search by Author is
not so much absurd or perverse as it is bemusing, humbling—confirming Dudley Fitts’ observation in his
introduction as editor o f the Greek Anthology that "the most popular author in history is "Anonymous."
A random run through a bibliographic list titled Anonymous Classics o f the Western W orld reveals the
usual "Dark Age" and medieval suspects. We have Beowulf; Sir Gawain and the Green Knight; The
Ballad o f Sir Patrick Spen. There is also a teeming mass o f manuscripts one has never heard of, and will
never likely look into. Yet, scholars o f "authorial attribution" are busily—stubbornly— working away as I
write to drop the pervasive mask o f Anonymous, to identify and reintroduce these orphaned, feral texts
back into the Community of unquestioned Identity where the writer revealed (and his/her scholar-advocate)
will enjoy a new or long-lost "Authority."
Add to the groaning lists o f literary and historical texts the even more numerous catalogues of
anonymous manuscripts of music. Follow this up with Art History's catalogs o f unattributed paintings and
sculpture. Then top all these "significant" objects o ff with the endless "ephemera" both on view and
hoarded away in the "permanent" collections o f the world's various kinds o f museums. Very quickly the
curious inquirer begins to understand the empirical sense o f augmentation and proliferation in Fitts'
observation.
What then does it really mean to do an Author-Search on the Subject o f "Anonymous" (meaning "of
unknown, or undeclared, origin or authorship")? It means that one must come round dialectically to what it
means to search for what, in the original meaning o f "theory," "remains to be seen" o f the origin and
function o f the Author in its largest, yet most lost, sense. The basic lines o f both a "Subject Search" and
"Title Search" o f "Anonymous" will lead the inquirer back onto the rails o f an "Author Search." In (re)
searching (for) "Anonymous" I realized that one part o f what I am calling the "composition" o f anonymity
is obviously historical, but is also, in the most compelling sense, theoretical. Thus, before I could even
consider what or how to write about "Anonymous," I had to reconsider, philosophically, the possibility
put forth by Richard Whitlock in 1654: “That it were...wisdom itself, to read all Authors as Anonymous,
looking on the Common Sense, not Proper Names o f Books.”

2
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My personal sense o f a "Common Sense"—in effect, the authority o f my experience, —was founded on
and, arguably, foundered in, a love o f philosophical wisdom. Plato was a true passion of mine in high
school and in the first years o f college. I drank in The Cratylus, or o f Names and Naming, the very first
treatise on the problem o f "nominalism" or the meaninglessness o f etymologies and genealogies. At stake
in this dialogue was choosing to believe in, and living the consequences of, a steady state of Form versus
the continuous, arbitrary transformations o f Flux. There was no both/and possibility. I look back on The
Cratylus' critique o f names as the prototype o f Derridean deconstruction, o f nominal slippage,
supplementarity, and ultimately, absence in relation not only to things, but also to any form of
nomination.
When Cratylus was written, nominalism was a very hot controversy. As poet at war with the
philosopher in myself, I was no less disturbed some two and a half millennia later with the argument Plato
had put into Socrates' mouth. It seemed a convincing argument against believing with the young
Hermogenes that the names o f things had any real connection worthy o f the word, knowledge, never mind
true wisdom.^ I produce Plato/Socrates’ anti-nominalist conclusion below to telegraph what the reader will
come to understand as the anonymous fim ction or the composition o f anonymity as theory, history, and
pedagogy. A covert aim is to work toward, rather than definitively demonstrate, the unnamed, unnaming,
and perhaps the unnamable, in the act o f writing itself.
Soc. And the work o f the legislator is to give names, and the dialectician must be his
director if the names are to be rightly given?
Her. That is true.
Soc. Then, Hermogenes, I should say that this giving o f names can be no such light
matter as you fancy, or the work o f light or chance persons; and Cratylus is right in
saying that things have names by nature, and that not every man is an artificer of names;
but he only who looks to the name which each thing has, and is, will be able to express
the ideal forms o f things in letters and syllables.
Her. I cannot answer you, Socrates; but I find a difficulty in changing my opinion all in
a moment; and I think that I should be more readily persuaded, if you would show me
what this is which you term the natural fitness o f names.
Soc. My good Hermogenes, I have none to show. Was I not telling you just now (but
you have forgotten), that I knew nothing, and was proposing to share the inquiry with
you?
Soc. How true being is to be studied or discovered is, I suspect, beyond you and me
to determine; and we must be content to admit that the knowledge o f things is not to be
derived from names.
....Soc. [No one] "of sense will like put oneself or the education o f one's mind in the
power o f names" [since to do so is to] "condemn oneself and other existences to an
unhealthy state o f unreality.
3
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The "common sense" I have today o f this passage, a quarter century since I first read it, is that though "true
being" is now a thoroughly suspect, and popularly written, as BEING, I remain attached to it as a category
for studying and discovering the knowledge to be derived from anonymity (meaning: "the condition of
having no [proper] name").
Implied in Plato’s critique o f names is that there is an anonymous quality, an unnamable sense, to his
now outworn notions of, and arguments for, Ideal Forms. Plato’s reversal o f our contemporary
connotations o f naming as normative—deeming it a healthy state o f reality—makes o f anonymity a healthy
state o f reality, not suspect or deviant. Such use o f a basic dialectical (and therefore nominally
“deconstructive”) principal o f reversal and reappraisal does not ignore or deny Suzanne Langer’s famous
phrase, that “ ...the notion o f giving something a nam e is the vastest generative idea that ever was
conceived; its influence might well transform the entire m ode o f living and feeling, in the whole species,
within a few generations"(Philosophy in a New Key). I simply wish to trace and consider the elements and
arrangements within and around the notion o f giving something a name that point to the possibility and
reality that the composition o f anonymity, as naming’s Other, is equally generative, influential, and
transformative.
The “nominalist” PRESENCE o f “Anonymous” would seem to be at “play,” in the Derridean sense,
across the entire range o f discourse as “signature, event, and context.” The composition o f anonymity in
broad theoretical terms infers anonymity’s massive metaphysical and philosophical background. I follow
throughout this investigation an obsessively-compulsive Derridean (and given the cue from The Cratylus, a
Platonically dialectical) principle o f reversal that endorses the “presence” o f anonymity’s absence wherein
dominant terms o f discourse such as “identity” are not so m uch subordinated or repressed, but are, instead,
recessed so that anonymity can come out to play.
We find anonymity’s work o f reversal (and its serious play) in the OED’s earliest recorded reference to
“Anonymous.” In 1601, Philemon Holland, a translator o f the writings o f ancient historians, including
Xenophon, Plutarch, and Livy, translated this sentence from Pliny’s H istory o f the W orld. “Anonymos,
finding no name to be called by, got thereupon the name Anonymos.” Playful as this appears to be, the
import is that Anonymous is a name, and therefore no exception to the rule o f the proper name. Or, if it is
an exception, it is precisely the sort that proves the absolute authority o f Nominalism. Forster tells us in
4
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his little essay “Anonymity: An Enquiry,” “it is a queer affair,” this name o f what unnames. That essay, as
we will see, is both playful and deadly serious about the generative functions and transformative
consequences o f anonymity.
My reader might have noticed that I have gradually linked, and subtly replaced, the term “Anonymous”
with that o f “Anonymity.” My reason for doing so returns us to the curious inquirer who performs a
simultaneous Author-Subject-Title-Search using the term "Anonymity" instead o f "Anonymous." What he
or she will find is a virtual Other End o f the infinite reference spectrum for “Anonymous” : “Anonymity”
is the subject o f four books.
Anonymity is a personal narrative by Susan Bergman, a memoir o f growing up with a loving father who
spent his life passing as a monogamous heterosexual while also sexually involved with other men until his
death by AIDS. One is a study by Maurice Natanson, a phenomenologist and student o f phenomenologist
Alfred Schutz (mentored by phenomenologist Edmund Husserl). One is a study by David Beck, a
hermeneuticist, on the link between anonymity and the “discipleship paradigm” in The New Testament. The
last is a brief essay by E.M. Forster (yes, the Author).
I will not involve Bergman's personal narrative o f passing and identity politics, though every fiber of
my pedagogical being as a teacher o f an expressivist/social constructionist hybrid approach to composition
tells me the irony/opportunity is too much to pass up. The other three references form the functionally
nominalist, nominally authoritative core out o f which the foregoing chapters on anonymity's identifiable
"origins" in phenomenology, discourse theory, hermeneutics, rhetoric, and finally, composition studies have
their BEING.
Doing Things with Anonymity
Taking a cure from Austin’s famous work, D oing Things with Words, the more direct answer to the
question as to why Anonymity is a significant issue in social and rhetorical life is to ask not what it is, but
rather: what does anonymity enable or accomplish as a social and rhetorical phenomenon; what are the
consequences o f its action as a pervasive “speech act” that derives from and responds to both healthy and
unhealthy states o f reality? In answer, I provide a series o f seven anecdotes that extend Langer’s premise: if
anonymity is not the vastest generative idea ever conceived, its influence does seem to have transformed
entire modes o f living and feeling in the generations that have succeeded her mid-20lh century ideas of
5
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philosophy in a new key. I chose these anecdotes at random, unable to decide which, among the many file
folders I have amassed over the past four years, would be most “representative” (in Burke’s sense) of
anonymity’s generative and transformative presence in discursive life.
Anecdote #1.
This, from “digital discourse” is from Eric Hughes, one o f the original Cypherpunks. "Privacy is necessary
for an open society in the electronic age," he writes in the opening o f "A Cypherpunk's Manifesto," which
he put online in 1993. The document continues.
People have been defending their own privacy for centuries with whispers, darkness,
envelopes, closed doors, secret handshakes, and couriers. The technologies o f the past did
not allow for strong privacy, but electronic technologies do.
We the Cypherpunks are dedicated to building anonymous systems. We are defending
our privacy with cryptography, with anonymous mail forwarding systems, with digital
signatures, and with electronic money...
Cryptography will ineluctably spread over the whole globe, and with it the anonymous
transactions systems that it makes possible.
The Cypherpunks' philosophy is extreme—they believe that cryptography and anonymous transactions
should and will inevitably make the idea o f the nation-state wither away—and their numbers are relatively
few, but their influence is growing, “augmenting” as it were, as a counter to the prevailing discourse of
centralized authority. In this first anecdote, there is clearly a lack o f identity (or at least o f “identification”)
between Anonymous State Authority and the Anonymity o f the People to be secure in their persons. We
can see the clash o f vision as to what will best foster and expand a healthy or unhealthy state o f economic
and social reality.
Anecdote #2
This, also from “digital discourse” involves the increasing concern over ‘cyber-stalking.” There is a call by
many social commentators to eliminate the anonymous shield which deviant individuals—a.k.a.
“cyberstalkers”—have used to engage young children in virtual chat rooms. These same commentators
wrestle, however, with the potential loss o f anonymity that they deem absolutely necessary to protect the
private identity profiles o f normal Internet users from “unauthorized” surveillance and intrusion by
corpor'.tions seeking to “personalize” their consumer customer bases.
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In this second anecdote we see, again, a clash between a clearly unhealthy — deviant or libertine—sense
o f community values versus some pragmatic and moderate version o f the extreme— libertarian—privacy
rationale o f the Cypherpunks.
Anecdote #3
This, from political discourse, illustrates anonymity’s “heroic’ or noble aspect, rather than its craven or
insidious capacity. It is well-known that the presidential debate commission set up by our two party
system is sponsored by the likes o f AT&T, United Airlines, and Anhaeuser-Busch. A recent visit by a
reporter from National Public Radio to Wake Forest College, one o f the sites o f the year 2000 presidential
debates, revealed that Wake Forest gave Anhaeuser-Busch the authority to turn its student lounge into a bar
for the exclusive use of the press corps attending the debate.
The power o f Anhaeuser -Busch to prevent Wake Forest students from using their own facility flows
directly from millions of dollars the corporation paid to the college for the right to have its name and
product identified with this aspect o f our democratic election process. The company’s public relations team
claims that, “Anhaeuser-Busch is only interested in being a good corporate citizen. We do not realize much
else from our largesse.” But in an interview with a political analyst who specializes in corporate influence
in U.S. politics, it was pointed out that the laws governing political contributions permit “anonymous
donations” to the Debate Commission. The official said: “I f Budweiser were genuinely interested in “good
corporate citizenship” exclusively, they would o f course pursue this option. That they wish instead to have
voters identify their beer with the democratic process is patently obvious.”
In this third anecdote, the corporate drive for consumer identification—in this case “the King o f Beers”
as visibly identified with the democratic process to elect a President— shuns the invisible honor being an
anonymous donor.
Anecdote #4
This, from the corporate workplace, illustrates anonymity’s constructive discursive capacity. In a National
Public Radio series titled “The Changing Workplace” reporter David Malthus focuses on work related
stress and employee dissatisfaction. The giant pharmaceutical corporation M ERCK INC. is universally
cited as a “superior work environment” because it uses “internal anonymous surveys” to uncover and
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mediate two pervasive problems: “employee stress and managerial mistrust.” Merck’s use o f anonymity has
been cited as a “progressive resource” in improving the work environment.
In this fourth anecdote, we see the generative effects o f corporate employees dropping their identities to
speak freely and objectively to authorities about problems in ongoing face-to-face and name-name relations
so as to transform an unhealthy corporate community where authoritative indifference or arrogance is a
reality.
Anecdote #5
This final anecdote from higher education. It highlights anonymity’s ambivalent relation to academic
assumptions about legitimate authority (and therefore o f student identity, and o f the university as a
community.) My spouse is a professor at Wesleyan University, an institution that prides itself on its
Honor Code. Each incoming student is introduced to this code (running many pages) on policies of
plagiarism and cheating. Students are required to sign a sworn statement that not only will they not cheat
in their studies, they will also report any act o f cheating among their peers.
A student sent m y spouse an e-mail letter informing her that she observed another student cheating.
Since my spouse did not see the accused student, she called the Dean o f Student Life for advice. The first
question from the Dean was: “Did the accusing student send you an anonymous e-mail through the web
site bulletin board o r did she use her real name on her own account? Students who name themselves are
taken more seriously.” When my spouse assured her that the student named herself, the Dean went on to
tell her, without any sense o f an inherent contradiction, that “anonymous senior surveys” reveal that
“violations of the honor code are rampant.” The university is only rarely given the opportunity to prosecute
a case, however, because “students do not want to be identified as ratting on their peers.”
This case got to the point o f informing the accused that he would be summoned before the Honor
Board to face his accuser. Having identified her self to (and with) university authorities, the accusing
student was told she could not refuse to help prosecute the case. I f she did, she would be in violation of
the Honor Code no less than the student accused o f cheating. A t the last moment the accusing student
disavowed her charge, telling the Dean that she could not be absolutely sure of what she saw. The Dean
told m y wife that the pressure o f being identified in a high profile case o f “Honor” usually makes students
think twice about seeing the process through.
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The point o f this anecdote highlights the hybrid, highly variable, and even excruciatingly ambivalent
uses and effects o f anonymity as a discourse that comprises and composes our larger sense o f community,
identity, and authority.
Here we see university authorities denigrating the legitimacy o f anonymous disclosure even as they are
utterly dependent upon its function as a truth effect. Furthermore, the student community speaks with one
authoritative voice o f concern that the Honor Code is a sham. Yet the student community’s anonymity
helps them to evade the responsibility o f being identified with the university that has authorized them to
name those who undermine the Code’s ideal o f fair and open play across the disciplines. The discourse of
Identity— in this case, being named as a participant who must cross between two communities with
different senses o f authority—carries with it the checks and balances o f anonymity.
Anecdote #6.
This anecdote, again from “digital discourse,” is from the distance learning Website o f Mercy College (or
MerLIN) “where” I taught two online courses—one on Drama, the other on Short Fiction—using the
TOPCLASS educational template.
Students, It is the time o f the year for faculty evaluations on MerLIN. Please go to the
link above and find your class. The classes are not under departments so scroll down
until you find yours. Make sure you have the right section and teacher. Click on that
class and you will be able to submit your faculty evaluation. These evaluations are
posted to a database anonymously. I f you submit more than one evaluation per class it
will kick out both. Click on the above link to fill out your faculty evaluations.
Here is the cybernetic version o f the familiar anonymous course evaluation that students universally
compose at the end o f every course in the still pervasive face-to face/ ”brick and mortar” context o f higher
education. Unlike the groaning metal file cabinets in most departments, these anonymous student
evaluations are out there in 0/1 code, a closed “fellowship of discourse” that is, however, “open to the
winds” (phrases from Foucault we will look to in Chapter two) o f Mercy College’s community.
This online sense of “community” further mediates the anonymous discourse community (more
towards “immunity” and its meaning o f “being without office”) that presently persists in face-to-face, hard
copy file access in all academic departments. It places the necessary rhetorical immunity that makes the
anonymous performance evaluation work into an authorized event and communicative context that is
literally elsewhere, out there, in an event and context “without office.” Mercy College’s authorizes access
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to its anonymous discourse community through the now familiar log on “signatures” (proper name plus
private pseudonym).
Thousands o f people form an effectively anonymous readership that reads these anonymous writings
about faculty, classes, and what was performed or learned. The only “named” individual— or truly nominal
identity—in this discourse community is that o f the instructor. Here is a highly mediated version o f the
immediate, intersubjective experience o f identity and identification that reign in this faculty-student writing
ritual at the close o f every course. We see here the rich and complex—rational and healthy—interaction of
the discourses o f identity, authority, and community under the anonymous function.
In other terms, here is an academic version o f Merck’s incorporate use by employees to open up and
judge the performance o f its most visible, or front line, authorities. In this case, teachers are the
“executives” and students are the anonymous “employees,” and the online database becomes discourse
itself—at once social and anonymous (in Bakhtin’s sense, as we will see in Chapter Four.)
Anecdote #7,
This final anecdote is from an academic community—the UNH department o f Composition.
7 December, 1994
Dear Tim D.—
After your presentation we were in such a state o f disbelief that we could barely form
words for it. Even now, we hardly know where to begin, but we do know that we cannot
end this semester without responding honestly to your work and your presentation of it.
So let us get this straight—this is a writing course on personal narrative and universal
ideas, and you are allowing your students to 'function' under the misconception that
gender equals sexuality, so that they continue to write into the void about their sexual
experiences. And they write anonymously, so that there is no sense o f ownership in the
best sense o f the word, no sense of taking responsibility for one's words and therefore
attitudes, beliefs, or actions, and no sense o f awareness o f audience in order to refine their
thought processes. Thought processes? Are there any? Maybe we missed that part, but we
saw no evidence o f your guiding hand as a teacher, to gently but firmly direct students'
solipsism into an awareness o f how their responses to their experiences affect others. Do
you at least show them how the sexual can be interpreted in the context o f gender issues?
Your attitude o f amusement is prurient at best and pornographic at worst. You seem to
take lightly and without analysis potentially traumatic disclosures ranging from abuse
and rape to masturbation with 'adult' videos. While you 'respond' at great length to a
select few o f these pieces, the responses fall to suggest ways writers can develop actual
idea-based essays by interpreting their own behavior and refining writing skills; other
pieces go without response at all. Fostering awareness o f gender identity and influences
from our personal and social fives is a worthwhile cause, but using composition classes
as guinea pigs for your own purposes either personal or academic doesn't sit right with
us. In addition to your inappropriate—use o f your course's topic, your shocking abuse of
photocopying privileges and your lack o f eye contact send o ff bad vibes. If this is how
experienced and worldly readers and teachers feel about what you are doing, how must a
young student feel being forced into this kind o f private (as opposed to personal; Denise
10
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Levertov's distinction) narrative exposure without any compassionate or instructive
guidance? As one person in attendance said, it's like therapy without therapy—meaning it
leaves one vulnerable and exposed in a potentially damaging and destructive isolation
that is truly disturbing to consider. W e are concerned for your students and sincerely
hope you will stop this voyeuristic exercise and get yourself o ff to the nearest
psychiatrist. Academia may have begun your personal journey toward enlightenment, but
serious counseling may be the only way to continue it.
Sincerely,
Henry Miller and Anais Nin
In this final anecdote we see the use o f anonymity to, perhaps, allow people to “tell the truth as they
see it” in the same way that Merck Corporation and Mercy College uses it. (Strictly speaking, this is
pseudonymity, in the cunning play of Proper—Authorial—Names associated with transgressive writing to
mask the actual names o f the writers. But in effect, the overall mode and consequence is functionally
anonymous.)
Whereas the use o f anonymity in the Merck o r Mercy cases maintains the mode and motive of candid
inquiry to be later used in colloquy, (which operates in both corporate and academic style performance
evaluations requiring anonymity), the mode and m otive in the final anecdote is one o f obloquy. As such, it
falls within what Judith Butler has called “excitable speech.” As such, this anecdote trenchantly
demonstrates what she generally means by “linguistic vulnerability” (in this case mine) in relation to the
rhetorical immunity provided by my colleagues’ particular use o f the anonymous function.
They are "responding honestly" under condition o f anonymity to my work and my presentation of it. I
cannot, however, respond honestly to their harsh working over, and re-presentation o f my work and my
presentation. A void is created: they are invisible/invulnerable; I am visible/vulnerable. They are
Odysseus/Udeis (as we will see in Chapter Three); I am the hapless Polyphemus, his one big IDEA put
out, it would seem by a joking, but smarting (Enlightened) stroke of fiery speech. Unlike what they
accuse me of—teaching m y students to write into a void with "no sense o f awareness o f audience"—they are
writing to ME, but I cannot respond. They have indeed taught me a lesson about the variable uses and
power o f anonymity. It would very much seem to be that in this case, it m atters very much w ho’s
speaking.
Unaware that my students were writing not to a void, but to an Other—sometimes an author, sometimes
an imagined identity different than their own—"Miller" and "Nin" respond honestly, and with some degree
o f authority (as anonymous colleagues). But they do not respond aesthetically, ethically, or in the best
11
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sense, pedagogjcally. In other words, their act o f masking or impersonation is not authentic. (Neither the
real Miller nor the real Nin, given their views of gender and sexuality, would respond in this way to my
course, I believe. I have read them both extensively, and there is a tenderness in their libertinism, even in
Miller’s sexist/sexual narcissism.)
Still, the views these writers took o f my pedagogy based on my presentation have elements o f
credibility: the relation o f anonymity to audience awareness is problematic; the relation o f responsibility
and accountability is equally vexed. It is interesting that these writer's sense o f a contact zone will figure
later-after the effects o f their timely "December 7th" (Pearl Harbor) sneak attack had been measured; it is
reported they intended to reveal their true identities sometime into the process o f community reaction. By
contrast, the students in my classes had written responses from me and full discussion o f their views and
values in face-face class sessions.
It is difficult to see such a use o f anonymity as intended for any thing other than to personally injure,
publicly censure, or to do both. Butler's idea of "excitable speech" may extend from pure racial or
homophobic hatred to an ambivalent kind o f razzing or hazing among prankster-minded associates. This
anecdote falls “somewhere” in between an unhealthy and healthy use o f the anonymous function. Its
censorious character fulfilled a double function. First, by using one o f the more suspect aspects o f the
anonymous function to sardonically “teach” me an “object lesson” about the ethical and rhetorical
consequences of an anonymous pedagogy, “Miller” and “Nin” wished to provoke a pathos o f reaction—not
an ethos of discussion—in the department. Second, in their “excitement” to incite, they overlooked the
problem of their immediate responsibility for the identity, and therefore, the author-ity behind their
charges.
Nevertheless, despite their avoidance o f face-to-face discussion, their "community" intention for this
writing throws a troubling shadow over the community use I employed with students’ anonymous writing
in my course. Those texts became common property—attained "immunity", were without office—for use and
comment by everyone without any need to know who had written what. Why no need to identify the
writer? Because the values and views expressed were what was important, and these were open for
discussion for further review and revision. The texts, as part o f the writing community, became part o f the
communicative authority and identity o f the course as well.
12
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Yet, troubling, and injurious things were written, especially in matters o f race, in some o f the
anonymous writing in one o f my courses. The only sense o f accountability and responsibility I could
generate was to explore the roots o f such fear and loathing—not to "out" the identities o f the writers, but to
address the problem o f racism there and now, in the presence o f young racists and young empathists, to let
them hear what the effects o f their writing could mean to someone of color, or to someone o f their own
color who did or didn't share their view. The ethos was pressurized and poignant. It was not therapy
without therapy as m y anonymous antagonists would have it; it was therapy transgressing the Prohibited
zone; dissensus and consensus politics in close contact. The distance of the anonymous writer from his/her
direct identification with his/her writing was compensated for by the embodied, face-to-face experience of
response—o f being a listener to oneself as other. Everybody spoke when I asked: "So what do you think of
this person's racial views?" Nobody was ever silent in response to anonymous writing.
By contrast, it is not at all clear that this letter from my colleagues parodying the sexually
"transgressive" reputation o f two major authors by trafficking in their name recognition had any
communicative ethos in mind. The intention was to shock me into silence; humiliate m e into a halfway
place between repentance and recrimination. They succeeded until I found a way to turn their excitable
speech into an opportunity to examine its place in a much larger spectrum o f anonymous expression. It is
just another exhibit now in a case that is not about deciding for or against the anonymous function. The
problem with anonymity is that one must be both for and against it—for it is as vexing as some forms of
group identity, o f unquestioned authority, or perfectly prescribed standards o f community.
Lessons from Doing Things With Anonvmitv.
Taken together, what these anecdotes should suggest to my readers is that anonymity is itself a mass
medium that converges our aspirations and suspicions about the health and sickness, the freedom and
oppression, within the discourses o f a founding rhetorical identity (the Subject), o f historical origin
(Authority), and o f some sense o f universal mediation (Community.) In this introductory, anecdotal
approach to sketching out an idea of what anonymity does as a speech act—whose rhetorical absence
amounts to a transdiscursive presence—my readers should recognize its vexing structure and function.
Whether deviant and regressive, developmental and progressive, or divisive and transgressive, it would
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seem that anonymity’s equivocal relation to identity and community, together with its ambivalent relation
to authority, is traceable to its unique capacity for transgression (literally, “to cross over”).
I f there is a single pragmatic concept that could be said to capture what it is that anonymity performs
in relation to the discourses o f community, identity, and authority, then it would be this action o f
transgression as a “crossing over.” But together with the idea and actuality o f crossing over and between, I
argue for another key concept, that is, I think, related to transgression (as both a violation and as a vehicle
o f discourse). I am thinking o f the notion o f a “contact zone.” As we will see the, this concept has a brief
but rich and complex history, extending from the writings o f Bakhtin into those o f Mary Louise Pratt and
on into the field o f composition-rhetoric where a host o f teacher-researchers have appropriated the term.
If anonymity can be said to be a site o f resistance as well as re-vision, that it upholds both energies,
allowing for their ‘transgression,” (both healthy and unhealthy in Plato’s original sense), then it can surely
also be thought o f as an ultimate zone o f contact for engaging or imagining a range of positions and
compositions of what it means to be a Self among one’ others and an Other among one’s selves.
If the meanings and actions o f identity (self-sameness), authority (increase), and community (common,
unofficial) can be said to operate as zones of contact, and if anonymity has a role in each o f these as
discourses, then the idea o f an anonymous contact zone must be composed o f discursive elements and
arranged in communicatively rational ways which we need to better understand. In Section HI. I will the
summarize the composition o f anonymity as a matrix of phenomenological, discursive, hermeneutic,
rhetorical, and pedagogical lines which cross and curve into the contours o f a zone o f contact I will come
to nominate as the anonymous Junction.
Outline O f Chapters
Chapter Oner Toward a Phenomenology o f Anonvmitv.
This opening chapter assumes that Plato’s argument against Nominalism as an unhealthy state o f reality is
essentially correct, though for reasons that have nothing to do with Truth or Being. It aims to uncover the
post-philosophical function o f anonymity and set it squarely down as a founding (but generally invisible
and unknown)discourse which enables us to consider what we mean by Identity as an impossible both/and
phenomenon o f inter- and intra-subjective life. Anonymity informs or prescribes a felt, unified,
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translinguistic, sense o f Self, as well as a fluid, parasitical sense o f performance scripted by whatever
discursive event o r context we find our ‘selves’ experiencing.
In this chapter, because I believe no theory o f anonymity makes sense without invoking

the

dominant discourse o f Identity, I highlight the discourse o f Personal Identity and Identity Politics in
terms of inter- and intra-subjectivity to shed some insight on the nameless nature o f the self and its
shifting functions in private and public identity performances. After drawing counsel from social theorists
(Brubaker and Cooper) who find that the range o f personal and political agency granted to ‘Identity’ makes
it practically an inert, insupportable lifeworld structure, the logic I play out is that anonymity informs our
sense of identification o f others in both the psychic and social realms. Though I can’t ever come to the
rescue of identity’s disoriented and dystopic fate, anonymity, I argue, has always rocked Identity’s
stubborn discursive delusion o f self-sameness.^
My concern with a theory o f Anonymity as intersubjective with Identity in this opening chapter comes
from its sources out o f Husserl’s “phenomenological” conception o f “the lifeworld.” From Plato to Kant,
philosophy can be roughly reduced to a concern with the “noumenon” (thing in itself) and “phenomenon”
(“mental appearance”). We have seen from Plato that names were not considered noumenal, but were
instead unstable, untrustworthy constructions o f the mind. Names— and by extension all words— could tell
us about things in themselves, but not really show us their truth in being.
Husserl, and the tradition o f phenomenology he helped to inaugurate, was interested in bridging this
artificial separation o f thing-word, body-mind, and by intersubjective extension, self-other, by accounting
for the lifeworld and its (im)mediate embodiments. Alfred Schutz was an associate o f Husserl’s who
became interested in phenomenological questions and wrote several treatises on social meaning in the
lifeworld. His texts are riddled with references to the “mediated” and “anonymous” nature o f social
phenomena. One o f his American students, Maurice Natanson, identifies this continuous reference to the
presence o f anonymity in social relations and wrote a treatise: Anonymity : The Philosophy o f A lfred
Schutz.
My purpose and goal in this chapter is to closely read and summarize the work o f Schutz and Natanson
(which covers the last half o f 20th century thinking directly devoted to anonymity as a phenomenon) and
redescribe it for the purpose o f contending that anonymity is a noumenal function— a thing in itself—that
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informs the appearance and passage o f all social phenomena. Anonymity—I contend—troubles the
founding discourses of what we mean phenomenally by Identity, Authority, and Community precisely
because it is a thing in itself which our Nominalist tradition cannot—or cares not to—acknowledge
precisely because it is the name o f what unnames or is unnamed.
Chapter One is therefore a rough, but ready, background against which we will come to understand
Foucault’s outline o f Language as a continuously circulating, expanding “universe o f discourse.” (That is,
language as Nominalism in the largest, systemic or structural sense is universal —“one turning”— within
which discourse —“utterly running around”—functions in a pervasive anonymity.) In order to get to
Foucault’s view o f discourse (the subject o f Chapter Two), I take Schutz’s social— objectively inter
subjective—view o f anonymity and show how Natanson, his student, tried (but ultimately failed) to extend
that view to a personal, private—intra-subjective—view o f anonymity’s function.
Natanson fails primarily because his training in phenomenology prevents him from fully following the
psychoanalytical lead his private view o f anonymity requires.^ Natanson, succeeds, however, in making a
major case out o f Schutz’s minor reference to the problem o f “enclaves”: that they represent a major point
o f entry for considering anonymity as an equally intra-subjective aspect o f imagination—of imagining
otherness. If we are to really understand the imaginative “composition” o f anonymity, (which, as we will
see, is anticipated in the inquiry E.M. Forster makes into anonymity ), the functional similarity of
enclaves to contact zones can not go unnoticed. (That is, the phenomenological sense we take away from
‘enclaves” becomes more noumenological—and therefore rhetorical, connecting the subject positions of
speaker, spoken, and audience with their textual counterparts.)
Chapter Two: Toward a Discourse o f Anonvmitv.
Where Chapter One builds the case for a theory o f anonymity by emphasizing its “phenomenological” or
passing appearance within and across the immediate relations o f identity, Chapter Two emphasizes the
“noumenal” effects o f anonymity, as a discursive thing in itself within and across identity’s mediated
relations through language. The slippage or transgression o f meaning between these chapters-on identity as
anonymously embodied and then as anonymously unfolded—is unavoidable given the impossible work the
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term and discourse o f identity must always perform as both an inutterable, yet essential sense o f Self, and
as a continuously scripted and performed sense o f an Other among all Others.
Chapter Two builds on Chapter One’s critique o f identity as an indeterminable psycho-social chaos of
private endearments and public enjambments by closely reading Foucault’s early text, “The Discourse on
Language.” I attempt to theorize this circular question o f Anonymity’s (Public) Identity versus Identity’s
(Personal) Anonymity by placing it within Foucault’s essay, “The Discourse on Language.” I contend that
the discourse on language has ignored the “presence” o f anonymity because it troubles its three formative
philosophical assumptions: the idea o f a founding subject, (the Discourse o f Identity), the idea o f an
originating experience, (the Discourse o f Authority), and the idea o f universal mediation (the Discourse of
Community).
I adapt Derrida’s ideas about signature, event, and discursive context to develop the first principle of
the anonymous function. Namely, that the / o f the subject as writer —even under the regime o f the proper
name—is essentially anonymous. The sense o f Identity between subjectivity and writing— o f their being
“selfsame”— is an illusory “presence” supplemented by the energy of anonymity’s nominal

“absence”

circulating the discourses o f community, identity, and authority.
In building up anonymity’s discursive concentration (since it seems to be “diluted” in our general sense
of discourse), I also suggest how Foucault owes an equal debt to Blanchot, a theorist whose influence he
acknowledges much later in his career. I then gather up the terms, “anonymous” and “anonymity” (few and
far between as they are) and suggest how these show up in a few commentators who make up part of
Foucault’s vast post-structuralist wake.
The point o f all this gleaning is to connect the pervasive anonymity in the Schutz/Natanson account of
any individual’s life activity—in his or her I/Thou; We/They orientations—to the function o f language
activity at large. I f the discourse of identity, (ultimately the belief in a Transcendental Subject), is
overloaded with ambiguous meanings and orientations, then I try to make the case that anonymity has very
much to do with identity’s (Subjectivity’s) problematic trajectories in what is (used to be) the language of
BEING and what is always the Becoming o f language. Chapter Two sets the stage for understanding the
two other fundamental assumptions which found the discourse o f language: a faith in an spoken/written
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Origin (The Word) and the hope for its Universal Mediation. I, not Foucault, correlate these three founding
discourses to the problem o f Identity, Authority, and Community.
Having connected the tunnel started via phenomenological anonymity on one side o f the collapsing
mountain of Being with the tunnel o f anonymous discourse theory on the other, I propose in Chapter two
three principles that reflect the functional interdependence o f Identity, Authority, and Community that has
not been recognized heretofore as the common light—or darkness visible—o f the anonymous function.
I have constructed these principles from my understanding o f Schutz, Natanson, Foucault, Forster, and
Bakhtin. These principles run forward from a given subjective self-consciousness into the depth and
distance of language at large, and back, through all time and space. They speak the voices in our heads, and
underwrite all texts accumulating, circulating, disappearing through history.
Principle One: The / o f the writing Subject—even under the sign o f the proper name—is
essentially anonymous because the act o f writing makes the writer endlessly absent from
his or her own writing. This states the anonymous function o f identity.
Principle Two: That an Origin can not be determined from reading, and "originality" can
not be ascribed to those whom we all read, (a.k.a. authors who remain writers, merely
writers, as Bakhtin has it.) A reader’s experience o f the writer, (never mind the writer’s
name), disappears in the act o f reading. The Subject position o f the reader—equally
anonymous to the writer in the act o f writing—endlessly disappears into the written as it
is read. Rhetorical indifference, the motive and consequence o f anonymity in its purest,
healthiest condition, extends to the indiscriminate, proliferative acts o f writing and of
reading, making the text as much the destination, as the origin, o f Nobody—and
therefore o f Everybody. This states the anonymous function o f Author-ity.
Principle Three: Following Foucault's definition o f Universal mediation—"when all
things come eventually to take the form o f discourse,... then all [will] be able to return to
the silent interiority o f self-consciousness" (157)-the I o f self-consciousness cannot be
founded upon the experience o f an originating subject, but must give itself up as the
intersubjective shifter o f a discursive Other that is, according to Principle One and
Principle Two, a function o f anonymous Identity and Authority. This principle therefore
projects the anonymous function o f Community.
The totalization o f anonymity implied by these principles— its virtual hegemony over the interiority
and exteriority o f all language consciousness —will not be taken seriously by any one who refuses to
consider the vulnerability o f Nominalism and its hegemony in the processes o f identity, authority, and
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community. Ail names and naming have their proper function. They may in fact be the vastest generative
idea ever conceived. The problem is: Who conceived them? When? How? I try to set up the possibility that
any useful answer to those questions must look toward a discourse o f anonymity.
Chapter Three: Toward a History o f Anonvmitv.
In this chapter, I show how the meaning and action o f "authority" as a discourse is as vexed as that o f
'identity.' I rely mainly on the work o f Thomas Docherty for this critique. I then move to a consideration
o f Foucault's early essay "What is an Author?" where he suggests the possibility o f an anonymous function
by opening with Beckett's absent character, who asks in Texts fo r Nothing: What matters who's speaking?
I closely read this essay, extracting and concentrating the presence o f anonymity by adding the solvent o f
my strong reading to Foucault's careful establishment o f the author-fiinction as being nevertheless an
unstable regime whose trace elements are anonymous.
Between the textual evidence gathered here and in his treatment o f discourse in the previous chapter, I
conclude that Foucault is really treating the anonymity o f discourse and the anonymous identity o f the
author-fimction within it. I surmise that he does not wish to bring in the influence o f Maurice Blanchot
lest he tip Foucault's nostalgia for a founding structure o f Presence in the function o f the author into
nihilism. Foucault does however conclude the essay by imagining all discourse unfolding in a pervasive
anonymity.
Along the way o f closely reading this essay, I summarize the various aspects o f the author-fimction and
show how they can function negatively (in the photographic sense) to help us picture the anonymous
function in three representative texts from ancient literature: The O ld Testament; The Epic o f Gilgamesh;
The Odyssey. The problem o f author-ity in these texts is double: not only is the determination o f a sole,
unitary author impossible, but anecdotes within the texts themselves point to the problems—and solutions—
that being unknown, because unnamed, present. I draw these anecdotes through two inter-animating levels
o f anonymity. The “overt” level o f the anonymous is itself composed o f two intersecting lines o f inquiry.
On the front line we have texts in which the identity o f an original author is unknown (as in The New
Testament.) Behind this bright line o f the pure “Anonymous” is the more dotted line o f traditional
attribution (as in The Odyssey.)
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I ultimately use the themes and theses o f the author-fimction as set forth by Foucault to exert a triple
sense o f anonymity's pervasive functionality. By repeating the epigraph from Beckett at the end o f his
treatise on the author, and summarizing it as "a rhetorical indifference," Foucault leaves an opening for me
to construct a Rhetoric of Anonymity. My overall purpose in this chapter is to demonstrate how
anonymity has always informed the arrangements and constructions o f authority, specifically the “author
function,” whose inherent instability subverts its capacity as a “nomination barrier.” 4 On the other side of
author-ity’s nomination barrier lies the “no man’s land” —or everyone’s story— o f what I am contending is
the anonymous function.
Chapter Four: Toward a Rhetoric o f Anonvmitv.
This chapter links rhetoric—the basic art o f linking a speaker with what's been spoken to a listener—back to
the problem o f Universal Mediation as the third founding discourse o f BEING. As w ith the chapters on
identity and authority, I use several commentators on community to demonstrate the contested nature of
the concept. I draw first on a compositionist, Vandenberg, whose review o f the meaning o f "discourse
community" vacillates between the concreteness o f the latter and the abstraction o f the former. It seems
they need each other to mean much o f anything.
I then turn to a political philosopher (Mason) who finds community is deeply contested in its
emancipatory sense, causing a fault line between its ideal meaning and normative meaning, which is not
contested, he argues. By contrast, a sociologist o f journalism (Stamm), finds levels to communitystructure, tie, and process, that would seem to destabilize Mason's claim that the normative sense of
community is uncontested.
I then bring Blanchot back in, and reflect briefly on his The Unavowable Community and his argument
that there is "an absence in the center" o f what we mean by it. Taking these together, I then turn to
Bakhtin's notion o f a "contact zone" and trace its aesthetic, special conception o f a listener—listening to an
author's "character zones"—into composition-rhetoric's reception of the term. My intention is to link up the
problem o f community as a discourse with the problem o f a contact zone. I see the two as essentially the
same, except that community is too large for a rhetoric, whereas contact zone is too localized and proximal
for a discourse.
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Once I work these local and global lines o f contact, I make the case that a rhetoric o f anonymity is a
contact zone at the very center o f what we mean—or think we mean—by community. If there are "faultlines"
(Miller) in the contact zone o f community, o f discourse, and o f a discourse community, these are due, in
significant part, to the rhetorical transgression o f anonymity which crosses over the disconnection o f the
speaker (writer) and the spoken (written) to place the listener/reader in an exclusive relation to the
spoken/written.
Anonymity is already a zone o f contact for the academic discourse community at large in the form o f the
anonymous performance evaluation. I argue that this contact zone, which appears to transgress the norms o f
rhetorical relation, is actually essential to maintaining them. It behooves us therefore, to experiment further
with a rhetoric o f anonymity by introducing its transgressions o f writer, text, and reader into the main
compositional lines o f the writing course. Toward this end, Teaching to Transgress: Education as the
Practice o f Freedom contains three essays—’’Essentialism and Experience,” “Eros, Eroticism, and the
Pedagogical Process,” and especially, “Building a Teaching Community”—that enabled me to imagine the
use o f anonymous composition within a Bakhtinian-driven theory o f pedagogical possibility.
Also in the late work o f Mikhail Bakhtin, are some reflections on the author, the writer, and the which
“superaddressee" contain a curious coinage—"transgredience”—which I use and adapt as a speculative lens on
my own curricular and pedagogical experiments with anonymity and identity politics. As I read Bakhtin’s
coinage, the separate ingredients o f expressivism and expositionism, so called, together with his almost
mystical belief in a superaddressee, point up the poignancy o f what I am calling the anonymous function.^
The argument is that anonymity serves as a rhetorical transgredient in all our assumptions about the
writer’s identity, authority, and community. Gloria Watkins, whose own engagement with the anonymous
function is reflected in the fact that she publishes under the pseudonym bell hooks.
Though her calls for risk taking and vulnerability do not approach anything like an anonymous
pedagogy, one can see the logic o f it in her pedagogical exhortations. Her sense o f transgression and
Bakhtin's sense of "transgredience" are brought together to suggest that a rhetoric of anonymity activates
the speech of Nobody —a super-addressee, which transcends our traditional ideas of who we are really
writing to, and what for. If not for, or to, an author-ity, if not for, or to, our self-identity, than the audience
o f anonymous writing is a sense o f community that has yet to come about because it never will. This
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makes writing an act o f yearning, a mask we place upon the audience that may not be there, but we make it
be there by othering ourselves in writing.
This sense o f transgressive othering, of communing, without the offices o f authorship or o f a stable
identity, returns us to the contact zone o f composition whose fault lines lie, in my simplified binary, along
the expressivist logics o f self-discovery, autonomy, and authenticity as suggested by Murray, Elbow, and
Macrorie. The alignment o f expressivism with an essentialist unitary self (witting and unwitting) poses it,
in abstract terms, against the alignment of a social constructionist approach to teaching writing in which
the self will more or less perform

according the discourses it is introduced to. Thus, give students

authoritative guidelines—accomplished authors to read, “good” writers to model from, and they will
identify with those authoritative ways o f being and becoming writers themselves. Thus, Bizzell,
Bartholomae, and recently, Alan France represent the social constructionist approach.
Clearly, teachers mix and match heuristics from both approaches; there are very few either/or
practitioners o f composition-rhetoric. But if we are to teach students and ourselves as teachers to transgress
the fault lines in our contact zones for composition, we need to risk what anonymity m ay provide: the
expression o f private views and values that have obvious social implications, ideologies that are already
and always being constructed freely by academic authorities for their non-pedagogical (out of
classroom)discourse communities. Anonymous composition, if properly trained on the contact zone
between autobiographical and academic material, will reveal the fault lines in falsely separating private
from public senses o f what's academically appropriate. As both contact zone and fault line, anonymous
writing amounts to a rhetoric o f composition's split within itself.
Thus, for example, whatever our students really believe about what happens in their classes is-or
should be—taken seriously by the entire academic community in a close review o f anonymous performance
evaluations. It is very likely, I suspect, that such evaluations go unread by the vast majority of
departmental discourse communities, and often go unread by instructor’s themselves. The expressive and
socially constructive potential o f this particular contact zone is rhetorically and pedagogically, under
imagined, if not, arguably, wasted. But if anonymous writing were made a permanent part o f the
composition course, o f all courses, regardless o f content, a new kind o f zone

o f contact and discursive

context for academic "community" might be established.
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Chapter Five: Toward A Pedagogy o f Anonymity.
This final chapter analyzes 25 pieces o f anonymous writing (from a total o f 33) on issues o f gender and
sexuality from an advanced course in composition I taught at The University o f New Hampshire in 1994. It
then analyzes 10 documents on race identity (from a total o f 40 documents) in a freshman course on race,
gender, and class identity that I taught the following semester, in 1995.
My preliminary findings suggest that the use o f anonymity in composition places expressivist and
social constructionist ideals into a zone o f contact. Further, in shielding identity, it does not destroy, but
expands a sense o f community by projecting a sense o f otherness on the part o f writers. Moreover, the
sense o f audience that emerges from anonymous writing is a complex awareness—not o f the instructor
(since the writing cannot be graded); not o f one's fellow writers, since they know this writing will be the
property o f all under discussion; the audience is Nobody in particular—an intersubjective merger o f self and
others.
Where does this sense o f audience come from? From deep down in the personality, as Forster tells us.
His brief essay, “On Anonymity”, argues the question o f whether writing should be signed. He ends the
essay with a “plea for something m ore vital: imagination.... [For] there are no names down there, no
personality as we understand personality.” This link between anonymity and imagination serves as a kind
o f silver backing for my reflections on anonymity’s historical composition o f an awareness o f audience.
How does the anonymous writer imagine his/her audience? The attempt is to “mirror” anonymity’s
imagination across a broad, but necessarily limited, spectrum o f literary anecdote. I then try to pick up this
anonymous—audit imagination—(Bakhtin’s “special conception of the listener”) and make it come into the
anonymous community o f the composition course devoted to the expression and construction o f identity
politics.
Under anonymity, perhaps, college writers find themselves forgetting—and regretting— themselves just
long enough to attempt the same rhetorical indifference that makes us forget the name o f the author we are
reading, involved as we are with character or idea, attitude or argument. And the audience o f students’
anonymous writing—which is themselves— doesn’t need to forget the name o f who's writing; the focus on
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what's written proceeds immediately. This double sense o f rhetorical indifference, in which writer and
reader disappear, and only the writing emerges, becomes its own kind o f audience. It is tantamount, I
believe, what Bakhtin calls the "super-receiver."
Perhaps because the writers in their non-identity are fieed from worrying about the authority o f who is
listening/reading, since everyone is, they can simultaneously conceive and receive the community in voices
that sometimes yearn for, and spum, the founding discourses o f identity, authority, and community. There
is a spectrum o f empathy to antipathy running through these anonymous writings. In this chapter, I do not
make the outsized claim that anonymous writing is a new communally Utopian contact zone where
universal mediation takes place in some new unhindered, expansive way. I do, however, trace something of
what hooks discerns in calling for teaching vulnerability toward the practice of freedom. To do that we
have to be willing to transgress some of the boundaries that composition-rhetoric leaves in place out of
inertia, apathy, or fear o f the unknown—or the yet to be named.
Conclusion to the Introduction.
Having outlined the theoretical, historical, rhetorical, and pedagogical case for anonymity as a hybrid,
opportunistic, pervasive action in our lifeworld that can be best understood by pairing it with more
dominant terms such as Identity, and Authority, I personally believe that it is Composition’s Community
o f Anonymity that is primary. Thus, the collective legacy o f expressivism as handed down from Donald
Murray (“discovery”), Ken Macrorie (“authenticity”), and Peter Elbow (“autonomy”) can also be understood
in triadic relations similar to anonymity’s discursive transposition across the “asymmetric opposites” of
community, identity, and authority.
It is my contention that the use o f anonymous writing in the “personal plus textual” approach to
teaching composition bridges what many would have us believe are opposing banks o f the river that is
college composition. ^ I contend that anonymous writing is a “bridging” discourse not only because it
spans often untenable distinctions between (and assumptions about) private and public composition.
Anonymous writing ultimately enables students to “cross over” (again, to literally transgress) some not so
hard and fast genre boundaries o f exposition and narration.
The difference between personal expression as a discursive starting point and academic exposition as the
final destination always returns to how teachers ask students to question who they are really composing
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for. It is this issue o f disclosure and reception that underwrites what anonymity can do as a rhetorical
situation in which a writer’s subject position and the position o f writing as a subject become, in Bakhtin’s
words, “a double voiced discourse.”
Far from addressing a rhetorical void, the voice o f the anonymous writer in my courses (which focus on
the composition o f gender, sexuality, race, and other issues o f identity politics) echoes Forster’s sense that
anonymity enables imaginative—more public and civic—possibilities of expression. I extend his suggestion
that there is no personal identity under the condition o f anonymity— the nomination barrier having been
transgressed.
I propose, therefore, the thtird principle o f the anonymous function. Anonymous writing helps mediate
between equally universal disxursive claims: personal narrative and academic exposition share the same
equivocal, ambivalent pronoun shifter—”1.” It is neither subjective nor objective, but projective o f an inter
subjective imagination whose sense lies in the composition o f a discourse community.
My case for anonymity as a pedagogical and rhetorical resource that has been misperceived or actively
avoided because o f its transgressive power lives or dies in the anecdotes o f students’ anonymous writing I
analyze. A different discourse o f community emerges—one that reflects and intensifies the expressivist credo
o f Discovery-Authenticity-Au-tonomy—when anonymity becomes part o f normal composition pedagogy.
That is a truth claim that is fragile in the free o f what w e normally assume about the power o f the proper
name and the legitimacy whicti attaches to the signature as shorthand for an Identity Authorizing itself for a
Community.
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NOTES TO INTRODIJCTTON
* Who Speaks fo r Plato: Studies in Platonic Anonymity an edited book o f essays, covers problems of
Socrates’ identity and Plato’s absent authorial voice. Theslef argues the “often forgotten fact” that “Plato’s
Socrates is never a real ’’authority” and that he “felt himself to be a new Socrates, continuing the search his
Master had begun. I f so, his personal anonymity is...easily explicable”(59). W est reviews the “mouthpiece
theory” that would have Socrates, the Master, speak for the Disciple, Plato. “I f one adopts this interpretive
method, the problem o f Plato’s anonymity is resolved” (101). West, however, is not convinced. Two
scholars, writing on the same issue o f Plato’s authority open up the equivocal, contested ground of that
authority’s identity crisis, as it were. If an AUTHOR such as Plato functions anonymously—on what
Foucault has called a “transdiscursive” level—then the discursive relation o f anonymity to community,
identity, and authority cannot be ignored.
2 In arguing thus, I try hard not to make o f anonymity a post-structuralist or post-humanist hobby horse. It
is far more “original” than those critiques would have us believe. Frankly, it is undecidable whether
anonymity functions as the metaphorical rider o f Identity or is that rocking horse’s runners. The hobby
horse itself is really language itself as an endless metonymic function, My Derridean play with anonymity
as Identity’s other, displacing and standing for Identity when its dominant position in a binary relation that
is language itself, collapses, enabling the suppressed, subordinate term, Anonymity, some brief sense of
precedence or succession, is part o f the hidden origin, not post-structuralist destination, o f language.
3

The scope o f this dissertation prevents me, too, from extending Natanson’s psychoanalytical (as opposed
to a transcendental) clue to the anonymous function. That clue would have us follow the
phenomenological work o f Merleau-Ponty on the embodied character o f all discourse—“the flesh o f the
world.” It would have us jump o ff into certain “corporeal” and “linguistic” feminists such as Gross and
Butler who owe much to the Lacan-inspired psychoanalytical feminism o f Kristeva and her American
followers. Thus, my reader might sense some degree of “disembodiment” because o f my determination to
first trace the male dominated origins o f the anonymous function. If so, then it is because at this point in
my project, I do not understand how to incorporate the inutterably feminist presence of, and influence on,
what one must ultimately come to m ean by the anonymous function. Namely, we know the subject/abject
positions o f Woman as Body— in the representative containment o f all her choreographic (“dancer’s
writing”), pornographic (“prostitute’s writing”) positions as womb space, mother-love, home-fire, genius
nurse, whore-void. These are at the center o f what it means to be Anonymous, because Woman as Mind
was erased from the discourse o f Author-ity in all its philosophical, historical, literary, and legal discursive
turns for so long. If I ever turn this dissertation into a book, the incorporation o f the imperative/problem:
“Woman thy Name is Anonymous” and the feminist question/solution: “Am I that Name?” will be
addressed. No true—authoritative and authentic—Composition o f the anonymous function would ignore
the name/unnaming o f more than one half o f our discoursing universe.
4

“Nomination barrier” is from David Beck’s The Discipleship Paradigm: Readers and Anonymous
Characters in the Fourth Gospel. He also cites and adapts Patrick Docherty’s theory o f “absent character.”
Given his proximity to my subject and thesis, it would normally make sense for me to incorporate Beck
more directly in my approach to a history o f anonymity. That I discovered his work after digesting
Docherty’s ideas leads me instead to give precedence to our common adaptation o f Docherty’s absent
character motif. The notion o f a “nomination barrier” is essential, especially given my ambition to explain
anonymity from a perspective much wider than Beck’s. Beck’s approach to linking anonymous
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characterization with readerly identification to Docherty’s “absent” character theory comes at the very
beginning of his study.
The absence o f a name can enhance a reader’s potential for identifying with a character in
a narrative. The lack o f a name removes the nomination barrier [emphasis added] that
distinguishes the character from other characters and from the reader. The inducement to
identity with a character occurs when anonymity combines with other elements of
characterization, including a progressive unveiling o f the character which is both positive
and consistent (1-2).
Beck’s “discipleship paradigm” applies, o f course, to Holger and West’s counterfactual questionings of
Platonic anonymity. I argue that anonymity animates a larger trans-discursive complex of community,
identity, and authority across all rhetorical situations, including the composition classroom.
I do apply Beck’s notion o f a nomination barrier to historical anecdotes o f anonymous authority. It will
be most useful in Chapter Five’s account of what happens when an expressivist approach to composition
pedagogy concludes that anonymity can be a useful way to test and otherwise transgress the nomination
barriers which normally stand between students and their instructors.
^That Bakhtin hid his own authorship through collective ghostwriting in the face o f Stalinist repression is
more than coincidental to his reflections on a transgredient contact zone where the discourse o f nobody,
alone in discourse, is nevertheless “populated” with the voices o f others—(perhaps a transcendental return
to an anonymous origin, o f what we imagine to be Other as Author-itative (more toward Authoritarian)
Discourse. Uncannily, in “Toward a Pedagogy o f Anonymity,” we witness one student addressing God to
rescue him/her from racialized Others.
^The phrase “personal plus textual essay” and its suggestions o f Bakhtinian hybridity comes from an essay
by Gordon Harvey in College English titled “Presence in the Essay.” Harvey counsels a purist approach to
teaching the genre o f the essay, and refers to my sense o f an expressive-expositional hybrid as
“Frankenstinian discourse.” Given my notion o f the anonymous function, it is significant that Shelley’s
evermore humanly present “monster” remains anonymous, yet his transgressions o f community, identity,
and authority are commonly confused with his creator, the rather more “absenf ’ character of Dr. Victor
Frankenstein. Chapter Five will look skirt the idea o f anonymous expressivism as a hopeful monster. It
is also significant, that after my presentation o f an anonymous pedagogy to my colleagues, one
sniffingly—and again erroneously— dismissed my ideas o f textually named and unnamed discourse
merging in the composition o f the writing course as it does in the greater course o f the lifeworld itself as
“a Frankenstein.”
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CHAPTER ONF-

TOWARD A PHENOMENOLOGY OF ANONYMITY

Locating Anonvmitv within the Dilution of'Identity'
"Identity" is what Kenneth Burke might call a "god-term." As a founding structure o f all philosophical
discourse, it can be imagined as the supreme being o f both metaphysical analysis and epistemological
application. Thousands o f years o f "Western" and "Eastern" thinking are invested in, and represented by,
this single term. It becomes an automatic fall back point, a portmanteau concept, everyone claims, yet no
one can really carry off. It is so massively packed, spilling over with "hard" won political facts, but also
with "soft" philosophical parades o f what Derrida has termed "the Metaphysics o f Presence."
The word literally means "the same, sameness," and it naturally connotes the sense o f self-sameness—or
permanence— any individual feels, or believes he or she can feel, even as the body changes, ages, fades.
This makes personal "identity" a function o f memory, o f remembering, o f autobiographical stability—that
one can identify a history—tell a life story. Our roughly remembered sense o f self-sameness—being the hero
or heroine o f our experience in the world over a given lifetime—creates voice(s), conscientiousness, an
intra-subjective independence that is nevertheless dependent on the self-same suppositions o f Others,
making, therefore, inter-subjectivity possible, inevitable, and the penultimate condition between natality
and mortality. Thus, "identity" must do the work o f phenomenological or lived experience: it is a concrete,
embodied practice. It must also do the work o f what Burke has called "logological or languaged experience:
it is an abstraction, the point of, and part of, all analysis.
The problem o f the essence and the existence o f Identity fascinated both Descartes and Hume. Their
introspective analyses—and those of many philosophers in between and after them—represent a kind of
historical parentheses that amount to a modem tradition o f general skepticism that belies a deep anxiety
about Identity which endures in the present epoch o f "post-humanist" and "social constructivist" analysis.
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In a fine overview o f the “problem” o f Identity, Douglas Kellner captures the (post) modem anxiety about
identity as a lived experience and as an academic catch-all for radically incommensurate notions o f its
meaning and action.
...[0]ne is caught up in so many different, sometimes conflicting, roles that one no
longer knows who one is. In these ways, identity in m odernity becomes increasingly
problematical and the issue o f identity itself becomes a problem. Indeed, only in a
society anxious about identity could the problems o f personal identity, or self-identity, or
identity crises, arise and be subject to worry and debate. Theories o f self-identity
(Kierkegaard, Nietzsche, Heidegger. Sartre) are often anxious concerning the fragility o f
identity and analyze in detail those experiences and social forces which undermine and
threaten personal identity Thus, in modernity, the problem o f identity consisted in how
we constitute, perceive, interpret, and present our se lf to ourselves and to others. As
noted, for some theorists, identity is a discovery and affirmation o f an innate essence that
determines what I am, while for others identity is a construct and a creation from
available social roles and material. Contemporary postmodern thought has by and large
rejected the essentialist and rationalist notion of identity and builds on the constructivist
notion which it in turn problematizes (Kellner, 144).1
In their 2000 article "Beyond "identity," social analysts Brubaker and Cooper sum up the 'problem' o f
identity in a legitimate, yet typically cranky appeal to academic precision. Identity becomes a ‘problem’
because it can’t possibly do the double—and ever re-doubling— work that four centuries o f essentialist to
constructivist statement and counter-statement have authorized it to do.
We argue that the prevailing constructivist stance on identity—the attempt to "soften" the
term, to acquit it o f the charge o f "essentialism" by stipulating that identities are
constructed, fluid, and multiple—leaves us without a rationale for talking about
"identities" at all and ill-equipped to examine the "hard" dynamics and essentialist
claims o f contem porary identity politics. "Soft" constructivism allows putative
"identities" to proliferate. But as they proliferate, the term loses its analytical purchase. If
identity is everywhere, [then] it is nowhere (1).
In their final suggestion o f syllogistic reasoning whose conclusion points to a useless Utopianism for
Identity, I perceive that the problematic o f Identity is a function o f anonymity. Identity is everywhere—a
discursive mesh o f sensual and textual bodies always in play. Everyone—any one—has claims to identity.
Yet no one of us can nominate Identity as an unambiguous category o f either autobiographical or analytical
practice. Amidst the proliferation and diffusion o f identity talk, claims, crises, politics, I see the discourse o f
anonymity, the suppressed, unreified Other o f Identity and its equally diffuse predication, Identification,
with its legal and psychoanalytical meanings. Because I believe it is both a suppressed and pre-possessive
term in the discourse o f Identity, I can grant metonymic, or dynamically substitutive energy, to anonymity.
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My argument, in theoretical terms, is that no "...one can analyze "identity-talk" and "identity-politics"
without, as analysts, positing the existence o f {anonymities}" (Brubaker and Cooper, 5). I have, given my
premises, elided the author's use o f "identities" and substituted anonymities to suggest that it is not an
antonym o f identity (or o f other contested and congested god-terms such as "authority" or "community"). In
more poetic terms, (with apologies to Blake), my argument for anonymity is that it is the invisible metonym
that flies through our nominalist nights o f practice, o f analysis. It founds—and finds out—the uneasy
amalgams o f w hat we employ to mean and mean to employ, and unnames us somewhere—nowhere—
between rage and remembrance, sorrow and joy.
The 'problem' o f identity is its multiple groundings, it continuous academic grindings (to the point o f
becoming ground down) into anonymities o f individuality and collectivity, o f sameness and difference, o f
the solitary and o f solidarity, o f the self as core and as cover, o f the essential and the performative. In
contending with Craig Calhoun's Social Theory and the Politics o f Identity, Brubaker and Cooper quote him
in order to agree with his baseline assumption o f our universal identification in a collectively nominalist
consciousness. But our common Identity as Namers effectively unnames—anonymizes—Identity. And
therein lies the rub that I dub the anonymous function.
It is certainly true that "[we] know o f no people without names, no languages or cultures
in which some manner o f distinctions between se lf and other, we and they, are not
made." But it is not clear why this implies the ubiquity o f identity, unless w e dilute
"identity" to the point o f designating all practices involving naming and self-other
distinctions (13-14).
I am making neither a "hard" or "soft" case for the ubiquitous function o f anonymity in the problem o f
identity. It is self-evident that anonymity dilutes identity as both a category o f phenomenological practice
and programmatic analysis. A ll phenomenological practices involving naming and therefore, self-other
distinctions, are <ie-signated by the structural and functional orientations o f an anonymous lifeworld where
identity has become so overburdened as to be incapable o f naming our inter-subjective orientations. In
order to make that case—endlessly open and shut—I turn to Alfred Schutz, a philosopher o f the social
whom Brubaker and Cooper would have done well to incorporate in their call to move "beyond identity."
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A Phenomenology o f Inter-Suhiective Anonvmitv
The first phenomenological account o f anonymity may be traced to Alfred Schutz. Influenced by Edmund
Husserl's work on the meaning and structure o f the human sciences, Schutz wanted to extend Husserl's
lifew orld concept (a concept often accompanied by the word "anonymous" Habermas' and Giddens'
reworkings o f Husserl). His goal was to understand "[t]he everyday life world [which] is...fundamentally
intersubjective; it is a social world" (Schutz, 16). Exiled by the Nazis, Schutz lived in the United States
where, before his death in 1959. He influenced many social theorists including Habermas, Giddens, and
Talcot Parsons. The Structures o f the Lifeworld, which his student, Thomas Luckmann completed in 1973
from Schutz's notes, crystallizes and clarifies the philosophical discourse o f Identity—the Self-Other
Relation— as it has obscurely trickled down from Hegel through Heidegger. In addition, one can find in
Schutz the merger o f a philosophical and anthropological humanism which Buber popularized in his "IThou" relation (a treatment which also influenced Bakhtin, and to which he returned at the end o f his life.)
Chapter Two o f The Structures o f the Lifew orld —titled "The Stratifications o f the Lifeworld"—lays out
what I see as the basic phenomenological relation o f anonymity to the fundamental intersubjectivity of the
lifeworld. My summary o f this relation is not definitive. It is meant to confirm and codify the total
presence o f anonymity—from relations o f "I" to "You" to "We" to "They"—so that we might better
understand the Discourse o f Identity as beholden to a theory—or what remains to be seen, about
Anonymity.
This section o f The Structures o f the Lifeworld also contains an interesting reference to "finite provinces
o f meaning" and their essential incompatibility with, or irreducibility to, one another without some kind
"...of a "leap" (in Kierkegaard's sense)" (24). This existential leap is "...accompanied by a shock experience
that is brought about by the radical alteration o f the tension o f consciousness" (24). According to Schutz,
though the everyday lifeworlds o f Home, Work, Church, State are relatively finite provinces o f meaning,
we "traverse a whole series o f such provinces." In such, "[t]here are just as many shock experiences as
there are finite provinces of meaning able to receive the accent o f reality through changes o f attitude" (24).
Schutz provides a footnote to this passing mention o f "finite provinces o f meaning" and their attendant
"shock experiences" that speculates on "the problem of "enclaves" and the necessity o f " a reflective
attitude"—presumably to deal with the shock o f leaping between lifeworld provinces (24).
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Maurice Natanson, a student o f Schutz, seizes o n this notion o f "enclaves" to develop a thesis that
anonymity operates in the overlap (or perhaps overleap) o f intersubjective meaning. We will look at what
he calls "passion in the enclave" so as to complete the theory o f anonymity as one that remains, if not
always attended to or "seen" in both inter-subjective and intra-subjective provinces o f the lifeworld. (Why
this is important to establish will become clear ortce we enter the "lifeworld" o f the composition classroom
in Chapter Five, "A Pedagogy o f Anonymity.")
Schutz is interested to "stratify" the lived, and generally taken as granted, sense o f having an inter
subjective, social Identity according to the basic positionalities o f the Self in relation to Other Selves.
Accordingly, he moves from the immediate experience o f self-consciousness to the less, but still relatively
immediate experience o f the Other. He does this through a reworking o f the I/Thou relation into a series o f
more highly "mediated" "orientations" toward the "We" and the "They" with some suggestion o f the "It" or
totally Other relation o f Cosmos, God—whatever one's sense o f the Unnamable might be. This is a
phenomenological, and therefore, classically categorical, treatment o f these levels o f Identity. M y only
goal is to suggest to the reader the pervasive role that anonymity plays in Schutz's systematic explanation
o f lifeworld orientation.
Schutz reminds us that "[a]ll experience o f social reality is founded on the fundamental axiom positing
the existence o f other beings "like me" (61). He then distinguishes how this fundamental identification o f
some one Other than one's S elf is "arranged according to various levels o f proximity, depth, and anonymity
in lived experience (61, emphasis added). In Schultz's distillation o f the discourse o f Identity (o f the "self
same," the "like me" tendency o f consciousness), it turns out that "anonymity" is one o f the "structures in
which the social world becomes built up in experience" (61). Anonymity quickly and pervasively becomes
a factor once "the face-to-face situation...the only social situation characterized by temporal and spatial
immediacy" is set as a phenomenological baseline. It would not seem so, of course, until we attend to
Schutz's stratifications o f the Self/Other situation.
Since attention to the s e lf is a phenomenological given, the social situation presupposes "that I turn my
attention to the Other" (62). This turning o f the S e lf and its internal community outward, as it were, "is a
universal form in which the Other is experienced "in person" "(62.) Succinctly, the "I" experiences a "thouorientation." It is a personal, essentially "unilateral" orientation that is itself subtly nuanced and articulated
in terms o f alienation and intimacy within the spatio-temporal proximity of the situation. I f the Other
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attends to my "I" than the orientation is, o f course "reciprocal." That is, "...a social relation becomes
constituted" which Schutz designates the "we-relation." Schutz is careful to rem ind his reader that there is
no "pure" Thou or We relation. Both are "...actualized only in various stages o f concrete apprehension and
typification o f the Other" (63). At the same time, once the immediate, intimate sense o f Self has been
reoriented to the social world, the apprehension and typification o f the Other is always "mediated" (63).
O f course, as long as there is a face-to-face orientation, what Schutz is calling the " "pure" we-relation,
which is constituted in a reciprocal thou-orientation" (64), is immediate, but there are "gradations o f
immediacy" (65). He looks into these gradations o f one's "fellow man" [s/c] 67 in the examples o f lovers,
kin, various kinds o f friends, and acquaintances. He sees that "[t]he mirroring o f se lf in the experience o f
the stranger (more exactly, in my grasp o f the Other's experience o f me) [which] is a constitutive element
o f the we-relation" (67). These gradations o f immediacy—in what amounts to a reciprocal attempt at self
recognition—are eventually mediated, as w e will see, by gradations o f anonymity. "In general,' [however] it
is...in the we-relation that the intersubjectivity o f the life-world is developed and continually confirmed"
(68).
What I read as an intimation o f anonymity's function in the inter-subjectivity o f the lifeworld, Schutz
concludes consideration o f the we-relation in this way: "The lifeworld is not m y private world nor your
private world, nor yours and mine added together, but rather the world o f our common experience (68). I
insist that that common experience—or sense o f community, immediate or otherwise— is beholden to
anonymity. This sense emerges, I believe, in the often unconsidered interstices or borderlands that Schutz
appears to be alluding to in the always and already anonymous Otherness of this "Our" orientation. In this
already anonymous orientation the "...differences in the immediacy o f my [your, our, their] experience o f
the Other already stand out" (69).
This brings Schutz to a consideration not o f immediate others, but to "...the transitions o f living werelations to social relations between contemporaries" (73). Thus "The more w e approach the latter, [i.e.
"contemporaries] the smaller is the degree o f immediacy and the higher the degree o f anonymity
characterizing my experience o f the Other" (73). (It will be of interest to the reader to note here, early on,
that Schutz’s equation of anonymity with lack o f "immediacy" is logical, even natural, in strict definitional
terms o f the social. A different logic is operative in the psychosocial terrain o f the teaching situation, and
in the complex rhetorical passions that inhabit the "enclaves" of reading texts and writing them.)
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In a subsection o f the "Stratifications" chapter titled "

The contemporary as type and the they-

orientation," Schutz begins a ten page stretch o f analysis that comprises another subsection titled "The
levels o f anonymity in the social world." "Contemporaries" are not in bodily time and space but in "world
time" (74) which we know through experience, knowledge, and "...the help o f various lifeworldly
idealizations" (74). The relation between "idealization" and "anonymization" becomes critical for Schutz's
thesis. (The reader can look forward to accepting or rejecting my sense that it is a relation equally crucial
in a pedagogy o f anonymity.) "Idealization" is a complex term, but it appears to be equivalent to what he
means by "typification"—how we must necessarily "type" Others—even intimate Others—according various
constraints o f language and knowledge. Thus, "[i]n contrast to the way I grasp the conscious life o f a
fellow-man, [s/c] the experiences o f mere contemporaries \a.k.a. "they-relations"] appear to me as more or
less anonymous events" (75).
We have, then, a large reservoir of "...typical knowledge concerning typical processes" in the social
world (75). We have a generalized sense o f otherness at this level o f the social. In "...whose consciousness
[do] these typical processes transpire" is open question o f "idealization": "the idealizations o f "and so
forth" and "again and again," that is, assumptions o f typical anonymous repeatability" (76). We are all
familiar with, but generally, do not bother to reflect on the typical anonymous repeatability o f self/other
identification in the series o f situations that constitute our everyday lifeworlds.
These become, in effect, "objective meaning-contexts"; and the more these "replace subjective-meaning
contexts, the more anonymous will be the reference point o f [our] they-orientation" (76). This is where
"typification" sets in and not only informs, but largely founds our "stock o f knowledge" about the world
(77). The fluidity and positionality o f subjective and objective meaning contexts is obvious, on selfreflection. Each o f us is aware that we can zoom in or out o f the I/Thou/We orientation into a theyorientation, depending on the situation involving "contemporaries." (Schutz uses the example o f a card
game in which some individuals are known to each other, others are new to the game. The game o f cards
itself is a highly typified, objective context Intimacy and anonymity wind and weave throughout the inter
subjective meaning contexts within the orientation toward the objective context o f a card game as played
by anyone, everyone—all contemporaries in world-time as it were, past, present, future, never.
Schutz opens the subsection, "The levels o f anonymity in the social world" this way: "The foundational
moment o f the they-orientation is that one imagines the Other, whose existence is assumed or suspected, as
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a reference point o f typical virtues, characteristics, etc" (79). It is this act o f imagination—or "idealization"-that links up with what he is calling "anonymization." That is, "...the world o f contemporaries is stratified
according to levels o f anonymity" (80). We imaginatively realize the Other through acts o f idealization
and/or demonization (though Schutz doesn't break down idealization along this line o f binaric typification.)
For Schutz, "[t]he most important variable [in this act o f imagining the Other] is the degree o f
anonymity”; and he sees "[t]he anonymity o f a typification [as] inversely proportional to its fullness of
content" (80). Thus, "[t]he sooner I can immediately experience the typical characteristics o f "someone"
as properties o f a fellow-man, [j i c ] as components o f his conscious life, the less anonymous is the
typification in question" (81). In effect, we have a sliding, eliding continuum o f otherness always and
already operative throughout our inter-subjective social rounds o f being and becoming. His nominative
examples o f anonymous typification include: "citizen o f the world," "leftist intellectual liberal,"
"combatant," "American" " (81). It is easy to add to this list, so easy in fact, that I (-Thou) begin to imagine
a "mobius strip" construct or "double-helix" contour prescribing the codes o f linguistic consciousness
itself: nominalizing and anonymizing at once.
In this subsection Schutz takes us through various "individualized types" that shade and adumbrate
themselves away from a "friend." Thus what he calls "personal types " are constructed and projected on the
basis o f " "people like X" " (82). These are not just "anyone", since they orbit our personal stock o f past
and immediate experience with a host o f intimate others. (Presumably, a favorite author, or more
accurately, an author's created character, can assume this status o f a personal type, as we will see in
Chapter Two in our treatment of the anonymous author function.)
Several steps beyond these personalized gradations (what I think of, following Bakhtin, as
"transgredient" and therefore rhetorically transgressive moments o f personal identity and identification),
are "the functionary type"-, "...typifications which closely approach pure behavioral types and which have
already reached a higher degree of anonymity"2 (82). Schutz uses the example o f the "postal employee"
who delivers our personal correspondence day to day. Both these types remain highly "individualized"—
they are still relatively "close to lived experience" compared to "[t]ypifications o f so-called social
collectives..." (83). Based on his descriptions, these types cover, in my own experience, the YMCA, the
Salvation Army, the U.S. Congress. These are still "...built on individualized functionary types or even
personal types" (82) which we can recast in terms o f a "we-orientation."
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Finally, according to Schutz, we get to typifications "...like "

the state," " the economy," " the social

classes," etc, they are completely unamenable to conversion into the living reality" (83) of reciprocal
Self/Other orientations. These typifications are ''[hjighly anonymous Objective-meaning contexts and
behavior-contexts" and constitute what social theorists o f many stripes—from Althusser to Foucault—
"ideological apparatuses" or "regimes o f truth." Writing a decade before the onset o f "post-structural"
conceptions o f Identity, Schutz sees these highly anonymous contexts o f identification as being
"...embodied in symbols that operate by instituting communities, ...in which these symbols become takenfor granted data o f the social and cultural world into which the individual is bom" (84).
The term "typification" becomes a crucial conceptual axis upon which Schutz turns and returns to the
anonymity and "anonymization" o f the lifeworld. My overview o f anonymity's phenomenology according
to Schutz is intended to suggest its functional range across a bewildering number o f situations just beyond
the pale of an immediate face-to-face orientation. Anonymity, it would seem, is not only a typically social
stratification. It also typifies nearly every inter-subjective situation outside o f family, friendship, certain
collaborative relations, and lovemaking. It may, in fact, function in these more "immediate" orientations,
as well, as we will begin to trace in Natanson’s development o f the enclave, below.
We can roughly conclude from Schutz that the essential sociality o f subjective experience is idealized
and is, to a greater or lesser extent, objectified across a highly nuanced spectrum o f intensely private—
"immediate"—to highly public—"mediated"— "provinces" or "enclaves" o f meaningful orientation. The
arrangement o f these meaningful forms o f orientation is accompanied by "prescribed levels o f anonymity";
therefore, to understand the social formation and meaning o f subjective experience, we cannot discount nor
disavow the function o f anonymity.
In the final chapter o f Schutz's study, (titled "Knowledge and Society"). Schutz provides a
compositional cue (or maybe a clue) to his notion o f anonymity as "prescribed." My tendency toward the
idealization of anonymization leads me to take the term o f p re scrip tio n in that literal way which doubles
back into symbolization. Anonymity is w ritten on the wind o f discourse itself. Discourse is at once social
and anonymous, centripedal and centrifugal, as Bakhtin has it. The whole o f utterance, o f language, is an
inter-subjective (dis) orientation o f naming and self/other distinctions that move beyond any congested and
contested holding term like "Identity." Given that the object o f my inquiry is anonymous writing and the
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composition o f identity politics, it is fortuitous that Schutz provides one example from writing and one
from self/other identification to suggest the range o f anonymity's rhetorical and attitudinal (im)mediacies.
Thus, for example, the fullness o f symptoms in which the Other is given diminishes,
according to whether one is concerned with the exchange of letters, with news which is
obtained through a third person, etc. In order to illustrate the variations in anonym ity, we
need only think o f the difference between the exchange of letters between two married
people and a business letter, or a last will and testament which refers to later generations,
stock transactions, judicial decrees, etc.
.... Social attitudes can be related, on the one hand, to a concrete individual ("my
absent father"), or also to different degrees o f anonymous social groups, roles,
institutions, social objectivations, etc. (aversion to lawyers, fear o f the police, respect for
the Ten Commandments, preference for Italian, etc) (253, emphasis added).
In the first example, Schutz is running a gauntlet familiar to any teacher o f composition—or to any one who
must be aware o f "audience." To make students aware o f the general importance o f audience, to help them
discover the genre conventions that virtually prescribe particular kinds o f addressivity, I have used an
exercise from rhetorician Ross Winterowd that provokes a range of "variation" sim ilar to what Schutz
describes. The subject is money. The problem is that the graduating student needs some. The object is to
write a letter that will best insure a solution to this problem. The assignment is to write three letters: one to
the student's parent or parents; one to a "best," but long lost, friend from grade school who always had
money; and one to a loan institution.
The resulting letters invariably demonstrate variations in familiarity—o f a sense o f identity, o f authority,
o f community—that are clearly coextensive with Schutz's "variations in anonymity." Though not written
anonymously, the letters do point to the inevitable sense o f an anonymous "To Whom It May Concern" the
farther one traces the implications o f the rhetorical directive, "Consider Your Audience."
The second example from Schutz conforms to my epistemological interests as a teacher o f composition.
Students write properly named personal narratives on their immediate sense and source o f personal identity
(as in Schutz's "my absent father"), and gradually "relate" these compositions to larger, more anonymous,
socially constructed, "groups, roles, objectivations" through academic research. At the same time, writing
as an anonymous community, the fullness o f symptoms in which the Other is given replenishes or
diminishes students' nam ed discourse of identity according to how they exchange and extend the personal,
textual, attitudinal, and social anonymity already suggested in their nominally identified compositions.
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Making anonymity a worthwhile rhetorical phenomenon in composition pedagogy requires that teachers
stress the inter- part o f intersubjectivity and intertextuality. Understanding the inter requires that teachers
make the case for the same sort o f Kiekergaardian "leap" between the private and public that Schutz
describes as happening between discrete provinces o f m eaning—betw een lifeworlds. The "shock
experience" which accompanies this leap, according to Schutz, is evident, as we will see in some o f the
anonymous writing, but cannot be adequately conveyed except in the face-to-face, "we" relation o f named
students confronting the "they-relation" o f their own anonymous writing. Some o f the writing might be
thought o f as outresubjective or outretextual—o f mere "shock value." That possibility is part o f a
legitimately "critical pedagogy" in which leaps and risks—transgressions— must be undertaken between
expressivist and constructionist "enclaves."
Before we can reflect on anonymity as a pedagogical phenomenon, however, there is a need to extend
Schutz's phenomenological account o f anonymity from the intersubjective, into the intra-subjective. Even
in my cursory outline and overview o f Schutz's treatise on the function o f anonymity in the structures o f the
lifeworld, the reader can begin to understand why one of his students, Maurice Natanson, might nominate
its function in the "enclave" as worthy o f a separate phenomenological investigation.
A Phenomenology o f Tntra-Subjective Anonvmitv
Maurice Natanson has determined that the Ieit m otif of Schutz's work was anonymity, and has written a
book titled Anonymity: A Study in the Philosophy o f Alfred Schutz, which is one o f many books published
under Studies in Phenomenology and Existential Philosophy series. In his introduction Natanson tells us
that he is "convinced that anonymity provides what Husserl called "a transcendental clue" to the
understanding of Schutz's philosophy o f the social world. Our task is the tracing o f that clue" (22).
Schutz's central insight about anonymity is its apparent "social" discontinuity with regard to the voice(s)
in our heads that we identify as subjectivity or personal identity. Anonymity for Schutz is a social, not a
psychic, operation. We are not strangers to ourselves, only estranged by the sheer phenomenological
otherness o f the situational array outside our personally embodied space. (One can begin to see Schutz’s
foundational importance to the phenomenology o f Merleau-Ponty, whose approach to anonymity we cannot
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follow up in these pages.) To confirm this, Natanson quotes fromt one o f Schutz’s earlier books Life Forms
and Meaning Structure
[W]hen we speak o f subjective meaning in the social world, we are referring to the
constituting processes in the consciousness o f persoms who produced that which is
objectively meaningful. We are therefore referring to th e ir "intended meaning," whether
they themselves are aware of these constituting processes or not. The world o f subjective
meaning is therefore never anonymous, for it is essentially only something dependent
upon and still within the operating intentionality o f an ZEgo-consciousness, my own or
someone else's (22 emphasis added).
In other words, what can never be anonymous is the inner c u rv e o f the "I-you" dialog we use in making
sense to ourselves—for ourselves, a ME like no Other. This is the narrative o f personal identity reserved in
our heads. It is that lifelong internal monologue which Bakhtin, ass we shall see, was interested to explain in
terms of a "dialogical imagination." Anonymity only takes hold- in inter- subjective, not intra-subjective
relations. We don’t m ask our identities from our selves, according rto Schutz.

3

Shutz's insight is consistent with Blanchot's insight about the winter’s identity disappearing in the act o f
writing, since subjective meaning has left the head and its self-reflection and entered the fascination o f the
page. Anonymity is structured in broad social, not deep personal, life. Natanson basically thematizes and
over-determines Schutz's stance on the subjective to m ake some basic but generally overlooked
phenomenological facts about the anonymity o f everyday life. A n extended passage from Natanson is
worthwhile at this point. It summarizes and authorizes what I educed from Schutz's stratified approach to
anonymity as a Iifeworld structure.
For the m ost part, anonymity is not considered by moost o f us in daily life to be a
desirable condition or circumstance. Who "most o f us" are is one o f the philosophical
aspects o f the problem o f anonymity... (23).
Most o f us must settle for knowing a small number o f p*eople, for knowing about a
larger circle o f fellow humans, and for being aware o tf multitudes who are and will
remain anonymous. This is the normal state o f affairs. /And if it is "normal" that m ost
individuals are anonymous to most other individuals, them it is evident that anonymity is
a standard feature o f everyday life, anonymity is part o f tlfae structure o f the social world.
...[Ajnonymity is an invariant feature o f an existence liv e d in the taken-for-granted terms
of ordinary life. What is implied by this taken-for-graantedness is the reciprocity o f
anonymity: I am anonymous to most Others ju st as most O thers are anonymous to me....
In any case, there is no difficulty in understanding whait it means for someone to be
treated as a number by the bureaucracy, to be looked at a s though you weren't there, to
have nobody interested in you, to be a perpetual strangerr, not to belong—anywhere. The
experience o f anonymity is widespread, if not commo-nplace; the concern with that
experience—its thematization, in phenomenological terms—is not an integral part o f daily
life (24-25).

39

R e p ro d u c e d with perm ission of the copyright owner. Further reproduction prohibited without permission.

Obviously, my concern with the experience o f anonymity is to thematize it and make it an integral part o f
composition's daily pedagogical life. Since it is an integral part o f the social structure o f the lifeworld
(including that o f academia), m y concern is with how it prescribes the agency o f self/other relations in
composition pedagogy. As both a theorist o f discourse, and as a teacher in composition-rhetoric, my
interest is in the double nature o f anonymity that Natanson elaborates from Schutz's work. We have already
noted the reciprocity o f anonymity that makes it a standard feature o f social life. In this phenomenological—
taken-as-granted— kind o f anonymity, there is a an autonomy, a freedom, that gives (inter)subjectivity its
hermetic seal and social security—its selfsameness, its identity, as I have argued in Section I.
But there is also the anonymous experience that Natanson tells us usually carries our common sense of
anonymity as wholly negative—the kind o f Kafkaesque depersonalization and alienation that no first name
basis can overcome. This essentially existential (versus the reciprocally social) experience o f anonymity
carries a sense o f unfreedom, and in binary relation to a positive sense o f self-identity, projects a negative
charge o f (In)Different Otherness.
With this great binary tension o f SelfrOther in its ambit, it is less o f a stretch to understand the total
"dialectical" (more toward "dialogical") reverberations o f anonymity. And though we are still sketching out
what I consider a "background anonymity," I am hopeful that the reader can intuit something o f what I
mean by anonymity's figure or character as represented in the "reciprocity" or inter-subjectivity o f
anonymous writing in a college composition class.
As I understand the theory and practice o f what has come to be known in composition-rhetoric studies
as "expressivism," it is not about personal narratives for the performance o f Self only. At its most
expressive—most social and political—the expressivist approach is dedicated to the expression o f an Other.
And the reciprocal—and "negative"—powers of anonymity can aid and abet this expressive goal. Just as no
composition of philosophy according to Schutz and thematized by Natanson can ignore the double edge o f
anonymity, neither can a philosophy o f composition, in my view, ignore what the Natanson extracts from
his mentor to call the "enclaves" o f anonymity. It is to these I will now turn before concluding this
particular subsection on anonymity's background.
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Schutz develops his concept o f "enclaves"—shorthand for "provinces o f meaning" from his
understanding o f Sarte's theory o f the Other (which, by my lights, was appropriated by Lacan, Bakhtin, and
a host o f other "critical" theorists). Natanson seizes on enclaves—which he defines as "phenomena of
intersubjectivity." He then attempts a more detailed description than the footnoted asides o f Schutz.
Within the course o f daily life, enclaves are more often than not "inhabited by Others....
You and I share some region of work, family relationship, avocation, past history, which
is our intersection in the world, not only unshared by, but unknown to, Others (96).
Simply understood, I think Natanson is speaking o f "the private realm." We all have our private, intimate
relations, real or imagined. Since every one senses privacy, the collective sense o f individual claims to
privacy points to a public domain in an ideal sense—a community o f subjectivity. The crucial link between
anonymity and the sense and maintenance o f personal, private identity gives anonymity a social, public
identification. Anonymity is the "open secret" o f inter-subjectivity.
Natanson seems to be distinguishing between intimate and generalized Others, or Strangers, within "the
paramount reality" o f the anonymous social world. This is a double overlap o f intimacies with certain
known Others, and the reciprocal recognition o f anonymity with Others in general. Natanson concludes that
when it comes to understanding the firewall between intimate and generalized otherness there is a
"temptation...to concentrate on intimacies, on private features o f the individual's life: hidden religious or
sexual activity, for example" (96). But if we are to understand enclaves, such intimacies prevent their
status as "a more vital, a more nearly structural aspect o f the social world" (96).
He returns to trying to define what an enclave is by telling us what it is not. "It might be thought that
formal alliances—marriage, friendship, business partnerships [and he later includes academic departments]-might automatically establish enclaves; they do not" (110). The reason they do not is because i f anything
"intimately shared in such relationships" does "not cross the boundaries of the finite province in which they
are held"—if, in other words, their secrets don't secrete, they are something else. The moment the privacies
o f different provinces are conjoined, an enclave is entered" (110). At this point "enclaves" seem to both rely
upon and deny the privacies o f self-identity.
Natanson's conclusion about enclaves subverts one o f his mentor's central contentions that "The world
of subjective meaning is...never anonymous, for it is essentially only something dependent upon and still
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within the operating intentionality o f an Ego-consciousness, my own or someone else’s." There is
something "objective" about the condition and operation of anonymity. Its meaning is, at a minimum "intersubjective." But Natanson contends that
[wjhat lies within the enclave, from an egological standpoint, includes an intensity of
experience concerning several provinces o f meaning, a remembered, anticipated,
imagined, or fantasized state o f affairs in which only the aspect o f experience relevant to
the enclave is attended to while the rest--an immense remainder—is not only set at a
distance but is apperceived as anonymous.... A glimpse of "otherness" is provided within
such a conception o f the enclave (110-112, emphasis added).
Natanson had initially defined enclaves from something like a "sociological" standpoint—"the more familiar
state o f affairs in which the individual knows Others only through the enclaves formed by the taking of
social roles" (112). This makes sense, given Schutz's attention to the socially structured character of the
kinds o f anonymity with which Natanson begins his study.
Why he shifts to an almost psychoanalytic take on enclaves is part o f a larger problem for philosophers
who consider themselves phenomenologists, who have split the difference between epistemology and
ontology and are caught on the horns o f the dilemma o f Identity as blurred emergencies of external and
internal Identification. That problem we cannot address here.

4

Our inquiry involves the "immense

remainder" o f Self identity (reminiscent o f Freud's "repressed elements" that Lacan says are "structured
like a language"). Does Self-identity have any access to, or is it accessed by, the "immense remainder" of
the world and its anonymously social otherness? Remember that he defined the enclave as: "The moment
the privacies of different provinces are conjoined, an enclave is entered."
That definition appears to effectively eliminate the pedestrian, emancipatory reciprocity o f Self/Other
anonymity; it points to the widespread experience o f repressive anonymization. In other words, the
possibility o f self-identity depends on an immense anonymous remainder that is distanced from the
immediate needs of that continued identification. Its presence is not only an immense remainder; it is a
reminder—a glimpse of one's own otherness. Thus, (and I am connecting disparate elements that Natanson
can't or won't), "...what is distanced from the [egological] enclave intimates an altogether different realm,
one in which truncation o f possibility signifies the recognition o f anonymity no longer as a mode of
abstraction but as otherness" (112). We are reminded here o f Brubaker's and Cooper's irritation over
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Identity's claim to abstract as well as practical categories. Otherness becomes a practice in the enclave. The
glimpse o f otherness provided by such "a conception o f the enclave" "is to be distinguished from the more
familiar state o f affairs in which the individual knows Others only through the enclaves formed by the
taking o f social roles." (These, as we have seen, include the commonplace anonym ity known as
reciprocity).
Let's try to summarize Natanson's summary o f Schutz's original conception o f anonymity—that it is an
abstraction we use upon the social world and its commonplace otherness to the self, an abstraction that
permits homogenous or typified recognitions that make for a generalized intersubjective behavior that is
essentially anonymous. Natanson argues that his teacher has made an important point about how human
beings tend to customize—to "typify"—reality with its capacity for uncertainty, chaos, accident. The way
we do this is to purify the continuous confusions o f perception and action through an act o f self-protective
reflection or typification. Schutz, once again, describes it this way. “ In the typifying synthesis of
recognition I perform an act o f anonymization in which I abstract the lived experience from its setting
within the stream o f consciousness and thereby render it impersonal” (Natanson 114).
There are any number o f (stereo)typical situations that demonstrate the presence o f anonymity. Schutz
was apparently not given to examples, according to Natanson, though I have found some, as we have
already witnessed. As Natanson tells us, Schutz used the word "anonymous"
to...replace the time-bound, circumstance-determined, situated particulars o f individual
existence.... Thus: the greater the purity, [as if intersubjectivity exists apart from its
relational and situational particulars] the greater the anonymity. In this way, [for Schutz}
typification generates sameness (114).
Conformity, typification, sameness (the etymological meaning o f identity) are wrapped up in Schutz's
conception o f anonymity; it is how he displays the structure o f social life in its generalized "impersonal"
character. This description follows from one o f anonymity's synonyms—"non-descript." And there is a kind
of rightness to what he was pointing to. When all is going according to plan, whether at a train station, at an
assembly plant, or in a classroom, "...the more standardized the prevailing action pattern is, the more
anonymous it is, the greater the subjective chance o f conformity and, therewith, o f the success of
intersubjective behavior" (In Natanson, 113).
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Nantanson's departure from his mentor pivots on, as we have seen, anonymity as a lived experience of
de-personalization, in contrast to the typical background reciprocity o f im-personalization. His detour into
the imaginative—intra-subjective— realm is an attempt, I think, to challenge one o f Schutz's opening
assertions that subjectivity, the meaning w e make from and for the continuance o f selfsameness, is never
anonymous. This challenge depends not upon sameness but upon difference, in turning a reciprocal logic of
identity into a disjunctive one o f otherness. Natanson seems to be saying that anonymity runs down into the
selfs glimpse o f its own otherness as well as out into the social. He assures us that his teacher has
performed a useful analysis o f anonymity based on a "dialectic o f common sense." But when we come to
the end o f that dialectic, (which we quickly must when we countenance actual situations o f
intersubjectivity), we come to "the beginning o f that more primordial meaning o f anonymity which we
have called "otherness" " (114).
The otherness o f anonymity, the enclaves it inhabits and interprets, may be said to dilute, even confute,
the discourse o f Identity. On the other hand, Natanson's intra-subjective take on anonymity helps us re
name self-other distinctions through the unnaming o f our "identities" which are "first intimated by [their]
passion in the enclave which anonym ity provides." However, we have now before us a few
phenomenological suppositions. There is the hard and fast categorization o f Identity as a politics of
idealizing an "Us" and demonizing, or at least, reducing the humanity o f a "Them." W e have lived practices
in which subjectivity requires a vast distancing o f others (both within and without a given self), "origin and
passion [are] taken from [others], [and] the anonymized Other continues to be a human "otherwise" " (115).
This typification o f an anonymous Otherwise, in both idealized and demonized term s, shows up, gets
mirrored in the masking operations o f an anonymous pedagogy.
Conclusion to Chapter One
My attempt to retrace the "phenomenological" character o f anonymity through Schutz and Natanson leaves
much to be desired in terms of clarity. If there is one practical theme that stands out from my summary
analyses of Brubaker and Cooper, Schutz and Natanson, it would seem to be that subjective, self-same
Identity, performatively anonymous or not, has an Other-wise orientation which the traditional discourse of
Identity does not account for. It therefore becomes us (so to speak) to see the anonymous identity function
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as a Active possibility for college writers. The Anonymous is a fugitive YOU that a given I —already other
wise—is always ready to discursively intimate in the enclave/community o f We anonymity provides.
Given the passionate enclave an "expressivist" pedagogy should provide, the passion in the enclave
anonymity provides (e.g., cyberspace's chatrooms) could become an intra- and inter-subjective discourse
community. In this zone o f taking social roles, the ambiguity o f secrecy and disclosure creates new
possibilities o f reciprocity that will in turn help us to rethink the relations o f identity in community. Given
the theoretical bent o f this chapter, it is not yet clear what gets rethought in the anonymous enclaves o f a
composition course whose problematic frame if the discourse o f identity itself. Natanson can help us chart
this pedagogical whatness in advance o f actually analyzing students' anonymous writing.
Although it is not clear which encounters [of Self/Other] qualify as constitutive in
establishing enclaves, it does seem in the encounter with the Other that, in being "looked
at," in finding m yself as an "object" for the subjectivity o f the Other—as Sartre contends—
a central moment in the becoming of the enclave is revealed: negativity is occasioned by
the "look" o f the Other but experienced in me, the "looked-at," as a "nothing" which is
already the herald o f otherness (116-17).
So then, what has this to do with anonymity, either in the commonsense definition o f a person unnamed,
unidentified, unknown, hidden, invisible, non-descript, or in the two highly nuanced corollaries set forth by
Schutz and nuanced nearly to terminological death by N atanson's attempt at a phenomenological
thematization? According to Natanson (courtesy of Nietzsche, Heidegger, Husserl, Blanchot, among
"others" I would think), the self-looked at (virtually from birth) negates the negation in that gaze, and that
immense remainder o f a selfs "nothing" distances and defends the enclave, makes it possible. And why is
the enclave important to the discourse o f anonymity? Because
[o] thers are permitted access to the enclave in abused form; their unity negated, their
possibilities denied, the work of the enclave accomplished, [then] others have become, at
last, anonymous. And this anonymity holds good for fictive as well as "real" persons. A
grand census o f the enclaves would have to include those who are imagined as well as
those who possess actuality—who have "papers" to establish their identity. It is time for
the credentials o f those who have fictive being to be examined (117).
This theoretical overview o f anonymity as a phenomenological discourse in its own right is a truncated
attempt at a grand census o f anonymity's discursive enclaves. My reader can reasonably conclude, however,
that anonymity does have a clear role in the lived realities—both psychological and social—o f everyone's
identity. The idea o f "enclaves"—their private/public equivocation—stands or falls on understanding the
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reach o f "inter-subjectivity" and its origin in an alter-able, fictive sense o f the otherness prescribed by the
discourse o f anonymity. It is a discourse that prescribes the problematic and overburdened enclaves o f
Identity itself.
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Chapter Notes
1

The work o f Erving Goffinan, a so-called "symbolic interactionist," remains useful for its peculiar sense
o f skepsis on self-id en tity as a continuously anxious balancing act or performance o f "cynical" and
"sincere" social roles in everyday life." By my lights, Goffinann brings the entire existential problem o f
self-identity into a complex intersubjective performativity o f roles that at times do the work o f masking and
other times o f mirroring the basic intersubjective orientation o f se lf in face-to-face orientations. W hat
happens to personal identity in more mediated situations, such as writing, is not, however, a problem
Goffinann is interested to engage. Ever new “cynical” and “sincere” possibilities for making, masking, and
mirroring one’s “person” through various personae are marketed by a capitalist culture. Captialist role
making is devoted to technologizing personal identity as a reproducible commodity. Such identities become
consumed by the flow o f information exchange and consumption. This is also usefully summed up by
Kellner with Goffinannesque trace elements.
"It is thus claim ed that in PM culture, the subject has disintegrated into a flux o f
euphoric intensities, fragmented and disconnected, and that the decentered postmodern
self no longer experiences anxiety (with hysteria becom ing the typical postmodern
psychic malady) and no longer possesses the depth, substantiality, and coherence that
was the ideal and occasional achievement o f the modem self. Postmodern theorists claim
that subjects have imploded into masses, that a fragmented, disjointed and discontinuous
mode o f experience is a fundamental characteristic o f postmodern culture, o f both its
subjective experiences and texts (144).
Identity today thus becomes a freely chosen game, a theatrical presentation o f the
self, in which one is able to present oneself in a variety o f roles, images, and activities,
relatively unconcerned about shifts, transformations, and dramatic changes....
...This analysis would suggest that what might be called postmodern identity is an
extension o f the freely chosen and multiple identities o f the modem self that accepts and
affirms am unstable and rapidly mutating condition, which was a problem for the
modem self, producing anxiety and identity crisis.... Yet one surmises that there is a shift
of identity formation and that postmodern selves are becoming more multiple, transitory,
and open... (158).
Rather than identity disappearing in a postmodern society, it is merely subject to new
determination and new forces while offering as well new possibilities, styles, models,
and forms. Yet the overwhelming variety o f subject positions for identity, in an affluent
image culture no doubt create highly unstable identities while constantly providing new
openings to restructure one's identity. (174)
The anonymity o f mass culture— that it provides new openings to compose or restructure one’s
identity—has its local counterpart in what I will be arguing in Chapter Five, A Pedagogy o f Anonymous
Composition.
2

The status o f the “functionary type” relates o f course to immediate personal experience. The various
situations o f meeting and talking with all sorts of strangers—from shopping to traveling—inevitably beg the
functionary question of: "W hen do I ask for this Other's nam e, or name myself? "Typically," the
anonymity of my LThou orientation never crosses what one theorist has termed the "nomination barrier." I
find this to be the case even in more supposedly "reciprocal" and proximal situations, such as parents
encountering and recognizing one another over the course o f a year as they pick up their children from pre
school. "Hello" and "Hi" are p ro form a, but these greetings only underscore an anonymous functionary
norm that no one seems aware of, never mind curious about. "Parents" are there to drop off and pick up
their "child" or "children." Our identifications become typified, enabling a level of anonymity that "floats
all boats" as it were. An additional sense of porous yet "incompatible" provinces of meaning between
family and school lifeworlds is that the children o f other parents will refer to me as "Clydajane's Dad" or
"Zoeann's Dad"—demonstrating a blurry, but still bright line between named and anonymized socialization
through functionary encounters.
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3

I will be making m uch o f the obvious function o f anonymity as a masking operation in the history of
literature, and in the practice o f composition. But i f the problem o f identity is its complicity with
anonymity, then anonymity also performs mirroring function. The standard rhetorical anonymity used by
editors o f newspapers in their viewpoint essays is not only meant, for example, to perform a sense of
community in masking the identity o f individual writers, a "common sense" which in turn lends a shared
sense o f authorship and author-ity to its readers. The anonymous editorial page functions even more as a
two way "mirror" for "reflection" on important issues o f the day. This is one o f anonymity's rhetorically
reconstructive powers.
In terms o f understanding its "media [ating]/mirroring power as a discursive danger, I nominate the
increasing appropriation and re-presentation o f familial, fraternal, and other sorts o f filial (com)passion by
visual media with their celebrity performances o f inter-subjective intimacy. We might reasonably conclude
that anonymity is not only a "prescribed" level in the discourse o f Identity and Identification, but one
"postscripted" within the structures o f the simulated Life(less)-World entertained by Baudrillard. (That
anonymization holds both powers and dangers as a structuring discourse is something alluded to by
Foucault, as we shall see.) The anonymity of television—from the discourse o f advertising to its culture of
celebrity—is the primary reason I won't have it in my home; my children's intersubjective lifeworld would
be infected, I believe, in their identification with its parody o f cathartic intimacy.
Similarly, I remember how my first experience with pornographic film in college enabled me to
understand the difference between "making" love and "having" sex; in the former, anonymous inter
subjectivity is not possible. This is one o f the dangers o f the anonymous. Yet, in this connection, there are
legitimate powers o f empathic identification. The film Last Tango in Paris profoundly affected me as a
young man. In retrospect, it was the film's poignant and conflicted sense o f identification in Marlon
Brando's character that sticks with me. Recall that Brando's character refuses to give his name to the young
woman he is having an affair with. When she tries to give him her name, he refuses it—shouts her down.
This intersubjective—erotic— anonymity is contrasted to the scene in which Brando's character is seen
speaking—praying, really -to his dead mother, addressing her by her proper name. His identification with
her is anything but anonymous, and yet her death—her absence—in every sense, but in name, reinforces the
form and meaning o f Schutz's sense o f anonymity.
As we will see, this paradoxical energy of anonymity—its capacity for alienation and intimacy—points to
its power and danger for intersubjective expression and construction o f the Other within the composition
classroom.)
4

The question o f the rightness or usefulness o f psychoanalytic theory as regards this question is o f course
ignored by Schutz. Despite his interest in all "phenomenon," he is a philosopher, after all. As a
philosopher-historian (some have called him a new kind o f "geographer"), Foucault also skates around the
psychosocial implications o f the Prohibited in his historical outline of discourse. But he does acknowledge
the important work o f Freud and Lacan on the question o f subjective meaning in the social world—summed
up in a single word "speech," which often stands in for "discourse" itself. What Schutz is calling subjective
meaning in the social world cleaves close to a Vygotskyean notion o f the speech in our heads. And it is
equivalent to what Foucault is calling first speech, then discourse. And, in the psychoanalytic connection, it
is important to repeat what Focuault does say about such speech or subjective meaning: "[P] sychoanalysis
has already shown us that speech is not merely the medium which manifests—or dissembles—desire; it is
also the object o f desire" (149). Assuming Schutz agrees with this assertion, he would then maintain that
subjective meaning, as the object o f desire, is never anonymous, even though it can be, and often is,
prohibited. The relation between prohibited and anonymous discourse is obvious, according to my
commentary on Foucault. Schutz's student, Natanson, sees this blind spot in his mentor’s conception o f the
anonymous, and tries to exploit it in developing a notion o f the anonymous "enclave" in which there is a
desire for an other, or at least, an otherness, of self-identity—as we will see.
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CHAPTF.R TWO

TOWARD A DISCOURSE OF ANONYMITY

Anonymous Discourse and Post-Structuralism
With the terminological confusion that continues to surround, and very nearly surmount, the usefulness of
"poststructuralism" for anything but its own self-reflexive theorization, it is useful to remember that the
very last sentence o f Foucault's "The Discourse on Language." It plays an interesting role in the term's
gestation, if not its overt appearance. “And now, let those who are weak on vocabulary, let those with little
comprehension of theory call all this—if its appeal is stronger than its meaning for them—structuralism”
(162). As can be predicted from one o f the internal rules o f discourse Foucault laid out, "commentators"
rushed in to infer that Foucault was christening his work, and calling for, a thoroughgoing "poststructuralism." He never, to my knowledge, used or avowed the term "post-structuralist" to describe either
his interests in, or conclusions about, discourse. Still, it is easy to identify him with the discourse o f post
structuralism given the way he distinguishes, for example, the personal author from a collective, historical,
and impersonal "author-fiinction." So to with his distinction between the "subject" (as in a person with a
self-identified sense of subjectivity) and "subject position."
That I have identified what I am calling the anonymous function as playing a critical role in the now
"post-structural" understanding of both the author-fimction and the subject position does not mean that
anonymity is a post-structural development. If I had time and space I would conclusively demonstrate that
anonymity functions transhistorically, across and within all disciplines and discursive functions. If
anything, anonymity is the powder post beetle of post-structuralism, the termite in the White Master's
House o f Nominalism. It is absent, yet powerfully, culminatively present. It is visible historically (the
author function of "Anonymous" is generic yet non-descript), but is invisible rhetorically (with speakerwriter and listener-reader positions exchanged and mediated in largely unrecognized actions upon our senses
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o f identity, authority, and community). Nevertheless, the anonymous functions as a pragmatic, not a
nihilistic, part o f our Iifeworld.
My "commentary" on the anonymous function is authorized by Foucault's early essays "The Discourse
o f Language" and "W hat is an Author?" The research I have done to enable that commentary —wherever
anonymity is named or...metaphorized— has taken me into and across so many commentators repeating
Foucault's findings about discourse that I now understand not only the role o f these published "authors" but
my own role as a writer on anonymity. Foucault's definition o f commentary is, therefore, not post-anything
but takes us past the structural as we think o f it and back to the functional: the function o f repeating, of
saying, o f voicing, o f reciting what we think we hear and believe about what really matters.
[C]ommentary's only role is to say finally, what has silently been articulated deep dow n.
It must...repeat tirelessly what was, nevertheless, never said. The infinite rippling o f
commentary is agitated from within by the dream o f masked repetition: in the distance
there is, perhaps, nothing other than what was there at the point o f departure: simple
recitation (153).
In my (re) search for the function o f anonymity, Foucault's cursory remarks on the discontinuity o f the
philosophy o f the subject and o f discursive subject positions, for example, kept returning as I read in a
"dream o f masked repetition. Take, for example, this passage by Chantal Mouffe in The Return o f the
Political, written 22 years after the appearance o f Foucault's essay. Utterly laced with Foucauldian trace
terms, it assumes its readership takes them as granted, part o f current disciplinary organization, so there is
no need for authorial attribution. "We" is the author, its academic audience, and Foucault the author-ity,
invisible in the anonymous distance o f discourse now considered public/political domain.
We can thus conceive the social agent as constituted by an ensemble o f 'subject
positions’... constructed by a diversity o f discourses among which there is no necessary
relation, but rather a constant movement o f overdetermination and displacement. The
'identity' o f such a multiple and contradictory subject is therefore always contingent and
precarious, temporarily fixed at the intersection o f those subject positions (1993 77).
If this dissertation were an extended bibliographic essay I could extend this "dream o f masked
repetition" almost indefinitely. The "poststructuralist" sentiment/sediment it expresses happens to resonate
with my own theoretical views personally, and with m y general view o f anonymity as a shifting,
positional ensemble o f the discourses o f community, identity, and authority.
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As we will see in "The Pedagogy o f Anonymity," anonymous writing is one o f that "diversity of
discourses" which constructs the subject position o f the college writer. The personal "identity" o f the
college writer is an important part o f expressivist inquiry into the academic relation between writing and
experience. The social constructionist approach to college writing, by contrast, sees the college writer as
"an ensemble o f 'subject positions' " o f which the questions and problems o f 'personal identity' become
irrelevant in the greater project of understanding the issues o f the discursive 'construction' o f the 'ensemble'
that is the "social agent." Anonymous discourse, I will contend, operates at, and even enacts, the
"intersection" o f those academic "subject positions" (personal narration and authorial analysis) among
which the expressivst and constructionist believe "there is no necessary relation."
In the present chapter, however, the goal is to suggest the very necessary relation between a
poststructuralist notion o f discourse and the anonymous function. Poststructuralist discourse references
anonymity and the anonymous—or its superordinate terms, identity, subject, author—in a dream of masked
repetition that my commentary might waken in my readers
The reiteration o f anonymity—both direct and suggested—within poststructuralist discourse might lead
readers to assume that anonymity is partly responsible for subverting humanism's privileged discursive
subject. But even cursory reflection will tell us that the anonymous vastly predates any theory of
personality or individuality, which are themselves no more than five centuries young. As we will see in a
brief history o f the anonymous author function, the idea o f a "personal" author was alien to the social
agency o f textual construction and representation.
While we are on the subject o f personal expression versus social construction, it is important to
remember the conclusions of Ferdinand de Saussure. He was a structuralist who believed that the whole of
language carried a sort of God or Author-like priority: its systemic, "synchronic" presence bears the same
indifference to individual, "diachronic" users as the genetic code does to any one species member. He
privileged the speech function o f language over its writing function, reconfirming in linguistic terms what
Plato had affirmed in philosophical terms over the Sophist's use o f writing. I also think, though, that
Derrida is right about the (dia) chronic need to reverse and play with the dominant speech/subordinate
writing binary opposition, make it into something like a synchronous polarity, a continuum o f self51
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identity into a shifting ensemble o f utterance, a community o f discursive subject positions.) Following
Saussure, the system o f language is anonymous to its users as are the users to the (not their) system.
Following Derrida, the nominalism dictating the structure and function o f the sign system is highly
mutable; in other words, the name o f the signifier is unknown, hidden—anonymous —to the signified and
vice versa.
Following both thinkers, I intuit a double anonymity—a natural, nameless duplicity— operating across
the gaps of an determinate system governing the indeterminate linguistic identity of any one self in relation
with a range o f others. Following, finally, the ethos o f an expressivist (more toward confessivist) approach
to writers and writing, I see the discursive "I" as indispensable, yet anonymous
in relation to the conditions imposed (a) by the code and (b) by the context of
enunciation, in which the speaking subject caught up in discourse is indeed up against it,
so to speak, but still, in a strong sense, operative, [and] still is an indispensable term in
a functionally understood process (Lewis, 7).
To repeat: the speaking/writing "I" subject is still very much operative under the condition o f anonymity,
and is, if such is possible, even more caught up against discourse as a functionally understood process. I
therefore think o f m yself as a Post-structural Romantic, a Social Expressivist, a Personal Textualist. That
is, I agree with the following: "No one has quite managed to extricate philosophic discourse from an
idealist, still essentially Cartesian problematics in which priority ultimately reverts to the mission o f an
individual subject: to secure knowledge o f self and world" (Lewis, 13).
But I also agree with the flip side o f that insight. That is, the order o f that discourse o f self and world
needs

continuous

questioning

and

provocation.

"For

understanding

the

reaction

against

[post]structuralism," according to Lewis, "it is the threat it poses to institutional authority, rather than the
theme of the decentered subject, that is decisive"(21). My theoretical and pedagogical interest in
anonymous discourse derives from a similar decisive understanding. It is capable of interrogating and
subverting both institutional authority and the logic o f centralized identity. Subject positions that might
go un-expressed or un-constructed become part o f the ongoing academic commentary. "The simple
recitation" it performs is not only the writing/reading-speaking/listening process o f whatever composition
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pedagogy one chooses. Anonymous discourse can claim performativity across the entire disciplinary script
of the humanities.
Let's return a moment more to "commentary" as described by Foucault above. Like Chantal MoufFe,
Paul Bove is an unabashed post-structuralist. His debt o f "simple recitation" to Foucault is clear in the
essay, "Discourse," which he wrote for the now ubiquitous reference Critical Terms fo r Literary Study. It
is also clearly useful to me, to my sense o f the anonymous function as having been "articulated deep down
" so that I cannot help but recite and repeat my sense o f its articulated silence, o f darkness visible in our
nominalist need.
In its thinking about discourse...poststructuralism offers us a kind o f nominalism-, all
that exists are discrete historical events, and the propositions or concepts which claim to
tell the truth about them have no reality beyond that acquired by being consistent within
the logic o f the system that makes them possible....[In effect,] [t]he function o f discourse
and the realities it constructs are fundamentally anonymous. This does not mean that no
individuals hold these perspectives nor that no individuals effect them. It means, rather,
that their effective realties depend upon no particular subject in history (Bove 56,
emphasis added).
Bove's unabashed advocacy o f a post-structuralist view does not prevent me from seeing its congruence
with the stubborn Cartesian (and Rousseauesque) insistences o f Philip Lewis, who is far less assured that
there is any thing "post" in poststructuralism. At the risk o f endlessly repeating my thesis, it seems to me
that the discourse o f anonymity is key to closing the circuit between nihilism (problems o f cause,
construction, and conviction) and pragmatism (problems o f "personality, power, and provocation" in
Cornel West's view). The reason it is key is that a discourse o f anonymity can be seen to run parallel to the
explanatory processes o f nominalism (problems o f naming). I have set forth the commonsensical "meaning"
of anonymity and the anonymous as key terms. They are, however, "finally more important for their
function, for their place within intellectual [and social, political, and cultural] practice, than they are for
what they may be said to "mean" in the abstract" (Bove 51).
My aim at a truth claim (or truth effect) for anonymity, therefore, is that it will be seen to be integral to
an endless discursive circulation o f authorities, identities, and communities. The question o f what for, with
what consequences, is the substance this dissertation will try to analyze and understand.
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Anonymous Plav in the Absent Field o f Presence
In "The Discourse on Language" Foucault holds that "[ejxchange and communication are positive forces at
play within complex but restrictive systems" (155). This subsection will extend that teaching to the
discourse o f anonymity.
Within the (unsettled history o f metaphysics, for example, particularly as Derrida has (unsettled it, the
anonymous is clearly at play within the structure and sign "of Being as presence in all senses o f this
word." Though he does not employ the terms "anonymous" or "anonymity" in demonstrating the profound
"absence" behind the various nominees for the "transcendental signified," he might well have. At the
beginning o f "Structure, Sign and Play in the Discourse o f the Human Sciences," he asserts that this
concerted effort to establish and enforce a "metaphysics o f presence" is demonstrated in
all the names related to fundamentals, to principles, or to the center [that they] have
always designated an invariable presence—eidos, arche, telos, energeia, ouisa (essence,
existence, substance, subject) aletheia, transcendentality, consciousness, God, man, and
so forth (84).
It is crucial that we keep the question o f the presence/absence binary as simple as possible when tracing
the relation o f anonymity to what it names or designates. Our purpose in this dissertation is to better
understand the rhetorical, rather than the metaphysical, "presence" anonymity. The apparent absence o f the
subject as designated by a proper name is a worthwhile metaphysical aside, but we are interested to
understand and interpret the anonymous subject at "play" in real rhetorical situations that are between or
beside the points of the history o f its presence/absence. Derrida teaches us that
[p]lay is the disruption o f presence. The presence o f an element is always a signifying
and substitutive reference inscribed in a system o f differences.... Play is always play of
absence and presence, but if it is to be thought radically, play m ust be conceived of
before the alternative o f presence and absence. Being must be conceived as a presence or
absence on the basis o f the possibility o f play and not the other way around" (93).
Following Derrida’s teaching that substitution and supplementarity are the ever-present rule o f language's
(de)termination of actual things and actions signified in absentia, I read the above passage and nominate
anonymity as a worthwhile substitute for, and supplement of, play.
I f it is to be thought radically, anonymity must be understood as the alternative o f presence and
absence. Or if that is too totalizing, anonymity must be considered to be at play within the contest over
who or what is present and/or absent in language, in linguistic self-consciousness and, for that matter, in
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what Gordon Harvey calls the composition o f the "personal plus textual essay." My speculation is that the
"Being" o f anonymity is perfectly and poignantly rhetorical because it "becomes ontological," in DeLuca's
sense. That is, rhetoric and philosophy were unjustly separated in their youth by Plato, and the anonymous
is not only a Sophist's compensation. It is, to adapt DeLuca's sense o f an ontological rhetoric: "the
mobilization o f signs for the articulation of identities, ideologies, consciousness, communities, publics,
cultures" (346). This rhetorical mobilization and ontological affirmation that I see in the condition of
anonymity depends on one's chosen frame of interpretation.
In one final adaptation from Derrida's teaching, I have chosen to interpret the subject o f anonymity and
anonymous subjectivity from the side o f "Nietzschean affirm ation" as opposed to "the saddened, negative.
nostalgic, guilty, Rousseauistic side" o f "the lost or impossible presence o f the absent origin" (93). I have
read both authors, and I believe in Derrida's distinction between their interpretive frames as these affect the
subject o f anonymity's relation to the inter-play o f community, identity, and authority. Nietzschean
affirmation, as Derrida describes it in positively nominal terms, uncannily clings to the anonymity not
only o f animal life, but also to that o f humankind. The mobile, performative, ensemble o f identity is
shifting endlessly, often insensibly, between the subject position o f a first person singular "I" and that of a
first person plural "We."
Derrida describes The Rousseauistic interpretation o f structure, sign, and play this way: "It dreams of
deciphering a truth or an origin which escapes play and the order o f the sign, and which lives the necessity
o f interpretation as an exile...." The Nietzschean dreams or recites another interpretation. It is
[t]he other, which is no longer turned toward the origin, affirms play and tries to pass
beyond man and humanism, the name o f man being the name o f that being who has
dreamed o f full presence, the reassuring foundation, the origin, and the end of play (93).
Taking Derrida at his word, this "other" interpretation is an interpretation o f the other that I believe is the
affirmative order o f anonymity's structure, sign, and play in the discourse o f language. But in order to
understand that claim, we will need to leave Derrida's rhetorical spin o f philosophy and its subject, and
look to Foucault's historical and, dare I use the word, structural location o f anonymity within the
discourse o f language. I f anonymity is at play within discourse to the extent I am claiming, it takes its
own linguistic turn like anything else w e’ve come to imagine as “human.’
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The Discourse on Anonvmitv
The Prohibited Subject
"The Discourse on Language" Foucault sets forth three themes which he believes, as we saw with Derrida,
have been undermined by the linguistic and, ultimately, rhetorical turn away from the philosophy of
founding structures. These themes are “the founding subject”; “the originating experience”; and “universal
mediation” (157). Within the massive metaphysical and philosophical background represented by this
trinity I recognize the anonymity as a rhetoric that foregrounds the discursive play o f identity (or founding
subject); authority (or originating experience); and community (or universal mediation). * Foucault builds
his historical outline o f discourse by linking the three great themes o f philosophy to the activities of
writing, reading, and their exchange. I intend to adapt these themes, as well as several other principles he
lays out in "The Discourse on Language" and in "What is an Author?" I freely adapt to help us better
understand what anonymity is and how it functions in the gaps left open between the subject and
discourse, the author and text, the proper name and identity.
One adapted definition o f anonymous discourse might then read:

[Anonymous] "discourse is really

only an activity, of writing in the first case [of the founding subject], of reading in the second [of
originating experience], and exchange in the third" [case of universal mediation] ("The Discourse on
Language," 158). The problem with the relation o f discourse to the three themes, however, is that the
themes have been traditionally proposed and conserved in order "to elide the reality o f discourse" (157).
The reality o f discourse is that it unfolds in a pervasive anonymity—thus linking what Foucault calls the
author-fimction with way I call the anonymous function. If I can persuade the reader that Identity,
Authority, Community are realities in large part informed by anonymity, than the themes don't elide the
reality o f discourse but ride on the back of anonymity. Anonymity and reality are in closer dialogue than
we might at first imagine.
Like Derrida, one o f Foucault’s more critical principles is that of reversal. He uses it, however, at a
different order o f hermeneutical resolution. I intend to demonstrate the principle o f reversal as it applies to
anonymity's relation to the discourse o f identity in this chapter, (and to authority and community, in the
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chapters, which follow). Before doing so, I am bound to comment on his commentary as it relates to
anonymity’s function within the discourse o f language.
Foucault's central thesis about discourse is that its "institutional" power is produced, "controlled,
selected, organized and redistributed according to a certain number o f procedures, whose role is to avert its
powers and dangers" (149). He then discusses at length "the three great systems of exclusion governing
discourse—prohibited words, the division of madness [and reason] and the will to truth [over falsehood]"
(151). The second type o f exclusion does not concern the discourse o f anonymity directly, i f at all. The
first and the third forms o f exclusion, however, can tell us a great deal about the powers and dangers of
anonymity. In the simplest form o f recitation, anonymous discourse permits prohibited words, and is
therefore, a highly contested, deeply ambiguous discourse in its representation of the will to truth [over
falsehood.] Under anonymous condition or its function, the nominal identity o f the speaker/writer has been
for a host o f reasons "prohibited.
Women interested to write, who managed, gradually, to overcome the constraints on their literacy
through access to books, then to the tools of writing, were prohibited from the manly art o f writing and the
masculine career o f authorship. As any number o f examples from feminist historiography and literary
analysis will show, the will to the truth of writing for wom en had only one avenue: through the
"falsehood" o f Anonymous (or the dissemblance o f the Pseudonymous.)
The slave who has been prohibited from learning the discourse o f the master, and is therefore rendered
anonymous in social-political terms, will nevertheless master the tools o f the master and write in a will to
truth (often anonymously) against the anonymous falsehood o f slavery.
Anonymous Chinese dissidents, prohibited from speaking against totalitarian rule, use untraceable web
sites to carry forth the will to the truth o f democracy.
The information held by the industry or government "whistleblower" is often officially prohibited
(marked "confidential" or "top secret") and to reveal his or her identity would be prohibit the revelation of
those documents' truth.
The location, never mind diagnosis, o f ADDS and HIV infected persons was next to impossible,
according to Health officials in every major city o f the United States. This stigmatized and hidden—
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essentially prohibitive condition—had to be brought into the will to truth of public health. The only way
was through an anonymous telephone and e-mail system.
The anonymous government official spinning the rationales o f power operates from a very different
sense o f the prohibited, and is engaged in a different will to truth that is not always the same as that of the
print media's. The reader is left to figure the discrepancies between a will to truth or falsehood. (The use
by Kissinger, Haldeman, and Nixon himself, o f the subject position of "high administration official on
condition o f anonymity" sends—or descends— the relation o f these two great systems o f discursive
exclusion back into the second great system: that o f reasonable madness.)
Foucault believes the prohibited class is the "most obvious and familiar," covering three types:
"objects, ritual with its surrounding circumstances, [and] the privileged or exclusive right to speak of a
particular subject." These three types o f prohibition "interrelate, reinforce and complement each other,
forming a complex web, continually subject to modification" (149). He spends very little time on the first
two classes o f exclusion, but does focus on the third type, which we will call "speaking rights." The
question o f a prohibition on speaking rights (and rites) is obvious and familiar. Foucault reminds us: “We
know perfectly well that we are not free to say just anything, that we cannot simply speak o f anything,
when we like or where we like; not just anyone, finally, may speak o f just anything" (149).
We know, for sure, that women and slaves, in their historic subject positions, and to a lesser extent,
the dissident, the whistleblower, and the diseased person understand this problem o f speaking rights in a
brutal, opaque, ineluctable fashion. The high administration official, and for that matter, the identity o f the
hate monger who has taken the Klan's white hood into cyberspace, also understand this relation between
prohibition, speaking rights, and anonymity in a much more manipulative and transparent fashion. What I
find interesting, is that the anecdotes I have chosen at random, from the top o f my research memory, as it
were, form a sort o f discursive web whose constructive elements Foucault has already discerned.
For Foucault, "the areas where this web is most tightly woven today, where the danger spots are most
numerous, are those dealing with politics and sexuality" (149). We might find this assertion outmoded
now, at the opening o f the 21st century. There seem to be no discursive prohibitions at all. The
inter/discourses o f sex and politics, o f sexual politics (and political sexuality) do, however, continue to
58

R e p ro d u c e d with perm ission of the copyright owner. Further reproduction prohibited without permission.

fascinate and stir up an incipient sense o f prohibition. Foucault's observation continues to carry weight, for
"[i]t is as though [such] discussion, far from being a transparent, neutral element, allowing us to disarm
sexuality and to pacify politics, were one o f those privileged areas in which they exercised some o f their
most awesome powers" (149). Why should this be so? And what is the link o f sexuality and politics to the
discourse of anonymity?
According to Foucault, the answer to the first question depends on an understanding o f "speech" (verbal
and textual language) that "reveals its links with desire and power." For this insight he draws from the
history of psychoanalytic discourse, telling us that it has "already shown us that speech is not merely the
medium which manifests—or dissembles —desire; it is also the object o f desire" (149).
The answer to the second question is a historical one better left to another Foucauldian context ("What
is an Author?") which we will take up below. But what can be said provisionally is that anonymous
discourse both assembles and dissembles desire; the anonymous is an objective] o f both political and
sexual identification. It is, in short, the subject position o f identity politics writ large, in which its private
and public realms transcode and transgress. Much in our private codes and public rights o f speech carries a
binding and conforming sense o f prohibition that transcends any legal sense. It is this internalized sense of
one's forbidden identifications being watched and listened to that Foucault demonstrates so forcefully in
his histories o f 'carceral consciousness'—from a penal to a pastoral power o f the "Panopticon." The
anonymous function is both an instrument o f the Panoptic power and a weapon against it.
Its power resides in its capacity as "a transparent, neutral element, allowing us to disarm sexuality and
pacify politics." Because it has this power (and danger) anonymous discourse is not just another "medium
which manifests—or dissembles—desire; it is also the object o f desire" precisely because o f its proximity to-and identity within— the rules o f exclusion and prohibition. It must be remembered that Foucault does
not come anywhere near to these speculative claims for the anonymous function. But given his separate
analyses of discourse and authorship, I believe my syntheses o f his conclusions can be adapted to better
understand anonymity as a discourse.
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Anonymous Authenticity
The third great system o f exclusion—the will to truth—needs its own treatment before we turn to the relation
o f anonymous discourse to "internal rules, where discourse exercises its own control" (152)—namely,
through commentary, the author, and disciplinary organization. The third rule o f exclusion—"the will to
truth [or falsehood]"— prepares the way toward understanding the pedagogical battle in composition
between expressivist "authenticity" and social constructionist "author-ity."
In his background sketch as to how truth became divided (sometime in Greece, 5th century BC), we see
the line getting drawn between philosophy and sophistry—"between Hesiod and Plato, separating true
discourse from false" (150). To summarize Foucault’s already dense precis o f this particular rule, his
research found that Plato's legacy has tended to affect (Derrida would say infect in a "parasitical" way) not
just scientific "truth," but the truth o f "Western literature.” “ It has, for centuries, sought to base itself...in
the plausible, upon sincerity and science—in short, upon true discourse" (150).
We can sense that Foucault sees the will to truth as itself a sort o f sophistic rhetoric that "has,
gradually, been attempting to assimilate the others [i.e., prohibitions and madness] in order both to modify
them and to provide them with a firm foundation" (151).
Foucault does not use the term sophistry or rhetoric when explaining the assimilative operations of
true discourse, but he might have. Read his explanation o f how it has operated over and against the central
objects o f human conflict—power and desire, or politics and sexuality.
[T|f, since the time of the Greeks, true discourse no longer responds to desire or to that
which exercises power in the will to truth, in the will to speak out in true discourse,
what, then, is at work, if not desire and power? True discourse, liberated by the nature of
its form from desire and power, is incapable o f recognizing the will to truth which
pervades it; and the will to truth, having imposed itself upon us for so long, is such that
the truth it seeks to reveal cannot fail to mask it (151).
This is a signature "poststructural" approach to the always-problematic binary. For our purposes, the issues
o f revelation, recognition, and response "in the will to speak out in true discourse" point directly to the
revelatory masking operations of anonymity and the anonymous. As I see it, anonymity is a truer
discourse in that it has always responded to the exercise o f desire or that which exercises power.
Anonymous discourse, intimately tied by the nature o f its form to desire and power, is quite capable o f
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recognizing the prohibited which pervades it and provides it, paradoxically, with the m ask that helps reveal
the sources o f sexuality and politics, o f identity politics in the largest sense—discourse itself.
W hen I assert that anonymity is a truer discourse o f truth, I am not advocating some naive sense of
rhetoric that sees itself as a mere transmitter o f preformed, ahistorical Truth. My emphasis is on discourse.
But unlike Foucault, who can't bring him self to fully and finally countenance the power o f rhetoric, so that
he is always burrowing around trying to uncover and discover the meaning o f discourse, I see discursive
meaning continually reconstructing itself through the largely unacknowledged rhetorical practices of
anonymity. Foucault anticipates and works out the upshot o f discursive constructs, o f course, making
possible the now ubiquitous "subject positions." But it is not clear to me that he focuses his massive
learning on the linkage between discursive subject positions and anonymity. If anonymity offers—or at least
troubles—the possibility o f a "truer discourse" because it mixes a range o f speaking rights and subject
positions, then we can begin to discern its possible academic presence and application within compositionrhetoric.
Anonymous Author-ity
Foucault is critically important to this dissertation because he does at least acknowledge the presence of
anonymity in the production and distribution o f discourse. But where he looks to constructs such as the
author first, I look and see the anonymous foremost. But as with all binary logic, we must understand the
dominant term first before we can gain access to its suppressed other. Foucault carefully distinguishes
between “ ...the author in the sense o f the individual who delivered the speech or wrote the text in question,
[and] the author as the unifying principle in a particular group o f writings or statements, lying at the
origins o f their significance, as the seat o f their coherence” (153).
As Foucault goes on to detail the author principle, it is certainly set in opposition to the contingencies
o f anonymity where identity is a relative, mobile construct. In contrast, "[t]he author principle limits this
same chance element through the action o f an identity whose form is that o f individuality and the I "
(153).^ Foucault, however, is in principle quite alert to the discursive pervasiveness o f authorial
anonymity.
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All around us, there are sayings and texts whose meaning or effectiveness has nothing to
do with any author to whom they might be attributed: mundane remarks, quickly
forgotten; orders and contracts that are signed, but have no recognizable author; technical
prescriptions anonymously transmitted (153, emphasis added).
This became the case with literature starting in the 17th century and "has become steadily more important."
Unlike scientific discourse, literary discourse "circulated relatively anonymously throughout the Middle
Ages," but in modem times
[w]e ask authors to answer for the unity o f the works published in their names; we ask
that they reveal, or at least display the hidden sense pervading their work; we ask them to
reveal their personal lives, to account for their experiences and the real story that gave
birth to their writings. The author is he [or she] who implants, into the troublesome
language o f fiction, its unities, its coherence, its links with reality" (153).
Together with his contrast between the author principle and the commentary principle—"the action o f an
identity taking the form o f repetition and sameness —I see first the problematic relation o f a writer to his or
her writing. Moreover, there is the related, but altogether different, order o f (non)identity between a writer
who becomes an author and his or writing becomes a "work."
Foucault is careful to distinguish the author from the writer—that "from his new position as an author"
the author function comes to be in "the still shaky profile o f his oeuvre (153). This idea o f writing as a
"work" (as in a work o f art) is clearly indebted, I think, to Maurice Blanchot's 1955 work The Essential
Solitude. In one subsection titled "The Work, the Book," Blanchot reiterates the great presence/absence
binary coiled within the discourse o f being and its philosophical proxy, identity. Blanchot's way of
framing these distinctions also influenced Derrida's deconstruction o f the metaphysics of presence.
The writer writes a book, but the book is not yet the work, the work is not a work until
the word being is pronounced in it.... The writer belongs to the work, but what belongs
to him [or her] is only a book, a mute accumulation o f sterile words, the most
meaningless thing in the world.... And in the end, the work ignores him [or her], it
closes on his [or her] absence, in the impersonal, anonymous statement that it is—and
nothing more (825, emphasis added).
Blanchot is having the writer be a catch all for author here, but what is important is not the meaning of
writer, but that o f the work, which Foucault does not declare quite so directly as his mentor does here.
Foucault finds the impersonal anonymous statement circulating in the systems of disciplinarity and
commentary, but cannot quite bring himself to assert from the shadow o f Blanchot that anonymity is at the

62

R e p ro d u c e d with perm ission of the copyright owner. Further reproduction prohibited without permission.

heart o f the author function also. (How I restate this question within a rereading o f "What is an Author?"
awaits us below.)
The Disciplinarity o f Anonvmitv
I have concluded provisionally that anonymity plays a crucial part in not only the structure o f the sign
(Derrida) but in the function o f the author's "signature" (Foucault). It should now be easier to move from
the theoretical identity o f the anonymous function to consider its presence within the field of composition
studies. I am particularly keen to trace the anonymous work in expressivist theory and pedagogy and will
take this up below. Composition teaching deals with writers—student writers—not authors, and with acts of
writing, not finished works. Yet, with Foucault's and Blanchot’s insights fresh before us, it seems to me
that the principle o f reversal is at work when it comes to considering the mandates o f literary studies and
composition studies within the discipline o f English.
As I see the lay o f the discursive land, then, literary studies is tied to the commentary principle, while
composition studies is, paradoxically, linked to the author principle on the strength o f what we ask of
student writers. Foucault appears to be describing the author exclusively, and yet, what does the
expressivist teacher ask o f students—if not the following: "[W]e ask them to reveal their personal lives, to
account for their experiences and the real story that gave birth to their writings." Expressivism is all about
author-izing student writers to perform a discursive recognition that is coiled, like a double helix of
individuality and the "I", within their own proper name re-cognition. But when we push Foucault’s
casualness about authorial anonymity to its original Blanchotian affirmation, we understand that "The Act
o f Writing" (another subsection o f Blanchot's The Essential Solitude)
is to pass from the I to the He [or She], so that what happens to [the] me happens to no
one, is anonymous because o f the fact that it is none o f my business, [and this] repeats
itself in an infinite dispersal (emphasis added, 831).
Anonymous writing is personal writing that places the expressivist "I" into an infinite dispersal o f "other"
identity claims, creating for the writer an absence o f personal identity that makes for a presence whose
author-ity derives from being in the act o f writing, rather than becoming a writer.
This issue o f composition studies defined as a separate field within the "disciplinary" rubric o f English
by virtue o f a pedagogical corollary to certain aspects of authorship leads us directly into Foucault's third
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principle o f internal rules o f control—the disciplinary principle. He argues that this rule is opposed to that
o f the author and the commentary principles.
Opposed to that o f the author, because disciplines are defined by...their corpus of
propositions considered to be true, the interplay o f rules and definitions, o f techniques
and tools: all these constitute a sort o f anonymous system, freely available to whoever
wishes, or whoever is able to make use o f them, without there being any question of
their meaning or their validity being derived from whoever happened to invent them
(154, emphasis added).
The anonymous system o f a discipline—essentially its authoritative texts—is an order o f concreteness related
to the more abstractly anonymous system o f language which all individual users (we are all on parole)
make use o f without there being any question o f who invented language. So we see that anonymity and
discourse are intimately entwined.
It is customary to see the author as that individual, or that I (in principle, anyway) drawing a bright
line of identity and identification (for a given discipline's commentators) between these two overarching
layers of systemic anonymity. But perhaps anonymity's discursive orders o f reification or resolution go all
the way down. I propose that we begin to extrapolate from Foucault's discursive rules and limits to
conclude that the author principle is no less saturated with anonymity than are disciplinarity and
commentary. Perhaps the author, like "beauty" is only a skin-deep identification, whereas anonymity is
tantamount to what we might consider "being" if ontology, rather than rhetoric, were still o f use in
understanding discursive existence.
This proposal runs against the current o f Foucault's line o f argument. Authorship as a "unifying
principle in a particular group o f writings" cannot be said to constitute a sort o f anonymous system, Seely
available to whoever is able to make use o f it. As we will see, the principle o f authorship is tied up with
the legal discourse wherein the proper name becomes a kind o f exclusive discursive right of property—more
commonly known as a copyright. Thus, commentators or other users o f discursive systems must "get
permission from the author or the author's agents" before using his or her individual text in what appears to
be an anonymous system freely available to "whoever."
Conversely, the disciplinary principle doesn't operate through the action o f an authorial identity whose
form is that o f individuality and the /. "Disciplines constitute a system o f control in the production of
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discourse, fixing its limits through the action o f an identity taking the form o f a permanent reactivation of
the rules" (155). It operates upon a collectivity—a community o f interests who follow these rules—rather
than the exclusive individuality roles exclusive to the author principle. And though disciplinarity relies
upon the principle o f commentary (the second internal rule of exclusion codified by Foucault), commentary
and disciplinarity are also at odds. Commentary, as we saw, is "simple recitation"; "the dream of masked
repetition," which fancies itself original. "(T]n a discipline, what is supposed at the point o f departure...is
that which is required for the construction o f new statements" (154). Put in another way, if a discipline
does not begin with and accrue fresh propositions for community use, it loses the identity o f its authority
and vice versa.
As a dutiful commentator I have reiterated Foucault's principle o f authorship: that it retains the
discourse o f individuality; that its collection of I ‘s is no dream o f masked repetition; that "new” (if not
"original") authors appear all the time within (or they are appropriated by) a discipline. (This is not to say
that many "authors" are not simply engaging in the commentary game, hypnotized by the specters of
initially fresh propositions within the dream o f masked repetition that often constitutes publication within
a discipline.) We have seen that each o f these principles works to control and lim it the powers and dangers
o f discourse. The disciplinary principle, however, is ultimately opposed to commentary and authorship
essentially on the strength o f its capacity to formulate—"and o f doing so ad infinitum"— an "anonymous
system" of "fresh propositions." These must also "fit into a certain type o f theoretical field" (154). And yet
the disciplinary principle does this work utterly dependent upon the two principles it is opposed to.
Therefore, it can be inferred, merely on the strength o f Foucault's use o f the term, that anonymity is a
fundamentaiybrce holding the discourse o f language together. Let us assume this is so, that anonymity is
the formal cause o f the three principles Foucault outlines. That means that authorship, as final cause, is a
projection o f anonymity w ith a highly ambivalent or unstable hold on the discourse o f identity. Foucault's
own historical outline o f the principle strongly suggests something o f this instability, while reducing its
priority as a principle to one among many factors o f discourse. With that established, we have before us the
profoundly obvious fact that the author principle is bom e out of discursive anonymity. It originates in the
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very anonymous system o f language freely available to whoever is able to make use o f it for the discourses
of truth, power, desire, and subjectivity or, in Foucault's case, o f discourse itself.
The Rarity o f Anonvmitv
In moving, finally, to "a third group o f rules serving to control discourse" (155) Foucault summarizes the
first group o f external rules (The Prohibited; Madness; Will to Truth). These deal with ways to avert "the
hazards o f [discourse's] appearance," while the second group o f internal rules amount to coping with "the
mastery o f the powers contained within discourse." Now we are to understand this third group as "more a
question o f determining the conditions under which [discourse] may be employed, o f imposing a certain
number o f rules upon those individuals who employ [discourse], thus denying access to everyone else."
Already it is easy to discern again the presence o f anonymity in the way it is elided by the discursive
claims o f identity. We had seen that the disciplinary principle is constituted by an anonymous system
freely available to all. Now we are told that this final group o f rules "amounts to a rarefaction among
speaking subjects: none may enter into discourse on a specific subject unless he has satisfied certain
conditions..." (155).
What Foucault is up to with this last group o f rules o f discursive control and exclusion is, I believe,
to put a human face on a history that has otherwise privileged event horizons, large synchronic movements,
anonymous operating systems. Like Saussure, he recognizes that langue is controlling and finalizing, but
we are all on parole, after all: the carceral Panopticon o f is watchfully listening to us all. What he means
"exactly" by rarefaction is that “ ...not all areas o f discourse are equally open and penetrable; some are
forbidden territory (differentiated and differentiating) while others are virtually open to the winds and stand,
without any prior restrictions, open to all” (155).
This description should remind us o f his definition o f the first rule of exclusion—the Prohibited.
Specific speech rights, in other words, get codified in particular institutions and their particular discursive
situations. Thus, lawyer/client, or doctor/patient discourse are not open to all, while a telephone talk
program, a chapter o f Alcoholics Anonymous, praying in a church, or visiting an Internet chatroom, are
virtually open to the winds.
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He is basically drawing a line between public and private—or wbat I call opportunistic and oligarchic—
discourse. And because his subtextual subject is about govemmentality, or the hidden ways language users
are subjected to discursive rules, it is easy to forget that Foucault sees these rules o f exclusion, restriction,
or limitation as enabling rather than enervating. "Exchange and communication are positive forces at play
within complex but restrictive systems; it is probable they cannot operate independently o f these" (155) is
a credo that ties in nicely with Foucault's overall sense o f power/knowledge regimes as opportune rather
than oppressive. With this run up, he introduces the rubric o f “ ’fellowships o f discourse', whose function
is to preserve or to reproduce discourse, but in order that it should circulate within a closed community,
according to strict regulations, without those in possession being dispossessed by this very distribution”
(156).
I have tried to cover all of the rules under the first two groups while pointing to the two that most
resonate in a discourse o f anonymity—prohibited speech and the author principle. Now we come to what is
Foucault's version o f saving the best (or worst) news for the end o f his treatise. Foucault insists that these
discursive fellowships, (religious and musical apprenticeships are his examples), though "archaic" and rare,
manage to persist within contemporary discourse communities with "their ambiguous interplay o f secrecy
and disclosure," and their "non-interchangeability" o f speaking and listening roles (156).
My interpretive inclination throughout has been to substitute anonymity for the primary referent in a
given authorial context. In this context, I don't believe anyone would question that anonymity features an
ambiguous interplay o f secrecy and disclosure. The identity o f a writer is kept secret from the reader or
from a readership. Yet much is disclosed—ranging from deeply private to compelling public issues—
depending on the status o f the writer's stated identification with this or that regime o f truth (that is, of
private desire or public power.)
The complexity o f anonymity’s range or regime o f ambiguity between secrecy and disclosure operates
in the private desire o f the stigmatized individual (a homosexual, for example) to publicly—yet secretly—
disclose and share this highly political side o f her/his sexual identity in the universal mediation of an
anonymous chatroom. This same ambiguous regime o f secretive disclosure informs the desire o f the "high
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government official" who on "condition o f anonymity" truthfully reveals the rationales o f governmental
power, or ju st as often, "spins" the wheel o f power politics.
The other part o f Foucault's requirement for the "rarity" o f 'fellowships of discourse'—"noninterchangeability" o f speaking and listening roles"-holds—or appears to hold—for the "closed community"
o f reporters and their sources. The unnamed official desires to speak privately, secretly—completely "off"
the record—to the named reporter who discloses to the public official information. There would seem to be
a "non-interchangeability" between this governmental source o f information flow and its media tributary.
And yet the authenticity and authority o f this information is vouched for—in effect, voiced over, and in a
real sense impersonated—by the identity o f the named writer, not the anonymous speaker/writer. Thus, the
"non-interchangeability" o f this established fellowship o f discourse between two rhetorical subject
positions across two discourse communities is not as closed or immobile as we might think.
I f the nominal identity is closed on one end of information input, then it is obviously wide open on
the output end. Less obviously, the closed nature o f the identity, authority, and community o f the
discursive exchange is actually an open, flowing, secret Foucault's qualification that such fellowships o f
discourse feature a "non-interchangeability" o f speaker/listener subject positions becomes very fluid,
indeed, when we look to the more "private" sector example o f the anonymous homosexual in a multiple
user domain in cyberspace. He/she is seeking a fellowship o f community through a closed identity —yet
one that is wide open in identification. (O f course, the problem o f the anonymous "pedophile" in
cyberspace, stalking young people on their personal websites which are open to the digital winds, hurls us
back into the rule o f exclusion—the Prohibited, and highlights the 'danger spots' in an attempt to "pacify"
politics or, in this case, sexuality.)
Unfortunately, I do not have the space to fully treat the fascinating inter-changeability and fluidity
between discursive desire and discursive power as these are linked back to Foucault's first great system o f
exclusion governing discourse. (The "prohibited class" and the problem o f "speaking rights" when "dealing
w ith politics and sexuality" (149) take on greater urgency in Chapter Five.) Obviously, the complex desire
for power in dealing with governmental politics requires both an "ambiguity" and a "fellowship" between
informant secrecy and information disclosure. So too, an informant's power o f desire in dealing with
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identity politics requires an equally ambiguous relation between discursive identity, authority, and
community.
Inspired by Foucault's critical genealogy o f discourse, I am contending that anonymity is the discursive
link or web which both ties and defies our definitions o f private and public discourse, as well as our
notions o f privacy and publicity in general. Where Foucault is interested to categorize discourse into great
systems o f exclusion and inclusion, however, I am interested to rhetoricize them. I am preparing us to
understand that the "non-interchangeability" and "closed community" of what Foucault is calling the
historical "rarity" o f discourse is opened up by theorizing an anonymous function which certainly operates
historically, but our interest is how anonymity functions rhetorically in the writing class.
More traditionally minded teacher-researchers in the general disciplinary matrix o f English might wish
to cleave to Foucault's notions o f "rarity" and o f a "closed community" dictating particular "speaking
rights." Thus, literary theorists, analysts, and teachers o f literature wish to exclude "compositionists" from
their "closed community" o f discourse. Likewise, compositionists of the social constructionist mould,
argue for the "rarity" and "non-interchangeability" o f their discursive approach over that of the
expressivists, and vice-versa.
We can now begin to see that it is the objectively anonymous character o f discourse at-large. Better yet,
through my distillation and revelation o f that character across Foucault's many themes, classes and rules of
discourse, I hope my readers can see that the anonymity is never far from, and may in fact (in)form, the
subject o f discourse. More specifically, it is my hope that my readers will begin to understand that
function in more specific rhetorical terms. In the composition o f discourse there is a historically
"impersonal" effect in the anonymous "web" as it is interchangeably "dealing with politics and sexuality.
The power o f desire and the desire o f power share a community o f immunity, an im personating effect, a
rhetoric o f self-other making, which needs to be experimented with and examined within the discourse of
composition.
There are, as Foucault tells us, "powers and dangers" in this anonymous discourse I have intuited and
extrapolated from Foucault's historical outline o f language itself as a "Discourse." As a member of my
dissertation committee, Professor Cinthia Gannett, concluded recently, anonymous discourse is "a perilous
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pedagogy." This insight follows o f course, from an understanding theoretically o f anonymity's role in the
discourse o f language itself.
The most difficult case to make about anonymity, o f course, is that it has any thing to do with
"fellowship" or what I am calling community. Anonymity does, however, operate from and for a sense of
community; anonymous identities interplay ambiguously between presence and absence, secrecy and
disclosure. And in this last go round with his schemas o f discourse Foucault offers ever-greater credence for
my hypotheses about the discourse o f anonymity. "[D]o not be deceived," Foucault writes:
even in the order o f published discourse, we still find secret-appropriation and noninterchangeability at work. It could even be that the act o f writing, as it is
institutionalized today, with its... personality o f the writer...occurs within a diffuse yet
constraining, ’fellowship o f discourse.' The separateness o f the writer, continually
opposed to the activity o f all other writing and speaking subjects, the fundamental
singularity [the writer] has long accorded to ‘writing,’—all this manifests...the existence
o f a certain 'fellowship o f discourse' (156).
To render this simply, the cult[ure] o f the authorial "person" is a function o f the secrecy and disclosure, and
non-interchangeability that has grown up around the institutionalization o f writing. More complexly, we
see the singularities o f writing and the author holding each the other in an ambiguity that hearkensback to
the power/desire binary Foucault opens this essay with.
Remember too that Foucault is focusing on "academic" realms. He mentions in passing that there are
"entirely different schemas o f exclusivity and disclosure"—"secrets" diffused and circulated across scientific,
medical, technical, and even "economic or political discourse (156). The common sense o f anonymity as a
kind o f rarity given the pervasiveness o f identification and the discourse o f identity is undercut by the
variety and depth o f anonymity's presence, not only in the discourse o f authorial identity, but in a given
disciplinary community.
As I have already asserted, I believe anonymity plays a crucial, protean role in these schemas of
exclusion and disclosure, and may in fact be the ultimate schematic holding 'writing' as structure and
author as 'function' in a tight orbit o f (in)visibility—"an ambiguous interplay o f secrecy and disclosure."
But in holding that premise I am reminded o f anonymity's negative reputation in the popular imagination.
In my attempt to present it as a positive force by high-glossing Foucault's extremely over-determined
outline o f discourse, I would be remiss if I did not explain the discourse o f anonymity according to "a
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principle of reversal" (158). He reserves this principle for what he calls the " 'critical' group' which sets the
reversal-principle to work" (160).
The Critical Function o f Anonymous Discourse
The 'critical group' is to be distinguished from the 'genealogical' group. It covers those "external rules” and
concern "that part o f discourse which deals with power and desire" (152). Their main connection to a
discourse of anonymity involves "what is prohibited " (149), as we saw above. We recall that the main
areas of prohibition are sexuality and politics (and religion to a lesser extent). Near the end o f his lecture
Foucault sets up his consideration of the reversal principle by questioning the apparent "logophilia" of our
civilization. He believes "a certain fear hides this apparent supremacy accorded" to discourse.
This fear is reflected in the zones o f prohibited discourse. These are “ ...taboos, [those] barriers,
thresholds and limits [which] were deliberately disposed in order, at least partly, to m aster and control the
great proliferation o f discourse, in such a way as to relieve its richness o f its most dangerous elements; to
organize its disorder so as to skate around its m ost uncontrollable aspects” (158). And so he concludes, in
a reversal of our common sense o f discourse, that "a profound logophobia" is at work in and around
discourse.
One of my interests in anonymous discourse is o f course the source o f its negative connotations. It is
my hunch that anonymity, operating as it does along and across the borders o f discursive prohibition, is
both an object of, and complicit with, this profound logophobia. Since my personal inclination is toward a
profound logophilia, I do not fear these zones o f prohibition or the relations o f anonymous discourse to
those zones. As we shall see, the Foucauldian historian in me is countered and balanced by the Bakhtinian
rhetorician.

That is, I see these zones o f prohibition for what they are, but also for what they can be—as Bakhtinian
"zones of contact" for "double-voiced discourse." I would have the reader suspicious o f anonymity to find
in it a curious power o f reversal, or at least, o f ambiguity, so that he or she would find in it those factors
which play a positive role. Put in another way, there is no traducing the tradition o f anonymity, so we
might as well give it the benefit o f our doubt. Perhaps we can better begin to do this i f we understand what
Foucault means by "a principle o f reversal.”
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Enough has already been glossed from Foucault's analysis o f "those factors which seem to play a
positive role, such as the author, discipline, will to truth" to conclude that they mask a "negative activity
o f the cutting-out and rarefaction o f discourse" (158). If we then apply this reversal principle to the factor o f
anonymity, particularly in relation to the author, we see that anonymity may in fact mask a positive
activity in that it performs a cutting-out o f authorial claims and control, and thus reopens and proliferates
the rarefaction o f discourse. But what then? What are the positive consequences of negating the controls
and limits exerted by the author principle? Aren't we just on a theoretical see-saw with Anonymous on one
end and Author on the other, one now up, the other down, now you see one, now the other—the descent of
anonymity beckons, as the ascent o f authorship beckoned (to paraphrase William Carols Williams)?
As we will see in my Bakhtininan treatment of "A Rhetoric o f Anonymity," the sense o f being hurled
inward and outward simultaneously by the discourse of language—what Bakhtin calls the "centripedal" and
"centrifugal" forces of language—attends to the private/public force o f anonymous writing in a composition
course. I am referring to that course that is devoted to merging contending expressivist and constructionist
identifications which seem, at times, to be pulling the entire field o f composition-rhetoric inside out and
back again.
Once we have ceased considering the author function as a fundamental and creative action, and can
bring ourselves to consider the anonymous in those terms, it turns out that we have gone as far as we can
go with a "critical" approach to the anonymous/author binary. Into the breach between them comes
discursive prohibition. We now have "to bring other methodological principles into play" (158), which
means we now have to play the "genealogical" game in earnest.
The Genealogical Function o f Anonymous Discourse
In contrast to the external rules, the genealogical group covers "internal rules" that are "involved in the
mastery of another dimension o f discourse: that of events and chance" (152). Commentary, the author, and
disciplinary organization constitute these rules. The author, as we will see in the next chapter, is of greatest
concern to a general understanding o f the anonymous function as not only a reversal of the "author function" but its profound transversal and transgression. We will also understand how a principle o f
reversal can place the author (ultimately underwritten by the philosophy o f the subject) in a zone o f
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prohibition while raising the profile o f the anonymous as a potentially positive force o f discursive
proliferation in the universal interest o f exchange and communication.
Foucault describes three principles that put the genealogical group to work: discontinuity, specificity, and
exteriority. According to the first principle, "discourse must be treated as a discontinuous activity, its
different manifestations sometimes coming together, but just as easily unaware of, or excluding each
other." According to the second principle, "...there is no prediscursive fate disposing the word in our favor.
We must conceive discourse as...a practice we impose upon [things]." The last principle "holds that we are
not to burrow to the hidden core o f discourse... we should look [only] for its external conditions of
existence, for that which gives rise to the chance series o f these events and fixes its limits" (158). I have
attempted, in direct contradiction o f Foucault, to burrow to anonymity's truly, or literally, hidden core.
Conclusion to Chapter Two
The upshot o f these principles taken together help us to reach two provisional conclusions that directly
concern the discourse o f anonymity as I have come to understand it. The first is that the principle of
authorship might help to uphold and extend Tradition and its history o f ideas as a necessary fiction. Its
fellowship of internal controls can't tell us much o f anything, however, about the origination, creation, or
unity o f discourse, because there really aren't any points for entry and understanding along these lines.
Foucault is teaching us to blow by Eliot's distinction o f the working relation between Tradition and
Individual Talent and just look at discourse circulating, impersonally, serially, discontinuously—
anonymously.
The second conclusion is that the subject positions of'w riting' and the subject as 'writer1 (together with
their indispensable others, 'reading' and ’reader1) have secretive roots in the prohibited. These positions take
up potentially transgressive positions, however chance and discontinuous, within desire and power, rather
than in some will to truth or knowledge. The actions o f their identities take on forms that are not of
individuality and the I in the controlling sense o f the author, but as objects o f sexuality and identity
politics that are the subjects o f writing in its most allusive, yet elusive and therefore, most inclusive
context. (I like to believe, however, that within the Prohibited, there lies a will to truth or knowledge. But
that is where "The Taboo" and "The Truth" set a discursive boundary—a genre distinction—that is not meant
to be transgressed or otherwise blended within academic settings, but only by writers who operate not
under laws o f commentary and exclusion, but under those o f creativity and inclusion.
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At the end of "The Discourse on Language" Foucault hopes for both kinds o f study, critical and
genealogical, with the first "one o f studied casualness" the second "one o f felicitous positivism." Whatever
becomes o f these projects on discourse, Foucault emphasizes "that the analysis of discourse thus
understood, does not reveal the universality o f a meaning, but brings to light the action o f imposed rarity
['critical' group], with a fundamental power of affirmation" ['genealogical' group] (162).
The methodological message I draw from this early lecture by Foucault is that there is no
"genealogical" approach to anonymous discourse. It has no formative signature primarily because it efiaces-even as it continually retraces—large areas of academic institutional purview, and not only because it is the
antithesis o f the author principle, with its cult o f identity and attributed originality. The absenting presence
o f anonymous discourse also profoundly affects the principles o f commentary and disciplinary organization
that form an academically discursive fellowship with the author effect. For all that, the absence o f a
genealogical approach to anonymity does not preclude a mood o f "felicitous positivism" or of the mode of
an "affirmative approach" in creating, as we shall see, a pedagogy o f anonymity.
I have attempted in these first two chapters to create some semblance o f anonymity's internal and
external conditions o f existence. It is an attempt that takes it for granted that the subject who is prescribed
by social anonymity is also one who de-scribes him or herself anonymously is dispersed across "a
multiplicity o f possible positions and functions." Given its inter/intrasubjective force in self-other
orientations, as well as in acts o f writing for oneself and for a range o f others, I am certain that anonymity
is a discontinuous, essentially ungovernable "ensemble" o f desire and power, o f sexuality and politics, of
identity and difference. The anonymous is at-Iarge-prescribing and describing all practices of naming and
identification.
Having brought us a bit closer "toward" the anonymous function as a lived phenomenon of
subjectivity, and as a function o f the discourse of language within the problem o f 'identity,' in Chapter
Three—Toward a History o f Anonymity— I look at the problem o f literary author-ity as an anonymous
function. Its 'problematic,' or at least ironic, character was first suggested by E.M Forster in "On
Anonymity." It was then broadly sketched by Michel Foucault in "What is an Author." It has, of late,
been handled panoramically in two studies by Thomas Docherty: On Modern Authority and Absent
Character.
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In a very real sense, all three thinkers pursue a "genealogical" approach to understanding the levels of
authority in the author function. Our job, thanks to Schutz and Natanson, will be to tease out the critical
levels o f anonymity working and playing in parallel to those o f authority. In effect, we will pursue a
"critical approach" to the genealogical problem of the authority o f anonymity. As such, the supposed
"rarity" o f anonymity will, on the principle o f reversal, reveal itself as a ubiquity that, I believe, Bakhtin
understood in his notions o f the "contact zone" and the "transgredient moment" (which we take up in
Chapter Four—A Rhetoric o f Anonymity.)
When the time comes to give the entire ungovernable ensemble o f desire and power, o f writer identity
and reader authority, its truly "critical" due in Chapter Five, my critical approach will be "genealogical" in
tone. The handling o f 'a perilous pedagogy' requires a felicitous positivism, rather than one o f studied
casualness, in Foucault's distinction. So far I have tried to maintain a playful, ironic distance on the idea of
a genealogical approach to anonymity. This enables us to more seriously entertain the idea o f a purely
critical approach to all o f anonymity’s functions.^
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Chapter Notes
4 t is tempting to account for a critical genealogy o f anonymity as a sophistic nemesis o f the formative
philosophies that posit a founding subject, originating experience, and universal mediation. To avoid
complexity and lengthy commentary, however, I will only suggest a sophistical genealogy as I might in
the future develop it within my view o f anonymity's structure, sign, and play in the discourse o f language.
Principle One: The I o f the writing subject—even under the sign o f the proper name—is essentially
anonymous.
Principle Two: To the extent that origins can be determined from reading, and "originality" ascribed to
those whom we all read (a.k.a. authors), experience of the real eludes discursive recognition; it does not
acknowledge processes o f naming and its attendant orders of truth formation.
Principle Three: Following Foucault's definition of Universal mediation—"when all things come
eventually to take the form o f discourse, then all [will] be able to return to the silent interiority of selfconsciousness" (157)—t h e / o f self-consciousness cannot be founded upon the experience o f an originating
subject. It must give itself up as the intersubjective shifter o f a discursive other that is, according to
Principle One, anonymous.
2 Looking ahead at further Foucauldian distinctions, (as well as my own adaptive commentaries on them),
authorial anonymity is very nearly a self-negating construction. Since we don’t know the identity o f the
individual responsible for the speech act, his or her status as a unifying principle for a community that
might wish to respond to that status under the commentary principle, is unknown, insignificant, and
incoherent under normative conditions o f discursive authority. If not an accident o f time or contingency of
human conflict wherein an author's nominal, and therefore biographical, identity is lost or destroyed, then
the deliberate inclination to discourse anonymously is institutionally suspect (with many paradoxical
exceptions, however, as the Introduction will detail).
3 Having already thrown my interpretive fate in with Derrida's notion o f Nietzschean affirmation, and given
the clear connection o f Nietzsche's method o f approach with what has come to be called by both Derrida
and Foucault as "genealogical," the attentive reader would find me guilty o f a massive self-contradiction
here. How can I claim an affirmative approach to anonymity, but assert that there is no genealogical
interpretation of it worth pursuing? The apparent contradiction disappears when it is realized that I consider
both Derrida and Foucault to be "critical" theorists who have helped to bring a rhetorical approach back
into vogue that is, by my lights, best upheld by Bakhtin. The contributions o f Foucault, Derrida, as well
as Schutz and Natanson to my dissertation are themselves genealogical or historical, rather than critical.
They are not responsible for any prohibited zone o f discourse; they only point to the anonymous as
prohibition's contact zone (to be taken up in Chapter Five's Pedagogy o f Anonymity.) Any critical
interpretation o f anonymity and its prohibitional effects comes from my interpretive and pedagogical
experience, not theirs. Ultimately, my approach to the discourse o f anonymity and to anonymous discourse
is rhetorical rather than critical or genealogical. That is, I am interested in the inter-relation and intersubjectivity—the community—o f speaker-Iistener and writer-reader.
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CHAPTER THREE

TOWARD A HISTORY OF ANONYMITY

Anonvmitv and the Problem o f Authority
Critical Genealogies
In Chapter One we examined the discursive problem o f Identity. In Chapter Two we examined the
problem of Discourse itself. In each examination we traced the common trajectory and complicity of
anonymity in their problematic conditions as academic terms and as lived actions of an individualized "I"
in relation to a range o f Others—immediate and mediated, real and imagined. In Chapter three we examine
the problem o f Authority as a founding philosophical discourse and as a locatable origin and lived
condition in the lifeworld. The discursive relation o f Authority to that o f Identity extends from their
shared provinces o f denotative meaning. It is a relation that opens transactions (more toward transgressions)
in acts o f anonymous writing where the Identity of the Author is "defaced"—or at least effaced. Thus the
Identification o f Authority m ust reside in the dialogical imagination o f a reader, of a readership, and over
time, o f an Audience, that is never really present, never quite absent, as an Anonymous Community
indifferent to who is speaking/writing.
Outside the philosophical treatments o f Schutz and Natanson, only one literary "author"—E.M. Forster—
has directly attended to the problem o f the author (and o f the authority of the author function) as an
anonymous function. After his little literary essay —"Anonymity: An Enquiry"—written in 1925, we have
Michel Foucault's little historical outline—"What is an Author?"—written in 1969, which indirectly
addresses the anonymity surrounding the "author-function." Beyond these two, the work of Thomas
Docherty comes closest to a literary and historical synthesis that links the problem o f authority to the
problem of anonymity. Docherty though important, is also indirect in his treatment o f these concepts of
character and proper name displacement. He does not develop outright an "anonymous function" that, by
my lights, is logical given his concern with "modem authority" in "the theory and condition of writing"
and in the use o f what he calls "absent character" in modem fiction.
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We will consider each o f these writers on th e problem o f what I will henceforth term author-ity. This
will highlight the historic relation o f the writing person who becomes an "author," to that o f the larger
discourse o f "authority" whose center or "presence" has been located in notions o f an Origin (whether of
God, the King, the State, the People). Before w e do, however, I want to set up some o f the overlapping
problematics between the discourses o f Identity and Authority that I could not entertain in our
examinations o f phenomenological and discursive anonymity.
My reader will recall that I concluded my parallax view o f the relation o f Foucault's "The Discourse on
Language" to a discourse o f anonymity by saying that, given his definition, it is not possible—for obvious
reasons o f pervasive namelessness—to take a "genealogical" approach to anonymity.

Equally obvious,

however, is the fact that in the "genesis" or origin o f writing itself—and in some o f our most "original"
texts—the anonymous is with us speaking "in the beginning" (whether in the Vedas or in Genesis).
In a collection o f essays edited by Stewart H all titled Questions o f C ultural Identity, Nikolas Rose, in
"Identity, Genealogy, History" attempts, in a clear debt to Foucault, what he calls "the genealogy of
subjectification" or "How should we do the history o f the person?" (128). This genealogical approach
would try to trace how we "authorize" personhood or personal identity, and
...would focus directly upon the practices within which human beings have been located
in particular 'regimes of the person'. This would not be a continuous history o f the self,
but rather an account of the diversity o f languages of'personhood' that have taken shape-character, personality, identity, citizen, individual, normal, lunatic, patient, client,
husband, mother, daughter.... —and the norms, techniques and relations o f authority
within which these have circulated in legal, domestic, industrial and other practices for
acting upon the conduct of persons (131, emphasis added).
Rose proposes a number of "linked pathways"—including "Problematizations," "Technologies," and
"Authorities" (131-133). My interest is in his notion o f "authority" as a pathway. The question he poses to
open his focus on Authorities is quite useful for focusing ourselves on the problem o f what I am calling
Author-ity. "Who is accorded or claims the capacity to speak truthfully about humans, their nature and their
problems, and what characterizes the truths about persons that are accorded such authority?" (132). For
Rose, and for us, the focus upon authority—"...the

diversity o f ways in

which authority is

authorized...seems to be a distinctive feature o f this kind o f [genealogical] investigation (133).
The relations between authority and personal identity have many roots and routes. Rose is interested in
the late work o f Foucault that sketches out the history o f "technologies o f the self." (Foucault traces out the
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importance of autobiographical writing among the privileged class o f ancient Roman political authorities
where the intended reader is the writer—selfsame, but now othered in the act o f writing about one's
authoriative self.) In a marvelous summary of Foucault's rather scattered overview o f the self-authorizing
power o f writing, Rose writes:
Technologies o f the se lf take the form o f elaboration o f certain techniques for the conduct
o f one's relation with oneself, for example requiring one to relate to oneself
epistemologically (know yourself), despotically (master yourself) or in other ways (care
for yourself). They are embodied in particular technical practices (confession, diary
writing, group discussion, and the 12 Steps program o f Alcoholics Anonymous). And
they are always practiced under the actual or im agined authority o f some system o f
truth and o f some authoritative individual, whether these be theological and priestly,
psychological and therapeutic or disciplinary and tutelary (135, emphasis added).
The discourse of identity—o f self: knowledge, mastery, or care—finds its origin in some way through a
discourse o f authority that it itself tied to some kind o f ethics o r ethos. Though based on immediate selfother relations, this ethos is projected in increasingly mediated ways into anonymous enclaves both
intersubjective (Subject-King; Citizen-State; Student-University) intrasubjective (Sinner-God; Ego- Ego
Ideal; Student-Author) and transgressive (Slave-Master; Lover-Beloved; Child-Parent; Subject-Discourse.).
And it is clear enough from what we have discovered about the phenomenological and discursive nature
o f anonymity, that the source o f an author-itative technology o f s e lf is not always known or nameable. As
a technology of the self, autobiography, for example, attempts to create for a reader a continuous, authentic
history o f the self. This is o f course impossible: the writer can authorize his or her own personal
experience, but cannot access in any complete way all the actual or imagined authorities that comprise a
given "person." Not only do the forces o f personal or passionate identification vary, but also the senses of
authority being identified also vary in the intensity of their presence.
In keeping with the word's historical action, re-presenting the intersubjective "masks" o f one's "person"
through the practice o f writing is not so much an un-masking, as it is a mirroring, o f the self in the
otherness o f language itself. Arguably, it is the code o f language, not the revealed credo o f a person
somehow before and beyond that code, that is the source o f authority for personal identity.
Rose, in authentic Foucauldian language, imagines the pathway provided by the discourse o f authority
as being "... not a matter, therefore, o f narrating a general history o f the idea o f the person or self, but of
tracing the technical forms accorded to the relation to oneself in various practices..."(138).^
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As a "technical form" or "technique" o f authorizing self-other relations and distinctions, anonymous
writing is not, in the vast oceanic history o f w riting (as distinguished from the surface history o f author
ship) does not submerge the characterization o f subjectivity or personal identity. In keeping with the
originally problematic meaning of authority itself, anonymity awg7wen/'.y—proliferates—the identity and
identification o f the person. In doing so, anonymous writing experiments with the location and
provocation o f various authorities: "those who have authority " and "those subject to authority " (Rose,
146). How it does this, or why it has to be considered whenever we attempt to understand the meaning and
action o f authority, is a question taken up by Thomas Docherty in On Modem Authority: The Theory and
Condition o f W riting: 1500 to the Present Day.
Docherty opens his study o f modem authority by attacking E.D. Hirsch's now famous "intentionalist"
position and what Docherty calls his "authoritarian" model o f the author—the Author as God, singular,
unitary, unchanging. First Hirsch:
When we simply use an author's words for own purposes without respecting his [ric]
intention, we transgress...the ethics o f language, just as we transgress ethical norms when
we use another person merely for our own ends" (Docherty 22).
Docherty has trouble, as most of us do, with the idea that we—or rather, certain authorities such as Hirsch
standing in mediate relation to an Author—can divine the "original" intention o f a given author. More
troubling to Docherty is Hirsch's assumption about an author's sense o f private "property" rights to a
common discourse—the system of language itself.
Firstly, in a modem print culture the words in question are not 'the author's words’ in a
strictly possessive sense: the author, at most, "borrows' the words that the common
lexicon is generous or gracious enough to afford an author. The typographic font is a
public fountain, and cannot be drunk dry o f potential fluency or meaning as its words are
used up or 'possessed' by 'authors' (22).
This private/public split over language and a given author's property] rights to it becomes crucial to our
anxiety or suspicion about anonymous writing. Where is this language coming from? Why doesn't the
writer authorize his/her proper[tizing] name—in effect identify his/her authority to claim this language as
his/her own? Aside from the rhetorical motives o f protecting one's identity against authorities who might
punish—justly or unjustly—the writer for language so used, these questions move onto the larger question
of rhetorical—even disciplinary—indifference as a transgression of—a "violence" to—what is hermeneutically
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sealed and properly authoritative. Docherty extends his criticism o f the Hirsch-Bloom canonical purity
and propriety in this way.
But transgressive criticism...is seen as willful violence only from the point o f view o f a
consciousness which understands or accepts dogmatically that texts are monuments
(which must not be 'defaced'), monuments to the quasi-sanctity o f another consciousness,
that o f an author (who is to be 'obeyed' simply by dint o f being 'authoritative') (31).^
Once Docherty lays out the problems o f authority in his introduction, he opens Part One o f his book—
significantly titled "(Fe) male Authority"—with a subsection titled "Authority in Crisis: The Threat of
Female Emancipation." He covers the complexites o f private and public "properties" as these are tied up in
the "...none too devious etymology" o f authority. We find that Vico "explicitly linked 'property' to
'authority,' arguing a connection between autos (“self') and auctor (“author") on the "Renaissance" idea that
one is the privately "proper" owner/author o f one's own self. Whatever the legitimacy o f this liberty with
etymology, Docherty, believing that language in the abstract belongs to everyone and or to no one, it is the
writing, not the writer, that has and will hold "authority." In this connection, we need to look more closely
at the meaning of "author-ity" itself. And on this score, Docherty is quite democratic in his authoritative
unpacking o f the word's inter/intrasubjective relations to ‘identity’ as a 'property' o f the self.
The OED finds an alternative root for 'author1in augere, with its suggestion o f beginning
or increasing. Both etymologies [Vico's and the OED's] here bear fruit. Property certainly
gives some kind o f identity to its owner; the word itself does derive from proprius,
'related to one's self.' Property, then, does give the kind o f 'title' name or identity at
issue. But in order to retain such a name or identity, such an 'entitlement', the owner not
only reifies herself or himself in the 'property' but also must by definition strive to
solidify, increase or regenerate more o f this property in order for the name or identity to
remain stable. It is precisely this capitalistic 'title to property' that More is questioning,
among other things, in Utopia (60).
My reader will recall that what upset analysts Brubaker and Cooper so much about the problem o f identity
is that it had been claimed as the proper name for so many different kinds o f meanings and actions-of
entirely incommensurate discourses—that it has, in effect, been "authorized" (as in augmented) into a kind
o f "Utopia"—a conceptual Erewhon. As such, it continues to increase as the proper authority o f Everyone—
or No One. We have the eternal call for an autonomous and stable sense o f Identity. We have Docherty's
history o f Author-ity as requiring an equally strong sense of retaining and regenerating the Proper Name of
Male autonomy over discourse. Between these we can begin to see the problem that Anonymous Writers
(largely women, but also Other subject positions lacking authority)—began to (com)pose for the Authority
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o f Identity and the Identity o f Authority.^
Docherty titles part two o f his book, "Natural Authority" (with "Natural" crossed out). With the
augmentation and proliferation o f "Author-ity" opened up by female writing, Docherty begins to play
seriously with the idea o f an original or natural Authority. H does not propose an anonymous function as
being integral to this play within and against authority. He does make much —especially in Chapter Six,
titled "The Impossibility o f Authenticity"—o f "the struggle for authority" that has clearly emerged at the
beginning of the modem period (1650-1700 AD) and which continues today in so-called "post-modem"
terms. For,
[o]nce God and nature as a source of authentication o f authorities disappear, then what is
left is either tradition (a kind o f intertextual authority) or the authority o f the present
'individual talent' struggling both with and also against such a tradition. Some attempts
to rediscover authenticity, but again...[the acts o f "authoritative" interpretation had
proliferated beyond the point o f a pure hermeneutic return to the Word],
The stage was set, then, for the struggle o f authority which was much later to be
posed as fundamental philosophical question by Humpty-Dumpty, in another text where
the reflexive m irror plays a huge role, Lewis Carroll's Through the Looking-Glass :
'When / use a word', Humpty Dumpty said in rather a scornful tone, 'it means just what I
choose it to mean—neither more nor less.'
'The question is', said Alice, 'whether you can make words mean different things.'
'The question is', said Humpty Dumpty, 'which is to be master—that's all' (In Docherty,
228).

We all know what happened to Humpty Dumpty. The sense we got from our Chapter One analysis o f the
"master" term Identity is that it has, like Docherty's sense o f the master term o f Authority, "had a great
fall." If neither is "to be master" —even when there seems to have been a vigorous effort to shore them up
as an inter-textual construction within an emerging capitalist discourse of "property"—then naturally we
have to look to the "wall" which both have fallen from. In this chapter, "Towards a History of
Anonymity," I will be making the case that that Wall is none other than the "nomination barrier" whose
structure is a master function o f anonymity—"that's all."
Forster: Anonymous Information or Imagination?
Forty-four years before Michel Foucault opened and closed his essay "What is an Author?" with an
epigraph from Samuel Beckett's Texts fo r N othing

("What matters who's speaking?"), E.M. Forster

opened his essay "Anonymity: An Enquiry" with a less polemical, but similarly rhetorical question. "Do
you like to know who a book's by?" (7). His own answer—"The question is more profound and even more
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literary than m ay appear"—is supported fay an example that compares the difference between the "The
Rime o f the Ancient Mariner" and " The Ballad o f Sir Patrick Spens." The difference comes down to one
o f authorship, o f course. When we speak o f the former, we say "a poem by Coleridge," whereas, when we
speak o f the latter we say,

"a poem." He then asks, in an uncanny anticipation o f both Beckett and

Foucault, "What difference, if any, does this difference between them make upon our minds?"(7-8).
Forster contends in the next fifteen pages that ”[w]ords are all o f one family," but that they have two
fundamental functions: to convey information and to create atmosphere, "...and the combination o f those
functions is infinite" (12). He provisionally concludes "...that what is information ought to be signed; and
secondly, that what is not information need not be signed" (13). By "atmosphere" Forster means passion,
pathos'. ".. the power that words have to raise our emotions or quicken our blood. It is also something else,
and to define that other thing would be to explain the secret o f the universe" (13).
Forster does, o f course, attempt to define that "something else "—the Otherness o f that function. He
believes that "all literature," in its function to create "another world" "...tends towards a condition of
anonymity...."
It wants not to be signed.... It is always tugging in that direction and saying in effect: "I,
not my author, exist really...." It may here be objected that literature expresses
personality, that it is the result o f the author's individual outlook, that we are right in
asking for his [wc] name. It is his [sic] property—he [sic] ought to have the credit"(15).

Forster acknowledges that this is an important objection, but that it is "...also a modem one, for in the
past neither writers nor readers attached high importance to personality that they do today" (15). He then
reminds readers o f the vast anonymous writings that comprise the Greek Anthology and sweeps through, in
another anticipation o f Foucault (who suspiciously does not acknowledge Forster’s inquiry) by mentioning
the anonymous stretch o f the medieval period. Personal Authorship, he reminds us, "...troubled neither the
composers nor the translators of the Bible"; "...they did not make a cult of expression as we do to-day.
Surely they were right, and modem critics go too far in their insistence on personality" (16).
Forster then appeals to the findings o f Freud and Jung (still radical and fresh in 1925 for a host of
writers—Forster, Woolf, and James—experimenting with "stream o f consciousness" narratives that would be
pushed to the lim it by Beckett). The reason modem critics go too far in their insistence on the personal
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author is that they don't understand that like words, linguistic consciousness "...has two personalities,
one on the surface, one deeper down." The upper one "has a name." The lower one "is a very queer affair"
(16). He is quite puzzled by this lower personality, but without, he is sure that no literature could be
written, nor could it be read. Having delved into the phenomenology o f anonymity courtesy o f Schutz and
Natanson, we can at least speculate along with Forster that this "very queer affair" of a nameless voice, of
words without a speaker, o f a passionate otherness "...is in any case the force that makes for anonymity"
(17).
Forster ends his inquiry into anonymity pretty much the way he began it. But he makes some close
and rapid connections that point to the reason that Foucault can "imagine all discourse unfolding in a
pervasive anonymity" at the conclusion o f "What is an Author?"
We decided pretty easily that information ought to be signed: common sense leads to
this conclusion, and newspapers which are largely unsigned have gained by that device
their undesirable influence over civilization.... [As for literature,] [w]hile the author wrote
he [s/c] forgot his [sic] name; while we read him [s/c] we forget both his[s/c] name and
our own" (22).
Common sense does seem to confirm what Forster is saying about the act o f deep reading—any reading of
anything, not just literature, in my experience. The anonymity, as we learned from Natanson becomes
reciprocal, a passionate enclave in which the otherness o f the text o f nobody—for nobody—is revealed and in
which we revel. I make no plea for this mastering force o f anonymity in the way that Forster does. I
simply point the reader to the uncanny community his notion o f the imagination shares with Natanson's
more obscure and dry phenomenological treatment o f "passion for the other in the enclave that anonymity
provides."
My plea is for something more vital: imagination.... Whether those words are signed or
unsigned becomes, as soon as the imagination redeems us, a matter o f no importance,
because we have approximated to the state in which they were written, and there are no
names down there, no personality as we understand personality, no marrying or giving in
marriage. What is down there—ah, that is another enquiry...(23).
It is an odd phrasing Forster uses—"no marrying or giving in marriage"—in connection to the
community o f anonymous writer and reader in that No Where o f the imagination. But it does suggest a
sense o f author-ity that is expressed, augmented, proliferated beyond the claims o f personal identity. I read
Forster's essay as a serious play/plea for more anonymous imagination (if such were possible) and less
identification and explanation. He was, after all, a literary author whose writings have become famous
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for their characters' sense of solitary otherness, tHieir search for a passionate private enclave, in the world.
It is no surprise that he links redemption to imagirxiation (a position at least as old as poetry itself).
More surprising is the idea that redemption iss therefore available in the anonymity that provides this
primary imagination. But his plea for the mastery* and mystery o f anonymity is also a ploy, since he does
not, much like Beckett and Foucault, test the limirts o f his plea by leaving his own works unsigned. (But
personal credit must be given, as history will Ibe forgiven, until the monstrous/mountainous authorfunction is folded once again into its original anon~ymous care and core.

Foucault: The fin) Difference of Anonvmitv
The scope o f this chapter permits only a scan o f anonymity’s ancient literary “author-ity.” I will look at
anecdotes from three universally "representative" tlexts: The Epic o f Gilgamesh; the Book o f Genesis; the
Odyssey. A historically minded reader o f the truly Old school might reasonably expect some attempt at a
"genealogical" account of, say, the number, frequenncy, and periodization o f pseudonyms, or the presence of
the category "Anonymous" as an archival marker aacross literary, musical, and artistic antiquities. But as we
saw in Chapter Two any historical account or ""moment" o f Anonymity, and o f the "Anonymous" in
particular, requires a "critical" rather than a genealor-gical approach. (Or, what is required to best understand
the anonymous function is an awareness that it reverses and exchanges the rules and themes o f each
approach to history until naming and identifying g iv e way to reflection and imagination.)
The only "genealogical" approach we might taEce must be with regard to what Thomas Docherty calls
“absent characters.” Or it could be framed by what: Nikolas Rose calls a discontinuous history o f the ‘the
person’ (with emphasis, by my lights, on the Fresnch sense o f personne as the m ask o f “nobody” or “no
one”). “God,” as developed and deployed by tlhe anonymous writers and compositors o f The Old
Testament, is the most “original” o f this line o f ccharacters in the Western hermeneutic/literary tradition.
“His son,” Jesus o f Nazareth, developed and deployed by named writer-disciples, would be next in a
genealogical line. (Anonymity and absent character in The New Testament is beyond the scope o f this
chapter, however.)
Though counter-intuitive, the genealogical senses is a smaller circle within the much wider circle drawn
by a "critical approach. A critical sense, according; to Foucault, "sets the reversal-principle to work." The
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first and most obvious consequence o f setting it to work in a history o f the anonymous is that
nominalism—theories o f the name, and o f the proper name most significantly—becomes anomalous. That is,
when anonymity takes a proper name, it takes on one name only—Anonymous—and that name deviates
from and subverts the general rule and regime o f nominalism/*
Anonymous is a proper name, which earns the capital letter o f a true name even though it merely
classifies unknown writers, does not isolate the unique qualities o f properly named authors, and can be
prefixed by an or the. My basis for this conclusion remains stable even if the signature) o f (the)
Anonymous destabilizes the norms o f identity and identification. Anonymity is always-already
demonstrating the principle o f reversal, radiating the logic o f both/and, rather than one o f either/or. Any
history o f anonymity, therefore, would need to proceed not in some linear, narrative form, but must
showcase anecdotes that tell us o f its antiquity, its poetry, and its mysterious "indifference."
It is this last quality—anonymity's power o f indifference—that upsets our customary assumptions about
the power o f names and o f naming. Considered as a proper name, Anonymous designates a person who is
unknown because unnamed. But it also describes a "work" that can be known, obviously, but cannot be
attributed and codified under the normative proprietary regimes o f Foucault’s Author-Function. The
anonymous work, cannot, in other words, be Properly Named. More critical than what constitutes the
"work" o f the Author, is the answer to his more specific question, "What is the name o f an author?" That
question must always beg its critical other: What is the name o f Anonymous? Forster tells us the answer to
that question is "the secret o f the universe." Schutz and Natanson, more sure o f themselves as a
phenomenologists, tells us over and over again the name is not important, it is the levels o f anonymity
that provide our nominalizing distinctions and orientations in both private and public terms.
The origin, departure, and destination o f anonymous discourse might strike the reader as artificial and
abstract. Foucault makes them rather more concrete in “What is an Author?" (completed two years before
"The Discourse on Language" and later collected in Language, Counter-Memory, Practice, 1977). He does
so by all but concluding that the Author is ultimately anonymous. A s we saw in my commentary on
Foucault's work on discourse in Chapter Two, he radically demoted the author to one o f twelve principles
and themes. My ultimate take on the implications of that post-structural dispersion o f the authorial
subject's authority is that it resoundingly affirms the power o f anonymity according to Foucault’s own use
o f it to account for "discourse."
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One of the more interesting interpretive outcomes o f "What is an Author?" is that the answer
Foucault provides to that titular question is itself a question in the form o f an epigraph that he repeats at
the end o f the essay. The question is taken from Samuel Beckett's little monological study Texts fo r
Nothing—a run up to his famous tetraolgy o f anonymously voiced experiments whose final work is titled
The Unnamable. The question, as written in Beckett’s original text, reads: "What matter who's speaking,
someone said, what matter who's speaking." Foucault finds this tidbit from Beckett significant enough to
assert that
[i]n an indifference such as this we must recognize one o f the fundamental ethical
principles o f contemporary writing. ...[T]t stands as an immanent rule, endlessly adopted
and yet never fully applied (139).
Needless to say, most o f us, regardless o f our disciplinary (and therefore institutional) affiliations, believe
that the answer to that question is no matter o f indifference at all—that it makes a vast difference not only
to know, or to identify who is speaking/ writing, but to maintain that identity$
Foucault uses the occasion o f the Beckett epigraph to create his own detour from some standardized
remarks about authorial status and his "research into authenticity and attribution" so as to restrict himself
"to the singular relationship that holds between an author and a text" (139). In trying to restrict himself
thus, Foucault draws forth four major "themes" concerning the "author.” These Themes are 1) Rhetorical
Indifference; 2) Authorial Death; 3) Naming the Author; and 4) Authorial Function. Under each o f these
themes he sets forth at least two major theses so as to illustrate and elaborate their categorical importance.
Thus, Rhetorical Indifference involves the ascent o f writing itself that creates "an opening where the
writing subject endlessly disappears" (139). Rhetorical Indifference also points up "the kinship between
writing and death” (139).
According to Foucault, this kinship is important enough that it be recapitulated as the second major
theme: "the author's death." The concepts o f the "work" and o f ecriture (or Writing as a transcendental
God-term whose presence is, as Derrida has shown, an absence) serve to illustrate this second major theme
(140).
The third theme involves the complex problem o f how "The name o f an author" emerges from authorial
death, disappearance, and absence. Its theses concern the Proper Name, and its complex, heterogeneous
relation to the name o f the author (141).
The fourth theme spells out the "author-function" under four theses: the author as a feature of "property"
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rights (and proprietary rites); as a historical feature that "is not universal or constant in all
discourse"(143); as a projective secular feature (and literary future) o f "Christian exegesis" (143) that (as a
counter to the third thesis) was concerned with establishing the authenticity and uniformity of authorial
authority; and finally, as a performative feature wherein the author-function "operates so as to effect the
simultaneous dispersion of...three egos" (145).
In a series o f hypothetical questions that constitute the essay's last paragraphs, however, Foucault
outlines the kind of critical history that would have to be written not about the author-function, but rather,
about the function of the anonymous (though he does not state this directly). As we have seen in my
previous analysis, anonymity bears a problematic relation to our more important "holding terms" of
discourse. A critical account o f what really involves what we often believe to be the author’s exclusive
discursive coordinates—identity, authority, and ultimately, community— actually help us locate the
anonymous (though Foucault does not say so.)
The end o f "What is an Author?” speculates briefly on "the absolute nature and creative role o f the
subject" (148). (And, as we now know, he picks up this reconsideration two years later in "The Discourse
on Language"). What Foucault is asking (for) at the end o f "What is an Author?" is not that the discourse
o f the subject "be entirely abandoned" but rather that it "(and its substitutes)...be stripped o f [their] creative
role and analyzed as a complex and variable function of discourse." This means that the "author-function"
is "only one o f the possible specifications o f the subject" (148). What all o f this means for attempting a
critical anecdotal history of the anonymous through the work o f the reversal principle is that when we tally
up the functional relations o f author, subject, and discourse we discover the following hypothesis:
A)
B)
C)
D)
E)

The subject is a function o f discourse.
The author-function is a species o f the subject.
In writing (and Writing) the subject writing endlessly disappears.
The historically significant, but highly mutable, "presence" o f the author must therefore
"endlessly disappear," as it were, given the significant "absence" o f the anonymous
specification of the subject. This yields
wherefrom
[wje can easily imagine a culture where discourse would circulate without the need for an
author. Discourses, whatever their status, form, or value, and regardless o f our manner of
handling them, would unfold in a pervasive anonymity (148, emphasis added).

Following the logic of Foucault's conclusions, I could not be accused o f jumping to an untoward
conclusion that a history o f the anonymous should begin with our own discursive present. It could focus
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exclusively on the Internet, the Worldwide Web, Electronic Mail, never mind traditional media such as
the daily newspaper, radio, and television. In doing so w e could revise Foucault's "we can easily
imagine.~a pervasive anonymity" to read: "A pervasive anonymity easily realizes us." Forster, as we saw,
had pretty much concluded this in his "enquiry"—except he was not cognizant o f discourse as a totalizing
"god-term."; his was the old fall back o f an anonymizing "imagination." Foucault, though more “poststructural” bears a similar sense o f anonymity as structural to the imagination.^
The truly critical approach to a history of the anonymous however must pay attention to some o f the
themes a n d theses Foucault has outlined in his own historical outline o f the author. Such attention m ust
have as th eir object works o f literature first and foremost, and the more "well known" the better so as to
highlight their unknown specifications. In the sections following in which I take up issues o f authority and
the anonymous function within that problematic discourse, I will apply various strains and combinations
o f Foucault’s author-function themes and theses. I have chosen for my analyses The Book o f Genesis, The
Epic o f G ilgamesh, and The Odyssey so that we can begin to understand the problem of originality and the
growth o f what mean by authority from some presumed Origin, can not be understood apart from an
anonymous function, the “other” side o f an author-function
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The Genesis o f Anonvmitv

Anonymity’s Shifting “I”
The last thesis in Foucault’s outline o f the author-fimction—performativity—most easily reverses itself so
as to constitute the anonymous-function through what he calls “pronoun shifters.” Foucault rehashes this,
one o f the certitudes o f literary analysis (but one which always freezes first year English majors with looks
of amazement or disbelief) in this way. In a more complex and variable text with an author (his example is
the "novel"), [i]t is well known that...[when narrated] in the first person, neither the first person pronoun,
the present indicative tense, nor for that matter, its signs o f localization refer directly to the writer, either to
the time when he wrote, or to the specific act o f writing... (144).
In effect, trying to link author with his or her choice o f a narrative voice is like trying to identify an
official who agrees to speak to the public on condition o f anonymity. There is an element of the
unrecognizable and unacknowledged (with the stress on recognition and knowledge) in the whole business
of voice that at the very least lends itself to considering the force and function o f anonymity. Crudely,
what Foucault is repeating bears repeating according to my terms: The fir s t person pronoun— the “I"
Junction— is an anonymous Junction. It might seem that I am leaping before looking more deeply at
Foucault. But further on he mentions the effect o f "shifters" (144)—that is, personal pronouns—which do
not refer, purely and simply, to an actual individual insofar as it simultaneously gives rise to a variety of
egos and to series o f subjective positions that individuals o f any class may come to occupy" (145).
The obvious and natural existence of authorial projection and impersonation o f “personae” (otherwise called
“characters”) in texts remains for many people a sure sign that the “imagination” is a real phenomenon. It
has psychological and sociological routes that cross and merge into that continuous cultural traffic that
Foucault, as we saw in chapter one, would sum up as the “discourse o f language.” Anonymity plays across
the dispersion and performance of these subjective/discursive positions.
For a powerful sense o f how the theses anonymity’s proper name and its shifting claim on/of a
subjective position, the responsible analyst is actually required to go back to the beginning o f literature.
Genesis, however, much a Bloomian mistake, a deliberate, belated misreading o f w hat it means to begin,
is aptly named for illustrating these theses. (G ilgam esh, on the other hand, is better suited for elucidating
anonymity’s work o f writing (im)mortality.)

90

R e p ro d u c e d with perm ission of th e copyright owner. Further reproduction prohibited without permission.

After laying out his themes and theses o f the author-function, Foucault never asserts outright that he
is really inquiring into the reversal o f that function-that he is really answering my question: “What is the
anonymous function?” What he flirts with in the final paragraphs I m ust radically assert and defend, lest I
have no thesis. The Anonymous, itself an Ideal or Transcendental signifier (though, in keeping with its
empirical gradient, remains unnamed and unknown as such) makes not only the name o f the author, but all
proper (more toward propertied or proprietary) names possible. Under the critical principle o f reversal, then,
it has the capacity to make real, empirical, liberatory inroads into how we use and abuse our so-called
identities, our questionable authorities, and our fragile communities.
Furthermore, like any controlling historical category, anonymity cuts a both/and swath: it is both
present and absent, public and private, open and closed, protective and hurtful. In my historical scan of
three primordial texts, we will see early indications of both valences. As a matter of historical analysis of
primordial texts, anonymity has been both a burr under the saddle and the horse that lets the historian
(literary or otherwise) ride over the (non)identity of those writers responsible for the world's oldest
writings. Again, Foucault makes the definitive historical case while making yet again the ulterior argument
that anonymity's constancy undercuts the pervasiveness o f" the "author" as a function o f discourse."
[T]he "author-function" is not universal or constant in all discourse. Even within our
civilization, the same types o f texts have not always required authors; there was a time
when those texts which we call "literary" (stories, folk tales, epics, and tragedies) were
accepted, circulated, and valorized without any question about the identity o f their
author. Their anonymity was ignored because their real or supposed age was a sufficient
guarantee o f their authenticity (143).
The "authors" of the Gilgamesh, o f The Bible, and The Odyssey (despite the customary attribution to
“Homer”) are unknown. As Foucault states, their anonymity is accepted, circulated, and valorized.^ My
task is to reverse the ignorance o f history: to not ignore anonymity; to try to know its function; and take to
heart part o f Foucault's nay saying at the end o f "What is an Author?": "No longer the tiresome repetitions:
"Who is the real author?" Instead, we must apply one o f his alternative questions: "What placements are
determined for possible subjects" (148)— subjects made possible not by the author-function, but by the
anonymous-function.
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Analyzing the Anonymous Authority o f Genesis
In order to take on Genesis as one o f the representative anecdotes o f the anonymous-function, for example,
I find it impossible to free myself from Foucault's designations. The rhetorical situation in this piece of
primordial writing fits exactly with his general sense that a human author's empirical activity has been
"effaced to allow the play, in parallel or opposition, o f religious and critical modes o f characterization."
That fact o f effacement grants "a primordial status to [the] writing" in and o f itse lf as I understand and
adapt Foucault. The fact o f authorial anonymity in Genesis also (un)knowingiy "sustains the privileges of
the author" by extending them "within a grey neutrality" (which I would equate with the "presence" o f God
as "fundamental" Author.) I therefore know o f no better opportunity for engaging in the play o f oppositions
and parallels between the author and the anonymous than in a primordial text such as G enesis. Its empirical
author has been effaced, yet extended under an "Author" whose unspeakable name, according to Jewish
orthodoxy, lends it an anonymity whose transcendence acts as a "check" on the disappearance o f the author
function.
The rhetorical situation in Genesis—the nature o f what Lloyd Bitzer would call its "exigency"—is one
where anonymity stands in place o f the conception o f writing which Foucault argues "sustains the
privileges o f the author through the safeguard o f the a priori" (141). Since the empirical author of Genesis
is primarily interested to establish the a priori existence o f "God" as Author of The Book o f Life, the role
of anonymity in safeguarding this conception becomes so critical as to appear integral, indivisible, and
original to that existence. Hermeneutics, originally the art o f interpreting "holy" scripture, has long since
become a set piece o f secular humanistic exegesis.
One lesson Harold Bloom has learned from the ^response to his ideas about interpretation as deliberate
misreading is that there are no purely secular texts, because canonization [of this or that text] by the secular
academies is not merely a displaced version o f Jew ish o f Christian or Moslem canonization. It is precisely
the thing itself, the investment of a text with unity, presence, form, meaning, followed by the insistence
that the canonized text possesses these attributes immutably, quite apart from the interpretive activities of
the academies (Bloom 293). I suppose I am trying to make the case for the canonization o f anonymity, if
only for its immutable "presence" as a form o f absence. Its presence, form, and m eaning in a canonical
exemplum such as Genesis (a text notoriously

lacking in "unity") do however require academic

interpretation.
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I liken my reliance on Foucault's historical synopsis o f the author-function to interpret
anonymity's apriori presence to that o f the physician's need for machines that reveal the body's interior (e.g.
x-ray, CAT Scan, MRI). In addition to the conceptions o f death, writing and o f the work, two other
Foucauldian ways of seeing anonymity are the theme o f the author's "proper name" and the thesis o f
pronoun "shifters." I adapt and combine these to try to answer my adaptation o f one o f Foucault's "new"
questions: "What placements are determined for possible [anonymous] subjects?" Genesis, in particular,
resonates to the theme o f the author’s proper name, as well as to the thesis o f the role o f personal pronouns
or "shifters" with respect to the unnamed "person" of a given author.
My reading o f certain passages in Genesis is a direct response to these ethical imperatives to a better
understanding o f the author-function. And, in taking seriously a critical approach to a history o f the
anonymous, its principle o f reversal enables me to see in the shifts and disappearances in authorial point of
view and presence the emergence o f the anonymous-function. But before we look at particular sections o f
Genesis that illustrate what I mean by "the anonymous-function," The Author o f the Book of Books,
following Foucault's conclusion, would therefore represent the ultimate retainer o f societal discourse. (That
all hotel rooms in the nation have a Bible in the drawer of the bedside table, that our national currency and
pledge o f allegiance feature the name o f "God", attests to a thoroughgoing, if now largely formulaic,
retention o f discursive author-ity.) But what exactly is the proper placement o f this authorial subject?
Our initial attempt at an answer might well start with Genesis 1:3: "And God said, Let there be light:
and there was light." When we read this, we assume what any grammarian assumes. The writer (unnamed)
is recounting what someone named "God" (or what the Greeks called "Logos") first spoke as the first real
speaker in a universe o f discourse to come. This writer's point o f view is ironically "omniscient" and
technically profane: God, supposedly the eternally present, transhistorical First and Last Person to turn the
lights on and off, is presented in the "third person" past tense. This mere writer has the first word in 1:1-2.
"Anonymous" presents God, supernatural Author of creation, as any natural author would with a given
character created through a chosen point o f view. The Babylonian Epic o f Creation not nearly so old as
Gilgamesh, but much older than G enesis also has an anonymous author whose third person point o f view
creates an aura o f author-ity. Interestingly, that author (or rather, an incorporated group o f scholar-scribes)
makes no bones about divine Identity at all. The "First Tablet" begins this way:
When on high the heavens were not named,
And beneath a home bore no name...;
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...When none o f the gods had been brought into being,
And they were not named, and fates were not fixed,
Then were created the gods in the midst thereof (Langdon 67).
Anonymous and Anonymity were both the form o f discourse and the discourse o f the void in this epic o f
creation. Orthodox believers or plain allocentric secularist might claim that Genesis, because it begins in
nomination, represents an advance in Self-Other consciousness over the Epic o f Creation. I believe that the
anonymous function begs to differentiate) itself from a Profane/Sacred binary.
With Genesis, historically considered, we intuit a scribe (or more likely, a group of scribes) names
unknown, who trans-scribed the tale o f a nomadic tribe with an anonymous oral tradition o f long
precedent. Their anonymous transcriptions, recounting a local community's origins, author-ized the textual
identity o f that community's implied Author-Function(ary). Even a cursory reading o f Genesis reveals gaps
and contradictions in plot and character continuity that signal the collective and patchwork activity ofmaiy
writers over the course o f the book's final development. Somehow, however, in face o f all human
discursive activity prior to and following its creation, this "epic" o f Judaeo-Christian tradition has managed
to claim for itself a divine author-ity. Part o f the reason it has been able to do so, I will argue, is the way
its "anonymous-function" was parlayed into a projection o f an ultimate Author. This Author, as
transcendental signifier, is imagined to hold a copyright on human discourse itself. Yet all historical
evidence confirms that anonymous authorship was the generic, normative expectation o f textual production
beginning in Mesopotamia some two thousand years before the appearance o f Genesis &
The external source evidence of the anonymous function is a sine qua non o f ancient studies. More will
be said about the cultural pervasiveness o f anonymity in the ancient world when I consider the Epic o f
Gilgamesh below. Our concern is with the plausibility that ancient "literary" texts internalized the external,
perdurable culture o f anonymity through the "novel" application o f such literary devices and licenses as
point o f vision, projection o f voice, and the predication o f value. This trinity, I believe, has much to do
with the emergence o f omniscient "third person" poetics as a central marker o f our first literary texts.
In Genesis this omniscient third person past tense formation continues through 1:25, enabling the
reader to see what God saw, thus creating the artifice o f God in/as the first person: "And God made the
beasts o f the earth...: and God saw that it was good." But then a remarkable shift occurs in 1:26 that
continues through 1:29. It is this section we will focus on deeply, using Foucault's fourth criterion o f the
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author-function, the effect o f "shifters" (144). These are personal pronouns that do "not refer, purely and
simply, to an actual individual insofar as it simultaneously gives rise to a variety o f egos and to series of
subjective positions that individuals o f any class may come to occupy" (145).
Genesis 1:26 begins this way: "And God said, Let us make man in our image, after our likeness:..."
1:29 begins this way: "And God said, Behold, / have given you every herb bearing seed..." (emphases
added.) The sudden appearance o f these personal pronouns needs to be considered in concentric circular
terms. The smaller circle radiates the terms Foucault has set forth as illustrative o f the author-function as a
series ofsubject(ive) positions. The larger circle circum-scribes what I argue is the "anonymous-function"—
the author-function's negative image, nemesis, or genetic "counter memory" (to adapt Foucault’s coinage)
o f those subject positions.
Whether we are critical thinkers or unquestioning believers, the odd use o f the plural pronouns "us” and
"our" in 1:26 tells us several things. In Foucault's language, God's subject position is not at all stable,
comprising, at the very least "a "second self' whose similarity to the author is never fixed and undergoes
considerable alteration within the course o f a single book" (144). God is first represented as a third person,
a re-creation o f an actual but anonymous writer. God is then presented, at a minimum, as having a double
presence, (or in Catholic exegesis, this early passage is "testament" to his "three-personed" Godhead.) We
should logically assume that this second, third, or plural sense o f se lf does not refer to our anonymous
writer.^ The "discourse" o f Genesis is linked not to a mere scribe or immediate author, but to a
"fundamental" Author. But once we perform this identification, Foucault assures us that "the role of
"shifters" is more complex and variable" than in texts without an author.
The appearance o f the "I" shifter at the end o f Genesis 1—"Behold, I have given you...."— coincides
with the creation of human beings: "male and female he created them. " This "I" shift is used by the
immediate writer o f Genesis to indicate God's fundamental authority, while indicating he is shifting from
monological to dialogical speech, since he has just created the very first listeners or dialogical counterparts
(still in a nascent condition o f anonymity and non-speech).
In chapter two of Genesis the writer returns to a third person omniscient point o f view as God creates,
but does not name, the "Garden o f Eden." The writer reporting this activity does not shift to the "I" and
have God name Eden's four rivers; the writer does this. Similarly, in 2:17 the writer reports that God "took
the man and put him into the garden o f Eden." This writer has God command the unnamed man not to eat
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o f from the tree o f knowledge (whereas the unnamed woman, created at the same time as the man
according to the writer in Chapter 1, has become a non-creature.)
Suddenly, in 2:18, the writer has God speak o f the man's aloneness and shifts to the "I": "I will make
him a help meet for him." Just as suddenly, the w riter reports in 2:19 that God has brought all the beasts
o f the field "unto Adam to see what he would call them: and whatsoever Adam called every living creature,
that was the name thereof." It is to this act o f naming that we will now turn to develop the elentic side of
another o f Foucault's themes o f the author-function. We must keep in mind our critical project o f reversing
his themes' polarity so that we might trace the hidden transdiscursive power o f the anonymous-function.
(The reader who dismisses this attempt at reversal will see my thesis as nothing m ore than a slavish
dependence upon the author-function.) But as we know, the question that opens and closes Foucault's
examination o f the author-function appears to confirm the anonymous function: "What matters who's
speaking?
The poststructuralist thinker who is trying to apply a critical, rather than a genealogical, view of the
author-function, is presented with a very unstable situation in applying the principle o f reversal to these
opening passages o f Genesis. Again, we don't know the identity o f the writer o f Genesis. This anonymous
scribe's use o f shifters, however, could lead us to believe that the character, "God", is the text's true author.
In pursuit o f our critical principle o f reversal let's assume this belief to be true, particularly so when the
text's pronoun "shifters" ("signs that refer to the author") shift from "us" to "I". According to Foucault, in
this more complex and variable text with an author (his example is the "novel"),
[i]t is well known that...[when narrated] in the first person, neither the first person
pronoun, the present indicative tense, nor for that matter, its signs o f localization refer
directly to the writer, either to the time when he wrote, or to the specific act o f writing...
(144).
I realize we are ourselves shifting—or continuously reversing—the subject positions o f natural and
supernatural "writer." Let's see if we can freeze this movement a moment and come to a conclusion that
advances our argument about the anonymous-function as superordinate, rather than subordinate, to the
author-function.
If we are referring to the natural writer, we can see that Foucault's description applies quite well. In fact,
our anonymous writer’s decision to shift to the "I" shifter is an unambiguous sign that not he (or "she,”
according to Harold Bloom, below) but that the Author, God, is doing the narrating. But Foucault also
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tells us, as I pointed out above, that these first person elements "stand as a "second self’ whose
similarity to the author is never fixed...." So we m ust reach the same conclusion whether we assume a
natural writer behind Genesis or a supernatural Author. That conclusion is this: The identity o f the Author,
never mind that o f the actual writer o f Genesis depends upon anonymity to sustain the authoritarian
privileges o f the author-function as it has come down and enveloped through history.
Furthermore, if the reader will grant even a shred o f credibility to my contention that the anonymousfunction is the binary other o f the author-function, then that same reader will appreciate my interpolations
to the following critical distinction as made by Foucault. I f the "true"" author is at least doubly
anonymous, then
[i]t would be as false to seek [God,] the [Transcendentally Anonymous,] author in
relation to the actual [anonymous] writer as to the fictional narrator [named "God" by the
actual anonymous writer]; the "author-function" [and so too the suppressed "anonymousfunction"] arises out o f their scission—in the division and distance o f the two (144).
So we have a mysterious, yet masterful division in Genesis between writer, author, and fictional narrator
(with theology claiming o f course that God is the person behind all three). We also have a distance between
the author-function and its anonymous counterpart. This total scission cuts across the philosophy and the
politics of Identity, and fo ld s the subject position o f the writer so seamlessly into the act o f writing that he
or she endlessly shifts or dis-appears, as can be seen in these opening passages from a founding narrative.
The meaning o f Genesis under the logic o f the anonymous function is the authorization o f the Identity of
the human with the Authority o f creative self-expression. The ambiguous dis-appearance o f shifters in
Genesis, particularly the "I", points up the thesis o f an anonymous subjective performance—o f anonymity
as the original subject position which is crucial to this book’s performative "genetics."
Basil Cottle's study, Nam es, can help us get a hold on what Plato was originally up to in his critique
o f nominalism via The C ratylus. Cottle is cognizant o f the scission o f the Identity/Anonymity binary in
that he finds it "an odd concept—that Man's naming o f creatures confirmed their subjection to him" (11).
We can extend our "genetic" understanding o f the discourse o f the anonymous and its radical power o f
reversal. When it comes to considering the meaning o f the Name o f the A.uthor, we should think o f the
ambiguity and elision o f personal pronouns in Genesis as a problem o f subject positioning and subjection
o f others.
That is, an anonymous "immediate" human author has represented "God" as the Author o f the Human.
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This ultimate Author then names "Adam" ("first man"), who is then authorized to name all subject
creatures (including "Eve"—literally "serpent" and "garden"). We then find ourselves as readers pondering
the following pentagon. First, we have an unnamed group o f (im)mediate writers. Second, these writers
create a character and project it as a fundamental Author. Third, this Author is made to make and name
Man. Fourth, Man names Woman "Serpent in the Garden" because, fifth, she transgressed the authorial
power subjection through naming by provoking knowledge through language and therefrom the authority
of subjectivity.
Eve's eating o f the fruit from the tree o f knowledge was a transgressive, liberatory act. God considered
the power o f naming knowledge enough. The power o f Logos, reserved to him, was prohibited to those
created in his own image. Eve altered existing power relations. She chose what Foucault would call the
"unthought" or "what is prohibited " ("The Discourse on Language", 149). She chose actual "thinking"
over Adamic "knowledge" (naming things without any sense o f signature, event, or context.) Her
independent discursive act (not in speaking to God's nemesis, but dialoguing with her own daemon)
transformed her "subjection" (under God's control) into a subject position (self-knowledge).
In effect, Eve's transgression toward an actual Identity unveiled the Transcendent Anonymity of God
and the Empirical Anonymity o f his proxy, Adam. Eve becomes the first postructuralist, or denier of the
transcendental tradition. Her transgression was not an exclusively feminist act, but in fact the first act of
liberatory secular humanism. Her punishment, under the principle o f reversal, was to become an unthought,
anonymous, while Adam was given the power of subjection over her which God once held over him: "and
thy desire shall be to thy husband, and he shall rule over thee" (Genesis. 3:16). The feminist mission has
been to uncover and reverse this act o f anonymization o f "Woman" ever since Eve.
But I digress from our central concern. It is the anonymity o f the human author o f Genesis which
creates the character o f an Author who occupies, in Foucault's terms, "a "transdiscursive" position" ("What
is an Author?" 145). This subject position is the absence o f subjectivity even as it is supercharged with the
presence o f subjection. Cottle reminds us that this transdiscursive position (a./fca. "The God o f the Jews")
"was known to have a Name, but it was unspeakable as His Face was invisible, and only its four
consonants, which Greeks called the Tetragrammaton, were displayed" (3 1 ).^ From the discursive "getgo" o f Genesis, then, anonymity was an integral part o f the socially taboo, or prohibited practices that
made its writing possible. The Name o f God, an originating prohibition, turns out to be The Name of the
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Anonymous.
So even though the immediate author o f Genesis will remain forever unnamed and unknown, his/her
transdiscursive persona will always be known—but never definitively, properly Named. (Or rather viceversa.) This double, triple, or up to Eve—quintuple (and therefore quintessentially troubled) undecidabilxty
about the subject(ion) o f discursive author-ity in Genesis leads Cottle to make a wry observation. "But
leave the Godhead unnamed, the monotheist might argue, and you give the lie to the old quip about man's
making God in his own image" (37). And yet, as we have seen, it is not implausible to assume that the
willed anonymity o f a human author (what George Eliot would call "anonymous heroism”) was
instrumental in impressing upon history the image o f an anonymous God who cannot be definitively
named or known. The name of God, as a truth effect o f both faith and reason, is the unthought that reverses
itself into the god o f the Name Prohibited, leaving us to weigh (and inveigh against) the "genetic"
authority o f Anonymous.

Anonvmitv: Deictic Deitv or Everyday Elentic?

I have been stressing in my initial look at the text of Genesis the ambiguities o f Identity and Anonymity,
o f Writer and Author, and their intersections: the Anonymity o f Authority, the Writer's (Non)Identity. I
have also been toying with the text under the assumption that those signifiers or shifters, which refer to the
author, are as much or more at play than in other, more belated texts. W e get a sense o f the undifferentiated
quality o f these authorial indices, and find it difficult to settle the question o f whether or not the text o f
Genesis is with or without an Author. Yet at the same time we know for sure that the writer is deeply
anonymous, and the attribution o f official authorship will remain forever unnamed and unknown for all but
the true believer and Jesuitical exegete.
This pervasive ambiguity makes it truly difficult to come on board w ith Foucault and state categorically
that the themes and theses o f "the author-function" are operating normatively in Genesis. And, if there is
something deviant about Genesis, we can, under the law o f binary operations, argue that "the anonymousfunction" is in the ascendancy in this historic text. Finally, if anonymity is functioning with so high a
profile in one o f the world's acknowledged Ur texts or master narratives, it might be necessary to grant a
greater sense of history to the structure and function o f the anonymous in a ll writing.
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Before I move to the next Biblical passage to illustrate another o f Foucault’s themes o f the authorfunction under the blacklight o f the anonymous, there is one more acute angle to measure within the
distinction between what Foucault is calling the "author-function" and the "actual writer.” He tells us that
if the text does not have an author, its shifters "refer to a real speaker and to an actual deictic situation,
with certain exceptions such as the case of an indirect speech in the first person" (144). As we have seen,
the "real" speaker referred to in the Bible is a person named "God." This speaker is re-presented through an
"omniscient" point o f view, referred to in the third person, past tense frame.
The rhetorical reality o f this speaker is clear and convincing enough to those who participate in both
private and public rhetorical situations. The outstanding example, given our present subject, is that God is
believed to be, or at least invoked as, a real speaker in the Churches as well as in all 50 State Houses and
the U.S. Congress through the genre of "prayer." I have more or less settled the question o f whether
Genesis has an author. (It does not; it has an anonymous writer who creates the subject position o f a real
speaker through the ambiguity o f personal pronoun shifters.) It is logical to conclude therefore that the
moniker "God" is not a reference to "a real speaker." As a transdiscursive element however, "God" is
spoken to and is believed to be listening. As the one and only "superaddressee" (a function that, according
to Bakhtin, carries a high degree o f anonymity) God transcends dialogical common sense. This absent, yet
ideal, listener gets repositioned as the speaker o f whatever "house" one cares to metonymize: at home, in
church—from the State o f the Nation to the state o f the soul.
Before us is the consideration o f whether the appearance o f the shifter "I" in Genesis refers to "an actual
deictic situation." "Deictic" (from the ancient Greek, "to show") is defined as "capable o f direct proof; of
showing or pointing out directly." Foucault chose the term because it is a standard grammatical reference
in dealing with personal pronouns: pronouns differ from nouns in that they are essentially deictic. I like the
term because it provides an opportunity for unparalleled play on deity. There is no etymological common
ground between the Greek deiknynai ("to show") and the Greek root for "god." The deictic problems of
identity and authorship in Genesis do however stem from the ambiguity o f deity. The pronominal shifts
between the third and first persons make it difficult for God "to show" up in the text, except as a subject
position. If anything, my cursory analysis o f the he/I/our shifters suggests the logical opposite o f a deictic
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situation. The "absence" o f God in Genesis is an elentic situation—"serving to refute" "his" rhetorical
reality and, following the meaning o f the original Greek, elenchein, permits the interested reader "to cross
examine" the text over and against Foucault's categorical definition.
We are now left with the very important exception that Foucault supplies. I f the shifters in Genesis do
not in fact refer to a real speaker or to a deictic situation, that must mean that there is an author. But
perhaps the issue is moot (and mute) since it also seems clear enough that the anonymous writer's shift to
the "I" o f God is a "case o f indirect speech in the first person." According to the rules o f an authorless text,
therefore, we can only conclude again, and this time definitively, that the text o f Genesis shows no proof
o f either a real speaker or o f pointing out, in direct fashion, an actual deity. But that means that the
discourse o f Genesis must be "linked to an author" wherein "the role o f "shifters" is more complex and
variable."* *
Well aware that I am arguing in circles, caught in the centripetal force o f a complex and variable text
that only tightens the tautological relation between author function and actual writer, I will repeat once
more my belief that this elenctic situation is caused and contained by the "anonymous function."
Furthermore, my counter theses o f the anonymous function, though crude, uncategorical, and slavishly
dependent on Foucault's theses o f the "author-function," turn the author-fimction on its head, turn it into an
ignoration elenchi, or "ignorance o f proof." This means that it is a fallacy in logic to suppose that the
point at issue-the anonymous function—can be proved or disproved by an argument—the author-function—
which proves or disproves something not at issue. That is, the author-function is not at issue in Genesis.
The anonymous function is what is at issue. To use the author-function to prove or disprove the
anonymity o f God through the theses o f authorial uniformity, regularity, and historicity is a fallacy not
only o f logic, but also o f Logos its e lf (Logos being the ultimately anonymous Word o f History.)
The fact remains, however, that however liberal the law of binary relations in permitting the sublation
and transgression of a dominant term by its suppressed term, the dominant term o f argument cannot be
eliminated, even under the logic o f its obvious ignorance of proof. I need the deictic situation o f the author
function in order to privilege the anonymous function's elentic situation (whose other meanings along with
cross-examine and refute are transgressive: "to shame, to scold, to swear"). Nor should it go unnoticed that
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Foucault does supply another possibility in his essay. He admits that he has "given the term "author" an
excessively narrow meaning" at times. He pauses to remind the reader that it is easy to confuse the author
as a real, phenomenal person, and the author as a circum-textual, epi-phenomenal, function. After all the
rigmarole o f shifters in authored and authorless texts, he asserts that
it is obvious that even within the realm o f discourse a person can be the author o f much
more than a book—o f a theory, for instance, of a tradition or a discipline within which
new books and authors can proliferate (145).
He concludes, as we mentioned above, that "such authors occupy a "transdiscursive" position." Since
he believes that "Homer, Aristotle and the Church Fathers played this role," why might we not therefore
conclude that "God" also occupies this "transdiscursive" subject position? Whereas the Church Fathers
(many of whom were anonymous) for example, were once living authors, and might be called "initiators of
discursive practices" (145), we might well call the author-ity o f God in Genesis the initiation o f anonymity
as the transdiscursive alternative to the intrinsic norms o f authorship. This declaration needs some
clarification before we can complete our exegesis o f the anonymous in Genesis.
By extending Foucault's argument about initiators of discursive practices to their (Il)Logical origin in
God's rhetorical situation, I am in danger of contradicting my Nietzschean belief that there is no origin or
point of return. This pitfall is avoided however by always remembering that anonymity, as a discursive
practice, is a primary point o f reference in any speculation about the origins of discourse. If its origination
point is to be appreciated it must be traced (or its traces would be found) in the earliest existing texts.
Foucault distinguishes between origins of "rediscovery", "reactivation”, and a "return."
My sense o f these distinctions eliminates the first, since the "rediscovery" of the anonymous function
would have the effect o f an "analogy or isomorphism with current forms of knowledge that allow the
perception of forgotten or obscured figures" (145). My capacity for tautology is large, but to state that the
anonymous author function allows us to clearly locate and understand anonymous figures has the
analogical effect o f asking the proverbial snake which has swallowed its own tail to cough up the truth of
its continuous (dis)appearance. (The Anonymous as a primary signifier is, in any case, more about
shedding, than swallowing, the philosophical skein o f Identity.)
Adapting Foucault once more, we could consider more clearly the "reactivation" of the anonymous as a
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primary point o f present historical reference—that it "refers to something quite different: the insertion of
[anonymous] discourse into totally new domains o f generalization, practice, and transformations" (145).
The recent national concern with the privacy domains o f the Internet and the World Wide Web clearly
demonstrates anonymity’s general, practical, and transformative insertion. (I will take up this sense of
reactivation in m y analysis o f anonymous discourse as a transformative practice for composition pedagogy
in Chapter Four.) But whatever one's sense o f Biblical scholarship or the contemporaneity o f hermeneutics,
it hardly qualifies as opening up "totally new domains."
I have no immediate hermeneutic choice, then, but to return to the "phrase, "return to," Foucault's third
distinction. If I "return to" Genesis as one o f anonymity's most primary points o f reference, "it is because
of a basic and constructive omission, an omission that is not the result o f accident or incomprehension"
(146). That omission turns out to be the anonymous representation o f "God" as the self-admitted/omitted
personification o f all discursive initiation. Following Foucault's definition o f how this fundamental
omission operates, the absent character, "God," becomes a "barrier imposed by [His own] omission."
In my exegetical return to Genesis I want to show that this paradoxical notion o f God's omission or
absence as "[b]oth the cause of [His anonymous] barrier and means for [His anonymous] removal" "arises
from the discursive practice in question." The discursive practice in question involves an unnamed and
unknown writer devoted to the representation o f an essentially unknowable, onomastic character—"God".
There is no real return but only and "always a return to a text in itself, specifically, to a primary and
unadorned text with particular attention to those things registered in the interstices o f the text, its gaps and
absences." Genesis is just such a text. To return to it as the initiation o f anonymous discourse is to return
"to those empty spaces that have been masked by omission or concealed in a false and misleading
plenitude" (147).
As I read and adapt Foucault's call for a return to a textual absence that transdiscursively initiates the
metaphysics o f presence, it is not a stretch to transpose his conclusion that "it [i.e. the eternal return of the
anonymous function] is an effective and necessary means o f transforming discursive practice." Why is my
insertion o f the anonymous no distortion or some sort o f Bloomian "misprision" o f his intention for the
author function? The answer is supplied by Foucault and involves five (quintessential) reasons.
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First, my sense o f these "retums...tend to reinforce the enigmatic link between an author and his
works" (emphasis added).
Second, if that link is enigmatic, then it cannot be an absolute condition that a "text has an
inaugurative value precisely because it is the work o f a particular author"; that is, "our returns are [also]
conditioned by this knowledge" [of the anonymous function].
Third, "[b]ringing to light," the book o f Genesis "to the extent that we recognize it as a book" [by
Anonymous ], "can transform not only our historical knowledge, but the field o f' [discourse theory] "—if
only through a shift o f accent or o f the center of gravity."
Fourth, "[t]hese returns [to the Anonymous], an important component o f discursive practices, form a
relationship between "fundamental" ["God"] and "mediate" [Adam/Eve] authors, which is not identical to
that which links an ordinary text to its immediate author" [who, in the case o f Genesis, is "Anonymous"]
(emphasis added).
Fifth, "the "author-function" is sufficiently complex at the level o f a book or a series o f texts that bear a
definite signature. It also has "other determining factors when analyzed in terms o f larger entities—groups of
works or entire disciplines," according to Foucault (147). How much more complex then is the
"anonymous function" which appears to shadow and answer Foucault's adumbrations o f the author
question? With the logic o f the anonymous function now (un) settled to our total (dis)satisfaction, I can
now continue a counter-exegesis o f Genesis.

The Name of Anonymous: 'The Lord God o f Your Fathers'
I now move to consider three sections o f Genesis in which the character "God" is portrayed by its
anonymous writer as an authority who cares about preserving rather than punishing those created in "our
image." All three sections have in common the theme o f "the Proper Name as set forth by Foucault and
reconsidered above. Two sections are from Genesis -1 7 :1 -5 , where God makes his covenant with Abram
and changes his name to Abraham; and 32:24-30, where "a man" wrestles with Jacob and his name is
changed to Israel. I will also comment on the identity o f God's anonymity in Exodus 3:2-15, where Moses
encounters "God" in a "burning bush." All three passages highlight the dialogical acquisition and
transference o f authoritative names even as the name o f G od remains anonymous.
As an early interlocutor o f the Bible—first as a very small child listening in Church and in Catholic
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school, later as a voracious reader re-searching my identity apart from religious orthodoxy—I was always
fascinated by the hide and seek character o f "God." You can't get very far into the Bible without noticing
that "God" cyclically calls on his male creatures—from Adam to the last o f the Prophets (excluding Jesus,
interestingly)—in this way: "So and So, where are you?" And So and So invariably answers: "Here am I,
Lord." This sense o f identity as a matter o f spatio-temporal location helped m e to dimly discern that an
"other" axis o f identity—Who am I? — was also at work in these call and response rituals. The "identity
crisis" in Genesis o f course is summed up by the answer of a vexed 'God" to Moses' question, Who am I
and Who are You? (That answer—"I AM WHO I AM"—is said with such emphasis I can almost hear the
"GODMANIT!" that has presumably been expurgated by certain anonymous "Church Fathers".)^
More seriously, the "identity crisis" in Genesis can be thought o f as rising, falling and melding along
two amplitudes o f identification. The first is the heterogeneity o f God's authority. The second, which
actually causes the first, is the hermeneutic finding that the authorship o f Genesis is itself heterogeneous,
comprising at least three, and perhaps four anonymous writers. (Arguably, when we read this "book" we are
reading a text that should rightly be re-titled HeteroGenesis. That coinage re-cognizes Foucault's thesis that
the author-function has never been stable over time, sometimes enduring, even relying on, anonymous
authorship, other times, making its proper(ty) claims via a proper name.)
To extend something o f the ersatz presence o f the early creator "God" to that o f a more political
chieftain God, the anonymous writer o f Genesis 17 has this "God" renew the Covenant that was broken by
Adam when he took Eve's lead and ate o f the Tree o f Life. This "God" "appeared to Abram, and said unto
him, I am the Almighty God.... And I will make my covenant between me and thee.... And Abram fell on
his face" (17: 1-3). We have here a now familiar character ploy and communicative device. Face-to-face
interaction with God fuses the deictic and elentic energies described above. In effect, the announcement of
God's "presence" is tantamount to the concealment o f an "identity." This primordial anonymity has long
maintained its (Revolutionary "spin" in modem press coverage o f political and governmental activity: the
rhetoric of full, authoritative disclosure is possible only through the invisibility or dazzling vagueness of
some 'highly placed, official source.' In contemporary terms, readers o f political news must fall on their
faces, unable or unwilling to demand full recognition o f the identities o f their own elected authorities.
Abram's face being well hidden from the well hidden face o f Being, the writer then reports that "God
talked with him, saying, As for me, behold, my covenant is with thee..." (17:4). Again, we find an
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evasion o f who or what God's "me" is. In its stead, Abram is given what "we" (the faithful) are surpposed
to believe is tantamount to the identity o f God. His "Covenant"—his agreement to meet with his heslpmeet
or proxy— is his Identity. His Word—Logos—is Identical to what we might call the "me", ego, o r self.
"God" then performs the sort o f flapdoodle nominalism that Frank Baum parodizes through that hrumbug
from Omaha, "The Wizard o f Oz": "Neither shall thy name anymore be called Abram, but thy nam*e shall
be Abraham; for a father o f many nations have I made thee" (17:5).
To underscore the indivisibly "genetic" structure and function o f his Logos, "God" p ro m ises to
"establish my covenant between...thy seed after thee in their generations for an everlasting covenant, n o be a
God unto thee, and to thy seed after thee" (17:17). It is no secret that hermeneutics, despite its se m in a l tie
to secrecy—the "hermetic seal,"—is all about the bloody rupture o f truth, the leakage of meaninag, the
secretion o f signifier into signified, until everything is actually "significant" to any given interpretamt. The
covenant o f "God", as it underwrites Judaeo-Christian identity, is that its efficacy springs from a literal
undercutting of this hermetic seal in all male members who "must needs be circumcised: and [ o n lv then]
my covenant shall be in your flesh for an everlasting covenant" (17:13).
Crazily, any newborn male with the hermetic seal o f his foreskin not cut off is a "soul [that] sfcnall be
cut off from his people; [for] he hath broken my covenant" (17:14). What God's chosen "people" armounts
to is a triple mutilation in the form o f an historically ungenerous exclusion of certain genitalia, o f a ^certain
gender, and most certainly, o f the genesis of cultural difference. The entire project and projection rests
significantly on the exclusion o f women, and ultimate anonymity o f Woman. ^

All this prin»ordial

prejudice, all this "genetic" damage, is Author-ized by an anonymous writer in the ambiguously (in d ire c t
speech of an unseen character. That character’s unspeakable name enables the equation o f that anonym ous
speech with the idea of Identity itself—the bloody cum seminal circumcision of the sexual, the fam ilial, the
gendered, the ethnic, the racial, the national.
In Genesis 32: 24-31, Jacob (son o f Isaac, grandson o f Abraham), is met by "God" through a proixy, "a
man" who is generally interpreted to be one of "the angels o f God" (32.1) whom Jacob meets at the sttart of
his journey. It is an odd passage that reiterates Cottle's sense that subjection through naming is ana "odd
concept." Jacob gets into a wrestling match with this nameless "man" in the middle o f the nighat and
wrestles him to a draw "until the breaking of the day" (32. 24). Frustrated, this (over)"man" resorts tto the
dirty trick o f using supernatural powers o f what amounts to "accupressure" and puts "the hollow o f Jacob's
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thigh out o f joint" (32.25). But Jacob wrestles on. Reminiscent o f a vampire, the angel o f God begs
Jacob to let him go "for the day breaketh. Clearly aware that he has an unparalleled opportunity for
advancement, Jacob refuses, "except that thou bless me" (32.27). In what follows I see as a remarkably
representative anecdote of the anonymous-function, or at the very least, yet another example o f anonymity's
binary relation—its historic, virtually "genetic," covenant—with identity.
And he said unto him, What is thy name? And [Jacob] said, Jacob.
And he said, Thy name shall be called no more Jacob, but Israel: for as a prince hast thou
power with God and with men, and hast prevailed.
And Jacob asked him, and said, Tell me, I pray thee, thy name. And he said, Wherefore
is it that thou dost ask after my name? And he blessed him there.
And Jacob called the name o f the place Peniel: for I have see God face to face, and my
life is preserved. (Genesis 32. 27-30)
Cottle, in a chapter titled "The Acquisition and Transference o f Names," makes much o f this passage.
He calls it "[o]ne o f the most haunting stories in the Bible" in that it exemplifies his assertion that "the
privilege o f possessing it [i.e. a proper name] and the right to change it are jealously guarded" (36). What
Cottle sees in the ex-change o f names between Jacob and "God" (the former becomes "Israel" or 'Prince of
God', the latter "Penuel" or 'the face o f God') is that "a whole new life for the Hebrews is implicit in [this
exchange]" 36. Because Cottle is writing about Nam es, while I am writing about Nam elessness, it would
be expected that his angle of interpretation would differ from my own, even as we are [mis]taking different
sides o f the same hermeneutic co[i]n.
What I see o f course is God's high-handed evasion (a mixture of arrogant refusal covered by a blessing)
o f Jacob's legitimate desire to know the name o f his nemesis. Jacob identified him self upon request and
expected to know the man's identity in turn. Clearly, when the question was m et with a question and a
blessing, Jacob inferred he had met his maker. "God" apparently disappears before this more than
competent, self-confident "Prince o f God" gets it into his head to prohibitively name—or, in a truly
transgressive act, rename—"God." Instead, "God" remains anonymous (under cover o f that universal
pseudonym). Jacob not daring to describe the person, designates the place o f the struggle, 'Face o f God.'
The anonymous writer of this tale never o f course has Jacob describe the face o f god. We are only told
that he has seen the main 'Man' "face-to face." Given the Hebrew's fear o f pronouncing the name of God,
and their habit o f re-presenting his face as unbearable, as o f the sun, it is sensible to conclude that Jacob is
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expressing profound relief at the end o f this passage. He says that he has seen God face to face yet his
"life has been preserved." But if there were such a state as being super-sensible in our hermeneutics, I
would conclude that Jacob's life has been preserved precisely because o f the anonymity o f the exchange.
The anonymity o f the actual writer o f this tale, an empirical fact o f history, makes possible, as I have
asserted above, the transcendental anonymity o f the "God" character. It also enables the transactional
anonymity running through the plot and development o f some o f the bible's central protagonists—Adam,
Eve, Abraham, Jacob, and, as we will see, Moses. The narrative device, strategy, or trope o f anonymity is
becoming, I believe, quite clear. Whether it is to be thought o f as an emergent property o f the author
function or the transmigratory ground upon which author-ity is figured and reversed is an open question.
That the function o f anonymity is indispensable to the Authority o f Genesis is, I think, incontrovertible.
The final Biblical anecdote that best illustrates the function o f anonymity as the enabler o f a
fundamental identity o f a god and the collective identification o f a "people" can be found in Exodus 3.2-6;
10-15.14 Arthur Hertzberg, editor-commentator o f Judaism , reminds us that unlike the covenant with
Abraham, whose name change represented the creation o f a familial tribe, "[t]he covenant with Moses is a
new and wider one, with a people as a whole. This is symbolized by the "new name" by which God makes
Him self known" 21). What Hertzberg is referring to o f course is that the writers responsible for Exodus
(different than those o f Genesis) decided to once again raise, by transgressing, the "nomination barrier.
"God" changes his name to "Lord” when speaking to Moses.
And God spoke to Moses saying, "I am the Lord. I appeared to Abraham, to Isaac and to
Jacob as God Almighty but by My name o f Lord I did not make Myself known to
them.... Therefore say to the children o f Israel, \form erly known as the children o f Jacob
renamed "Prince o f God" by "God" now "Lord God"], 'I am the Lord, who will bring
you out.... And I will take you to Myself for people and I will be your God; and you
shall know that I am the Lord your God who brought you out.... I am the Lord' (Exodus
6 : 2- 8 ).

Moses, as is well known, deviates from the normative line o f God's chosen. When we encounter him,
he is nameless, almost purely anonymous given his unnamed parentage— the son o f an "man o f the house
o f Levi" who took "to wife a daughter o f Levi" (Exodus 2. 1). Levi, the third son o f Jacob, had three sons,
Gershon, Kohath and Merari. But the writers of the Bible, usually such sticklers for paternal genealogy, do
not mention these names.
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Moses, an anonymous bastard (and perhaps the issue o f the incest taboo?), was named by an
Egyptian woman who found him floating in a basket on the Nile River. Certain compassionate midwives—
Shiphrah and Puah—who ignored the Pharoah's edict to drown all newborn Jewish males, had saved him.
(Our anonymous writer, in a nice aside tells us that "[B]ecause the midwives feared God, ...he made them
houses" Exodus I. 21). He was then hidden away and then cast unto the waters by his unnamed mother in
order to avoid the Pharaoh’s version of "The Final Solution."
The initial encounter with God in the form o f a burning bush reiterates the theme o f hiding God's
identity, keeping it mysterious, enigmatic, and powerfully anonymous. God's face cannot be seen; it is his
voice that is crucial in all o f these anecdotes, from the Garden of Eden to Mt. Horeb. (Though the
anonymous writer o f Jacob's encounter would have the reader believe that the face o f God was seen, it is
fairly clear that the prohibition on His Name, leaves His Face as anonymous as his voice.) In a now
familiar gambit, the anonymous author handles the problems o f identity and identification this way:
"Moreover he said, I am the God o f thy father [anonymous!], the God of Abraham, the God o f Isaac, and
the God o f Jacob. And Moses hid his face; for he was afraid to look upon God" (Exodus. 3. 6). Obviously,
the burning bush has petered out and God is something of a "man" with a free that Jacob is said to have
seen. But Moses, unlike that more intrepid creation o f our writer, is afraid to look at his face, never mind
ask for his anonymical name behind all those patronyms.
As we know, "God" has chosen Moses to lead his people out of Egypt. Given Moses' sense of
uncertainty about his origins, his question—"Who am I, that I should...bring forth the children o f Israel...?"
(3.11)—takes on all the modem freight o f an identity crisis underpinning the "prophetic" question of his
authority to undertake such an adventure. In The Authoritative and the Authoritarian, Joseph Vining
combines legal and humanistic scholarship to inquire into sources o f the law's authority. In a chapter titled
"Authenticity: Connecting the Speaker and the Spoken," looks into the differences between the authentic
authority o f a Supreme Court judge and a literary author.
The difference seems to come down to one o f "delegation" o f authority, and with it, authenticity.
Looking at the problem o f clerks writing opinions in "the name of the judge" he concludes that
"ghostwriting" takes many forms and is differentially (in)authentic or (non)authoritative as it runs across
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the incommensurate discourses o f the legal opinion and literary production. Vining nuances the problems
o f author-ity's possible inauthenticity in this way, which leads us, literally, back to the source of the
(Mosaic) law as handed down—delegated—by an unseen, effectively, ghost-writing, authority.
Thus the problem o f delegation is not simply one o f deceptive packaging, which is
immaterial and can be forgotten (as the dust jacket o f a book is forgotten) because it is
the writing that is important, not is packaging.... But, it may be said, justices do not
speak for themselves even when they themselves think and speak. They speak for the
Court. Great authorities, it m ay be said, rarely speak for themselves. Moses came down
from Mount Sinai with tablets purporting to have been written by the finger o f God....
The only difference seems to be that the justices sign their own names when speaking for
another and Moses did not....[T]he putative author and the true author are separate, yet
the texts have had authority. Knowing, or believing, or assuming that Jehovah himself
did not cut the tablets does not seem to affect the authority o f what is written on them
(55-56).
What Vining appears to be overlooking, as with so many commentators on the problem o f authority, the
sources o f its authenticity, etc., is that some function or form o f anonymity is always near to hand in these
transactions between proper authority and a properly named identity behind such authority.
When Jacob essentially asks "God", Who are you? His answer is a name change and a profound
promotion. "God" is made to perform a similar evasion and indirection when answering Moses' question]
o f identity qua authority: "And he said, Certainly I will be with thee" (3.12). Moses wants to know who
he is in both an essential sense o f identity and a performative sense o f his authority. All he gets is the
assurance o f an unseen, anonymous presence—"God—whom he "shall serve...upon this mountain." It turns
out, however, that our anonymous writer is as vexed by a divine identity gambit as all thinkers (and
believers) should be. The writer then turns the same characterological trick that was done with Abraham
and Jacob, lending Moses their same level o f hermeneutic suspicion or brinkmanship.
And Moses said unto God, Behold, when I come unto the children o f Israel, and shall
say unto them, The God o f your fathers hath sent me unto you; and they shall say to me
, What is his name? What shall I say unto them?
And God said unto Moses, I AM WHO I AM: and he said, Thus shalt thou say unto the
children of Israel, I AM hath sent me unto you (3.13-14).
Much has been made o f this p a ssa g e .^ My first sense that it had real carrying power into a child's life
beyond the walls of a church was in the cartoon Popeye the Sailor M an, who habitually pronounced, in a
speedy riff "Iamthatlam!" Popeye used it in a humble yet cooly confident sort o f way. There was a whatyou-see-is-what-you-get finality to his way o f making no excuses for his identity. It would have taken a far
more tongue in cheek writer, willing to push much further the anxiety o f a Moses or Abraham, or the
incipient skepticism o f a Jacob into a character who might ask God:
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Tell them 'I AM' sent me? You've got to be joking. I have no credibility as it is, and you want
me to base my assumption o f leadership o f an entire Community on the premise that
your Authority is a tautological reduction o f Identity in and o f itself-that I spoke, on
condition o f Anonymity, with someone named 'I AM?' They'll think me an insane
solipsist. Just tell me who you are. W hat's you're real name, so that I might share the
Identity o f its Authority with our Community?
In a connection to this passage and shadowing o u r ongoing theme, Marmorstein quotes K. Abba b.
Mamal, who paraphrased the God/Moses exchange in this way.
'God says to Moses, "Thou wilt know m y name? I am called according to my deeds.
When I judge the creatures, I am xxxx; w hen I fight the wicked], I am xxxx; when I leave
the sins o f man in suspense, I am xxx; and when I am compassionate, I am xx! " ' (52).
[As I don't know the Hebrew, nor do I have typography to reproduce it, I have
substituted an x for each o f the original letters in each word.]
We see in this Rabbi's paraphrase o f the Exodus passage a conflation o f the arrogant, evasive God
answering the natural and justifiable inquiries o f Abraham and Jacob. We also see the fundamental
philosophy o f nominalism that is underwritten by what I have been calling the anonymous-function in
these anonymous writers' repeated representation o f'G o d ' as a naming, nameful, yet maddeningly nameless
character.^
It is as if the anonymous w riters) of this passage became aware o f his/ her/ their excessive,
transgressively anonymous epithet a t the end of 3:14-. Immediately after the writer tells us that the character
'God' tells Moses that "I AM hath sent me unto you' 3:15 that writer seems to pull back his/her character
into a semblance o f rationality. The writer has some pragmatic awareness that genealogy, however much a
function of anonymity, would better advance Moses' political chances.
And God said moreover unto Moses, Thus shalt thou say unto the children o f Israel. The
Lord God o f your fathers, the God of Abraham, the God o f Isaac, and the God o f Jacob,
hath sent me unto you: this is my nam e forever, and this is my memorial into all
generations.
3.16 begins with "Go...." and virtually repeats this patrimonial appeal word for word, as recognizing that
the cranky enigmatic (a)nominalism o f LAM had fallen a bit awry. But again, a cursory glance at this four
part genealogical evocation reveals that the name o f 'God' remains up for grabs. Which name is his name
"forever" that will serve as an eternal generational "memorial"? The reader now very well knows what my
answer is. It is the anonymous function, the fluid pseudonymity of Identity itself, that has become
etemalized-and internalized—for all generations requiring a "religious" (literally "to bind") identification
with what the originator o f Critical Theory, Max Horkheimer, has called "the Totally Other."
Ill
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(Too?) Much has already been made, in both the body o f my text and in footnotes, o f the use of
pseudonymity to create a divine presence from an essentially absent and anonymous character. Those who
initially wrote "God" into existence recognized the importance o f maintaining an enigmatic atmosphere
even as the character of a Creator who just "Is" had to be named in some way. As the Prohibition on His
Name came into effect, new names were substituted. But neither the writers o f Genesis nor of Exodus were
operating under that Prohibition. To achieve the (ob)scenic truth effect o f a divinity that is unknowable
making itself known these writers initiated and continued (through acts o f redaction) the "nomination
barrier" whose final cause is the "anonymous function."
Enough representative anecdotes have been presented that the reader should be able to divine what I
mean: take out the names "God" and "Lord" and you are left with a funny, wise yet foolish, often irascible
self-referentaility. The rule o f "Me", "Myself, but most of all that great discursive solvent, the anonymous
"I", dominates these anecdotes. This first person point o f view, under the screen of third person
autobiographical voice points, I think to Foucault's definition of discourse as "universal mediation": "when
all things come eventually to take the form o f discourse,...then all [will] be able to return to the silent
interiority o f self-consciousness" (157).
When I consider the legacy o f the Bible's early anonymous writers, I don't think it can be over-stated
that their most outstanding achievement (because so rhetorically understated it resists rhetorical
understanding) is this subjective projection from behind and beyond a nomination barrier. But studies of
texts far more ancient than those o f the bible have clearly established a link between the anonymous
Semitic writers o f Genesis and their Babylonian, Sumerian and Mesopotamian predecessors. The device of
the anonymous third person autobiographical voice is equally operative in Gilgamesh, though the density
and gravity o f its nomination barrier leaves much to be desired by those who believe in only One Tme
Anonymous writer whose Name returns all to the silent interiority o f no Other consciousness.
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The Epic Work o f Anonvmitv

Gilgamesh: The Genesis o f Third Person Autobiography
Many pages back I had said that Foucault's theme linking writing and death could be best illustrated by
considering The Epic o f Gilgamesh, the oldest known piece o f "fictional" writing yet discovered.^ It is
fitting to apply his characterization of contemporary writing and writers to its ancient situation in
Gilgamesh.
If we wish to know the writer in our day, it will be through the singularity o f his [or her]
absence and in his [or her] link to death, which has transformed him [or her] into a
victim o f his [or her] own writing (140).
We now know that Foucault was mainly addressing the metaphysics, with a nod, perhaps, to the
rhetoricity o f a writer's relation to his or her text (as in "What matters who's speaking?") By accessing the
work o f Piotr Michalowski, Mesopotamian scholar, we can better understand how the rhetoricity of
anonymity is inevitably tied up with its historicity. Whereas for Foucault, the voice o f the author amounts
to a theory o f indifference, for Michalowski, "[t]he voice is more than sound: it is the locus o f authority"
(182). Both Michalowski's assertion about the ancient anonymous writer of Gilgamesh and Foucault's
assertion about the indifference and absence of the writer in our own day can be brought together. Their
synthesis serves as an "olamic" (or, depending on one's tradition o f immanence or transcendence,
"kairotic") reminder that anonymity does not mean the end o f a text's import. On the contrary, anonymity
can be seen to be the "formal" and possibly "final" cause o f a text's Authority.
The work o f Kramer has shown us that Gilgamesh is "The First Case of Literary Borrowing" ( 181).
The notion o f a properly named Author, with its hard and fast intention as the property o f a copywright,
simply didn't exist at the time Gilgamesh was finally cobbled together. Writing in 1985, Kovacs takes up
Kramer's 1950's realization that Mesopotamian literature was a culture o f literary borrowing. He applies it
to the going concern with the author this way: "As was traditional in Mesopotamian literature,
"authorship" consisted largely in the creative adaptation o f existing themes and plots from other literature
to new purposes" (xxi-xxii). Borrowing and adaptations were not only commonplace in ancient literary
circles, but as Michalowski, writing in 1996 has it, they were expected at a time "when anonymity of
authorship was the rule" (185).
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In other words, "collaborative", "patch", and what our hierarchical culture o f the truly gifted
autonomous author would consider "plagiaristic" writing was the rule o f those giants in whose anonymous
shadows we now stand. ^

Distinctions between writing as an original action—between "scribing" and "de

scribing"—and all the acts o f writing's redaction (gathering, adaptation, translation in order to get it ready
for publication) simply did not hold at the time o f the Sumerian Gilgamesh and its later Babylonian
versions. Michalowski informs us that "the anonymity o f Mesopotamian literature..." is precisely the kind
o f pervasive anonymity that Foucault imagines in 1969 will one day unfold and take hold. Why? How?
Because it "...provides a marked contrast to the Romantic and post-Romantic concept o f the author that we
[in the wake o f Foucault's anatomy o f authorship's poltergeists] find so difficult to shake"(l83).
Furthermore, through the deliberate anonymous construction o f various ancient scholar-scribes, and the
anonymously intentional destruction o f those original tablets ("deliberately broken to bits when Nineveh
was sacked in 612 B.C " Biggs, Xll.), Gilgamesh speaks to us as a "double-voiced discourse,” to adapt a
phrase from Bakhtin. That is, the singular absence o f its actual writer(s) provides the transformative link of
"Gilgamesh" as the central character that epononymously becomes the text's "fundamental" Author. As we
will see, King Gilgamesh, a mortal character seeking divine immortality, represents the very earliest
cultural concern with Foucault's paradoxical sense o f Writing as Death's ultimate victimizer o f the
Immortality it would supposedly confer upon the writer who would be an Author. Truly, if we would
know the writer o f our own day, we must, at some level, look back to the beginning o f writing itself.
The advantage o f starting an anecdotal history o f the anonymous with a look at passages from the
Judeo-Christian bible is that it helps to highlight the less obvious intentions and tropes o f anonymity in a
literary precursor such as Gilgamesh. Regardless o f anonymity's overwhelming "identity", my argument
that the writers o f The Old Testament maintained anonymity in order to foist and foster the delusion o f
divine authorship is ultimately a thought experiment rather than an empirical conclusion. Foucault's
themes and theses about authorship serve as speculative instruments that magnify and amplify anonymity's
visibility or signal strength, but they are not the thing itself, and should never be confused as such. With
The Epic o f Gilgamesh the reader might come to conclude that my sense o f the anonymous is a grasping at
hermeneutic straw men or a running on Foucauldian fumes. I do believe the reader will be convinced,
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however, o f the power o f the principle o f reversal to animate their reception o f this text.
The modem Sumerian scholar S.N. Kramer has already been invoked in a footnote to remind us that
certain ancient anonymous scholar-scribes of Babylonia nominated one o f their own antecedents as the
"mediate author" o f Gilgamesh. As his "postmodern successor, Michalowski, makes abundantly clear,
however,
Sin-leqe-unninni, or someone under such a name, remodeled the older Gilgamesh tale on
the pattern o f an equally old Naram-Sin text [legendary King considered the "prime writer
o f his own deeds"] and added a prologue that turned the whole story into a third-person
autobiography, thus radically changing the whole narrative (187-188).
Kovacs, whose translation we will be using as part o f our anecdotal analysis, extends my argument linking
the narrative innovation o f this "third person" to an anonymous vision, voice, and value—tinat such an
autobiographical presence sprang organically from an all-pervasive anonymous function.
Though Tablet I o f the Old Babylonian version is not extant, we know that it began at
line 28 with the traditional royal hymn o f praise. The narrator's opening lines were added
by a later author who wanted to impart very different values, honoring not Gilgamesh's
adventures but his achievement o f understanding and humanity (2).
The fact that the name o f a scholar-scribe was nominated from among an anonymous collectivity that had
in turn borrowed heavily from anonymous Sumerian sources to create the Babylonian original is o f course
interesting, given the present thesis. But because "source analysis" is neither my specialty nor the heart of
my obsession, such questions o f historicity pale and fall away in comparison to questions of anonymous
rhetoricity, o f unidentifiable voices o f author-ity that continue to speak to and resonate with otherwise
incommensurate communities o f interpreters.
My residual passion for literary themes and problems, particularly those that point up the heights and
depths o f (mis)understanding and (in)humanity will not go away however. That is why it is important for
my thesis o f the anonymous-fiinction that Gilgamesh too, according to Kramer, "revolves about forces and
problems common to [humankind] everywhere through the ages." O f these forces and problems, I will
focus on "the impelling urge for fame and name", "the all-absorbing fear o f death," and its binary other,
"the all-compelling longing for immortality." According to Kramer, it is "the varied interplay o f these
emotional and spiritual drives in [humankind] that constitutes the drama o f the "Epic of Gilgamesh"—
drama which transcends the confines o f time and space (183). Now that we are familiar with the Hebraic
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concept o f olam (with its obvious complement to the Greek concept o f kairos) it becomes all the more
"timely" to consider the possibility that the anonymous-fimction—as an authoritative absence— has a
timeless role in this sense o f spatio-temporal transcendence or "presence." In other words, "the impelling
urge for name and fame" is continuously transgressed by the equally compelling desire (in the form o f a
cultural directive) for collaborative namelessness and obscurity.
Before we can get to representative anecdotes that elucidate pet themes and theses, a fuller summary of
Michalowski's findings on the "third person" autobiographical construction are in order, since such a
"voice" or tropic projection reminds us of Foucault's idea o f a "third" ego in the structure o f authorship. It
should also remind us a bit o f what is going on in the book of Genesis.. As with the epic o f Gilgamesh,
it is also narrated in the third person. My adaptation o f Foucault's description o f pronoun shifters and their
relation to the projection o f various "egos” by an "author" purportedly "fundamental," "actual," or
"mediate," was meant to implement and underscore the projection o f God's "ego." In other words, the
books o f Genesis and Exodus are to be treated (by secularists and orthodoxists alike) as a "third-person
autobiography" o f "God".
According to Michalowski, where these two grand narratives part company is in the flood story. In
Gilgamesh, (which is universally agreed upon to be far older than the so called divinely authorized Old
Testament version featuring Noah and "God"), the flood story "was used for an amazing new narrative
purpose, one that appears to have been an innovation within Mesopotamian literature" (188). It turns out
that this innovation was the anonymous deployment o f this "third person autobiography." This primordial
literary innovation within Gilgamesh uses the autobiography o f "Uta-napishtim" (the very first "Noah"
figure). Without descending into this part of the actual text, it is important to treat this "historicist"
situation in some detail before considering specific passages that exemplify the themes o f name and fame,
and o f death and immortality. Micahlowski must be our interpretive guide.
In essence, Michalowski's source analyses enables what he admits to be only an "intuition" that the
inserted third person autobiography of "Uta-napishtim" "directs Gilgamesh to the ultimate end o f his quest.
He will achieve immortality only through the epic itself because his immortal fame [and name] will only
be a function o f the tale that he will write down with his own hand" (188). O f course, as Michalowski
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knows much better than I, the figure "Gilgamesh" is a character as much or as more as he is an actual
historical personage. True, there was a King Gilgamesh o f Uruk, who is credited with building the great
walls o f the city o f Ur (from which we derive the term ur-text.) None o f the scholarship I have read,
however, gives credit o f authorship to

" G ilg a m e s h " .)^

Taken together, Auerbach, Michalowski, and most recently Gallagher and Greenblatt, help us conclude
that a millennium o f Mesopotamian, Sumerian, and Babylonian cultural mimesis or "textuality was quite
specific in its local knowledge and network o f assumptions. As Gallagher and Greenblatt would have it,
this textuality [was] "not a system distinct from lived experience but an imitation of it, and "imitation"
(that is, representation) is the principal way human beings come to understand their existence and share it
with others" (40). As it just so happened for thousands o f years, however, ancient forms o f m im esis, the
principal way to understand and share—in effect, communicate—were pervasively anonymous.
Rhetorically and historically considered, Gilgamesh does not write down the tale with his own hand,
but the double anonymous screen o f third person autobiographical positioning projects the m im etic or
representational sense that "h e" did so. The third person autobiography o f "Uta-napishtim" which
Michalowski writes about occurs deep in the epic, at the end o f the tenth and into the eleventh o f the
twelve surviving tablets that comprise The Standard Version. Its appearance is, according to Michalowski,
unprecedented. It is the first person autobiographical voice which opens the Prologue o f Gilgamesh,
however—the opening lines which Kovacs attributes to a later anonymous author who wanted to impart a
very different sense o f vision, voice, and value—that must first concern us.
Even though patch written by a later anonymous writer, it has become the locus o f all the tablets'
authority. And though, strictly speaking, this narrative voice cannot be considered "third person
autobiographical," I consider it, according to a Bakhtininan rhetoric, a superaddressee.

In other words,

there is the person o f "Gilgamesh" ("He who has seen everything"). There is the person o f the writer who is
speaking to us about this person who has seen everything. Yet if we follow in the considerable wake o f
both Foucault's discursive histories and Wayne Booth's The Rhetoric o f Fiction, we find, first, that author
and narrator are never one and the same persona.

Second, this authorial projection of an "other" voice to

speak to a reader, is often, according to Booth, an "unreliable narrator" and has been so at least since
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Henry James' fiction. He writes, "Some o f our greatest problems come when we are given another
character as unreliable as the hero to his ambiguous story" (339).
According to Booth, there is a tendency in modem fiction for such characters to disrupt the "normative"
function o f narration which has been regulated by a Western tradition o f "rhetorical purity." This sense of
extends to narrative vision, voice, and to the (evaluation o f what happens in the story as being consistent,
ingenuous, trustworthy—in essence "reliable."

At some point this reliability is undermined by authorial

shifts in perspective. Part o f what I am arguing is that the ambiguous figure o f the unreliable narrator so far
preceded the "modernist" experiments o f James that it can either be likened to the discursive equivalent of
"the lost wax method" or it is overtly operating in the ancient culture of anonymous discourse that
produced Gilgamesh, The Odyssey, and The Bible. Furthermore, anonymity transgresses this tradition of
rhetorical purity even as it underwrites a tradition o f transcendental author-ity.
Thus, in narrator at the opening of Gilgamesh we surmise that an unknown author (very unreliably
known as "Sin-leqe-unninni") emended the opening o f Gilgamesh. He or she did so to create a persona who
is not writing (his? her?) first person autobiography. He or she is instead addressing a super "third" person
who is meant to "identical" to the person o f Gilgamesh, that part human, part divine, heroic king. It is
difficult to rely on this narrator, who is obviously re-presenting "Gilgamesh" as a posthumous figure. But
because this anonymous narrator is the projection o f an anonymous author, its double unreliability
performs a positive reflection or redaction upon the rhetorical position o f the reader in Western history.
Much in the same way that two negatives added together equal a positive number, this superadded
anonymity paradoxically falls into the sort o f narrative reliability that has constituted the tradition of
rhetorical purity—or so I would I argue. Moreover, anticipating a Bahktinian rhetoric, these heterogeneous
of elements o f (un)reliability create the reflexive conditions that (im)personate a reading self. In a very real
and most lasting sense, then, the originally anonymous narrator envisions, voices, and values the endless
anonymity o f the reader. The polarity o f these anonymities creates a sense of community, identity, and
authority which transcends any particular immanence o f authorship —whether original, mediate, or one
more author-itative translator—and readership.
In this shifting rhetoric o f the anonymous—at once embedded" in all embracing ancient culture of
118

R e p ro d u c e d with perm ission of the copyright owner. Further reproduction prohibited without permission.

anonymity, and floating free as a narrative fixture possibility—we have the "vatic" voice that Eliot
others have distinguished and that has become a staple

and

assumption o f literary rhetoricalanalysis."Vatic"

comes from a long etymological line having to do with a voice or song that is "possessed" somehow
divinely. It correlates with Bakhtin's sense o f the superaddressee. It also points up anonymity's nomination
barrier where vision, voice, and value turn the quest(ion)of identity into a transparent veil—an ambi-valence-over someone, anyone who has seen everything, who will make known, who will teach in our own
alikeness.
As for the actual representative textual anecdote from Gilgamesh, I present two versions. The first is a
"transformation" by a poet who has no knowledge of the originallanguage. Thesecond

is a strict

"translation" by a Mesopotamian scholar, and only one o f two women that I know of, who has rendered
Gilgamesh for the umpteenth time into "authoritative" English.
Fame haunts the man who visits hell,
who lives to tell my entire tale identically.
So like a sage, a trickster or saint,
GILGAMESH
was a hero who knew secrets and saw forbidden places,
who could even speak o f the time before the
Flood because he lived long, learned much,
and spoke his life to those who first
cut into clay his bird-like words (Jackson, p.2; 1997).
He who has seen everything, I w ill make known (?) to the lands.
I w ill teach (?) about him who experienced all things,
...alike,
Anu granted him the totality o f knowledge o f all.
He saw the secret, discovered the Hidden,
he brought information o f (the time) before the Flood.
He went on a distant journey, pushing himself to exhaustion,
but then was brought to peace.
He carved on a stone stela all o f his toils
and built the wall o f Uruk-Haven (Kovacs, p.3; 1989).21
Our sense o f anonymity's binary other has long since settled upon 'identity," (even as we must try to
keep in mind that anonymity resists such singular reiteration, that i f "identity" is its media res,
"community" is where it begins, and "authority" is its end). Not surprisingly, I am keen on Jackson's use
o f "identically" and the triple role o f "sage, trickster, saint" used to describe "Gilga" ("mesh" being a
generic epithet for "hero"), but which also point back to the identity o f the narrator behind "my tale."
Kovacs' more strict translation places the first person "I" o f this narrator up front and center, but does not,
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like Jackson, or those I featured in my endnotes, transform "alike" into an identity issue.
Kovacs teaches that this anonymous narrator's addition o f 27 lines, which has managed to displace
what would be the original start o f the poem given the loss o f Tablet I, deviates from the norm o f ancient
anonymous authorship, according to Michalowski. As an atmospheric historicist, Michalowski equates
Gilgamesh’s fame with his ability to write down the tale o f his quest— to perform the first autobiography.
The quest for fame is tied up with self-authorization in the form o f an autobiography whose author-ity
derives not from a first person, but from a third person point o f view. His argument must lead us, he
asserts, "back to the beginning o f the text—in Sin-Ieqe-unnini's version—to the fact that whole composition
is an elaborate naru, a gigantic royal inscription" (188). (Kovacs and Micahlowski agree that the name
"Sin-Ieqe-unnini" is not a proper name at all, but is itself pseudonymic cover operation o f what I am
calling the anonymous function.)
It is to the beginning o f the text that I have led us, given. Kovacs’ cue about the mediate author. I have
tried to make clear the rhetorical complexity and effect o f this anonymous text as a projection o f a larger
cultural discourse o f anonymity. But I am not really up to it and must let Micahlowski confirm, and to
some extent clarify, what I groping to understand about anonymity writ large, not just in terms of its
Mesopotamian genesis.
The fact that the whole composition is a gigantic royal inscription, projecting the impression (however
much obviously "ghost written") that it is the word of Lord Gilgamesh reminds us o f how Genesis is
assumed to be "the Word o f the Lord." This notion o f super-inscription and o f a superaddressee should tell
us something too about the rhetorical power and performance o f the anonymous function over the course of
history, as a force o f history. The parallaxis o f Kovacs’ anonymous narrator and Micahlowski’s thesis of an
unprecedented third person autobiographical voice can be best understood if we can appreciate, according to
Michalowski, "the commemorative nature o f first-millennium Babylonian narrative." Like anonymity's
network terminations o f community and identity—the "commemorative" nature of Babylonian narrative
authority is rooted in antiquity but [in the opening o f Gilgamesh] now seeks authors and
authorities, [and thus] reaches its highest level. It is a matter that we will have to rethink
in the future, since our own notions of hero, author, and redactor are simply inadequate
to handle such a situation. The Gilgamesh text is narrated in third person, is ascribed to
an author named Sin-leqe-unninni, but is actually treated as a third person autobiography
o f Gilgamesh(188).
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I f this is not a direct affirmation o f Booth's "unreliable narrator" thesis, I don't know what is. It also,
obviously, hurls its innovation as modernist, back to the very beginning o f narration itself. It is also an
illustration o f Foucault's thesis o f the work and o f whether an anonymous work is not something written
by a person called an "author." Always accompanying this authorial disappearance is the sure answer that
the royal work o f inscription bypasses "the individuality o f the writer" who may or may not attain "status
as an author" (140). I have presented, I think, a fairly persuasive scholarly case that the anonymous
discourse culture that produced Gilgamesh was in existence to create the illusion that the text is a "giant
royal inscription."
Furthermore,

the narrative voice behind that inscription achieves a "vatic" third person status

equivalent to that o f the man-god, King Gilgamesh, speaking transdiscursively to all once and future
readers. That is, the story o f Gilgamesh's story, though unattributable, is not at all unrealiable. Quite the
contrary, it is highly conscientious—its motive and agency being not "vicious" but "vatic" in the best
sense, and to a degree that only the anonymous-function can underwrite and thus guarantee. I f this is be the
case, then we must reverse our sense that the anonymous-function is an "unreliable" narrative structure
dedicated to undermining readers' expectations through the kind o f viciousness that Booth describes.
It is not simply that 'the story o f one's story' [i.e. narrative] has become more than the
original idea [i.e. m otif or theme o f the story]; that in itself would not necessarily cause
trouble. But the reflector, [i.e. "narrator"] in becoming inconscient about his own
motives and about the reality around him, becomes a vicious agent in the story (347).
This is not the say that anonymous writing does not have its share o f vicious agents (as we will see in the
chapter on "A Pedagogy o f Anonymity"). It is only to say that any consideration o f the rhetoric of ancient
fiction must assume more modernist motives and tendencies.
I will not burden my readers with the Boothian complexity o f the Uta-napishtim third person
autobiography which Gilgamesh listens to so as to Ieam how to achieve an immortality he fails to achieve.
I have been trying to compress a Boothian with a Bakhtinian rhetoric so as to point up Micahlowski's and
Kovacs' conclusions about Gilgamesh : that it ultimately derives the identity o f its authority from an
anonymous community of scribes. My larger point is that this squaring o f anonymity with community,
identity, and authority demonstrates the "historicist" credibility o f the anonymous function. A legacy of
individual reliability or autonomous purity was not the primary motives o f ancient discourse. Immortality
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o f fame and name were not to be achieved through the named property o f a properly named author's
work. The work o f ancient anonymity was not caught up in our more covetous, meretricious—vicious—
cult(ure) o f authorship. It was more concerned with a vatic, commemoritorious (a made up word combining
a "commemorative" and "meritorious") sense o f author-ity.

The End o f Gilgamesh: Anonymous Procreation or Famous Death?
I want to close out this section o f representative anecdotes in pursuit o f the anonymity o f Gilgamesh with a
cue from Kramer as quoted above—the interlocked problem o f fame, name, death, immortality. If I intuit
his universal thematic appeal argument for this epic correctly, he would, I think, conclude that the
humanity and understanding to be found between two male characters who are the true prototypes for the
"buddy film" lies ultimately in this epic's depiction of death/"hell." Gligamesh is, in Jackson's words,
literature's "first recorded vision o f afterlife (91). This takes place in the final. Twelfth Tablet. Gilgamesh
visits his dearly departed friend Enkidu in hell. (Thus Jackson's poetic license in transforming the epic into
an "envelope" with hell in the first line.) The reader is led at first to believe that Gilgamesh, though he has
lost both his friend, and the secret o f eternal life, has at least his fame and name inscribed upon the walls
o f the city he built. Whereas, for Enkidu,
Hell became his home
.... Not even the soldier's death-in-battle,
with all its false and phony honor,
helped Enkidu. Death ju st swallowed him, unrecognized (93-94).
In this passage we can see the eschatological linkage between death and anonymity which can not but
underwrite perennialist attitudes regarding fame, name, and Authorship in whose hold the individual, who
holds a ticket o f passage of whatever class, might sail immortality's vast ocean. The unpublished work of
mere writers gets swallowed, unrecognized. But if Foucault is to be believed, the work o f the author is no
less a death wish. More interesting, though, is the conversation Gilgamesh and Enkidu have when the
former is permitted a short visit with his dead friend in hell. Gilgamesh, though utterly grief-stricken, is
curious about death and identity:
Speak to me please, dear brother,
whispered Gilgamesh.
Tell me o f death and where you are (95).
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Gilgamesh then asks Enkidu a series o f questions that revolve around the requirements and meaning of
lasting fame. Most pointedly is his question about fatherhood, since Gilgamesh is remembered as the
builder o f the walls o f Uruk (where, as we saw above, the story o f his story is meant to be imagined as
inscribed as an U r-text). Nowhere in the Epic o f Gilgamesh is there mention o f a genealogical or even a
patriarchal legacy as with the "heroic" characters in Genesis or Exodus. As we will see, it is the mother of
Gilgamesh, Ninsun, who "affirms the centrality o f family and kin to human life, the importance o f the
private sphere to men who dominate the public sphere" (harris, 81). But once in hell, a different form of
fame haunts Gilgamesh, the man, who has failed in his quest to become a god. He asks Enkidu: "Did you
see there a m an who never fathered any child?" And Enkidu answers: "I saw there a no-man who died."
Back and forth, Gilgamesh asks about men who did or did not father, beginning with one child, and
ending with seven children. Enkidu's answer is always joy for the father, and the anonymous loneliness
for the childless man, ending with the immortality o f the fully familied man, as in,
"And could you find a man with six or seven boys?"
"You could and they are treated as the gods" (95).
Given our ongoing dialectic between a transcendental and a transactional level o f the anonymous, this
final tablet o f Gilgamesh is quite telling. It tells us that he has perhaps botched his quest for fame and
name. He wore himself out seeking the secret o f immortality. The only immortality he will achieve is
having a giant royal inscription inside a wall o f his own purported construction. The stories he hears in
hell add up to a very different name for fame: the anonymous heroism of having and raising a family.
The dramatic poignancy of this last tablet is considerable, even if it did not bear so directly on my
thesis as it is developed in later chapters. Even more to the historicist point o f my thesis is the fact that
this last tablet is often disdained and rejected by many translators because it is by another anonymous
community o f patchwriters come-Iately (some few centuries hence). Kovacs, honoring the rules o f a strict
historical translation, leaves it out. Jackson, o f a more poetic sensibility, perhaps understands the theme of
rhetorical indifference—"What matters who's speaking?—how it manages, under condition o f anonymity, to
reverse the apathy (more toward a-pathos ) o f academic attributive authority into the poignancy of
identity's common composition.
The paternalism o f this dialogue in hell permits us to point our consideration o f Gilgamesh in another
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direction: the historical anonymity o f Woman. Michalowski is quite explicit about this when he traces
the exceptions to the pervasive authorial anonymity in Mesopotamia. Significantly, these exceptions
involve five texts by two women writers: Enheduana and Lu-Inanna, both priestesses. Given the pervasive
anonymity and pseudonymity o f the time, Micahlowski stresses that "there is no assurance that [either
woman] was truly the author o f these pieces." He concludes this way: "The uniqueness o f these claims of
authorship only serves to underline the anonymity o f Sumerian literature" (184). What is perhaps an
extreme case o f waving a weak hermeneutic flashlight at such dark Sumerian stars, I want to pursue the
anonymity o f Gilgamesh in a more historicist-feminist direction, than that supplied by humanists like
Kramer, or translators like Jackson.
The more poignant, "counterhistorical", and atmospherically anonymous alternative for closing out our
analysis o f Gilgamesh rests with the cue provided by Michalowski. He finds in the uniqueness of
Sumerian claims to authorship by a couple of temple priestesses underlines the anonymity o f Sumerian
literature generally. What I find in his finding is the overwhelming identity of woman becoming
progressively—historically—anonymous. In "The Marginalization o f the Goddesses," Tikva Frymer-Kensky
clearly shows how
[t]his diminution o f the goddesses continued and intensified in the Old Babylonian
periods and later. There are very few stories about females in Akkadian literature, [the
official scholarly term for the discursive culture in which Gilgamesh appears] and those
females who do appear are generally in ancillary roles and in stereotypical figures of
mother, advisor, and temptress (97).
After listing all "the major female figures o f Sumerian literature [that] have shrunk [into sexual consorts] or
disappeared" into that immanence that has come to mark Woman as Anonymous under The Name o f the
Father, Frymer-Kensky tells us that finally, "Nisaba's role as goddess o f writing and patron o f scribal
schools was taken over by [the m ale god] Nabu" (97). With this poignant historical background before us,
it is fitting that I summarize Rivkah Harris' "Images o f Women in the Gilgamesh Epic," since it engages in
the sort o f counter-historical activity o f the new historicism and draws on Foucault's principle o f reversal in
the bargain—what she calls "symbolic inversion."
True to Frymer-Kinsky’s findings, Harris finds that "[t]he adventures o f the heroes [Gilgamesh and
Enkidu] preclude a primary role for women. In their dialogue in hell, only fathers and sons, not mothers
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and daughters, are linked to a legitimate sense o f fame, name, and immortality. The force o f the
feminine, and the function o f women, are confined to that of "intercessors, playing intermediary roles"(79).
It turns out, however that two o f the women, "wives," are significantly anonymous, whereas two
prostitutes are given names and are thus elevated in status. Harris believes this role/status reversal—
"symbolic inversion1'—to be "[a] crucial element in the epic" and constitutes the earliest instance o f such
inversion. Quoting Barbara Babcock, editor o f the study, The Reversible World: Symbolic Inversion in Art
and Society, Harris defines symbolic inversion as
any act o f expressive behavior which inverts, contradicts, abrogates, or in some fashion
presents an alternative to commonly held cultural codes, values and norms be they
linguistic or artistic, religious or social or political (81).
We can ignore the general conclusion that anonymity is just such an "act o f expressive behavior," that it
presents a pervasive discursive alternative to all codes, values and norms, yet remains unacknowledged.
Gilgamesh, however, much like the smaller o f Burke's two concentric circles, is symbolic reversion's ur
text operating within the much wider transdiscursive orbit that is the anonymous function.
Nor, I think, is this symbolic reversion reserved for marginal female characters. The liberties which
Jackson takes in his opening trinity o f epithets for Gilgamesh—"sage, trickster, saint"—wittingly reinforce
this sense o f reversion, particularly its m ost telling form—"the comic principle o f inversion which involves
a sudden, comic switch o f expected roles" (Harris, 81). I say comic because the original epithet, the one
that opens most translations o f Gilgamesh is "He who has seen everything." That this great hero, in hell, is
shown to have been quite blind as to what is important for posterity, certainly reverses the epic's dominant
m otif that an anonymous "fame" does not haunt, but instead insures, the act o f "inscription" or ecriture.
(Or, ever mindful o f Foucault's own principle o f reversal, Writing itself haunts the author's "work" insuring
the anonymity o f its fame.)
But rather than stand on Harris' feminist shoulders to wave my dim flashlight at the male stars of
Gilgamesh, I wish to conclude where she does, but with an additional twist that the anonymous function
always exerts. Harris has managed to notice something about the female characters in the epic o f Gilgamesh
that nearly two hundred years o f male translation and commentary has been blind to and reduced to the
depressingly familiar binocularism o f the Mother/Whore spectrum.
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Relying on Hannah Arendt’s distinction between the private and the public as detailed in

The Human

Condition, Harris reminds us that ”[b]oth prostitute and tavemkeeper belong to the extra-domestic
domain; both were important in the leisure activities o f Mesopotamian men." But, unlike the two wives
in the epic, the innkeeper and the prostitute are both named, "given individuality and personhood” (82).
According to Harris, this comic inversion must have been enormously amusing to Mesopotamian
audiences (at least the men.)
On the other hand "[tjhe two married women in

Gilgamesh, the wife o f Utnapishtim [the only mortal

to have achieved immortality and whose third person autobiography so complicates the narrative] and the
Scorpion-man's wife, are unnamed , anonymous creatures" (84). As far as I can interpret, Harris does not
find this side of the inversion comic. From my point o f view it is nothing if not inversely, —and perhaps
perversely— poignant in that from the rhetorical position o f their anonymity they ensure that Gilgamesh
carries on his quest. Utnapishtim's wife gives Gilgamesh bread after he fails the sleep test that would
grant him eternal life. The Scorpion-man's wife recognizes that Gilgamesh is part human and convinces
her husband to assist him in his river passage. In these inversions I see the earliest instance of an
anonymous heroism that became, in a modem example, the unspoken maxim of George Eliot’s fiction.
Harris concludes her fine investigation with a question
The Gilgamesh Epic informs and reveals cultural stereotypes and ideals, perhaps
even the irretrievable life experiences of its authors), but what can it inform us
about everyday life?
My answer relies, like so much of my interpretive momentum, on the metonymic function. Given the
presence and power of the anonymous function (a presence I don't think Harris has adequately perceived
in her interpretation), the question should end as "but what can the Gilgamesh Epic inform us about the
anonymity of everyday life?" Rephrased thus, I think it teaches us far more than the nomination barriers
that were erected by the later authors o f the books of Genesis and Exodus. Also, with the interpolation o f
"anonymity" we have a reconfirmation o f the discursive "anonymous heroism" that motivated the epic's
authors. That much of what has passed for a pervasive eveiyday anonymity has been the resort and role
o f women is not a comedic, but a tragic, representative anecdote, one that is only glanced at in the even
more patriarchaUy charged books o f the Bible. My present scope does not permit consideration of Beck’s
analysis of the “discipleship paradigm.” If it did, we would come to realize that in the books o f The Hew
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Testament the figure o f the anonymous wom atn returns with a poignancy that, as we have seen, has its
genesis in Gilgamesh. In the interim, we will ttum to an anecdote o f the anonymous that represents its
invulnerability and/or injury, but also symboliizes the "eye" o f anonymity's discursive hurricane of
centrifugal forces (the discourse o f Authority), ancS centripedal forces (the Discourse o f Identity).
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The Odvssev o f Anonvmitv

“Nobody is hurting me”: Enlightenment and Anonymity
In our analysis o f the anecdote from Homer’s Odyssey, in which Odysseus cunningly saves himself from
the Iiteralist Cyclops, Polyphemus, who had promised to eat “Udeis” (NoBody ) last, I will draw from
several o f these Foucauldian themes simultaneously to confirm and extend a now famous reading o f the
same passage by the critical theorists Max Horkheimer and Theodor Adomo in their D ialectic o f
Enlightenment.
If I were to apply any one o f Focuault’s themes, It would involve the performative feature o f what I call
the anonymous-function (which, in principle, reverses the author-function.) It seems clear enough that
Odysseus’ adoption o f the protective and projective pseudonym “Udeis”—Nobody—is also an introjective
anonym. It points ironically to his own properly named status as very much a Somebody—dispersing Ideal
Ego #1 within the epic itself. Ideal Ego #2 is Odysseus as a key Authority figure in the mythic and ethical
lifeworld of Ancient Greek culture. In terms o f our “Western Canonical Tradition,” the cunningly character
o f “Odysseus/Udeis” created by the Homeric author-function, (since we have no substantive knowledge of
a personal author, “Homer”), begins to iconically blend, or stand in, with an anonymous Homeric
Tradition, such that the duplicity o f Nobody/Somebody effect becomes the original dispersion o f Ideal Ego
#3 from the anonymous-function o f rhetorical indifference: “What matter who’s speaking?”
But I will not pursue this line o f analysis. I am more interested in tracing some of the isssues o f
identity and duplicity, impersonation and authenticity, suggested by this Homeric anecdote. For they help
us to better build a case for the pedagogical use of anonymity as a rhetoric o f community in which the
disappearance o f Somebody becomes the problematic opening within a course of composition where
Everybody is reading what Nobody is writing. The purported author o f The Odysey occupies a different
category o f authorial anonymity than o f that o f Gilgamesh or o f G enesis in that he is named. The name of
"Homer" remains, however, a textbook illustration o f what Foucault means by the problem o f the author's
proper name. A recent article in U.S. News &World Report (July, 2000) reveals a growing popular
fascination with issues o f authorial attribution and authenticity that have been "business as usual" at least
since the time of Nietzsche, and other 19th century founders o f philological analysis. The article, by Jay
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Tolson, is a vulgar, and therefore quite useful, reduction o f the scholarly “problem” o f authorial
attribution. As part o f a series the magazine inaugurated around the hype o f “miilenium fever” titled
Mysteries o f H istory the title poses this question: ‘Was Homer a solo act o f a bevy o f bards?” The subtitle
reads: “Classicists have fe w clues but lots o f theories” (39).
What’s m ost useful about the article is the way Tolson handles the historical literature on the identity
o f Homer—the living individual/personal author. Fifth Century Greeks had long since accepted the legend
that Homer was a blind itinerant performer who lived, according to the notorious historical fictions of
Herodotus, “400 years before my time—and no more than that” (Tolson, 39). No one ever doubted
Homer’s standing as personal author and “sole creator” o f the epics that have come down to us until the
early 18th century when Vico, extending the work o f Bacon, began seriously upsetting canonical and
curricular assumptions about Traditional Author-ity that would reach its satirical epitome with Swift’s The
Battle o f the Books. Tolson skips this part o f the disagreement over Homeric Authority to focus on the late
20Ulcentury.
We have scholars like Barry Powell who theorize an “ ‘Adapter’ —the recorder o f Homer’s works”—
versus Robert Fagles, the reigning king o f Homeric translators who operates more on “feeling” that Homer
was sole creator (39). What I find interesting in this struggle of theory and feeling about original versus
evolutionary authorship is how it conforms to what we saw in Forster’s distinction between the
“information” and the “atmosphere” of author-ity. To say that one can’t believe there was more than one
“Homer,” or that one fee ls the work of many hands is, I believe andfeel, a confirmation o f the anonymous
function.
Aside what one or we might believe or feel, the information we do seem to have at present The
Odyssey, as we have come to know it in its many translations from "the original,” is itself a collection or
composite o f at least two texts—one truly primordial, the other more recent, as in "ancient." From the
Ancient Greek, meaning "scraped again," the continuously erased and rescribed parchment manuscripts of
The Odyssey —as well as those of the Old Testament and Gilgamesh—by unnamed and unknown hands
("Manuscribers"), can be seen in the patched palimpsestic writing of "Homeric" "mythic" and "epic" genres
spanning centuries o f "...a histrorical process which can still be discerned where the disparate elements of
the Odyssey have been editorially reconciled" (Horkheimer and Adorno, 43). We haven't the space or scope
to consider, however, this complexity of "blurred genres" supporting "blurred author-ities" amounting to
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anonymity's function as a transhistorical palimpsest.
In our final anecdotal approach towards a history o f anonymity, we will focus on the name which
Odysseus uses to deceive a one-eyed, flesh-eating, immortal demiurge—the Cyclops named Polyphemus.
We will lean heavily on Horkheimer’s and Adorno's chapter, "Odysseus or Myth and Enlightenment" in
their now famous treatise, D ialectic o f Enlightenment. As with so much o f my research into critical
literature that supports my thesis o f an anonymous function, D ialectic o f Enlightenment neither mentions
the words "anonymous," or "anonymity," nor treats, in even an indirect way, their functions. Nevertheless,
as founder's of what we have come to call "critical theory, Horkheimer and Adomo link the instrumental
rationality of the Enlightenment subject to what they call "...the sophistic double-entendre of Odysseus'
false name" (65). This, as we shall see, confirms much o f what I have been trying to demonstrate as
anonymity's ever-present function as a problematic solution o f nominalist consciousness itself.
Simply put, the concept o f Enlightenment Reason—starting with Bacon and finding fruition in
Kant—“ ...has always aimed at liberating men [ric] from fear and establishing their sovereignty”
(Horkheimer and Adomo, 3). This primal fear o f primitive humans was directed at Nature, its awesome
forces. Such terror gradually coalesced into reverence, and reverence into myth-making, magic, and the
religious impulse—to literally “bind” the individual to the natural. Horkheimer and Adomo sum up the
relation of terror to the sacred and therefore to the emergence o f language as the original utterance o f SelfOther identification in a new nominalist consciousness this way.
The gasp o f surprise which which accompanies the experience o f the unusual becomes its
name. It fixes the transcedence o f the unknown in relation to the known, and therefore
terror as sacredness (15).
Anonymous Nature, the Great Unknown (because Unidentical, Utterly Other and therefore reciprocally
Unspeakable/Unnameable, but gradually identified in mythic, religious, and scientific versions o f reason as
a literal coming to terms), underscores the Known as a series o f tentative nominations “...as evidence for
an Other...[in which language expresses the contradiction that something is itself and at one and the same
time something other than itself, identical and not identical” (15).
In other words, we are back to the philosophical discourse o f the Origin—o f Identity, Authority,
Community. With this attempt at sketching the primordial function o f anonymity in relation to the
emergence of language as the technology o f self-preservation and affirmation, o f sameness amidst sheer,
contingent difference, Horkheimer and Adomo posit “Odysseus” as “ ...a prototype of the bourgeois
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individual, a notion originating in the consistent self-affirmation which has its anicent pattern in the
figure of the protagonist compelled to wander” (43).
What these two thinkers go on to argue in “Odysseus or Myth and Englightenment” is that this
prototypical actor/seeker after sovereignty, o f freedom from Natural Terror, in fact “ ...loses him self in order
to find himself.” And, given the confusion and conflation o f older mythic texts with later epic texts that
comprise the books o f The Odyssesy, we see that, “[a]t the Homeric level, the identity o f the self is so
much a function o f the unidentical, o f dissociated, unarticulated myths, that it must derive itself from
those myths (48). That is, the identity o f the self must derive itself from the anonymous function.
But how does this prototypical, this new, self in the character o f Odysseus accomplish this leap from
undifferentiated anonymity into self-nominative identity, autonomy, and therefore authority? How does the
“self’ (autos)— the “I”— which “Homer” introduces in relation to Odyssesus’ encounter with Polyphemus
make itself Other to the natural order of otherness represented by the Cyclops? “Artifice is the means by
which the adventuring se lf loses itself in order to preserve itself’ (49). That is, Odysseus, as the prototype
o f enlightened self-consciousness, deceptively, but protectively calls himself “Udeis” (No Body ) when he
realizes that he might not survive the encounter with Polyphemus, that his body would be eaten as a
sacrifice to expiate his original sin against Poseidon, father o f the Cyclopes. Here is the key passage from
The Odyssey.
You, Cylops, asked my worthy name. This I will tell,
and you must give to me, as promised, your guest gift.
My name is "Udeis". Odysseus is what I am called
by mother and by father and by all my friends.'
Later, the blinded, agonized Cyclopes reports to his fellows on who put out his eye.
'Friends, NoBody ["Udeis"] slays me by deceit; there
was no force."
And they, in turn, replied to him with these winged
words:
'If Nobody there to you, alone, does violence,
can you escape the sickness Zeus imposed on you?'
Recounting this story to his hosts, the Phoenecians, who had asked this "Udeis" (this "NoBody")

to

identify himself after his incognito story o f linguistic conning and self-preservative cunning, Odysseus
finishes his allegory o f anonymity with this comment: "Now thus the Cyclopes spoke and left, and in my
heart I laughed that name and clever scheme had so

deceived them all."
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One direction we might take in understanding how the anonymous function operates in this famous
passage from one o f the founding texts o f Western literature is to look at its relation to what Judith Butler
calls "linguistic "vulnerability." A s we will see below, Odysseus' superior sense o f an Austinian "how to
do things with words" makes the Cyclops linguistically vulnerable to the homonymic blurring between the
name o f the hero, "Odysseus" and that o f "Udeis" (NoBody). The use o f the anonymous function to protect
his identity (and his life) is a case o f what I call anonymity’s rhetorical immunity or, to modify Butler,
"linguistic invulnerability."
The irony o f the blind Polyphemus bellowing for help—"Nobody is hurting me"—and receiving none
because of the non-descript, essentially anonymous, name Odysseus has used to identify himself is an
exquisite, excruciating irony. It reminds that excitable, and "injurious speech" (Butler) is always possible
under conditions o f anonymity, even as it protects (in this case, justifiably) the identity o f the speaker. In
my reading of the Odyssesus/Udeis duplicity we see not only the transgressive power o f naming as
underwritten by anonymity, but their "traumatic" (Butler) power. The scope o f this study, however, cannot
take up the ethics o f anonymity's relation to traumatic substitution, linguistic (in)vulnerability and
injurious speech.22
In effect, what Horkheimer and Adomo refer to as “the sophistic double-entendre o f Odysseus’ false
name,” is both a no-name and one phonically self-same to his actual name. It the metonymic epitome of
what I have been calling the variable and pervasive functionality o f anonymity, of its play across the
founding discourses o f modernity and “enlightenment”—so-called.23 Odysseus’ self-sacrifice through the
serious play o f anonymizing while metonymizing his own name, confirms his standing characterization as
being “cunning.” For Horkheimer and Adomo, this nominalist, calculating consciousness— its “deceit and
artifice” (50)—is at the center o f enlightenment rationality. There also, at this originating, radiating center,
is the dialectic o f self-mastery through self-renunciation which Foucault made much of, and which we saw
as integral to Nikolas Roses’ attempt at a “genealogy o f subjectification” or “a history o f the person,” the
sources and technologies of authority that make for personality and inter-subjectivity. Again, uncannily,
Horkheimer and Adomo ramp up, forty years earlier, to this same sort o f genealogical approach in their
“critical” theory o f the Odysseus m yth o f rationality through anonymity.
The calculation that, once blinded, Polyphemus would answer his tribesman’s question
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[“Who is hurting you, brother?’] as to the source o f this anguish with the word “Nobody!”
-thus concealing the deed and helping the guilty man to escape punishment— is only a
thin rationalistic covering (67).

That is, Horheimer and Adomo need to remind us that Odysseus’ new found authority in playing the
dialectic o f enlightenment within vicious/virtuous circles within circles o f imitation and deception, of
identity and anonymity, that he will end in an extreme form o f self-authorization—/zwirir. It is a neat
ethical turn, for they want to instruct the reader that the dialectic o f enlightenment, the mastery o f nature
through various forms o f renunication and deception o f otherness, has brought as much loss in reason as it
has gained for civilization.
In their focus on the deception and artifice in the nominalized identity crisis between Odysseus as
Somebody who becomes Nobody in order to survive as Somebody, Horkheimer and Adomo see our way
past Odysseus’ consummate impersonation as finally anonymous, a Nobody, whose enlightened selfinterest saves him from the fate of his consumed companions.
In reality, the subject Odysseus denies his own identity, which makes him a subject, and
keeps him self alive by imitating the amorphous [more toward anonymous non-identity of
Nature]. He calls himself Nobody because Polyphemus is not a self, and the confusion of
name and thing prevents the deceived savage from evading the trap...(67).
Odysseus’ adroit use o f the anonymous function as a technology o f self-mastery (through a tight orbit of
nominal renunciation, enuciation, and denunciation) can be seen as maladroit and arrogant according to
Horkheimer and Adomo. For it must be remembered that once he has escaped the cave o f the now blinded
Polyphemus, Odyssesus taunts the Cyclops, revealing anonymous concealment by yelling “..his real name
and his origin” (68). This is an act o f hubris—o f insolence—and therefore o f nominalist stupidity rather than
one o f anonymous author-ity, as I read and adapt the endlogic o f Horkheimer and Adomo. Their conclusion
is that, "...once having been known as nobody, lest he again become nobody, he must restore his own
identity with the magic word [that is "Udeis" now reintonated to sound like Odysseus ] already dissociated
from rational identity" (68).
This is indeed an act o f hubris in that Poseidon hears the name Odysseus rather than "Udeis" and
pursues him once again with renewed vengeance. And, in perhaps their most insightful take on the
Homeric anonymous function as it supports and subverts the author-ity of the proper name, they cap their
133

R e p ro d u c e d with perm ission of the copyright owner. Further reproduction prohibited without permission.

charge of hubris this way: "The cunning o f t h e clever man who assumes the form o f stupidity turns to
stupidity as soon as he surrenders that form. That is the dialectic o f eloquence" (68). In other words,
Odyssesus, a man, a King, in fact, who understands words, their distance from things, how they can refer
to many things at once, or to no thing at all_ just a stream o f other words, very rationally—cunningly
(literally "knowingly")—nominates the word inr closest proximity to his own proper name. A cunning King
suddenly becomes a stupid non-descript non-p*erson—Nobody— with the slightest inflection o f his own
proper name.
In the technology o f self-affirmation as renunciation that his practice o f the anonymous function
literally proto-types, the character Odysseus/Ud*eis had been relying on sophrosyne— the opposite o f hubris.
That is, however cunning and deceptive, the artifice o f his double name game o f protecting a heroic
Somebody behind a vulnerable Nobody in ordenr to reproject himself as heroic Somebody, was an act not of
insolence but o f the highest discretion and prudience. The anonymous function becomes a form o f stupidity
in the deepest sense: it is a act o f astonishment*, amazing the un-worded, in-eloquent Polyphemus. But as
soon as Odysseus indiscreetly, arrogantly dropsj the anonymous persona, he has committed a "stupid" act
in the worst sense. The sophrosyne of the anonym ously functioning Nobody turns to the hubris o f the
properly named hero, Odysseus.
Thus, the anonymous function, as I read Horkheimer and Adorno’s reading o f this anecdote, is at the
center of what they are calling the "the dialectic: o f eloquence" in which the authority and authenticity of
discourse are in continuous, inter-subjective tension, in much the same way that Forster's twin functions of
language as information and language as atm osphere inform his inquiry into anonymity. The charged
atmosphere of Odysseus' properly named heroine, yet hubristic authority is a surface whose anonymous
depth is the authentic (as in sophrosynically "prudent") information of being Noman, Nobody.
This problem between authenticity and auOthority and their relation to anonymity's proper-improper
naming, its person-impersonating, or mask-unmasking effect has been picked up as we saw above by
Thomas Docherty. In Part Two o f his study,

M odem Authority titled "Natural Authority" (in which

"Natural" is x'd over), Docherty genealogically traces this problematic relation o f authority in a Chapter
titled "The Impossibility o f Authenticity." W hatt he has to say about the impossibility of authenticity by
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the time we get to the age o f Shakespeare (speaking o f a problem o f author-ity) is already well under way
at the Homeric origin o f literature.
To impersonate another person, as Shakespearean twins demonstrate, is to question the
very individuality o f the person thus duplicated. As a result, the question o f the
authenticity o f the 'original' is raised. When one person stops imitating or impersonating
another, she or he does not return to an authentic selfhood, but returns instead to an
impersonation o f the 'originary’ self.
It would seem that Horkheimer and Adomo get close to "the secret o f the universe" as Forster put it, by
noting Odysseus' originating play o f nominalist self-consciousness through the impersonation o f Nobody.
The reader will remember that Forster speaks o f a "lower personality" a "down there" where there are no
names. Horkheimer and Adomo posit a self for Odyssesus but no self for Polyphemus. The Odyssean self,
built on the impersonation o f an originary non-identity, are one and the same for them.
Odyssesus' two contradictory actions in his encounter with Polyphemus, his answering
to the name, and his disowning it, are neverthelessone. He acknowledges him self to
himself by denying himself under the name Nobody; he saves his life by losing him self
(60).
Thus if we follow Docherty's alignment o f "an authentic selfhood" with the problem o f an author-itative
impersonation or impersonation o f authority, we end up wondering with him whether "...there arises a
realization that the question o f an originary source becomes simply unanswerable: an essential nature gives
way entirely to the play...of artifice...which might be called duplicity" (214). And then we find ourselves
with back with H&A critically theorising that Odysseus' orginating "[a]rtifice is the means by which the
adventuring self loses itself in order to preserve itself' (49).
If this literally original—author-itative—characterization o f Odysseus is to be taken as the prototype o f
an authentic, intersubjective self-identity, then the function o f anonymity in what "might be called [its]
duplicity" is rather incontrovertible. This possibility of an orginating anonymous duplicity is itself a
sophistic double entendre, since we have no authentic sense o f who Homer was, only the knowledge that
the character o f Odysseus created under the authoritative name o f Homer is an authentic prototype o f selfother duplicity.
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Conclusion to Chapter Three
Anonymous duplicity brings me, by way o f a conclusion, to the observation o f Walter Benjamin, a fellow
member o f the original group o f critical theorists founded by Horkheimer and Adomo. "The authenticity of
a thing is the essence o f all that is transmissible from its beginning—.Since the historical testimony rests
on the authenticity...what is really jeopardized when the historical testimony is affected is the authority o f
the object" (852). The "author-ity" o f the object The Odyssey, much like that o f The Book o f Genesis and
The Epic o f Gilgamesh, is really not a problem. Nor is the respective "authenticity" o f their characters
operating across a range o f nomination barriers and anonymous contact zones, as we have seen. The
problem lies in the function o f anonymity within the double—or duplicitous—discourse o f authority and
authenticity.
It is a problem, I am arguing, because, we don't wish to believe that the irresolution and duplicity of
discursive anonymity explains the continuing centrality o f Foucault's author-function. Nor do we wish to
consider that if that function is to be denominated as central, (as Anis Bawarshi, a worker in the field of
composition-rhetoric, does by renominating "the genre function" in its place), then it is the anonymous
function that enables whatever substitution or displacement we might become enamored o f as authentic and
authoritative. As a matter o f fact, I can't name a single person who might concur—making me quite certain
that absolutely Nobody believes in the authentic and original authority o f anonymity.
The anonymous function comes down to merely a "rhetorical question" that is effectively unanswerable
in terms o f its historical testimony:" What matters who is speaking?" The answer to this question matters
very much indeed, as we will now see in Chapter Four, where the matter o f connecting the speaker and the
spoken is not one o f rhetorical indifference at all to the one or to those who are the "spoken to." Identity,
Authority, their problematic origins and authenticity are ultimately connected to the concerns o f a
community, and of specifc "audiences," be these listeners, readers, or viewers.
My consideration o f the inter-related problems of authority and authenticity as ones that cannot be fidly
understood without accounting for the largely unaccountable presence and influence of an anonymous
function will now turn, then, to the problematic anonymity o f community, and o f the audience function.
"The murmumr of indifference" that Foucault says accompanies Beckett's unanswerable question, "What
matters who's speaking?" is countered rhetorically by a question o f community in the form o f a declaration:
What matters is: who's listening? The disconnection between the anonymous speaker/writer and the
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spoken/written emphasizes the linkage between community—as a special conception

o f the

Listener—and anonymity—as a special conception o f the Other. We now take up this issues as one
intimately linked to the meaning and function o f community in Chapter Four, ‘Towards a Rhietoric of
Anonymity.” Bakhtin can help us understand stand that community is a kind o f identity sshield or
immunity from the discourse o f author-ity, and that the rhetorical immunity at the operative centner o f the
anonymous function has much to do with what has come to be called a zone o f contact between ax Writing
Self and its Other.
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Chapter Notes
*As we will see in Chapter Five, the linkage o f the anonymous pastoral practice o f confession, for
example, to that o f an expressivist approach to composition under conditions o f anonymous writing
problematizes the practice o f actual and imagined authority in the composition course. This is especially
apparent in a course that values both named and unnamed texts within face-to-face orientations o f group
discussion o f both kinds o f writing.
2

Looking ahead from the present problem o f compositional author-ity to that of the composition
community, many o f my composition colleagues were hostile to my use o f anonymous writing, I believe,
because they were similarly invested in the sacrosanct and monumental tradition o f the author-ftmction.
Not really committed to personal writing, they often used author-driven belles letters anthologies to teach
composition. They therefore uncritically, or at least to some extent, unconsciously, transferred and
projected this "author-tarian" conception o f writing into their own positions o f authority as teachers o f
composition in charge o f giving students a dubious "ownership" o f their texts. Thus, they might have
conceived o f my anonymous pedagogy as a literal "defacement" o f the subject position of the "student" and
his or her "personal" investment as a writer "speaking" to a reading "audience." It did not matter to them
that the ethos of the situation in which students' anonymous writing was re-presented and commonly
shared was hardly faceless, for I required that all students discuss in face-to-face interactions the exigent
senses o f authority named in the w riting as it transgressed self-other identifications, not the contingent
identities o f the writers so un-properly named. Reactionary colleagues were not as concerned with an
expressivist identity crisis, as they were with what anonymity might present for them as a crisis o f theftown authority.
3

Even though my analysis o f the presence o f the anonymous function in Ancient Author-ities deals with
supposedly Male writers—"God," Gilgamesh, Homer— I try to identify the authority o f Anonymity as
always provoking the voice, image, and im-proper name o f Woman as Author. The (fe)male author, always
on the original anonymous margins o f the history o f authorship, gradually—ironically— augments the
problematic center o f author-ity until writing does become a Utopian province o f meaning, a passionate
enclave for anyone, everyone—an erewhon available to the anonymous No One writers and readers become
in the anonymous textuality o f history itself.
^More precisely and more complexly, Anonymous becomes the nomenclature for all pseudonyms that have
ever been used in place o f an "actual" proper name that the individual, for various personal, social,
rhetorical, ideological, and economic reasons, has determined m ust remain invisible, in suspended
animation, and most important, not so much without a discourse o f author-ity, but functionally distant
from what it nominates. If the so called "nomination barrier" is perfected by the writers o f the book o f
Genesis it was—theoretically—invented by the nameless scribes who figured out from the Phoenicians how
to alphabetize oral discourse. Horkheimer and Adorno, as we will see when we look at The Odyssey,
speculate that the first Ur-Writer who transcribed the oral poems o f the unknown personal author, "Homer"
(or whatever nameless group o f listeners who connected the spoken with a speaker so named), discovered
"nominalism" out o f the literal "formalism" o f the words “scribed” onto parchments that became
palimpsests—literally "scraped again and again" over generations o f revision and redaction. Thus, these
Homeric Adapters (or re/de-scribers) realized in breaching the nomination barrier that they had not only
transgressed the oral and the written, they had crossed erasure and rescription. In doing so, they exposed
"..the fact that they [words] distance themselves from every fulfilling content, and at a distance refer to
every possible content—to Nobody [“Udeis] as to Odysseus" [Wandering Hero] (60).
5 The ethos or ethical principle governing the teaching o f composition extends across the disciplines. That
is, it matters very much indeed who’s speaking or writing, to which audience/readership, and that together
this basic rhetorical relation (which is essentially grounded in the metaphysics o f presence, and out of that
"speaks" to a phenomenology o f Self/Other) influences what is being communicated. In “The Speaker
Respoken: Material Rhetoric as Fem inist Methodology,” Vicki Tolar Collins features the Beckett quote
used by Foucault as her own epigraph to remind us that “Who is speaking and who is silenced are core
feminist issues in both rhetoric and literary studies” (CE 61/5: 545). I will discuss this feminist ethos of
material and rhetorical (indifference in greater detail in Chapters Four and Five, A Rhetoric and a
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Pedagogy o f Anonymity, respectively.
As I will make clear, my sense of what Foucault is ultimately up to (and up against) in "What is an
Author?" is a dalliance with the "dark star" o f anonymous discourse—that it is more powerful—more
permeable and permanent—than its more open and over-determined counterpart, authorial discourse. When
at the end o f the essay he imagines all discourse circulating "without any need o f an author," unfolding "in
a pervasive anonymity" (148), he is providing the overriding answer to the question o f what is an author:
the name o f the author depends upon and unfolds from the pervasive anonymity o f writing itse lf Thus,
though the example o f an anonymous poster having a writer and not an author would seem to highlight the
importance o f authorial identity and authority in all discourse, it is actually a cue to the ever-unfolding
pervasiveness o f anonymous discourse that has only spread more deeply and widely since Foucault's
speculations in 1969. Foucault could hardly be unaware o f the pervasive anonymity o f radio and
television's advertising underwriters, never mind the longstanding tradition o f anonymous editorializing in
print media. With the advent o f the Internet and the World Wide Web, Foucault's generalized notion of
anonymity’s pervasiveness had begun to take on a concrete discursive reality that looked like it might
reverse the dominant-subordinate order o f exclusive author/excluded writer. Copyright law, however, being
grounded in notions o f proper-ty under the ownership o f an Author proper-Iy (usually Corporately) named
is ultimately having its way with free digitized identities and common law anonymity. That is because the
right o f the Author is an extension o f Capital as the only believable a priori category. The progressive
priority o f Capital has, ironically, displaced trust in the transcendental signifier responsible for faith in the
value o f currency and the currency o f all value—namely, an unnamable and therefore unknowable sense of
God.
7 Foucault also reminds us that anonymous author-ity has been very conveniently ignored. It has been
historically convenient, and in the case o f The Holy Bible, ideologically essential. We attribute authorship
to "Gilgamesh"— King o f Ur, or to "God,” King of the Universe, or to "Homer,” king o f Poets. Yet all
scholarship points to a either a collaborative effort at an undetermined point in time when orality was
congealing toward textuality, or to a corporate patch-write, a collective redaction o f an undetermined
original. To push to the limit o f Foucault’s assertions, the anonymity o f these preeminently "literary” texts
does not diminish but instead thoroughly guarantees their authenticity. In this passage, as in other places
in "What is an Author," Foucault seems to be robbing from the Peter o f the author-function in order to pay
the Paul o f what I have been calling the anonymous-function. In any case, no historical outline o f the
anonymous can ignore the presence o f these absent authorial identities. Again, the common suspicion of
contemporary uses o f anonymity and the anonymous as somehow inauthentic deserves, like all common
sense conclusions, to be questioned, tested according to a critical principle o f reversal, and if need be,
overturned for its bad faith or un-truth effect.
^ As we will see in our analyses o f representative anecdotes from the Epic o f Gilgamesh—"the predominant
epic o f them all" (Ferry, viii)—the obvious heterogeneity and discontinuity o f the Genesis epic in part
derives from the anonymous function, the same function responsible for its projection as unified. The case
of Gilgamesh sets a rule from which Genesis can hardly be thought to be some transcendent, ahistorical
exception. "The earliest indications [of Gilgamesh] are o f an oral tradition, with many variants, taking
shape in a variety o f compositions which later were merged, seemingly cobbled together into a work of
literature by some unknown Babylonian poet" (Ferry, ix).
^Believers o f the truly, madly, deeply persuasion, however, read these shifters as a sign that God, the
Author o f The Book, first wrote himself into existence using the omniscient past tense point o f view. In
effect, the anonymous writer, and the authoritative character being described as God is one and the same
authorial ego. In effect, there is no anonymous scribe, only God, at once present in the Word and absent
only to the reader who sees His Book as reducible to "literature" rather than what it "IS": revealed scripture.
But anonymity, or the anonymous-function, will no more disappear at the insistence o f orthodoxy, than
will the author-function which, as we know from Foucault, gets canonized, in large part because o f St.
Jerome's principles o f authentication. As we can see, and as I have been repeating and will reiterate
throughout this dissertation, there can be no author-function without the anonymous-function. They are as
tightly braided as the double helix of genetics, as the speaker/audience system o f self-consciousness, or as
the identity o f writer and author in Genesis.
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10Yet another indication o f the transparent, taken-as-granted, generally unexamined presence o f the
anonymous is this open secret o f the Tetragrammaton. It continues to be considered "blasphemy" (literally
'evil speaking’) to pronounce the forbidden name o f god. My take on this as a blasphemer, or at least, as a
disbelieving atheist who believes firmly in life before death, is that to come clean and pronounce the name
o f god would give up the whole game o f divine authority and human subjection. Say the name and "God"
becomes just another subject. But this subject has a purely rhetorical, not historically embodied name—a
name lacking real historical reference but for that concocted by a group o f anonymous writers working near
the beginning o f fiction. Logically, the name should lose Truth-value, most o f its meaning, and therefore
its hermeneutic cachet. A look into Webster's Third New International Dictionary provides the following
entry on Tetragrammaton. What this entry says to me is that the forbidden name o f god turns into an
anonymity that is itself the source o f a renaming so obsessive and neurotic as to preserve not only an
Identity that does not in fact exist, but unwittingly transgresses the original Prohibition. But such is the
paradoxical, uncanny nature o f the anonymous function. A prohibition on Naming and Identity turns the
Anonymous and Anonymity into an acceptable rhetorical action. Paradoxically, anonymity is viewed as
transgressive, abnormal, anti-social, in much o f the secular humanist side o f language life.
The Hebrew word o f four letters constituting a divine proper name which the Jews out of
reverence or fear o f desecration ceased to pronounce about three centuries BC and for
which they substituted Adonai or Elohim and being variously transliterated without
indication o f vocalization usually by YHWH, YHVH, JHVH, JHWH, IHVH and with
vowels usually by Jehovah, Yahweh, Jahveh, Jahweh, Yahveh, Jahve, Jahwe, Yahve,
Yahwe (264)
11 It is difficult to imagine a more complex and variable discursive situation than the text of The Bible
(literally, "The Book"). Its authorlessness is radically anonymous, which means, according to Foucault,
that its shifters refer, first o f all to "a real speaker." TTiis is quite puzzling. This can be cleared up to some
extent by granting that Foucault is making a distinction between a canonical (originally, "holy") Author
and merely profane (literally, "before the temple") writers or mediate authors. This distinction is implied
in his summary of the relation o f modem literary criticism and "Christian exegesis when it wished to prove
the value o f a text by ascertaining the holiness o f its author" (143). In this summary—the thesis o f the
author-functioris "projective" character—he shows how modem literary criticism, "in its desire to "recover"
the author from a work, employs devices strongly reminiscent of Christian exegesis." He then recounts St.
Jerome's "four principles o f authenticity" guaranteed to "disclose the involvement of several authors" versus
the singularly authentic author. There is, in terms of the texts to be considered, "a standard level of
quality"; "a certain field o f conceptual or theoretical coherence"; "stylistic uniformity"; and " definite
historical figure in which a series o f events converge" (144). Clearly, when we turn to The Holy Bible, the
supposed Alpha/Omega Book o f books, with these Christian exegetical principles in mind, the questions
o f authentic authorial quality, coherence, uniformity, and singularity fly in all rhetorical directions. The
center o f Jerome's authorial authentication cannot hold this Book's centripedal and centrifugal forces (cf.
Bakhtin in Chapter Four, "Toward a Rhetoric o f Anonymity"). So now we have a disparate series of
anonymous writers responsible for the most canonical of all texts, a "holy" text that is wholly—"utterly"—
unworthy o f Jerome's principles o f authentication. On Jeromian principle, the Bible should have been
rejected (even after taking "The Apochrypha" or the Bible's rejected texts into account—never mind the Dead
Sea scrolls still awaiting exegetical authentication or rejection).
12 Catholicism of the old order overtly underscored this double indemnity and indecision of one's
creaturely identity. This was no accident. Its operation is another angle on what Foucault meant by
"pastoral power" and how it springs from the culture of the confessional. It was a rhetorical action that
helped advance its goals o f fear and shame. It would not surprise me to finally realize that my Catholic
immersion in The Bible was the "genesis" o f my present interest in anonymity as the guarantor of
community, identity, and authority. I have since managed to expunge the major part o f my belief in a
Catholic God, and am happily engaged in the transgression and reversal o f its retroactive remnants. What I
see as the interlocked Catholic legacy o f exegesis and confession is not so easily "transcended", however,
into an immanent practice. (Though the recent academic vogue o f "auto-critique" gives me hope. It leads
me to suspect that part of its deeper motivation is hidden in the collapse o f the Catholic Church
13 "God" does change Abraham's wife's name from "Sarai to Sarah, but he does not o f course tell her of
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his plan to make her "a m other o f nations." As we learned from Basil Cottle above, it is an odd concept
"that Man's naming o f creatures confirmed their subjection to him." It is not so odd however when a non
descript, virtually unidentifiable character has the power to (re) nam e his creatures and in so doing confirm
their subjection to "Him." And when fiction invents life (thus the title (Genesis) it is a truly mindboggling subjection that would have real listeners or readers turn into billions o f believers who have
subsequently identified with a covenant predicated upon a name gam e played by an anonymous author. The
immense reminder and remainder o f the name o f Woman as an ultimate anonymization may be summed up
in the consideration that the name o f the Father always and already eliminates the Name o f the Mother, but
it is not a problem we can explore here. Cottle goes on to speak o f "primitive races, [y/c] and even
primitive folk [sic] in English villages, who feel that our [sic] knowledge o f their names is related to a
power over their bodies, though being numbered (by National Health, or one's bank, or even the genial
National Trust) is closer to depersonalization and slavery" (11). I see here the multivalent nature o f
anonymity, an issue we will take up more directly in Chapter Four, on "A Rhetoric o f Anonymity." In
short, all kinds o f "primitive" types have clung to the protectiveness o f anonymity, rightly frightened of
European (or bureaucratic) elites armed with the power o f naming as codified and extended through the
power o f literacy. Cottle turns this protective form o f the anonymous on its head and speaks o f anonymity
as depersonalizing to the point o f creating nondescript slaves—audits o f modem bureaucratic life. He is
hinting that the subject citizen comes to wish for the more "primitive" situation where a person was at least
in part identified, and maintained some sense o f group identity, through his or her name, rather than, say, a
social security number. As with the covenant o f circumcision proffered by an anonymous double—
Author/writer—modem anonymity is both a cut and suture across the idea o f Community, Identity, and
Authority.
It should not go unnoted that the entire Book o f Esther never once features, makes reference to, or
otherwise uses, the name "God." This tale, of a beautiful Jewess who is beloved by a Persian King bent on
destroying all Jews, is o f course anonymously authored. That it does not even use the word "God," never
mind get close to the Tetragrammaton, tells us that it was written at the height of the time when Jews
strictly observed the prohibition on using God's name, either in Temple, or outside. It is a strange,
virtually a-theistic, story. It points up the total anonymity o f a God who obviously enables his people to
prevail against their enemies, but because of the Tetragrammaton, the covenant or commandments at the
end o f the story concerning the Holy Days o f Purim seem to be created by a Woman. God forbid!
Harold Bloom's essay, ""Before Moses Was, I Am": The Original and the Belated Testaments" makes
very much o f this passage. Ever-true to his lifelong project o f all textual interpretation being some
variation on a deliberate misreading, he finds that The Revised Standard Version o f The Bible is "like
every other version, [in that] it cannot handle Yahweh's awesome, untranslatable play upon his own name:
ehyeh asher ehyeh. I expand upon a suggestion o f Martin Buber's when I render this as "I will be present
wherever and whenever I will be present." For that is the Yahwist's vision o f olam as "a time without
boundaries," and o f the relation o f Yahweh to a dynamics o f time that transcends spatial limitations" (293294). Bloom went on to write an entire book treating the problem o f the identity o f the Yahwist author o f
the first books o f the Old Testament, titled The Book o f J. He is therefore cognizant o f the writer/Author
split in The Old Testament, which often gets elided or overlooked because o f the tradition o f belatedly
sacralizing certain texts as "the world o f God", rather than as the writing o f an intentionally anonymous
writer. My take on Bloom's Buberian retranslation o f "IAM W HO I AM" is not altered a whit. It is an
artifice, an artful dodge employed repeatedly by a writer committed to creating an olam via the power o f
writing as the grand synthesis o f expression and intention that transcends the writer into what has since
been codified by T.S. Eliot as the "vatic voice." The voice o f "I AM " is the olam that would transgress its
"nominal" existence as the original Prohibition, or name that m ust not be uttered. "I AM" becomes the
substitute for Identity as the tautology o f the self-same. The Nam e o f God was Prohibited because its
content is fundamentally absurd. As in Baiun's parody, no amount o f smoke, fire, or angry, amplified
voice, can ultimately disguise its anonymous construction (and your little dog/god that is its undoing, too,
dearie.)
16 The take o f rabbinical scholarship on this question o f an inchoate, incorporate, and perhaps incontinent
nominalism turns out to be quite fascinating. Rabbi Arthur Marmorstein's The Old Rabbinic Doctrine o f
God has a chapter titled "The Names o f God in the Bible" in w hich he tracks the various epithetic sum
totals down through the ages. Some say 57, others 70. His definitive genealogical work finds that there are
91 ancient rabbinical synonyms. "I" is one o f these.
"God" is another, as is "Man," and most
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tellingly, "The Name." Marmorstein also has a chapter, "The Pronunciation o f the Tetragrammatron,"
which traces the history o f the prohibition on saying God's true name. He clearly shows that the
prohibition was not always in effect, that it shifted according to where one was, and whether one was naked
or clothed, and what kind o f Jew one was. "As to the manner o f pronouncing the Name, however, there is a
consensus o f all reports. It seems that even in the Temple the pronunciation was not distinct. The High
Priest tried to utter the Name in such a way that the people listening to the blessing should not hear the
Name distinctly" (26).
^ At this writing, there are three extant versions o f the Gilgamesh epic that were composed over a
thousand-year period. Additional tablets and fiagments have been discovered and await translation. In the
foreword to her 1989 translation, Maureen Gallery Kovacs informs us that it "is assumed that stories about
the deeds o f the famous King of Uruk, Gilgamesh, circulated in his own time, ca. 2700 BC. The earliest
written epics about Gilgamesh were produced in the Sumerian language...ca. 2000 BC (xxii-xxiii). Texts
considerably older than The Epic o f Gilgamesh survive from somewhere between the Fourth and Third
Millennium BCE According to Tikva Frymer-Kensky, the Abu Salabikh are "our earliest religious
documents" (96), considerably older than the Semitic sources that produced the books o f what is now called
the Judeo-Christisian Bible. But it is The Epic o f Gilgamesh—a.k.a. "the Old Babylonian Version- that
presents, according to S.N. Kramer, "the earliest example o f literary evolution." That is, somewhere
around 2500 BCE someone o f Sumerian birth decided to let a human being hold "the center o f the stage"
(183). A more recent Gilgamesh cycle—AKA "the Standard Version"— has been attributed by "ancient
Babylonian scholars...to a man named Sin-Ieqe-unninni, a scholar scribe who probably lived in the Middle
Babylonian period (about 1300B.C)" (Biggs, XV). Recent scholars agree that the text's ultimate authorial
origins are lost in Mesopotamian civilization. But enough o f this. Whenever I try to mimic the
genealogical seriousness o f scholars devoted to authorial attribution, Foucault's borrowing from Beckett's
The Unnamable keeps up its echo: What matters who's speaking?
18 This last sentence is o f course patching from Rebecca Moore Howard’s Standing in the Shadows o f
Giants: Plagiarists, Authors, Collaborators. W e will have occasion to return to her contentions and
conclusions in the chapter on anonymous pedagogy. In the present "historical" consideration o f the ancient
"anonymous-function," we can reflect, however on how her four defining properties o f the author might be
greeted by the ancient scribal circles—aboriginal composition classes or writing centers—o f four thousand
years ago: "the author is or can be autonomous and should be original. The autonomous, original writer
deserves property rights to his or her work. The writer who is not autonomous and original demonstrates
an absence o f morality, earns the label "plagiarist," and deserves punishment” (58). In Foucauldian terms,
the pagan collaborators who patched and plagiarized the Gilgamesh material lacked all discipline and not
only should have been punished, but have been, in that anonymity is their legacy. A different set of
anonymous scribes and compositors responsible for the various patch jobs that constitute the JudeoChristian Bible, on the other hand, become the disciples o f "God," the only true autonomous author.
"God's" exclusive property rights to his text are summed up by St. John in The Book o f Revelations in a
clear warning to all future collaborators, patchwriters, and plagiarists: 'If anyone adds to or takes from this
book, his punishment is banishment from the sight o f God." The sheer hypocrisy o f this can be summed
up by referring ourselves to one of the more representative anecdotes o f Genesis—namely, the Great Flood,
in which "God" renews His covenant with "Noah" after drowning the whole world, including the innocent
children o f the iniquitous. That this event is borrowed from Gilgamesh, a text 1500 years older than
Genesis, and becomes part o f the patchwriting o f Genesis is an undisputed fact o f non-orthodox textual
hermeneuticists. In Gilgamesh one reads that the Sumerian Gods and Goddesses wept over and regretted
the actions o f one o f their number in bringing the Flood with such indiscriminate vengeance. One is
forcefully reminded that the anonymous creators o f the Genesis God decided to include no such sense o f
remorse in their divine persona. How much the better would a Western religious tradition have been if it
had understood the more compassionate collaboration o f Gilgamesh and stood in the anonymous shadows
o f giants whose subtext suggests dedication over discipline, perseverance over punishment?
^ Compared to the 'discipline and punish' author-ity situation o f the Judeo-Christian "Bible,' which has
generally succeeded in attributing authorship to "God," the naturally assumed anonymity o f Gilgamesh is
historically and communicatively rational. Even the little that we now know o f writing's history, o f its
rarified, elite circle o f priests and scholar-scribes, it is clear that the gift and burden o f composition was its
atmospheric anonymity (if I may be permitted to redact Gallagher's and Greenblatt's redaction o f
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Auerbach's "atmospheric realism"). For a general sense o f what I mean by atmospheric anonymity in
connection with the history o f writing, the interested reader should look at the introduction to Ernst
Doblhofer's Voices in Stone: The Decipherment o f Ancient Scripts.
20"rhe importance o f "rhetorical purity” to a rhetoric o f anonymity will be explored in Chapter Three,
where Booth's rhetoric o f fiction is placed into the context o f Bakhtin's idea o f rhetoric. Because Bakhtin is
quite cognizant of a rhetorical impurity, given his notions o f "heteroglossia" and "double-voiced discourse"
he is probably the best theoretician-historian for understanding the sense o f an anonymous narrator as the
extreme case of unreliability and impurity.
2*1 chose Jackson's translation (or "transformation') of Gilgamesh from a bewildering number o f (un) like
efforts. His takes the most transformative or appropriative liberties with the "original" (itself an
appropriated transformation.) His take on the politics o f identity—"who lives to tell my tale identically"—
contrasts nicely with the more strict translation o f Kovacs' "alike," which is far more ambiguous, and can
only be said to correlate with the identity or consubstantiality o f all things, not rhetorical agents.
22 Aside from the perfect application o f her analysis of "Linguistic survival" to The Odyssey—"[T|t appears
that the metaphorical connection between physical and linguistic vulnerability is essential to the
description o f linguistic vulnerability itself'(4). Butler's Excitable Speech: A Politics o f the Performative
would be the center o f a proposed, but for now, unwritten Chapter 6, "Towards an Ethics of Anonymity."
My reader can, however, look forward to Butler's ideas o f performativity, injury, vulnerability and their
relation to the anonymous "recirculation" and mediation function in Chapters Four—Toward a Rhetoric of
Anonymity, and Chapter Five—Toward a Pedagogy of Anonymity. For now, two passages from Butler on
"the force o f the name. The first could help us radically extend Horkheimer's and Adorno's reading o f the
prototypical passage from Homer, in which Odyssesus is triumphant, and Polyphemus is traumatized,
through the force o f the name and its anonymously variable (invulnerability. Thus, I might title this first
passage from Butler
“The Trauma of Polyphemus”
I f we understand the force o f the name to be an effect o f its historicity, then that force is
not the mere causal effect o f an inflicted blow, but works in part through an encoded
memory or a trauma, one that lives in language and is carried in language. The force of
the name depends not only on its iterability, but on a form o f repetition that is linked to
trauma, on what is, strictly speaking, not remembered but relived, and relived in and
through the linguistic substitution for the traumatic event (36).
The second passage can help us look forward to how the force o f the unnamed, historically a part o f
composition pedagogy in the anonymous course evaluation, is an intersubjective transgression o f potential
"trauma" and "excitement" within the scene o f writing instruction. The question posed by Butler holds an
answer that may be supplied by the anonymous function, as we will see in Chapter Five. Thus, I m ight
title this second passage,
“Recirculation/ Reverse Citation Via Anonymous Writing”
Can repetition be both the way that trauma is repeated but also the way in which it
breaks with the historicity to which it is in thrall" What makes for a reverse citation in
the scene o f trauma, how can hate speech be cited against itself?
In the case o f hate speech, there appears to be no way to ameliorate its effects except
through its recirculation, even if that recirculation takes place in the context of a public
discourse that calls for censorship o f such speech: the censor is compelled to repeat the
speech that the censor would prohibit.... There is no way to invoke examples o f racist
speech, for instance, in a classroom without invoking the sensibility of racism, the
trauma and, for some, the excitement.
23Horkeheimer and Adomo take a long excursus into the relation o f human sacrifice and the nominal
sacrifice by Odysseus’ o f his identity. We cannot follow this up in these pages, but the reader should be
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reminded o f Foucault’s theme o f writing as “a voluntary obliteration of the self that does not require
representation in books.” Uncannily, the identities o f the writing collective nominally obliterated, yet
reiterated, under the author-ity “Homer” did, proto-typically, represent this ‘post-‘enlightenment theme of
anonymous-self-sacrifice
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CHAPTER FOUR

TOWARD A RHETORIC OF ANONYMITY

fdentifVing the Authority o f Community

Both mysterious and mundane, the linkages between the structural anonymity o f language (Saussure) and
anonymous social function (what Schutz calls “typification”) point beyond a discourse of Identity to
summon or provoke a discourse o f community. Why is this so? The short, popular, but reductively vulgar
answer is: “We are all socially constructed.” More robustly, the discourse o f Identity teaches us that every
individual existence continually summons “a plurality of others...though it would risk losing itself in the
infinite if that number were not determ ined...” (Blanchot 6). Sheer otherness, the sense we have o f
ourselves, is determined by an anonymous function (Natanson). The plurality o f others summoned by a
given personal identity summon in turn,
...a community: a finite community, for it in turn has its principle in the finitude of the
beings which form it and which would not tolerate that it (the community) forget to carry
this finitude constituting those beings to a higher degree o f tension (Blanchot 6).
This higher degree o f tension, I have been arguing throughout Chapters One and Two, amounts to the
anonymous function—a curve o f binding energy between language and the individual lifeworld. The
Discourse o f Author-ity, attempts to both negate and elaborate the anonymous function o f language by
claiming— impersonating—this higher degree o f tension as its own.
Thus, before we could entertain the intimate linkage between anonymity and community, in Chapter
Three, "Toward a History o f Anonymity," we had to countenance the mask o f the author-function, to
expose it as the anonymous function. (The tension between the “mask” and the absent “face” o f the
rhetor/author is a lesser degree of tension than that between the being of an individual listener/reader and an
audience/readership, but it remains awesome.) That is why we tried to understand (again paradoxically) the
problematic discourse of authority—particularly that of the author-function as a point o f origin—within the
larger historical moment of the anonymous function.
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The communicative rationality o f any shared sense o f Identity (understood as a performative relation
between sameness and difference) is not only at work between speakers with bodies in history, but also
between bodies o f work—texts—whose "speakers" transcend the identity o f a given Author. That is, the
author-function, as central as it is to Discourse (political, philosophical, legal scientific, poetic), is itself
pervasively anonymous; it is a function of the anonymity that haunts and heralds all senses o f authority as
origin.
In Chapter Four, "Towards a Rhetoric o f Anonymity," our overall aim is to understand in rhetorical
terms the subject position not o f the Rhetor/Author, but of the speaker/writer who is, or becomes
anonymous, for whatever motive or condition, chosen or not, and the relation o f this anonymous subject
position to that o f a particular (discourse) community. Throughout this dissertation, I have repeatedly,
tiresomely, invoked a shortened form o f the Beckett line from Texts fo r Nothing: “ ‘What does it matter
who is speaking,” someone said, “what does it matter who is speaking?’ ”
I did so initially to try to get to the rhetorical heart of Foucault’s critical use o f it as an epigraph to his
“What is an Author?” As a rhetorical question whose answer lies in an understanding o f rhetoric itself
(from the Greek eiro : “I say”), Focuault’s evocation o f Beckett’s question from an anonymous “someone”
suggested that that “someone” is no body in the sense of an embodied speaker/writer.
The body in question is some body o f discourse—o f writing—that speaks. The author-function is not a
corporeal, embodied function, but a rhetorical, evocative one that owes much, if not all, to the function of
anonymity. But Focuault’s rhetorical use o f Beckett’s almost anti-rhetorical question, (if it doesn’t matter
who is speaking, then it doesn’t matter who’s listening, and therefore nothing matters), was a tactical
opening toward understanding the massive and pervasive structural conditions o f discourse which turn
individual users into ephemeral, ultimately anonymous, functionaries.
In a genuine “rhetorical” (from the Greek,

eiro : “I speak”) treatment o f the anonymous function,

however we will want to locate the special conception o f a speaker/writer and a listener/reader which must
pertain in the anonymous function— which does matter very much indeed, as we have seen, in many
senses, if not yet a purely “rhetorical” sensed For that “special conception” or “image” o f a writer and a
reader dialogically imagining the other, it seems to me that Bakhtin becomes the rhetorician o f choice, even
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though he was essentially a literary historian. But we have much to consider before we can get to Bakhtin’s
special conceptions of a speaker and listener in a “contact zone.”
First, we will try to understand the discourse o f community and its source in the very same anonymous
function that is never far from what mean by a discourse o f identity and authority, respectively. As a way to
set up the heteroglossic nature o f the discourses o f Identity, Authority, and Community (since, only in
theory, never in lived practice, can we separate these discourses, for they are o f "one tuming"~a literal
universe of discourse), let's pick up some o f the loose etymological interstices or aporia left in our wake
between Identity (as "sameness"), Authority (as "increase"), and Community (as "in common" and "without
office".)
It is a "phenomeological" fact that the discourse o f community is a lived "public" meaning for any and
all persons whose identities are oriented towards various "privacies" or enclaves o f meaning which operate
inter- and intra-subjectively simultaneously. That is, there are sites and sights o f "official" and "unofficial"
authority throughout any community—so-called. Yet, the total sense o f a community is that it is itself
"without office": it is an emergent property, floating in some sense free, o f the personal identities and
historical authorities, which inform its lived reality.
Hearkening to its etymological roots, community develops an "immunity" to the claims o f Identity and
Authority even as it holds in tension their combined forces as an increase o f the same. How is this
possible? And what has this to do with the anonymous function? The short answer to the first question is:
This is possible because o f the unrecognized function o f anonymity. The short answer to the second
question is that the non-recognition o f the transparency of anonymity at work in the discourse of
community points to its role in community as a discourse that features an immunity to authority. That is,
taking its root in “the common: it is “without office” o f authority. To get some sense o f how and why this
is so, I turn to Joseph Vining, whose book The Authoritative and the Authoritarian traces the legal and
literary—root and vine—growth that we presuppose as the discourse o f authority.
In a chapter titled Authenticity: Connecting the Speaker and the Spoken , Vining begins to approach not
only a rhetorical situation, but also one that Burke would call an act of “identification” between speaker
and listener (and perhaps an entire audience) to bring about a desired (on the part o f speaker and audience?)
change.
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I also begin to hear in Vining, however, a Bakhtinian hint o f the rhetorical: o f what he termed a “special
conception o f the listener,” and o f what he meant by a “contact zone” ( as we will see below). For Vining,
authority and holding one’s attention are the same. There seems to be a virtually complete identity between
them, Authority identifies the pow er o f its office in w hether or not it holds the attention o f a
community—literally those without office. It is always dangerous to jum p from the primary speech genres
o f rhetoric in its original sense to the secondary genres o f writing, but Vining does so in a way that Bakhtin
also often does in order to make a point about all o f discourse. But whereas Bakhtin increasingly opened up
the boundaries between what he called authoritative or authoritarian discourse and internally persuasive
discourse, Vining does so to make a much more closed down, exclusionary point about authority and the
presupposition of its authenticity.
Whether a listener continues to pay attention to a speaker, and whether a speaker has
authority for [her], is the same question. But delegating writing without office does not
produce a new authentic voice, nor attention, nor authority....If one did begin to pay
attention one would soon stop. And actually one would not pay attention in the first place
if the deception were known from the beginning—any more than one would pay serious
attention to an opinion that one knows is only the outcome o f a process, the speech o f no
one (58).
O f course he has a point. As I pointed out very early on, Beckett’s Texts fo r Nothing, for example, would
not have received the attention o f a world wide reading community that it has if he had not written
them— if they weren’t key run ups to his experiments in that have made him so famous an author-ity o f
absent character and anonymous voices. Texts fo r Nothing are “the speech of no one,” putatively
rhetorically indifferent, but that speech was created by a very well known writer with office— that is, an
AUTHOR. But Vining is way o ff in at least two crucial, rhetorical, senses.
First, in terms of the larger project o f the discourse o f authority, (of the author-function), “putative
authors” are assumed not to exist as individuals. Their speech is the speech o f no one and the result o f “a
process”—a writing process whose function derives not from the deception or inauthenticity between a
writer and a community, but from a profound act of impersonation and imagination that works dialogically.
Forster taught us this much in his inquiry: the reader forgets the name o f the author and enters— often
enough, but let’s take Beckett specifically—the speech of no one.
Second, Vining’s ( authoritarian?) idea is that no one pays attention to a text written by no one,
(meaning an anonymous writer, or collective of such). If Forster is correct, then the entire logic o f reading
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is not to remember the author, but to take in dialogically the process of writing as a special conception of
speaking, and the process o f reading as a special conception o f listening. The very process o f authority
works this way in and through a community through a pervasive “condition o f anonymity.”
Finally, Vining is clearly blind to various kinds o f discourse communities. His officious dismissal of a
writing process pretty much eliminates the common project o f composition: we are teaching, given his
grand legislative schema o f delegated writing, no one. But the charge that one stops paying attention to
common writing is particularly belied by the attention I found was paid to the writing o f no one, as we will
see in Chapter Five, “Toward A Pedagogy o f Anonymity.”
For now, given that we are in the process o f developing the relation of an unstable, contestable discourse
o f community to a rhetoric o f anonymity, what is most amazing to me is how Vining glides toward, than
blindly passes over the obvious contact zone between the office of anonymous authority and a given
community whose “common” sense of itself is without office, but very much anonymous in its function as
well. With his focus on the authenticity o f authority, he neither sees the authenticity presupposed by
anonymity, nor that community, when reduced to its most common denominator, requires the immunity o f
anonymity.
What does this mean— the immunity o f anonymity ? It means that we might begin to think o f anonymity
as not only a communicative function, with all the rationalities (full and fragmented) that inform identified
and authorized discourse. We need to finally think o f anonymity as a function o f community in the largest,
ideal sense (since we already know it functions in the normative, face-to-face, text-to-text representations
o f our everyday Iifewor[l]ds.
To get to that ideal sense o f community, we will need to first look at what some thinkers are presently
concluding about the discourse of community. W e’ll also have a look at Blanchot’s conception o f
community, since it is my reading o f his use o f absence that has made possible the sense that anonymity is
a form o f absence that gives presence both to what mean and can’t possibly maintain about identity,
authority, and now, community.

The Discourses of Community: No Signs o f Abating
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Is Community Both Normative And Emancipatory?
This entire dissertation has carried on a border conflict with binary and dualistic thinking. Anonymity, I
have tried to argue, is not—never has been, never will be— the binary other o f Identity, Authority, or
Community. Anonymity is an emergent property of each o f these dominant terms o f discourse. Anonymity
has no binary opposition except for that o f Nominalism. But even in that ultimate binary code, we saw that
it is impossible to decode one from the other— in much the same way that 1 depends on 0 for “writing” the
code o f all word processing and Internet communication. (The ultimate “other” o f Anonymity might be
Celebrity, what with its cult o f “name recognition,” but when we begin to consider the anonymous
functions of that subject position— name changes, enormous regimes o f privacy and identity protection in
order to enable a consistent public or star image, we quickly retreat.)
The relation of anonymity to the discourse o f community, however, is the least binaric, I think. Part of
the reason for this has to do with the initially simple breakdown o f community into the public/private
realmification that Hannah Arendt, Jurgen Habermas, Seyla Benhabib, among many others, have worked
up in detail, and so well. For that fatal binary split, we need look no more far afield than into community
itself. There appears to be a “normative” and an “emancipatory” concept o f community that we can look to
from the get go when inquiring into the fissionable meaning and function o f community.
My reader might remember that we leaned heavily on Brubaker's and Cooper’s "Beyond Identity" to set
up its problematic condition as a term holding together one o f the founding discourses of philosophy—that
o f the Subject. Near the end o f their analysis they conclude that the "[t]he use of'Identity' to define a host
o f incommensurate meanings across a wide range o f disciplines shows no signs o f abating (45, emphasis
added). Whether or not the problematic

Identity of the Subject is due, in whole or in part, to the

anonymous function, is a matter o f dispute. What is indisputable is that the Name o f Identity—and what it
Names—is never self-same, or identical, to itself, even when it becomes a "god-term” or "terministic
screen" o f subjective consciousness. So too, with the discourse o f community, and its fate as the
portmanteau word that must carry the freight of the founding philosophical discourse of "universal
mediation."
Andrew Mason, in “Two Concepts o f Community,” makes the case for the “normative/emancipatory”
split in what community means and does. He reminds us that there are “ ...vigorous disputes over what
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counts as a community. Some argue that communities have to be face to face, while others allow that they
may unite those who do not know each other” (3). Already we see the proximity o f the discourse o f
community to that o f anonymity. In making his case for two concepts o f community, Mason finds that the
“normative” concept, though vague, is not “essentially contested,” while the “emancipatory” concept,
though more morally robust, is split within itself along lines of the meaning o f “solidarity.”
The role of anonymizing forces in shaping both the illusions o f individuality and commonality across
both accounts o f an ideal emancipatory community cannot be calculated, but only added to the overall
question of authenticity. (It would seem that the contest over the meaning o f an emancipatory community
carries over into educational settings, particularly when the term “discourse” is super-added to that of
“community,” as we will soon see.)
Mason concludes that “[tjhere is nothing wrong with employing both senses o f community, [but it
would be confused to suppose that community in the emancipatory sense...is a more authentic community
than in the ordinary sense” (14). What I conclude, given the split in the emancipatory sense, is that
anonymity functions in the vaguely “social” ties that stabilize the normative sense, as well as in the more
“moral qualities” which radically split the emancipatory sense o f community.
The fact of social anonymity makes the first connection clear, but what of the second? The answer
comes back to the ideological nature o f emancipation, and the resulting turn to politics and therefore to
claims of identity and authority for what makes for—drives—community in the first place. Politics of class,
race, sexual orientation, gender, religion, nation are not always open and “face-to-face.” They strive, often
thrive, anonymously, in other words, and they must often be opened to community view and
evaluation—“universally mediated” in some ideal sense— through the very same function of anonymity,
since the normative eyes and ears o f community by vague association—not by emancipation—make a
given individual vulnerable.
What’s Normative About Community?
Mason’s contention that the “normative” sense o f community is not essentially contested, or that it is, at
least, stable, is belied by Keith Stem’s study, Newspaper Use and Community Ties: Toward a Dynamic
Theory.

In normative terms, the discourse of community, (vastly enlarged from Mason’s positing of it as

the uncontested binary other o f an emancipatory concept), is “the construction of community—a sharing of
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values and objectives— [and it] requires a communication process.”) This process however, is “much
distrusted and abused” (146). Part o f this mistrust and abuse stems from the use o f anonymous polls and o f
anonymous sources to make news. Despite the fault lines in what amounts to these anonymous “contact
zones,” they are widely used.
For Stamm, “[t]he heart o f the matter is that community process still lacks a communication mechanism
that lives up to the democratic ideal o f citizen involvement” (147). Face to face meetings in the old town
hall m odel have become impractical in the massification o f the lifeworld. Letters to the board o f Editors,
(not accepted unless signed), have been a standing way for a community as a given readership, to respond
to the social, political, and other changes re-presented in the anonymous view o f those same editors who do
not sign their names, or identify their author-function.
The normative and emancipatory conceptions of community have become, in Century 21, a contact zone
in its ow n right, where abstraction and concreteness, presence and absence, merge and reverse their ties to
process, structure and place. The role of the anonymous function in these (uncertain}ties is, like
community itself, “defended according to what it might become rather than for what it is or has been” (18).
Community and Composition: Headed O ff (Dis)Course?
Coincidentally, yet significantly, I think, "...no signs of abating" are the final four words of Peter
Vandenberg's "Discourse Community," one o f the essays in a book he edited with Paul Heliker titled
Keywords in Composition Studies. The full phrase—"the perceived explanatory power o f discourse
community shows no signs o f abating" (70)—is a somewhat tongue-in-cheek residue o f how composition
studies has received and revised these two constituent terms during its struggle to legitimate itself as not
only th e second coming o f rhetoric, but as a field with epistemological and pedagogical status equal to that
of literary studies.
The strength of Vandenberg's entry, as with all the entries in this little book meant mainly for the
practicing compositionist, is that it takes an "OED" approach to its subject matter. That is, in three pages
this key term gets trenchant, if not exhaustive, treatment. We leam that discourse community has circulated
in composition studies for less than twenty years. To the best o f his knowledge, we can credit Richard
Ohmann's 1964 discussion, "In Lieu o f a New Rhetoric," with juxtaposing the two terms, with not very
illuminating results. "The community that a piece of genuine writing creates is... fundamental [to] modes of
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perception, thought, and feeling. That is, discourse works within and reflects...a world view" (In
Vandenberg 67-68).
Vandenburg then jumps to M. Jimmie Killingworth's 1992 article in Rhetoric Review to buttress support
for the idea that once combined, the two terms become "useful in the theory and analysis o f writing because
[they embrace] the rhetorical concern with social interchange (discourse) and with the situation or context
(community)" " (In Vandenberg, 68). Bartholomae and Herzberg are then brought to bear on the meaning
and significance o f discourse. The former gussies up the common dictionary definition: It is a "peculiar
way o f knowing, selecting, evaluating, reporting, concluding, and arguing"; with well-defined "projects and
agendas that determine what writers can and will do." The latter advances common sense about the term in
this way: "discourse is a means o f maintaining and extending [a] group's knowledge and o f initiating new
members into the group" (In Vandenberg, 68).
Vandenberg concludes treatment o f the meaning o f discourse with an interesting question: "Is discourse
enabling or prohibitive?" (68). (Interesting because, this is a question that we bring to our understanding of
anonymous discourse.) The question is meant to set the reader up for similarly questioning the capacities
o f community. According to Vandenberg's findings, community has received far more attention from
compositionists, primarily because o f its indeterminacy or "instability."
Joseph Harris' treatment of the term is given greatest authority:"

community ...makes a rhetorical claim

on us that is hard to resist." But he finds that our notions o f community are just that, existing "at one
remove from actual experience....They are all literally utopias—nowheres, meta-communities—that are tied
to no particular time or place" (Vandenberg 68). Elaine Maimon's treatment of the term is seen to be so
inclusive as to become meaningless: every site within the academy (never mind outside it) is a community.
Harris' reading o f Maimon's pan-directional use o f community as "gambits," or "perform atives—
statements...in which saying does indeed make it so" bolsters the sense that the term is vulnerable not only
to utopianism, but to becoming uncritical.
Vandenberg finds that, according to Killingsworth,

discourse needs "the ballast o f

community, which

designates a (real or imagined) site for production" because discourse by itself is a one-way ticket to
abstraction. Vandenberg then quotes Killingsworth at length on the distinction between "local" and "global”
communities. Essentially, a local discourse community is "occupational" and "demographic," while "The
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global discourse community [is] mental" (In Vandenberg, 69). As can be expected, the local and the global
communities are "involved simultaneously" in and around any individual. In fact, the ultimate space for
local/global interrelation is "the individual as community" (Killingsworth) in whom, according to
Vandenberg, "conflicting discourse practices" can be observed in both one's self and in the selves of others.
Vandenberg pays homage to Bruffee's Burkean take on community, and brings Harris back in to bolster
it. In effect, composition studies has embraced the notion that community is a consensus of assumptions and
values—what might otherwise be called our "common sense." Without this common sensical view o f
community the goal o f collaborative projects can be quickly lost. And yet Vandenberg is careful to include
Harris' final take on this idea o f community : there is "only an affinity o f beliefs and purposes'; "one does
not need consensus to have community" (In Vandenberg, 69).
Vandenberg sharpens this line o f argument by quoting from his own earlier work on community:
When used to authorize a writing pedagogy...consensus-based conceptions...tacitly
support the preservation o f institutional authority by privileging discursive authority, a
gesture that renders a community an oligarchy, an exclusive rather than inclusive
construct (69).
He gives Bizzell the last word, (arguably the greatest scholar o f discourse communities our field has
produced, and whose opinion on the meaning of “contact zone” extends her reputation, as we will see
below.) Bizzell’s sense of this useful/useless hyphenated term leaves the curious composition-rhetorician
with a decidedly equivocal sense o f Discourse Community : it can come "to seem like an oppressive
affirmation of one—and only one—set o f discursive practices” (In Vandenberg, 70).
Composition’s Discourse Community of Anonvmitv
My interest in anonymity as a discourse, (and as a discourse community writ locally and globally) follows
from the sense of Vandenberg's case for individual identities as local/global sites of communal conflict. I
see the "the individual as community" function as coincident with anonymous discourse. Much o f the
"consensus" governing our assumptions and values on anonymity is that it does not belong to the discourse
o f community. If any discourse could be said to be a real or imagined site for production—a "nowhere"
belonging to "nobody"— it is the discourse o f anonymity. Certainly, within the prevailing authorizations of
this or that writing pedagogy, anonymous writing is so far from institutional recognition, so removed from
institutional hierarchies of authentic disciplinary identity, authority, and community that it might not even
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register as a marginal discourse. In the terms bandied by Vandenberg, it lacks the commonsensical
"ballast" o f community, and is even more "abstract" then discourse.
Within the institutional purview o f rhetoric-composition studies it is fairly safe to assert categorically
that anonymity lacks all power as a discourse comm unity (although within literary and philosophical
studies the "presence o f its absence," so to speak should now be far less transparent). But that safe
assumption is belied by the pervasive use—the discursive-communal use—o f anonymity in collegial review
o f manuscripts for article publication and conference presentation. More telling—and defining, really—o f
anonymity's function as a discourse community in its own right is the now nearly universal institution of
anonymous course evaluations. These are required o f students at the end o f each semester's course work,
and represent the last (and for many courses, the only) piece o f writing they perform.
This anonymous writing performance has a multiple readership: the instructor and his or her superiors
directly. Indirectly, and ideally, however, the audience for this universal communication is one that might
be thought o f as universally mediated by all o f one’s colleagues, students—really anyone who is part o f a
given college or university discourse community. In its ritual repetition, accumulation, and retention across
the discourse communities o f every departmental discipline, (students’ anonymously compose these forms
four times a semester, eight times in an academic year for four years), I believe a good case can be made
that anonymity, in deed, functions not only for, but from, the complex and equivocal sense o f discourse
community outlined by Vandenberg. To pick up a cue from Homer’s prototypical anecdote, it can be said
by any one teaching from and for a particular discourse community that Nobody is evaluating me.
Following Vandenberg, I have a clear temptation to pursue the questions that arise from his analysis of
discourse community: Is this {anonymous}discourse community enabling or prohibitive, inclusive or
oppressive? Does it belong in an anonymous abstract nowhere to anonymous nobodies, or is it the open,
common property o f an anonymous everyone situated in concrete, rhetorical situations? Rather than pursue
these questions, I will simply underscore what the reader might also sense to be a "problem" for the
meaning o f community. If anonymity is a discourse without office, we now see why community itself, true
to its etymology, is also without office.
Let’s assume that the discourse o f community and the community of discourse are as vexed and vacuous
as Vandenberg makes them out to be. (And rem em ber he limits these questions and their open-ended
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answers to the discourse community o f rhetoric-composition exclusively.) How, then, are we to think about
a sense o f discourse and its sense o f community that are prescribed by university mandate to foster an
authentic rhetoric o f universal mediation (in which writer and the written are disconnected) by virtue of its
anonymous function (I mean the course evaluation)? Given the (discursive) evidence I have accumulated
across the last three chapters, we can begin to see, I think, that the anonymous function may well be a
problem for the discourses of identity, authority, and community.
Given the principle o f reversal we have been pursuing throughout this dissertation, the anonymous is
clearly a functioning part o f community’s permanent immunity from its own ideal. But immunity works in
two orientations. For just as anonymity operates through the absence o f a connection between speaker and
•the spoken, it presents to the listener a special conception o f the speaker—a rhetorical indifference that
connects both to a community— if it is anywhere—in the text itself.
Here, then, is the beginning o f what Bakhtin, in my reading, eventually meant by the contact zone: where
the text is held in common, without the office o f writer in the way, the reader can focus on the grain of the
voice (Barthes) and the going view (Bakhtin). The question then becomes: When a sense of authority is no
longer delegated between the identity claim o f the writer and the reader’s identification with that claim, is
there, following Vining, a reason to pay any further attention. Before we get to Bakhtin, Blanchot and
Lunsford are made to commune on the possibility of reconfiguring the discourse o f community as a place
unowned by the discourse o f author-ity. Thought o f in this way, community as a place of a “common
share” becomes less oppressive than Bizzell has rightly pointed out above.
Sharing Community: Blanchot Meets Lunsford
The sense we took away from Vandenberg's review of community was that it does not, taken by itself,
escape the blandishments o f abstraction. Its fate, like that o f ‘identity’, as a catchall, would seem to
decrease, not increase, its authority. And, given its juxtaposition to discourse, itself impossibly abstract
without the "ballast" o f the comparatively more "concrete" community, we have anonymity’s nameless
rhetorical indifference increasing the volume o f its function, and thus it dislocates both.
Vandenberg's pragmatic point about "the individual as community" blending "mental" and
"demographic" locations meshes nicely with the poststructuralist certitude that discourse in general, and
anonymous discourse in particular, depends upon "no particular subject in history" (Bove 56). But we have
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already located anonymity as both a local and a global discourse in my first three chapters. It might, in fact,
be thought that a complete phenomenology of anonymity covering its embodied and disembodied effects,
amounts to its eco-location.
What we really need to do now, prior to positing Bakhtin as the best rhetorician o f anonymity—what
with his notions o f "contact zones" and "a special conception o f the listener"—is to determine anonymity's
ecko-location, in a metaphorical or metonymic sense. We can hold in mind the actual "biological" (in bats)
or "technological" (in submarines) processes for locating distant or invisible objects by means of sound
waves reflected back to the sender by the objects sought. We must, however, take the strangest kind of
"eschatological" turn toward Writing, itself, as a finally in-human process for (dis)avowing whatever we
mean by community.
Only one writer that I know o f locates Writing as a final, echoing anonymous process in his own
writing: Maurice Blanchot. His work is so dense and obscure, I will not spend much time on it in support o f
anonymity's echo-location through "processes" o f what, given Vandenberg's hints, is beginning to look like
the pervasive absence of community. Nevertheless, all o f his work—from The Space o f Literature to the
one we shall linger on, The Unavowable Community—seem to be about absence: whether of the writer from
writing, or of a community for those who have no community. We have encountered Blanchot earlier, in
Chapter Two, when we discovered Foucault's and Derrida's dependence on his notion of the "work" o f
"absence” as summed up in his 1955 "The Essential Solitude":

The writer belongs to the work, but what belongs to him [or her] is only a book, a mute
accumulation o f sterile words, the most meaningless thing in the world....A book is not a
work until being is pronounced in it. And in the end, the work ignores him [or her], it
closes on his [or her] absence, in the impersonal, anonymous statement that it is--and
nothing more (825 emphasis added).
I won’t belabor Blanchot’s repeat of what Plato seems to have been saying in

The Cratylus : that the

work of BEING is anonymous. For Blanchot, the "work" o f writing—whether it end in a book for the
public library or in a diary for the hope chest —not only distances the writer toward an unutterable, endless
point of disappearance. (Ong teaches us just about as much in "The Writer’s Audience is Always a Fiction":
if the reader must imagine an absent writer in the form of an author-function, then so must the writer
imagine an absent reader in the form of an audience function. Both functions operate anonymously.)
157

R e p ro d u c e d with perm ission of th e copyright owner. Further reproduction prohibited without permission.

The writer's sense o f community can not be involved with the work o f writing because that work
requires, then "closes on," the writer's absence, permitting a reader can find a presence in the work o f
words, impersonal and anonymous as these are. The reader has no community with the writer at all, but
may have with the work o f writing that is the writer’s unworking, according to Blanchot in The Unavowable
Community. I write may have community because, as we have seen in Vanderberg's equivocal conclusions
about a "discourse community," there may be "no (discourse) there" in community, and "no (community)
there" in discourse at some concrete level o f a singular writer or reader.
Why, or how could this be so? Part o f the answer returns us to Schutz's reciprocal sense of
intersubjective anonymity. But Blanchot pushes the otherness o f intersubjectivity to the sort o f limits o f the
"enclave" Nantanson attempted to elaborate from basic anonymous sociality.

Here is how Blanchot

captures the problem in the second section o f The Unavowable Community, titled "The Exigency of
Community."
...[T|f the relation of one o f us with another one o f us ceases to be that o f the Same with the
Same, [literally, the traditional intersubjective sense o f Identity] but rather introduces the
Other as irreducible and—given the equality between them—always in a situation of
dissymmetry in relation to the one looking at that Other, then a completely different
relationship imposes itself and imposes another form o f society which one would hardly
dare call a "community" (3).
Blanchot goes on to play the familiar dialectical game I stand guilty o f throughout this dissertation: we
learn of the "exigency of community" (or o f identity, or of authority)—its urgent necessity— by having the
word continuously hailed into existence for our attention by any number o f discourse communities. This is
necessary, lest we forget to remember that its presence in our lives is somehow always and already absent.
(Where is our normative sense and existence o f community to be found—never mind trying to locate an
emancipatory sense/essence o f community?)
After making a good case that the pervasive sense of otherness in identity’s regime of sameness prevents
the meaning of community, he starts his next sentence this way.
Or else one accepts the idea of naming it community, while asking oneself what is at
stake in the concept o f community and whether the community, no matter if it has existed
or not, does not in the end always posit the absence o f community (3).
Call it community, but understand that in naming it thus, an absence must be accounted for. How so? As we
saw in a phenomenology of anonymity, the discourse o f Identity is shot through with otherness in our
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intersubjective and intrasubjective orientations. This continuum o f otherness functions anonymously, as we
saw. For Blanchot, it is the anonymity o f death that calls the self-other relation into the question of
community: “That is what founds community” (9). But Blanchot is not nihilistic regarding the deathcommunity connection. He simply wants to make sure that we understand that community is immune to the
discourses o f Identity and Authority. Its material rhetoric, its function in connecting the speaker to the
spoken—the Speaker Respoken—(Vining and Tolar Collins at odds) makes community
...not the place o f Sovereignty....[E]ven by giving it various names: death, the relation
to the other, or speech when the latter is not folded up in ways o f speaking and hence
does not permit any relation (o f identity or alterity) with itself. Inasmuch as the
community on behalf o f everyone rules (for me and for itself) over a beside-oneself (its
absence) that is its fate; it gives rise to an unshared though necessarily multiple speech in
a way that does not let it develop itself in words: always already lost, it has no use,
creates no work and does not glorify itself in that loss.
This characterization o f community has clear ties to the function o f anonymity: it makes possible a speech
that is beside-oneself, a multiple speech that might or might not be shared by a community in the sense of
being the common space for sharing views, values, visions that we cannot always hold in common: thus the
unstable sense of community as both emancipatory and oppressive. Isn’t this precisely the going view and
value o f anonymity itself? Further, the anonymous writer, by definition, sacrifices itself, s/he does not
“glory itself’ in the loss o f shared identification that might—or might not— constitute the meaning of
community.
On the issue of community making possible what Blanchot calls a “necessarily multiple speech” that
does develop itself in terms, or “in words” o f the Sovereignty o f the Subject, o f a single Identity or
Identification (in those “words”), I am reminded o f another invocation o f feminist rhetoric in the same
volume o f College English in which Tolar-Collins’ article appeared. In “Rhetoric, Feminism, and Textual
Ownership, Andrea Abemethy Lunsford reviews her work with Lisa Ede in Singular Texts/Plural Authors,
noting “ ...some of the problems attendant on continuing to try to fit the square peg o f multiple, polyvocal
creativity into the round hole o f singular “authorship.”
Their critique of “the hegemony of romantic authorship” (529) leads them to “ ...an open
acknowledgement of the weaving together o f others’ words characteristic to some degree o f all writing”
(540). This notion of writing, o f language use, as “ ...a stitching, a seaming together o f a garment...that is
taken from “what is out there” and that is thus both yours and not yours...[is]...very much in the spirit”
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(540) of what I believe Blanchot is trying to ascertain about the absence o f community. If community is not
the place o f the Sovereign, romantic conception o f the Author, then it is a kind of anonymous “garment” :
“It is what exposes by exposing itself. It includes the exteriority o f being that excludes it” (Blanchot, 12).
In other words, “what is out there” and thus what is yours and not yours” (Lunsford). Lunsford goes on
to analyze
[t]he result o f such a reconfiguration[:] [it] would be to open up what Susan West calls
the “authordoxy” to multiple voices, not ju st to those who are author ized to
speak/write/be heard and thus to enlarge and enrich the conversation for all...in a way
that “invites the participation o f others” (West 190, in Lunsford 540).
What unites Lunsford’s and W est’s feminist rhetoric o f community with Blanchot’s “rhetoric” o f the same,
in contradistinction to the rhetoric o f author-ity, is the possibility o f exposing the non-identifiable property
lines of discursive ownership as a “multiple speech.” What separates them is Blanchot’s insistence that
community is so always beside-oneself—and certainly beside the rule of “authordoxy”—that it is
effectively absent for the very “multiple speech” it makes possible.

In other words, Lunsford’s

“commitment to giving voice to multiple positionalities as well as to women’s voices that have been muted
or ignored” (540) would seem to revile Blanchot’s sense that such multiple speech possibilities creates a
community that is “always already lost...has no use, creates no w ork....” And yet, I think she would have
to agree that the common taking from “what is out there” to weave a text o f otherness “does not glorify
itself in that loss” o f Sovereignty which Community [and] Writing produces.
But there is a further, deeper affinity between the great composition-rhetorician Lunsford and
the great critical theorist Blanchot. I did not supply Blanchot’s final sentences in the passage
quoted above that open a subsection o f The Unavowable Community , titled, “Community and
Writing.”
Thus the gift o f speech, a gift o f “pure” loss that cannot make sure of ever being received
by the other, even though the other is the only one to make possible, if not speech, then at
least the supplication to speak which carries with it the risk o f being rejected or lost or
not received. Hence the foreboding that the community, in its very failure, is linked to a
certain kind o f writing, a writing that has nothing else to search for than the last words:
“Come, come, you for whom the injunction, the prayer, the expectation is not appropriate
( 12).

In this invocation I hear echoing Lunsford’s call for “participating in such a refiguration” (540).
She is calling on the need o f all “ [s]choIars of rhetoric and composition... to identify, theorize, and
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begin systematically practicing and teaching alternative forms o f subjectivity and alternative
modes o f ownership” (541). Her invocation supports the same call by Blanchot for “a certain kind
o f writing” that is not addressed to “God” or its proxy the author-function, but to that
reconfiguration o f subject positions as multiple speaking positions in ownership becomes
nominally absent. The rhetorical space or place o f community has to be reconfigured so that its
normative meaning, o f holding in common, o f commonly shared views and values, does not run
the risk (as we saw in Vandenberg’s critique o f community) o f becoming re-authorized in terms of
sovereign ownership. In teaching alternative modes o f subjectivity and ownership, we may have to
require what Blanchot tells us in another subsection titled, “The Sharing of the Secret.”
...that what was most personal could not be kept as the secret o f one person alone, as it
broke the boundaries o f the person and demanded to be shared, better, to affirm itself as
the very act o f sharing. This sharing refers back to the community and is exposed in it; it
can be theorized there—that is the risk it runs— becoming a truth or an object that could
be owned while the com m unity...m aintains itself only as the place— the non
place—where nothing is owned, its secret being that it has no secret, working only at the
unworking that traverses even writing, or that, in every public or private exchange of
words, makes the final silence resound, the silence where, however, it is never certain
that everything comes, finally, to an end (19-20).
In crossing Lunsford’s and Blanchot’s understanding o f an alternative sense of community (where the
ownership of subjectivity and the subjectivity o f ownership become (un)stitched and (un)seam(ly), what we
begin to understand as the garment of anonymity is really what community exposes by exposing itself as an
“unworking” of the public and private fringes o f writing.
We also understand that what Vining was calling the “secrecy of office” (of author-ity, of
“authordoxy”), is revealed by community whose secret is that it is without office, which is no secret at all
once we introduce the ownerless sharing o f anonymous writing—that absence— into the absence of
community that is always and already that absence o f the anonymous.
Most important to understand is that the sharing o f personal identity is emancipatory to the extent that
the community o f sharing monologues is maximized as a no place where no writing is owned. Only
anonymity can ensure this edge o f nowhere in which nobody needs to own or own up to what’s written.
Writers endlessly disappear in the act of anonymous writing . Anonymity is not the place o f Sovereignty, it
is the final unresting place o f community, as community is anonymity’s never ending test case for whom
the injunction, the prayer, the expectation, is not appropriate. The composition of community as a function
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o f anonymity should enlarge and enrich the conversation for a ll... in a way that invites the participation of
others. But because it is linked to a certain kind of writing, a writing that unworks our expectations o f
identity, authority and community, its sense of otherness, its multiplication o f voices would appear to have
no use, to create no work (the work o f the Academy, for example, and whatever in hell it means by a
discourse community.)
Between the disappearance o f the writer and the absence o f a community whose finite reality is typified
by anonymous social relations, however, I posit a radical performativity o f self-other relations that creates
a shared sense o f what no one would dare call community. Call it then, a zone o f contact, descried, as we
saw in Blanchot’s and Lunsford’s common sense o f private/public boundaries getting broken and
reconfigured, a zone o f contact where the personal and public— one’s own or an other’s word— becomes
(dis)owned and possibly (un)shared. It is this sense of community, as a place of rhetorical unworking and
immunity that sets up a more considered sense o f anonymity as a rhetoric in the work o f Bakhtin.
Bakhtin’s Rhetoric o f Anonymous Contact Zones
Anonymity’s Dialogic Destination
What have we learned from our excursus into the meaning o f community as a discourse of
anonymity? It might be summed in this way. There is no such thing as a community without a
discourse. If anonymity is a discourse without a community, then anonymity and community share
a vast discursive identity, a common sense o f office that is without office. The idea [1] o f an
anonymous discourse community reconfigures the discursive share o f Identity and the ownership
Authority, and in so doing opens up both oppressive and emancipatory possibilities for new
subject positions to speak/write. In real terms o f action, however, the composition o f an
anonymous discourse community “seems to propose itself,” (to adapt Blanchot’s foreboding about
the oppressiveness o f community itself which Bizzell, as we saw, also senses),
as a tendency towards a communion, even a fusion, an effervescence assembling the
elements only to give rise to a unity ( a supra-individuality) that would expose itself to
the same objections arising from the simple consideration o f the single individual, locked
in his [s/e] immanence (7).
How can we escape from this ironically solipsistic—arhetorical—sense of an anonymous
community? How can we aid and abet the rhetorical return to an eiro — “I say...”— that fully
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reconfigures the subject position of a first person singular as always and already an interalia—a
“We” who is both Some body and No body? I know o f no better theorist than Bakhtin. The
Blanchot passage uncannily echoes one o f Bakhtin’s last reflections made in “From Notes Made
in 1970-71,” right down to its technical jargon. But notice how Bakhtin opens up, emancipates the
single individual, locked in his/her immanence though the suggestion o f a communal anonymous
function. In this passage, Bakhtin is speculating finally on what he had long since posited as a
super-addressee o f all discourse—that this ultim ate sense o f audience originates in intrasubjective consciousness, but does not remain there.
Does man [rib] remain only within him self [szc], that is, remain solitary? Something
absolutely new appears here: the supraperson, the supra-I, that is, the witness and the
judge (204).
Despite this clear sense o f proximity to what I have been contending is the anonymous function, the reader
might ask skeptically, Why Bakhtin? For many o f us know full well that the riverine nature o f his works
have become one common well to which all kinds o f disc-ho[u]rses are brought to water. So now I lead a
discursive horse with no name. Why Bakhtin? Bakhtin imagines a zone o f contact where anonymity and
community drink.
Bakhtin’s imagination of discourse—whether authoritarian or internally persuasive, or double
voiced—always points towards the “dialogical”, not the dialectical, as I have been doing throughout.
D ialectical reasoning about the relation o f anonymity to the discourses o f Identity, Authority, and
Community can not get us to a rhetorical conception o f anonymity. I can tell you right now that I believe
that the anonymous function is inherently dialogical and therefore eminently rhetorical, but readers are
more likely to give credence to my belief if I summon the author-ity of Bakhtin.
The obvious place to begin, then, is with Bakhtin’s

The Dialogic Imagination , a group of four essays

gathered from a larger collection o f his essays representing some thirty years o f thinking on the poetics of
the novel, and amounting to his “middle period.” (It is interesting to note that Bakhtin’s early period, under
Stalinism, saw the use o f collective, untraceable—and to this day contested—authorship, in which three
books attributed to Bakhtin, come from the Circle o f Bakhtin, with Medvedev and Voloshinov,
significantly figuring in his (who’s?) author-function.)
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My present scope does not permit any reflection on Bakhtin’s lifelong interest in the author-function and
its relation to the novel as the historical epitome o f what he calls heteroglossic, internally dialogized,
discourse. I cannot treat his distinction between “authentic” and “ inauthentic” double-voiced discourse,
except to remind the reader that he felt that the separation o f poetics and rhetoric created two kinds o f
“monological discourse” which pass themselves off as authentically double-voiced. Lost to this discussion
is a review and redescription o f six ancient forms of “autobiography”— particularly the “rhetorical” and the
“stoical” autobiography—which Bakhtin discusses in such detail in “Forms o f Time and Chronotope in the
Novel” that no contemporary expressivist should ever feel a sense of being ahistorical or arhetorical.
But what of my sense o f Bakhtin as a rhetorician rather than a literary historian who merges poetics,
philology, and linguistics into what he would later come to call “translinguistic understanding?” He did not
have good things to say about rhetorical discourse, generally, casting it into the realm, along with poetic
discourse, o f “inauthentic double voiced discourse.” It was thoroughly “monological,” in actuality. It had a
hand, with poetic discourse, in “centralizing” language life—a centralization which “novelistic discourse”
had to struggle against long and hard in “the zone of contact” that arose between them. Yet, near the end o f
“Discourse in the Novel,” in a subsection titled The Speaking Person in the Novel, Bakhtin has this to say
about rhetoric and the rhetorical. His theme up to this point, (as we will see below), has been the image o f a
speaking person in discourse that is anticipated in the listener, creating, in effect various speech and
character zones.
It was Bakhtin’s desire to merge several lines of investigation toward a new human science. It might
stand up to “[t [he entire methodological apparatus o f the mathematical and natural sciences [that] is
directed toward mastery over mute objects, brute things, that do not reveal themselves in words, that do not
comment on themselves” (351). Rhetoric in its present state and form could not answer this call. “The
importance of another’s speech as a subject in rhetoric is so great that the word frequently begins to cover
over and substitute itself for reality” (353). Whatever sense o f “double-voicedness” rhetoric might achieve
“ ...is abstract and thus lends itself to formal, purely logical analysis o f the ideas that are parceled out in
voices, an analysis that then exhausts it” (354 In the “contact zone” as Bakhtin analyzes it, we can sense
that he wanted to take from the study o f psychology “the possible inner monologues of developing human
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beings, the monologue that lasts a whole life” (345). He wished to make these monologues the purview of a
rhetoric that could preserve the multiplicity o f voices.
Anonymity’s Rhetorical Force
Bakhtin’s examination o f discourse is obsessed with voice and voices, double-voicedness, with the
“image o f a speaker,” and “the image of a listener.” Together these dialogically concretize a much
more abstract “image” “that is not the image o f a man [st'c] in his [sic] own right, but precisely the
image o f a language (336). It is to this more specific focus on what seems to be a “phonocentric,”
but which becomes a dialogic, imagination that we first turn. In it we can sense Bakhtin’s desire to
synthesize and synergize the best tendencies o f rhetoric and poetics, psychology and philology.
We will ultimately focus on just a few pages from the subsection, The Speaking Person in the
Novel. To set up this discussion of the contact zone however, we open with two passages from the
first essay in The Dialogic Imagination. Once we have determined the context o f that phrase, as
Bakhtin intended it in understanding the novel in its earliest appearance, we can then slowly
“refract” and “reaccenutate” its meaning and function as partaking of anonymous speech as itself a
“novel” discourse.
In “Epic and Novel: Bakhtin has this to say about the origin o f the novel,
The novel took shape precisely at the point when epic distance was disintegrating, when
both the world and man [j/'c] were assuming a degree of comic familiarity, when the
object o f artistic representation was being degraded to the level of a contemporary reality
that was inconclusive and fluid. From the very beginning the novel was structured not in
the distanced image o f the absolute past but in the zone o f direct contact with
inconclusive present-day reality. A t its core lay personal experience and fre e creative
imagination (39, emphasis added).
As we will see below, Bakhtin returns to this use o f the zone o f contact or contact zone and this discussion
o f distance and proximity. In this first appearance what I find important is the resemblance o f the novel’s
struggle to re-present o f “personal experience and free creative imagination” and the still embattled status
o f “expressivism” within the field of composition-rhetoric. I see in Bakhtin’s description a reminder of
expressivist discourse’s devotion to having students engage the zone o f direct contact with inconclusive
present-day reality. In contrast, “academic discourse” is “structured...in the distanced image of the
absolute past” (in the sense o f other’s/author’s already achieved experience o f the written). These are
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artificially pure binary oppositions, to be sure—-just as Bakhtin’s oppositions between “epic and novel” are.
The discursive reality is always heteroglossic (as we saw in our study o f “ancient epic” material.)
And, in terms o f a hybrid, heteroglossic sense o f writing as a developing reality, we all understand that
what Bakhtin is calling “a zone o f direct contact” has become for composition-rhetoric almost a genre in
itself. For if first year writing has anything in common across its many discursive forms and function, it has
to be that its nearly universally required status makes it “ ...a genre that is ever questing, ever examining
itself and subjecting its established forms to review. Such, indeed, is the only possibility open to a genre
that structures itself in a zone o f direct contact with developing reality” [whether that developing reality is
defined as academic discourse analysis or academic autobiographical analysis] (39).
Where and how anonymous writing could or should become part o f that struggle, o f that zone of contact
with students’ developing academic reality—and with developing students’ academic reality— is the subject
o f our close reading o f Bakhtin’s contact zone theme. That close reading o f the contact zone should
develop yet another possibility that anonymity informs the larger inconclusive discourse of community, a
discourse out of which any sense o f contact zones as a lived reality will appear. For now, we will return to
the anonymity of discourse in more conventional rhetorical terms: the anonymous nature o f the utterance.
Near the beginning o f the fourth essay in

The Dialogical Imagination , “Discourse in the Novel,”

Bakhtin reminds us o f the forces in language, and of their anonymous orientation.
Every utterance participates in the "unitary language" (in its centripetal forces and
tendencies) and at the same time partakes of social and historical heteroglossia the
centrifugal, stratifying forces (272).
The authentic environment o f an utterance, the environment in which it lives and takes
shape, is dialogized heteroglossia, anonymous and social as language, but simultaneously
concrete, filled with specific content and accented as an individual utterance (272,
emphasis added).
For our purposes of understanding anonymity as the background condition for identity in community, we
see a juxtaposition that should no longer strike us as peculiar: anonymity and sociality. We have been
prepared to accept that anonymity is part o f the authentic dialogic environment o f every utterance. With
Bakhtin we also begin to see that anonymity is essential to maintaining the structure and sense o f
community when understood as a tension-filled negotiation between what is meant by the private/public
self-presentations and our private/public otherness.
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That language is both anonymous and social is clear enough—a pure Saussurean precipitate that has
undergone Bakhtin's unique metaphorical spin, as in the description o f the utterance just before the second
passage in question. What are langue and parole for Saussure, are for Bakhtin "unitary language" and
"heteroglossia”. N ever mind trying to picture a situation in which a phenomenon wants to spin both
outward and inward. Bakhtin believes it "possible to give a concrete and detailed analysis o f any utterance,
once having exposed it as [just such] a contradiction-ridden, tension-filled unity o f two embattled
tendencies in the life o f language" (272). Having, I hope, exposed the discourse o f anonymity as sharing
this contradictory unity, I will not take up too much space here to underscore what has already been done in
the name o f Saussurean-Derridean binaries.
It is important to repeat, however, the counter-intuitive logic o f the anonymous: it operates from and
appeals to a social whole—a supra-individuality as Blanchot told us above. That the individual identity of
its speaker/writer is concealed is merely a recapitulation o f the thoroughgoing anonymity o f those who, in
occupying an audience or a readership, have no individual identity either. The normative rhetorical
situation has the writer or speaker named and therefore "known" (if only in a formal, conventional sense).
This norm "turns" on the expectation that the writer/speaker desires to self-identify for larger purposes of
identification with a social but anonymous group o f reader/listeners. When the writer/speaker position
remains "centrifugal" (turning outward toward the social) but unknown, a curious "centripetal” effect
ensues, wherein the anonymity o f the writer "exposes" the anonymous but social mass o f reader/listeners.
The writerly (rather than authorial) desire to identify with a readership is brought into tension with the habit
and desire o f a readership to identify (if only in name) who is attempting an identification with a "me” or an
"us." When taken together in Bakhtin's "centripetal" image, connecting the anonymous writer and reader
constitutes a "unitary" sense o f the social.
Not only are the subject positions of writer/reader now "tension-filled" with a pervasive anonymity both
social and personal, but the normative tendencies o f writing and reception to be centrifugal and centripetal
can be seen to reverse spin. The anonymous writer is seen as making some sort o f inward turn while
appealing outward to the community. The receiving community on the other hand can be seen to spin
outward toward the unnamed in a flurry o f desire to first identify the writer, rather than identify with the
writing—“the image o f a language.”
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This description o f what I believe happens within the action o f anonymity relies on Bakhtinian
categories o f spin control. I don't think my adoption and adaptation is coincidental. For one thing, both
Saussure and Bakhtin see language as a whole "structure"—a kind o f commonwealth for all, but specific to
no one person. We see this in Bakhtin's description: "anonymous and social as language."
The most critical point in my adaptation o f Bakhtin to anonymous discourse is to understand that the
anonymous text is "simultaneously concrete, filled with specific content and [is] accented as an individual
utterance" regardless o f the concealed identity o f the writer. In fact, that very concealment raises the
intensity or level of difference of the anonymous text. To think o f the anonymous "utterance” as a genre o f
"dialogized heteroglossia" is to begin to understand the place it holds and shares in diversifying and
stratifying, in widening and deepening, the needs and uses o f a discourse (of) community (both abstract and
concrete, individually accented and socially anonymous at once.)
It would appear that anonymity not only holds in tension the centripetal and centrifugal forces o f
language and its users. Anonymity also resonates because it impersonates a fully rhetorical condition in
which writer/reader and writing/reading become an act o f communion. The communion possible here
happens along a continuum o f otherness. Its presence— if desired— in the discourse of community is
always, at the same, time an unspeakable absence whose special conception is all o f us, listening.
Anonymity’s Rhetorical Face
I have been building a general case for the “double-voicedness” of a presupposed contact zone that is
anonymous and social because the contact zone is itself a construct o f the “dialogic imagination” which is
heteroglossic and hybridized by virtue o f many contending “monological” forms. We also know that the
monological “I” o f private phonocentric consciousness is anonymous with regard to the “I” o f the writer,
the “I” in writing. Bakhtin’s bias, as we know, is toward the novelist, not what he calls the “prose writer,”
or “the writer, simply the writer.” Still, he has much to tell us about the intra-subjective anonymity of the
writer.
Even had he [s/c] created an autobiography or a confession o f the most astonishing
truthfulness, all the same s/he, as its creator, remains outside the world s/he has
represented in her/his work. If I relate (or write about) an event that has just happened to
me, then I as the teller (or writer) o f this event am already outside the time and space in
which the event occurred. It is just as impossible to forge an identity between myself, my
own "I," and that "I" that is the subject of my stories as it is to lift myself up by my own
hair (256).
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Bakhtin is alive to what he latter calls “the alien discourses” that inhabit, dialogize, and bring on an
incipient double-voicedness in time most personal writing. He ju st wants to valorize their ultimate rhetoricity
in the way the novelist handles tthem, choosing from the alien discourses o f autobiography or confession as
easily as she or he does from radfio-nation, journalese, TVspeak.
But Bakhtin can never elide, irf he would remain true to the project o f a

dialogic imagination, the

monological; he can only d ism iss or displace its historic author-ity in the rhetorical and poetic forms both
denigrated and appropriated by EPlato. He can’t and won’t, because o f his abiding interest in the image o f a
listener/reader. Thus, in a Bakhrtinian redescription o f rhetoric, the eiro “I speak” undergoes a centrifugal
spin, in which
[a] II rhetorical forms, nmonologic in their compositional structure, are oriented toward the
listener and his (her) amswer. It is highly significant for rhetoric that this relationship
toward the concrete listesner is a relationship that enters into the very internal construction
o f rhetorical discourse (2280).
However, Bakhtin, goes on to Hell us, the rhetorical conception takes “ ...the listener for a person who
passively understands but not ome who actively answers and reacts” (280). This is where he jumps from
rhetorical to novelistic discouirse, building a case that the latter creates an "internal dialogism"—
"aspects...that take the listener:...who actively answers and reacts" (280). In fact, Bakhtin tells us,
“[rjesponsive understanding i s a fundamental force, one that participates in the formulation o f
discourse...(280).
The key issue in what I would • call the “diabolical” account o f double-voicedness (autobiographically
lifting oneself up by one’s owm hair), is that it remains a rhetoric o f the listener/reader, not o f the
speaker/writer. The writing “I” creates a written “I”—an other—which takes on an active, responsive
understanding not for the writer but for still other readers. This “I”—already an alien discourse to the “I”
that performed it, “ ...enters inlto dialogical relationships with certain aspects o f this system.” As a
“speaker,” this “I” anonymous to the writer who created it, “breaks through the alien conceptual horizon o f
the listener [-reader]” to become a “...new form of internal dialogism o f the word” (282). Bakhtin is careful
to distinguish the “alien” (literally “other”) nature o f the writing itself (as “object”) from this new form o f
the alien. It is not “ ...the object* [of writing] that serves as the arena for the encounter, but rather the
subjective belief system o f the listener [reader]” (282).
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Under the protective/reflective, rhetorically alien, condition o f anonymity, it is my belief that students'
new found orientation toward the position o f the listener/reader is altered once again through a doubling of
the encounter "on alien territory." It is this sense o f anonymity as the rhetorical common ground of such
alien conceptions of listening—internally and externally dialogized—that begins to describe its structure
and function as a contact zone.
I cannot prove, of course, that Bakhtin would agree that anonymity, as a rhetorical form, answers his
description o f a fundamental force o f responsive understanding which, in effect, “looks” rhetorically to the
listener, while rhetorically overlooking, or remaining indifferent to, the speaker. I cannot prove that he
would see that anonymity functions “...m oreover [as] an active understanding, one that discourse senses as
resistance or support enriching the discourse" (280-1). (Though I think that students’ anonymous (dis)
course evaluations, together with the academic herd o f unseen, but not unheard, anonymous readers who
actively respond to fellow colleagues seeking publication more than fulfills the idea that it functions as
resistance or support enriching discourse.)
I do think, however, that we can begin to understand something o f what anonymity’s “doublevoicedness” might “look” like in a Bakhtinian rhetorical accounting. In the case o f the anonymous student
course evaluation, the special conception o f the listener becomes double-voiced and internally dialogized
when we remember that students are an audience of, and for, academic discourse; they are trained to
listen—often passively— for 12 years. The special conception o f a listener which the anonymous course
evaluation creates is one in which a speaker/writer (institutionally anonymous) seeks to break “through the
alien conceptual horizon of the [student as] listener” 282).
But whereas Bakhtin goes on to describe this “speaker” as constructing “his [her] own utterance on alien
territory, against his [her], the listener’s, apperceptive background,” the internal dialogism and the
centripetal force of the passive listener gets reversed into the image o f the entire “student body.” This
anonymous collective apperceptive “body” is “saving face” first, in order to share its centrifugal force at
last. That is, students’ various audiences to the heteroglossic academic discourses o f a semester are given
the chance to break through the alien conceptual horizon o f the teacher’s, and his/her institutionally,
apperceptive background. In effect, through the internal dialogism o f anonymity, anonymous listeners
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speak to anonymous listeners in a double-voiced discourse seeking a more active, responsive
understanding.
In the case of the anonymous peer review, this reversal and reaccentuation o f the forces o f language and
the imagined faces o f speaker and listener is already predicated upon the kind of “active, responsive
understanding” Bakhtin underscores as fundamental. Yet the anonymous function remains constant as an
internally dialogized, double-voiced discourse that reaccentuates a sense o f audience, not o f speech: readers
o f a writer who becomes their reader.^
If these two examples do not descry the kind of contact zone that anonymous discourse can be said to
create and occupy, then I have profoundly misread Bakhtin’s conceptual and rhetorical conceptions o f the
listener as an image o f the language—social and anonymous— itself. Keeping always in mind Bakhtin’s
bias toward novelistic discourse, I nevertheless see and hear in the following passage the rhetorical
presence and inventiveness of the anonymous function. In my bias, the ‘writer: transgresses the “novelist”
and “the living heteroglossia o f language” is always and already, as we know, “social and anonymous.”
The anonymous function as “double-voicedness,” then makes its presence felt, as we saw, through the
author-function, but also in the specific figure of the novelist.
This double-voicedness makes its presence felt by the novelist in the living
heteroglossia o f language, and in the multi-languagedness surrounding and
nourishing his own consciousness; it is not invented in superficial, isolated
rhetorical polemics with another person (326-7).

Bakhtin would find the anonymous discourse of my two examples o f course evaluations, and
peer review salutation, inauthentic pretenders to genuine double-voicedness. In his view, what
might be thought of as authentically rhetorical double-voicedness would be neither poetic nor
polemical. Each is “monological” in his author-functional view. Yet, we also know that what
Bakhtin has called the "possible inner monologues of developing human beings, the monologue
that lasts a whole life" (345), is behind (or before, and following ever after) his fully achieved
sense o f “double-voicedness.” This lifelong monologue that secures the certainty o f selfconsciousness is, as we have already seen, populated by voices that are not our own, but which,
assuming phonocentric normalcy, we dialogize as our own in a contact zone otherwise known as
the “I-Thou” orientation.
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The rhetorical, internally dialogized nature o f this private, immediate, intrasubjective zone o f
self-other contact was not o f much interest to Bakhtin. He was interested in its externalized,
textualized reaccentuations that nevertheless, become again, internally dialogized. The idea that
anonymity is a double-voiced contact zone, one rhetorically devoted to a special conception o f a
listener/reader, is now ready to be realized in Bakhtin’s actual use of the term.
Anonymity’s Rhetorical Voice
The “Glossary” put together by editor Michael Holquist at the end of The Dialogic Imagination
opens a definition o f “speech zones” this way: “Zones are both a territory and a sphere o f
influence. Intentions must pass through “zones” dominated by other characters, and are therefore
refracted” (434). This is not of direct interest to our discussion, since “zones” specifically aid in
understanding the meaning of novelistic discourse’s “dialogized heteroglossia” as always having
more than one “voice” (unlike, lyric poetry, for example, which Bakhtin calls “single-voiced
discourse.”) But as we saw in our discussion o f the meaning and function of community, it seems
to be a loading zone—much in the way that Identity is—for a number of incongruous uses and
meanings. These include a “territorial” sense, and a values/views consensus site, whose “sphere o f
influence can indeed be said to “refract” the intentions o f individual identity.
O f far greater interest to us, now that we have the basic drift that an author’s character’s speech
is polyvocal, (including the absent character that is the author’s), is Holquist’s author-itative
closing to this definition. (Fittingly enough, it also ends the Glossary.)
In Bakhtin’s view there are no zones belonging to no one, no “no-man’s land.” There are
disputed zones, but never empty ones. A zone is a locus for hearing a voice; it is brought
about by the voice” (434).
It would seem that that “no one,” “no body,” (or noman, the commonly mistranslated word for “Udeis”, the
name used by the character Odysseus in one o f the founding speaking moments o f an anonymous contact
zone), couldn’t claim an identity, authority, or a community. The anonymous, because it comes from no
one, a no body, cannot claim a voice. In Holquist’s entry just above that for “zone” (whether a zone for
“character” or for “speech”), we discover, however, that a “voice” is “the speaking personality, the
speaking consciousness. A voice always has a will or desire behind it, its own timbre and overtones” (434).
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It would seem, then, that anonymity and its function either presents a problem for “voice” and the
speech/character zone it creates and is created by, or it is the problem o f voice and the problem o f the
contact zone. It would seem that if there are any dialogic “fault lines” in the contact zone created by
speaking personalities, those fault lines are opened, widened, deepened, yet simultaneously transgressed
-crossed—by anonymous speaking personalities which, as we have seen in Chapter Three, “Toward a
History o f Anonymity,” create, in order to populate, any number o f contact zones.
Holquist is obviously basing his determination o f Bakhtin’s “view” o f these matters of voice and zone
on the text he has himself edited. Let’s return, then, to The Dialogic Imagination to confirm or disconfirm
the definitions o f zone and voice as set forth in the “Glossary.” The section to focus on in the final essay
“Discourse in the Novel,” is The Speaking Person in the Novel. As we have already seen, for Bakhtin, “the
fundamental condition, that which makes a novel a novel,... is the speaking person and his [sic] discourse “
(332). Common sense tells us, and Bakhtin reminds us, that this speaking person is an “image,” an “artistic
creation.” Further, the speaking person is “always, to one degree or another, an ideologue”— that is, one
“who must defend and try out his [sic] ideological positions, who must become both a polemicist and an
apologist” (333). Thus, in one o f Bakhtin’s many contradictions, genuine dialogized heteroglossia does, in
fact, engage to some degree or another, a monological rhetorical purity, where polemics and apologetics are
the rule.
It could not be otherwise: Bakhtin’s own system of a dialogic imagination is indebted, to some degree,
to the lifelong monologue we carry around in our own heads: the polemics and apologetics of the voice that
has been called self-consciousness, or more ethico-religious, “conscience.” Just as Yeats held that poets
write out o f “an argument with themselves,” so do we all operate from a contact zone whose speaking
personality is dialogic—“it anticipates a listener” has “a special conception o f a listener,” in Bakhtin’s
words.
The monological, single-voiced, discourse o f self-consciousness is actually “rhetorical” in its most
robust sense o f an “active, responsive understanding.” The speaking personality—the character zone— o f
the self is thus not only an ideological, discourse, but an “alien discourse” as well, since the self is dia
logic, is split within itself between at least one speaking personality and one which is a listener—an other.
The self-sense o f otherness in its dialogic personality is not alienation in the existential sense developed by
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Nietzsche through Heidegger through Sartre, etc. It is an interalia -th e “I” is the subject o f a “You”—the
most immediate o f all orientations, and one that, we decided, contains an anonymous function.
Thus, when Bakhtin considers “novelistic discourse,” he is enacting a trans-positional—or what he very
early on in his career called a transgredient —moment from the speech zone o f individual consciousness, a
zone which is not purely or finally nominalistic, but rather, anonymistic in its provocations, its
summonings, of voice. “The theme of the speaking person,” he writes, “is after all a subject sui generis,
[that is, “unique” or “singular”] one that poses special tasks for our language in all its spheres” (337). And
most certainly, Bakhtin is alive to the “alien discourse” o f the image or theme o f this rhetorical, ideological,
consciousness o f the speaker. Writing about the “the transmitted speech of another” he concludes that it
always “ ...m ust be kept in mind [fitting translation, that] i f we are to make good our claim that o f all words
uttered in daily life, no less than half belong to someone else” (339).
Trying to be quantitative, Bakhtin is basically reaffirming the [half] self- [half] other theme o f the
binaric discourse o f identity, and its subsequently more nuanced, phenomenological history. And, as we
know from our own self-reflection of “I” whatever half belongs “to someone else” much o f it is, to return
to Natanson who is returning to psychoanalysis, “an immense remainder”—what I call “an immense,
intense reminder” o f the anonymity of our “other” half.
So already we are beginning to see that Holquist, in his pursuit o f compression with clarity that
characterizes any “Glossary”, has significantly misstated the situation o f the “character/speech zone.” This
zone may well be the zone o f “no one,” since “some one else” is just another no name for the other-ness of
all such zones where “voices” take up the paradoxical position o f watchful listening and responsive
understanding. This rhetoric of an intra-subjective anonymity o f “the speaking person” does not ignore that
o f the speech zones o f inter-subjectivity, where what Bakhtin calls “representability” must not be forgotten.
That is, “[I] n order to assess and divine the real meaning o f others’ words in everyday life, the following
are surely o f decisive significance: who precisely is speaking, and under what concrete circumstances?”
(340).
Bakhtin has left the phenomenological or “artistic representation” of speech zones for “real” world,
face-to-face speech zones to make a point that we have not left uncovered in earlier chapters. Namely, the
immediacy o f face-to-face, intersubjective orientations is the least anonymous o f all orientations, as we
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learned from Schutz. And yet, we also understand that the subtle shadings o f such orientations make the
question o f “who precisely is speaking” answerable to the function o f anonymity as a contact zone whose
immediate proximities and mediated distances continuously emerge within the larger problematic discourse
o f community itself.
Where does this leave Holquist’s declaration that Bakhtin’s view of speech zones, o f the contact zones
created by voice, does not entail an anonymous function or orientation? The scope o f our discussion cannot
take up Bakhtin’s discussion o f “authoritative” and “internally persuasive” discourse as “a playing with
distances, with fusion and dissolution, with approach and retreat” (344). (In the idea o f distance the
anonymous function returns not with a vengeance, but with a murmuring voice o f rhetorical indifference:
“What matters who is speaking, someone said....”). We are therefore poised to look at Bakhtin’s actual use
o f the phrase “the contact zone” (or perhaps the translator’s phrase, lifted from Mary Louise Pratt’s
Imperial Eyes.)
In brief, Bakhtin’s believes that “authoritative discourse,” (founding exemplars being the holy canonical
trinity I looked at in Chapter Three), does not permit us to frame its speech zones it into our contexts; it is
not heteroglossic. (I believe my analysis o f Genesis fully contradicts Bakhtin’s dictum, since, if framed
within the context of the anonymous function therein, it is decidedly heteroglossic, and double-voiced.) He
is partially correct, in view o f the anonymous function, that “[t [he zone o f the framing context must
likewise be distanced—” for we understood, and, I hope, still understand, that anonymity is a distancing act
between speaker/writer and listener/reader.
But anonymity is also a complex act of proximity for the writing itself as a special double-voiced
conception o f the listener/reader— o f other voices in its contact zone. Thus, when he finishes that last
declaration, “The zone o f the framing context must likewise be distanced— no fam iliar contact is possible
here either” (344, my emphasis). We have to await the findings of Chapter Five, “Toward a Pedagogy of
Anonymity,” to understand just how wrong Bakhtin really is about the possibility o f familiar contact in the
rhetorical zone of anonymity’s “alien discourse.” This familiar contact operates on two planes—between
the unnamed writer and his/her image o f speaking others, and between the named, face-to face readers of
these writings of “no one” speaking about some one—the self itself an alien among its others.
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In the following passage, Bakhtin uises the very phrase, “the contact zone.” In terms o f Bakhtin’s
thematically recursive approach and style, its reappearance after many years and essays after “Epic and
Novel,” is not surprising, and would “seem to be a recapitulation o f that earlier description, which we have
treated above. But its appearance in tthis later context takes on a more universal meaning. He is no longer
concerned with the novel and its discursive struggle, but with all discourse—with idea o f any and every
discourse community coming to termes with its sense of author-ity— o f “authoritative discourse.” Here is
where the fault lines inevitably ap»pear between what should be distanced or centralized. Here is
where—and how—voices o f discursive emancipation come to figure in and refigure the contact zone.
These non-authoritative voices are mot the guarantees of the discourse of identity, and certainly
not of community, given its contestaible discourse. They involve fresh personal experience and
free creative expression that are essentially without office. This makes them to some extent
immune to the official, already authoor-zed (default) line. Thus immunity enables the finding o f
fault in authority’s default line (o f appropriateness, or correctness, for example.) As a phrase,
contact zone has become critical to understanding these multivocal fault lines in the discourses of
identity, authority, and community thait trouble composition-rhetoric. These fault lines also enable
it to transgress its theoretical and pedagogical troubles, making it one o f those “fields” o f “studies”
that thrive (contra North) on heteroglos-sic, and multi-vocal discourses.
In the history o f literary languuage, there is a struggle constantly being waged to overcome
the official line with its tendency to distance itself from the zone of contact, a struggle
against various kinds and degrees o f authority. In this process discourse gets drawn into
the contact zone, which resialts in semantic and emotionally expressive (intonational)
changes: there is a w eakening and degradation of the capacity to generate metaphors, and
discourse becomes more reifh.ed, more concrete, more filled with everyday elements and
so forth (345 emphasis added)..
Readers will note that Bakhtin is stilLl taking a shot at what he considers the monological purity o f
poetry, especially lyric poetry, with its; proven (Bakhtin would say craven) capacity to generate metaphors,
but not much else of ideological worth j. (In this, o f course, he is wrong, ultimately, but he is still writing in
the flush of a faith in the novel as comning to incorporate all discourse. What has, in fact, happened, if we
march with Foucault, is that the “noved” is no longer new, and becomes just another episteme, no less, no
more, authoritatively or internally persiuasive than The Bible or the daily newspaper. Bakhtin comes to this
realization as his career closes. )
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More important to notice, I think, is the attempted ascendancy of prose writing that, in keeping with its
etymology, does not turn like “verse” toward an authoritative past. Unofficial Prose does not genuflect
before a canonical altar. It walks past it in the concrete pursuit of the everyday expression. In this, I think,
we can identify a bit o f what’s at stake in the struggle over the meaning and function o f the contact zone in
composition-rhetoric. Before we get to some o f the field’s reception and contestation o f the term, we might
reflect, once again, on Bakhtin’s hope for a new rhetoric o f the contact zone. How far, from what Holquist
asserts as being the view o f Bakhtin, is that zone in which anonymity maintains a voice no less pervasive
and functional than what we found in our analysis o f community as the site o f some hoped for process of
universal mediation?
The answer lies in the run up to what I believe amounts to Bakhtin’s call for a new rhetoric o f the
contact zone. The preparation for the contact zone is his conclusion about “internally persuasive discourse.”
This is sort o f discursive life force is that struggle to hear and speak “one’s own word” within a lifelong
monologue whose “ ...process is made more complex by the fact that a variety o f alien voices enter into the
struggle for influence within an individual’s consciousness”(348). He describes a process by which both a
writer and a reader conduct “experimental guesswork [wherein] the image o f the speaking person and his
[sic] discourse become the object of creative, artistic imagination” (348).^
We now begin to sense some anonymous fault lines in the contact zones o f speech, character, and of
discourse at large, which Holquist did not take account. Between the image of the speaking person and the
struggle o f alien voices with an image that, as we have learned, always anticipates a listener there is always
a matter o f what Bakhtin calls “experimental guesswork.” But to discover that sense o f a possible new
rhetoric o f the contact zone, where not only “alien voices,” but the voices o f “no body” do indeed speak,
we need to leave The Dialogic Imagination and look to Bakhtin’s late writings Speech Genres and Other
Late Essays.
At the end of “The Problem of Speech Genres” Bakhtin clarifies a blurring he often made in the
essays comprising The Dialogic Imagination regarding the “voices” o f spoken versus written
genres. This blurring was natural, o f course, since the “image of a speaking/listening person” is
critical to understanding—to imagining—the dialogic representation o f reality in a novel. But
Bakhtin was also fascinated, as we saw, by the “monological” nature o f individual self177

R e p ro d u c e d with perm ission of the copyright owner. Further reproduction prohibited without permission.

consciousness and the voices it holds in tension as both a centripetal and centrifugal source for
what happens in novelistic discourse. By the time we get to “The Problem o f Speech Genres” he is
keen to re-sharpen some o f the distinctions that tended to blend under the scrutiny o f his
experimental guesswork, between the utterance as an image and as an action.
Thus, addressivity, the quality o f turning to someone, is a constitutive feature o f the
utterance; without it the utterance does not and cannot exist. The various typical forms
this addressivity assumes and the various concepts o f the addressee are constitutive,
definitive features o f various speech genres (99).
In this sense of turning to someone, we understand that the quality o f this addressivity is
various. There is intensely intimate, beloved, private, bedroom address, in which the exchange o f
voices are such that no one else will ever hear, (or care to hear, except that filmic love scenes
always parody these privacies with a watchful listening from nowhere). There are voices o f
strangers sitting in the airplane seats in front of you. What o f the collective addressivity in a full
restaurant growing louder until it is bearable because it is absolutely unhearable—a non-language
buzz and boom cocooning your intimate, private dinner talk? In the next paragraph, Bakhtin might
have saved many readers much trouble in their first and second passes through The Dialogic
Imagination if he had stated this, the paragraph following the one above.
As distinct from utterance (and speech genres), the signifying units o f a language—the
word and the sentence— lack this quality of being directed or addressed to someone:
these units belong to nobody and are addressed to nobody. Moreover, they in themselves
are devoid of any kind o f relation to the other’s utterance, the other’s word (99, emphasis
added).
True, true, Holquist was defining “speech” zones when he asserted that “in Bakhtin’s view there are no
zones belonging to no one, no “no-man’s land.” But once we remember that these speech zones, these loci
created by the voice for the voice, are in turn, made out o f words, we begin to understand—actively,
responsively understand—how anonymity structures the contact zone of no body.
In his some o f his very last writing—“From Notes Made in 1970-71: He asks” “Do there exist genres
without an addressee? And then he writes, as if in answer: “The world without names.... Not from the thing
to the word, but from the word to the thing, the word gives birth to the thing” (153). Words belong to
nobody and are addressed to nobody. The contact zone o f anonymity is complete, and never empty, replete
with a community that it might become. It gives voice to what is silenced. The unspeakable absence, and
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the absence o f the unspoken, at the heart o f community as a contact zone, cannot be understood in
theoretical or rhetorical terms without taking account o f an anonymous function.
Anonvmitv and Pedagogical Artists of the Contact Zone
Fault lines Part One: Pratt. Bakhtin. Hesford

I first became acquainted with Pratt’s notion o f a “contact zone” after I had first read Bakhtin in 1990. I
picked up her book Imperial Eyes; Travel Writing and Transculturation and made my first foray into
ethological and ethnographic research on the colonialist and imperialist encounters between the Western
subject and its Native/Savage Others. I did not then appreciate the anonymous function in the moment of
such encounters. It was not until Pratt published “The Arts o f the Contact Zone” where it was reproduced in
Bartholomae and Petrosky’s Ways o f Reading—an anthology I used as a TA while at The University of
Massachusetts/Boston—that I began to sense the enormity of the concept’s importance.
I never did trace back the question of whether Holquist seized on Pratt to translate Bakhtin’s concept of
contact zone, or the Russian translates Bakhtin’s inimitable neologizing straight into English, and Pratt
picked it up through Holquist. It matters little, since Bakhtin and Pratt, have much in common for
composition-rhetoricians. Both have been drawn into its discourse community so deeply and widely that to
get some sense o f cogency behind the vast references to both thinkers, I seize upon the concept they share,
as it were, to help composition-rhetoric, stay in contact with its own struggles and encounters.
In terms of my own research to contextualize my own past attempts to enable a contact zone
through anonymous writing about the politics o f identity, (1994-5 at The University o f New
Hampshire), the latest reference to Pratt’s use o f contact zone appears in the 1998 Feminism and
Composition Studies: In Other Words (Jarratt and Worsham. Editors.) In that book, Wendy
Hersford’s “Ye Are Witnesses”: Pedagogy and the Politics o f Identity” sums up Pratt’s idea this
way to set the stage for her own pedagogical experiments and experiences during the fall o f 1993
at Oberlin.
Pratt’s notion of the contact zone helps us understand how historically oppressed groups
negotiate identities and imagine communities in the context o f institutional power
relations.
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Hesford has not read Im perial Eyes. Like all others, she seizes upon the “Arts of the Contact
Zone.” Pratt’s use of it in the larger study is not nearly so upbeat as related here. Still, the idea of
imagining communities within a contact zone created by voices o f a dominant Other which then
provoke the suppressed voices o f the subordinated Other (thus the subtitle o f the Jarratt/Worsham
edition, “In Other Words”) returns us to Bakhtin’s speech zones, and gives a poignant double
meaning to the idea that they are/are not inhabited by “no one.” She then quotes from Pratt’s “Arts
o f the Contact Zone” to define the term.
...a space in which people geographically and historically separated come into contact
with each other and establish ongoing relations, usually involving conditions o f coercion,
radical inequality, and intractable conflict (Hesford, in Jarratt and Worsham 134).
The zone o f contact Hesford creates her own intention and Pratt’s actual definition is very much
reminiscent of Bakhtin’s sense of the struggle to make an authoritative discourse part o f one’s own word,
make it internally persuasive, rather than hard edged and unalterable. Hesford then completes the
ideological transformation o f Pratt’s idea o f contact which she initiated with her uncited use (from Pratt) o f
“ imagine[ed] communities” by applying its imperialist orientation to the normative entitlements o f a first
world academic orientation.
O f course, Pratt performs this ideological transformation herself—in total— when she
reaccentuates her book length study o f subject peoples under W estern domination into a
pedagogical application within the dominant zone o f Western imperial power. In this sense, to
hearken back to Bakhtin, Hesford is struggling against Pratt’s authoritative, official line on the
contact zone. She seems to be suggesting that Pratt’s conception, as “the official line with its
tendency to distance itself from the zone of [academic] contact,” needs to be overcome—even
though Pratt has already overcome her own official line. The discourse o f academic community, in
other words, is one of various kinds of struggle with its own authority.
When applied to the academy, Pratt’s concept o f the contact zone challenges images of
colleges and universities as stable and unified cultural sites where the principles of
cooperation and equality obtain. In fact, colleges and universities are sites where the
contradictions o f power, politics o f representation, and construction o f historical memory
are made visible. Collisions and conflicts among students illustrate how power is
expressed and contested through written, spoken, and symbolic representation (134).
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I have no disagreement with Hesford’s appropriation and application o f the term. It very much describes
my pedagogical experience, except that I find the “contradictions” and “politics” she speaks o f were far less
visible, thus my idea o f an anonymous contact zone.
Fault lines Part Two: Pratt Bakhtin, van Slvck
Phyllis van Slyck’s 1997 article “Repositioning Ourselves in the Contact Zone,” is the next most
recent appearance o f the term. It also tells us much about how rhetoric’s-rhetoric’s discourse of
community is (again Bakhtin) “a struggle [that is] constantly being waged to overcome the official
line with its tendency to distance itself from the zone of contact, a struggle against various kinds
and degrees o f authority. In this process [the] discourse [of community itself] gets drawn into the
contact zone, which results in semantic and emotionally expressive (intonational) changes” in the
original conception o f the contact zone itself.
Van Slyck samples from Pratt’s article, opening with this epigraph:
What is the place o f unsolicited oppositional discourse, parody, resistance, critique in the
imagined classroom community? Are teachers supposed to feel that their teaching has
been most successful when they have eliminated such things and unified the social world,
probably in their own image? Who wins when we do that? Who loses? (in van Slyck
149).
As we will see in Chapter Five, “Toward a Pedagogy o f Anonymity,” the answer to these questions,
especially the first two, get treated in terms o f the anonymous function: the place o f all three of Pratt’s types
o f “oppositional discourse” is located there; and furthermore, that “place” or contact zone that is anonymous
writing is “the imagined classroom community”— the emancipatory/oppressive, essentially contested
concept revealed over and against the normative sense—“unified social world”— o f community that
generally pertains in teaching not to transgress, but to process community.
I have never felt more successful in my teaching then when I was teaching in the contact zone of
anonymous writing. I state that even as I was made to feel a failure by many colleagues who felt that the
prevention or elimination o f such transgressive, oppositional discourse (however residual and inconsistent)
is the sign o f an emancipatory classroom community. Why? Because controlled consensus becomes selffulfilling: a normative, authoritative discourse o f community o f the going view and going value of
compositional identity “wins” and the hybrid, centrifugal, heteroglossic otherness o f writing itself “loses.”

181

R e p ro d u c e d with perm ission of th e copyright owner. Furth er reproduction prohibited without permission.

van Slyck’s pedagogy is not an anonymous one, but a close reading and oral/written response to “ ...a
variety o f postcolonial, nonwestem, and other so-called minority texts, in conjunction with western texts...in
an artificial space— the classroom— which does not appear to them to be safe or neutral” (151). Precisely
because o f their view o f classroom vulnerability, and the power o f office held by the teacher within that
artificial space, making no real sense o f community possible—normative or emancipatory -the rhetorical
immunity of anonymity is necessary for sense o f safety and neutrality in terms o f teacherly/ institutional
power in the contact zone of the classroom.
van Slyck wants “to offer students modes o f resistance to their own and their peers’ cultural chauvinism,
yet [she does] want members o f the class to divide into separate and hostile camps” (151-52). I admire her
recapitulation of the contact zone in terms more faithful to Pratt’s original agenda than Hesford’s or mine,
which import first world identity politics into the contact zone. She cannot have the ideological struggle and
resistance inherent to the contact zone without having it operate as an absence -o r profound dissensus
between normative and emancipatory senses-- o f community. Quoting Catherine Stimpson who is, naturally,
appropriating Bakhtin, she asks: “How can I demonstrate “that it is possible to live openly with difference in
a dialogic community?” ...—that students “...can engage in cultural analysis and ethical negotiations, without
necessarily coming to consensus”(152).
In reading her article, I she her giving the contact zone a short leash, pulling it back, before the logic of
its anonymously communal elements can assert the logic o f an answer to her questions. She is more
obsessed with proving to students that their “values are socially and culturally constructed” (152), and
having them “...recognize that the illusion o f a “core” self is at the heart o f essentialist positions which
privilege one culture over another” (153), then she is fully drawing them into the contact zone and its
anonymous destinies. Divided and hostile camps, tension in the enclaves, pressure between intersubjective
and intrasubjective transgressions that, in Pratt’s words, “clash and grapple with each other,”—these are
inevitable “fault lines” in the anonymous contact zone.
Because her pedagogy stands on the shoulders of not only Pratt, but also upon Bizzell’s and Miller’s
earlier (1994) invocations of the contact zone, she has the luxury and responsibility to quote each of them.
Speaking o f Miller, but not directly o f his notion o f “fault lines” in the contact zone, van Slyck repeats his
reminder, itself quoting Pratt, that “ “ ...there is still a great deal o f work to be done in constructing the
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‘pedagogical arts o f the contact zone’ ” and that one o f the most important steps [sum m arizing him] is to
reconfigure power relations in the classroom” (152). She then quotes Bizzell, w h o se “OPINION:
“CONTACT ZONES” AND ENGLISH STUDIES” preceded Miller’s “Fault lines in the Coratact Zone” by
two months in 1994. Van Slyck’s quote is really Bizzell quoting Pratt’s original idea— “historically defined
contact zones, moments when different groups within the society contend for...power “ (154-55).
Thus van Slyck’s focus on “power”—as understood by Miller and Bizzell (which is itself a contact zone
with fault lines), reduces the possibility o f the contact zone into simply redrawing, not transgressing the
boundaries o f academic power in the figure of the teacher. Standing on their shoulder, van

S ly c k

asserts the

power of the contact zone as an academically author-itative discourse community, not one in w hich is filled
and defined by students’ voices as well: “Contact zones must therefore be defined [my em phasis] more
broadly as spaces where diverse world literatures, and the cultures they represent and critique, «nay be taught
in thematically organized contexts”(154). (Certainly, I taught the politics o f identity in a^ thematically
organized context, using readings. The difference— the essential difference— was the anonym ity o f one o f
the contact zones enacted by what was defined for composition.)
Van Slyck’s “proposal for an English department contact zone course” (155) is simply repeating the
official line laid down by Bizzell three years before on what contact zones are for, and how tfciey should be
deployed (Bizzell’s “opinion”: give the power o f deciding what a discourse community back: to literature
where it has always belonged, and get the expressivists— specifically Elbowians— out o f the contact zone.
Swell, Prof. Bizzell! Contact the zone o f postcolonialism if you must, but is that contact zone- the only one
that can interrogate the insidious, falsely emancipatory Western S elfs sense o f entitlem ent through
normative, exemplary identities of whiteness, middle classness, heterosexuality?
Eiro—I say: Bizzell, along with van Slyck, are traitors to, or at least traders on, composition’s indigenous
contact zone and its own imagined community o f discourse where the illusion o f a unitary, autobiographical
self meets its own social construction through writing the intersubjective experiences o f identity within the
anonymous ties and processes of otherness. Quoting Gerald Graff (no friend to composition, esccept that his
dissensus model o f teaching has yet to be fully adapted to writing in and of itself), van Slyck believes such
courses would become universal, standardized and could thus “be put into dialogue with o n e another to
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create a sense o f [Graffs] “continuing community” ” (155). I will grant that she and Bizzell are correct— i f
we are advocating abdicating control o f composition as a distinct discourse community.
More generously, van Slyck is interested, as are we all, in teaching students “to define ethical positions”
and that it is, in deed, “[p]art of our responsibility...to help students see that unreflective group consensus
does not constitute an ethical position and that sometimes becoming an individual means standing apart from
one’s community and questioning its practices and values” (156). To not see— or attempt the experimental
guesswork o f - a n anonymous contact zone as a way to stand apart from one’s community so as to question
its practices and values, is, I think unethical. The powers that be institute anonymous course evaluations not
for the going view and going value, but to aid students in standing apart from the academic discourse
community and questioning its practices and values. So much more then, would this sense o f resistance,
parody, critique that Pratt calls for under van Slyck’s own regime o f (in) citation, under conditions o f
anonymous classroom conditions.
Significantly, on the final page o f her article, van Slyck quotes from Bakhtin’s subsection “The Speaking
Person in the Novel”. His idea o f “ideological becoming,” in which we “selectively assimilate the words o f
others” is an opportunity for all o f us “to explore our increasing cultural hybridity” (168). If anonymous
writing (and that’s a big IF ) does perform at all what I am claiming for it— namely, contact with a
continuum o f otherness, hostile and humble, compassionate and contestatory, oppressive and emancipatory,
sincere and cynical—then the sense o f hybridity van Slyck has apparently unwittingly adapted from
Bakhtin’s own notion o f a contact zone will not go unnoticed or reimagined by the community o f the
composition classroom.
Being the hybrid voices o f no body, the anonymous function is a process o f ideological becoming no less
ethical in its remarkable range o f dissensus and consensus than what van Slyck is call “w orld literature.”
“Anonymous” is part of world literature and o f all writing beyond literature. It is a process in which people
have undergone various kinds of ideological becoming for as long as writing has existed. Van Slyck’s (and
inferentially, Bizzell’s) “multicultural vision” is a confirmation o f Henry Louis Gates’ definition that such
vision entails “identities [being] always in dialogue...as sites of contest and negotiation, self-fashioning and
refashioning” (in van Slyck).
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When she ends her article by citing “this process” as described by Gates, it occurs to me that Gates has
always understood, better than almost anyone, except for the great African-American writers it is his
privilege to reposition in the white canonical contact zone o f literature what van Slyck is only now calling
for. Van Slyck ends by calling us all to embrace “this process” of dialogically imagined identities so that
“ ...we may all begin to reposition ourselves in the contact zone” (168 emphasis added). American slaves
began by repositioning their identities in an anonymous contact zone not even Pratt can barely imagine. I
find van Slyck’s invocation of a literary critic and theorist whose race has been the metonymic default line
for invisibility and anonymity in its most oppressive sense yet another ironic oversight o f the anonymous
function, always and already rhetorically (in)different to the other side of “our” “discovery” o f the contact
zone.
Fault lines Part Three: Pratt. Bakhtin, and Bizzell
Patricia BizzelFs February, 1994 College English piece, “Opinion: “Contact Zones” and English
Studies,” is remarkable for its continuation o f the ideological re-positioning o f compositionrhetoric’s on-going struggle between “academic discourse” and “expressivist writing.” Her brief
excursus enables van Slyck’s impressive, but strangely myopic, proposal for reconfiguring and re
positioning composition as a post-westem contact zone, where the personal narrative is exposed as
narcissistic, uncritical pandering to an American obsession with a unitary, solitary self. By positing
the true and rightful place of composition pedagogy—of all its writing— to be part o f a larger
“ideological becoming,” o f “struggling with an other’s authoritative word,” as Bakhtin had it,
Bizzell appears to have chased expressivism from the field to clear the way for compositionrhetoric as an exclusively literary sharecropper whose harvest is multicultural ism generally, and
post-colonial critique specifically. Even Elbow, as she has it, is unnerved by the lack o f a place for
literature in composition pedagogy during a summit conference some years ago on English Studies.
She pillories Elbow this way:
Elbow, although an advocate o f composition pedagogies in which each writer is to do
pretty much as he or she pleases, was sufficiently troubled by [the evasion o f the place
o f literature in answering the question, What is English!} that he propose his own list of
literary contents for English studies in an appendix (165).
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I have no office, no authority, but I too advocate a pedagogy in which each writer writes as he pleases. The
most personal writing—(to be distinguished from navel gazing, bourgeois, first World self-congratulation,
or the composition o f complaint that spews from a larger culture o f complaint (to be distinguished from
legitimate discourses o f trauma, o f bodies/ psyches in pain) the most personal writing is intellectual and
inter-textual. I have never encountered a personal narrative that couldn’t be re-mastered into a research
paper that would satisfy BizzelFs adaptation of Pratt’s contact zone in which “all students [may see] their
roots traced back to legacies o f both glory and shame” (Pratt, in Bizzell, 167). The hybridity, the double
voiced discourse, o f the normatively named contact zone that is the personal plus textual essay is
achievable. I have many class books o f students’ final essays to prove it.
Bizzell’s ultimate call for a contact zone leans on a different section in Pratt than does van
Slyck’s derivative elaboration of Bizzell’s original sighting. She approves o f Pratt’s call for, oddly
enough
exercises in storytelling and identifying with the...attitudes o f others... experiments
in...the arts o f critique, parody, and comparison Including unseemly comparisons...;
ways for people to engage with suppressed aspects o f history (including their own
histories); ways to move into and out o f rhetorics o f authenticity; ground rules for
communication across lines o f difference and hierarchy that go beyond politeness but
maintain mutual respect; a systematic approach to the all-important concept of cultural
mediation (Pratt, Bizzell 168).
Interesting, isn’t it that Bizzell elbows Elbow for “autobiography”, expunges the expressivist ethos from
any proximity to this new contact zone, and then shoe homs most o f what he’s been arguing for, especially
in Writing with Power, under the heel of Pratt’s “autoethnography.” Equally interesting is the unwitting
confirmation of a transgressive expressivism suggested by anonymous writing in the contact zone. As a
“way for people to engage with suppressed aspects of personal and public history; as a way to move into
and out of rhetorics o f authenticity through parody and impersonation; and as a systematic approach to
cultural mediation (where even, initially “mutual respect” is transgressed), anonymous writing is one
“way” toward those goals.
Bizzell, hidebound and blind because of Elbow’s challenge of otherness (a challenge that has its roots
the Sophists’ challenge to Platonism), ironically imagines much what an anonymous discourse community
is all about. Her author-itative “Opinion” is a startling example of late Bakhtinian rhetoric in which he asks:
“It is customary to speak about the authorial mask, But in which utterances (speech acts) is there a face and
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not a mask, that is no authorship?” (152). That is, she knows not where o f the no one she is speaking for.
Her famous linkage between “academic discourse” and “critical consciousness” must clearly be examined
for the high threshold anxiety that must obtain for her perform a repression o f the expressivist and
anonymous voices that must have their eiro— their communal say— in spite o f her identification with
author-ity.
Fault lines Part Four Pratt. Bakhtin, and Miller
Richard Miller’s “Fault lines in the Contact Zone” is my version of saving the best and worst for
last in arguing for and defending my sense that the anonymous function is not only an integral part
o f what we mean by the discourse of community, but is essential to how we position our teaching
and our students’ writing within Pratt’s own pedagogically applied sense of an “autoethnographic”
contact zone. The presence o f the anonymous function in his descriptions o f his classroom and the
surrounding academic discourse community is far more pervasive and penetrating than what
Foucault abstractly imagined “unfolding” at the end o f “What is an Author?” In resummoning
Blanchot from The Unavowable Community, perhaps I should write: The perilous and paralyzing
absence that is anonymity in Miller’s descriptions o f academic writing and response. Remember
Blanchot asserting,
the supplication to speak which carries with it the risk of being rejected or lost or not
received. Hence the foreboding that the community, in its very failure, is linked to a
certain kind of writing, a writing that has nothing else to search for than the last words:
“Come, come, you for whom the injunction, the prayer, the expectation is not appropriate
( 12).
...w hile asking oneself what is at stake in the concept of community and whether the
community, no matter if it has existed or not, does not in the end always posit the
absence of community?
Miller uncannily picks up Blanchot’s sense o f “foreboding” that is the absent community o f anonymous
writing, a writing that has nothing else to search for, precisely because it cannot be properly identified as
belonging to somebody. Because it belongs, rather, to no body, anonymity as a certain kind of writing,
lacks any authoritative claim to a community because addressivity and answerability are effectively,
dialogically, absent. It therefore, cannot be taken seriously, ultimately. It is rejected as craven precisely
because of its cunning, as absent precisely because o f its arch altitude, as reprobate precisely because of its
attempt to revise the intimate, embodied, binary o f response and responsibility.
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There is no audience for anonymity, Miller argues, because its anticipation o f audience is an
image of a listener who remains silent, who cannot imagine how to become a speaker in turn.
What matters who is speaking/writing, concludes the listener/reader anticipated by the anonymous
function: for if I respond, to whom shall I respond? What is his/her/their address(ivity)? The most
rabid, radioactive speech/character zone brought into being by the anonymous speaker/writer has a
very feverish but short run as a dis-ease, a very short half-life, Miller tells us.
The conventions governing the interchange, [of three anonymous posters and an
anonymous interview with the feminist author o f the first poster in the school magazine]
in effect, guarantee only that the described situation will continue: in this sphere,
anonymous threats and ambiguous slogans combine to produce a kind o f political
paralysis, where nothing happens because nobody knows where anybody stands (403,
emphasis added).
Yet, the emergence o f the anonymous function was found interesting enough—pedagogically
irresistible—to Miller that he had to import its alien discourse into his classroom for analysis leading to this
and other conclusions w ith his students. His conclusions about the composition-rhetoric o f
anonymity—what its pedagogical object lessons are— are not, in my view, a matter of a very long
rhetorical run for a very short didactic slide. The “fault lines” he traces in anonymity’s contact zone are
numerous and interesting for study, perhaps, in a more universally curricular, and ethically applied fashion
in the same way, if not for the same rhetorical “conventions” o f “otherness”, that “post-colonial” textuality
(reading and writing) was at the time being advocated by Bizzell and at the end o f the 90’s by van Slyck.
The core documents around which Miller builds his sense o f “fault lines” in the contact zone of
anonymity are three anonymous posters that have surfaced in what he calls an on again, off again, “corridor
war” involving anonymous feminist speech against a rape culture and counter- anonymous speech
threatening violent “revolution” against those who would dare declare this undeclared war on women. The
first anonymous poster
DON’T MAKE
YOUR
MOTHER
HAVE TO TELL
HER FRIENDS
THAT YOU’RE
A
RAPIST
(400)
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is brought in as exhibit A—a perfect heuristic-for bringing to life Pratt’s definition o f “ “autoethnographic
texts” as “heterogeneous on the reception end as well as the production end” (Pratt in Miller 401). “Here
was writing from the contact zone that was simultaneously oppositional, parodic, resistant, and critical:
how, I asked, were we to read it? (401).
Miller found the ensuing class discussion—which basically endorsed the poster’s condemnation o f rape
and rapists, but found the intention-message o f the fem inist/artist provocateur unhelpfully
ambiguous—predictable, approaching banality. Given the combination o f the context and the location of
this discussion and the spell cast by the rhetorical structure o f the first poster, it is hard to see how they
could have said anything else” (401).
The “context” Miller is referring to is a kidnapping and sexual violation that had occurred the previous
weekend. Against that context, I find it difficult to see how the appearance o f the first poster could not have
said anything else and with “signature” o f no one else. The second poster is a Derridean “play” at
threatening the feminist outrage and extremity of the first. Its graphic complexity is almost impossible to
reproduce here. Suffice to say it contains sexist slurs such as: WHORE TRAMP BITCH HOLE SLIT
WENCH DYKE TEASE and ends with DOGS RUN.
These two posters, virtually back to back, are followed a month later by another anonymous poster
NOT ALL
MEN RAPE
SOME OF US
JUST WATCH
(402).
Taken together, Miller found that his students unleashed brilliant flood o f interpretations of the meaning of
all three posters, followed by stories of personal experience with daily acts o f verbal or physical
harassment/violence based on the gender/sex o f a given victim (generally female). What troubled him was
that none o f this social constructionist and expressivist flash (orally reflected and discussed, not written) led
“ ...to any sort o f consensus about which reading...was “correct” (402).
Miller concludes, “[t]his is one o f the hazards of allowing students to work with writing in the
contact zone”(402). He finds three hazards: meaning is up for grabs; local, situated knowledge can
trump a teacher’s global, textual knowledge; teacher authority in guiding consensus about
plausible readings is undermined. I quote at length his conclusion, having initially misread it, as
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advocating against an endorsement o f what bell hooks in Teaching to Transgress would call
authority o f experience, teacher vulnerability, and boundary transgression between empancipatory
and oppressive discourses inevitable to identity politics and its contact zones.
In place o f a community o f uniform and obedient students, one finds a contestatory space
where the vertiginous possibilities of the multivalent, multivocal text become at least
momentary reality in the hands of a loosely federated, heterogeneous group with widely
divergent reading abilities and political commitments (402).
Miller is stoic, if not stem in his conceptual attitude toward both the contact zone as a premise and ilts
specific engagement via anonymous discourse. He finds students’ entrance into the contact zone created b y
what Judith Butler would call “excitable speech”, and the resulting politics o f that speech’s performativiry,
“exciting” but hardly the final goal o f his pedagogical approach and ambitions for his students. By the tim e
o f the third poster and the ensuing discussion, Miller concluded that the contact zone enacted by anonymi*y

“...designed to be “dangerous and political” ended up being dismissed as the work of cowards afraid So
make their position clear” (403). Like the peril (described above) o f having students have their way with tine
interpretive and authoritiative boundaries o f the normative contact zone that is the classroom, the apparently
“emancipatory” contact zone opened by anonymous speech, is ultimately “cast aside as nonsense” because it
lacks, as 1said up top, addressivity and answerability.
So Miller was pushing his students past the initial excitable speech zone moment to come to some kind o f
reflective, ripened conclusion. And he feels this rhetorical lesson learned about the provocative character o f
anonymous discourse is “ ...is not an insignificant lesson to learn in a course devoted to thinking a b o u t
writing as a process” (403). Thus, anonymous writing as a process may “buy the writer or writers thie
freedom to express opinions and prejudices openly, but it does so at the cost o f undermining the credibility
or significance of what is being said... [and] also helps to create an environment of suspicion and hostility-”
(403). So then, I must stand corrected, phenomenologically, discursively, historically, rhetorically, and, I
suppose, where the anonymous contact zone most counts—pedagogically.
Rebuttal and Conclusion
The writing of No Body —like the speech of Udeis/Odysseus— might be a primal act of enlightenment in th'-e
sense o f coming into our nominalist consciousness that identity is split, that we can do all sorts o f thing;s
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with words, and words with us. But Odysseus had to become Somebody; he had to disclose himself after
concealing himself, even at the risk of getting himself killed after blinding his adversary through anonymity.
The risk in losing himself through continuous impersonation was too great, the stress o f his
wandering/wondering too profound, that he had to rename to remind himself o f who he was and where he
was ultimately oriented, to his Sovereignty first and last, to his wife, Penelope, distantly, to his son,
Telemachus, far off, almost the other he had been before his odyssey as no body. Anonymously
impersonating an old beggar, once home, he chooses his time to rename and reveal himself—the anonymous
function shielding his identity, until the time was right for revealing his power: to take his revenge and kill
his rivals.
Anonymity is serious play; no body doubts its perilous two-way tactics o f subjection. Yet it remains a
useful contact zone, if not a permanent state of mind, since the mind is always embodied, and the body is not
no body. It is a body, and is named, among other bodies. Anonymity is a contact zone, as Miller tells us,
“where nothing happens because nobody knows where anybody stands” (403).
But—and this is a big BUT—Miller did not make the “autoethnographic texts” o f the anonymous contact
zone a working part o f his own course “devoted to thinking about writing as a process” as I have. He
engages with his conclusions about anonymous writing to “drive home the importance o f balancing the
strengths and weaknesses available within any given rhetorical approach” (403).
BUT: he did not begin his writing course with anonymity. He has done an incisive job o f weighing those
strengths and weaknesses and concluded that the anonymous contact zone is so full o f fault lines that it falls
through into its own unanswerable, nonsensical, other-wise/unwise otherness o f the rebel yell/rhetorical hell
o f nobody.
BUT: he did not text his findings from a rhetorical situation completely outside and other to his own to
determine if the same results pertain. In driving home his point that the fear and suspicion generated by the
last two posters’ suggestion o f complicity—sins o f omission, not o f commission—with the kidnapping/rape,
he quotes one of his students as asking: “What if...the people producing these posters are in this class?”
Miller answer to this is what I’ve already quoted: “a kind o f political paralysis” and a rhetorical suspicion
and sense o f threat.
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BUT: if he had engaged the anonymous contact zone as part o f the pedagogical and rhetorical goals o f
the writing process itself as “autoethnographic” he might have witnessed students who don’t need to ask the
question What if...there are racists, sexual abuse victims, onanists, beautiful empaths, sexually confused
searchers, god-hungerers, parodists, crticasters, sexists, anti-feminists?
Yes, what if

NOBODY were any o f these identities. What if the class discussed the dialogical

imaginations invoked or provoked by these contact zones? What if they were the super-person, the superaddressee, the No Body at the center o f audience that is the resonant, watchful listening absence at the center
o f community itself? What if those heterogeneous productions became common discursive property? And
what if only one student only revealed her identity at the beginning o f one course and only one—another
-student revealed his identity at the end o f that course in a reflective essay on his writing processes and what
he learned about gender and sexual identity?
What then? What are we to do with all these cowards and suspects, the hostiles and the humbles, the
humbugs and the humorists, with their undermined credibility and significance what was said/written in and
about the anonymous contact zone? What if the fault lines are also de-fault lines for experimental guesswork
about the essence of identity and the performative discourses constantly transforming it? What if anonymity
and the discourses o f identity, authority, and community it contacts and hybridizes turn out finally to be a
matter o f masking?
I present Richard Miller for a concluding answer to these eminently rhetorical questions. If,
given those What Ifs,
Then This:
In the uncharted realm o f teaching and studying in the contact zone, the teacher’s
traditional claim to authority is thus constantly undermined and reconfigured which, in
turn, enables the real work o f learning how to negotiate and place oneself in dialogue
with different ways o f knowing to commence. This can be strangely disconcerting work
[and remember, he didn’t really work the zone], requiring, as it does, the recognition that
in may places what passes as reason or rationality in the academy functions not as
something separate from rhetoric, but rather as one o f many rhetorical devices (407
emphasis added).
The anonymous discourse community, undermining the discourse o f universal mediation, also initiates it,
for it is not something separate from rhetoric. As one of many rhetorical devices it deserves, fault lines and
all, a sustained trial as a contact zone, if for no other rhetorical reason than to connect its heterogeneous
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production with that o f its fellow discourse of heterogeneous reception which also passes as rationality in
the academy, and functions not as something separate from rhetoric as undermined but ever reconfigured
super addressee—namely the anonymous course evaluation?
And what are we to do with these students who entered the course anonymously (in a critical
emancipatory sense) in the contact zone I provided and exited it anonymously in the contact zone
provided by the academic discourse community? Again Miller provides an answer.
For teachers who believe in education as a force for positive social change, the
appropriate response to these new working conditions is not to exile students to
penitentiaries or the psych- wards for writing offensive, anti-social papers. Nor is it to
give free reign to one’s self-righteous indignation and call the resultant interchange a
“political intervention” [which is precisely what occurred in the Henry Miller/Anais Nin
parodistic power play in my department]. The most promising pedagogical response lies,
rather, in closely attending to what our students say and write in an ongoing effort to
leam how to read, understand, and respond to the strange, sometimes threatening,
multivocal texts they produce while writing in the contact zone (408).

Richard M iller comes closest to understanding the strangeness, what I call the transgresshold of
anonymous discourse. Yet, not having closely attended to his own students’ possible need/desire for
anonymity, he doesn’t give full justice to the idea and practice o f a contact zone in which one’s own and an
other’s word contend with and subtend each the other. In effect, he has traced a fault line up to, but still
outside, the door o f his own authority and of his students’ struggle with its authentic disclosure o f how a
classroom discourse community should conceal, or could reveal, itself as a contact zone where all the arts
of rhetoric and composition come into play.
If Chapter Five, “Towards a Pedagogy of Anonymity,” had been an analysis of my close pedagogical
writing in response to students’ struggles in the contact zone—addressed to No Body, yes?—then Miller
would more closely understand the rhetorical usefulness of anonymity generated within, not without, the
composition course. But of course, he does already understand that the fault lines lie not in ourselves, nor in
others, but in the rhetorical situation, the facemask, that contact zone of writing that is always in parity with
a voice already other-wise, already disappearing as eiro— as “I” write
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Chapter Notes
I It matters on the strength o f one familiar and pervasive example: “An official, speaking on condition o f
anonymity, said today: ‘I ...’” This is a material, embodied rhetoric, even as it is the speech o f no body, a
reporter telephones or meets face-to-face with “someone” whom he or she knows but can’t identify to the
community lest the authority that official holds in trust be compromised in personal or organizational
term s. Yet, though anonymity would seem to decrease authority, it actually increases the power o f its
office. However, as I pointed out in the endnote to the General Introduction, there is a massive feminist
critique o f rhetoric, and possibly o f the anonymous-function, as a complicit form o f silencing—not
speaking—the existence o f those marginalized within the dominantly male operation of the author-function.
Vicki Tolar Collins also uses the Beckett line as an epigraph to open “The Speaker Respoken: Material
Rhetoric as Feminist Methodology.” Her opening assertions are worth quoting in full and commenting on,
before we proceed with my admittedly male dominated investigation.
Postmodern indifference to who is speaking is a position authentically available only to
those who already possess the authority to speak. When the primary modes of persuasion
of a text (oral or written) are the ethos o f the speaker and the moral argument o f her
narrative, who is speaking does indeed matter to the speaker, to the audience, to the
discourse community, and to historians o f rhetoric
And when women’s lives are
formed and women’s voices are managed and silenced by the ways a production
authority uses their discourse and the forms and forums in which it is published, who is
speaking and who controls the materiality o f the message matters very much—culturally,
rhetorically, and ethically (545).
Tolar Collins nails the point I have made about the author-ities o f Beckett, and then Foucault, having the
luxury or privilege to be rhetorically indifferent, and to therefore countenance the invisible face or visible
m ask o f what I am calling the anonymous function. Whereas, women, blacks, emigres, criminals, and a
host o f otherwise enslaved, oppressed, and marginalized persons have had to resort to the anonymous
function to make their voices heard. Their subject positions are, in material and rhetorical terms, the name
o f Anonymous. Their essential “difference” from the discourse o f Identity, the cycles of violence and
indifference to their speech by the discourse of authority, made, by default, the anonymous function their
only rhetorical option—a kind o f author-function alter-native. This entire discourse o f anonymity as a
suppressed rhetoric o f identity, authority, community—or otherness— is notably “absent” in these first four
chapters. It was meant to be a part o f Chapter Three’s “Modem” and Postmodern” sections that had to be
excised because o f space considerations. I try to bring Tolar-Collins consideration of The (Other) Speaker
Respoken... into what I consider a material rhetoric as feminist methodology in Chapter Five, “Towards a
Pedagogy of Anonymity,” where students’ anonymous writing— male and female—become a matter o f
asking, over and ever again: “what does it matter who is speaking?” Anonymity is a matter—the material
rhetoric—of private and State secrecy. In the final chapter, students’ anonymous documents—their
testimony, confession, argumentation, invocation, all reaffirm my sense that an anonymous pedagogy is a
material rhetoric as feminist methodology. My use o f Bakhtin to aestheticize what I mean by a rhetoric o f
anonymity is in large part due to the image, the imagination o f who someone is in saying eiro: “ Is a y ...."
^ Here’s an added centrifugal twist o f what I mean: The author’s self-generated summary o f his or her
professional activity, which appears at the bottom o f articles published in College English, for example, is
“alter-ed” by anonymous editors by substituting “He teaches...” or “She teaches...” for the original “I”—as
in “I teach....” At the end o f one such anonymous blurb— now an example o f dialogized heteroglossia or
double-voiced discourse for the community of College English— we find the final sentence o f writer, Anis
Bawarshi. It reads: “He thanks the article’s anonymous readers for their thoughtful guidance.” A further
tw ist here can be entertained, since Bawarshi’s article is titled “The Genre Function.” In this essay similar
claims are made for the pervasiveness o f “genre” that I making for anonymity as a function.
3 It would seem that both sides o f the theoretical and pedagogical contact zone of composition-rhetoric
could claim that they are engaging in this kind o f “experimental guesswork.” The academic expressivists
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would seize on the idea o f struggling with one’s own word—as the image o f a speaking person whose own
voice is a kind o f experimental guesswork with alien voices struggling for influence and expression within
the speech and character zones o f personal narrative. The academic discursivists would seize on a sentence
that appears in between the two I’ve quoted above: “The importance o f struggling with another’s discourse,
its influence in the history o f an individual’s consciousness, is enormous.” The fact is, most compositionists
are experimenting—consciously or not—with a hybrid approach to teaching writing, since they are aware,
given their own images o f a speaking person and alien voices, that a personal/intellectual struggle and
experimental guesswork is ongoing within any individual consciousness during the performance o f writing.
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CHAPTER FTVF.

TOWARD A PEDAGOGY OF ANONYMITY

Expressing Anonymous Social Construction

The Anonymous Function Within the Structure o f English
We have, in the last four chapters, understood that it is not accurate to imagine anonymity’s dialectical
relations as one o f binary opposition. Rather, we must think o f it as a synchronizing polarity. As such, it
prescribes our understanding o f autonomous self-other relations in all writing (Identity); it proscribes the
authentic origin and propagation o f canonical or official writing (Authority); and it describes the discovery
of the universal hope'of mediation through a rhetorical sense o f writing as a speech zone that anticipates a
special, perhaps surprising, conception o f the listener/reader.
In this final chapter, we will begin to see how the total

Composition o f anonymity—given the almost

spectral range o f its powers and dangers o f impersonation—is a “problem” for composition-rhetoric as a
pedagogical performance o f identity, author-ity, and community. Anonymous writing is a problem because
it epitomizes the powers and dangers o f a “performativity revolution” (France 150) within the structure o f
English Studies whose fault lines run deep and wide between the study o f literature and the study o f
composition. It is a problem because it throws the expressivist claim for an autonomous, authentic sense o f
self-agency and textual ownership in student writing into a “contact zone” where it meets the social
constructionist claim for cultural structure and author-itative citation.
The result of this dialectical contact between agency and structure, between the performance o f self and
the social prescription o f subjectivity under conditions o f anonymity, are dialogical possibilities for a
discourse “community o f dissensus” where personal and social, private and public “thinking is a shared
process without identity or unity (Readings 192). In seeking to create a concretely lived, dialogic
imagination within the abstract hope o f universal mediation, anonymous writing functions precisely as a
shared process without identity or authority— without unity—in a discourse o f community devoted to
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responsively understanding the politics o f identity as a matter o f agency and structure, o f autobiographical
expression and academic scrutiny.
Alan France, in a recent article, “Dialectics o f Self: Structure and Agency as the Subject o f English,”
approvingly quotes Bernard Donald, who appears to be in support o f an anonymous pedagogy. “In our
desire to foster student agency, we too often make o f the composition classroom ...“a safe place where
students can experiment with expressions but where the structure o f those expressions remain outside the
door” (148). Anonymous writing is just such a contact zone for both expressing and examining the
performative agencies and structures o f identity politics that would otherwise remain at the threshold of
personal and the social constructions o f identity. Within the terms set forth by Ruth Spack in her article,
“The (In)Visibility o f the Person(al) in Academe,” we will come to understand that the safe-risk contact
zone o f anonymity enables students to give voice to what Toni Morrison has called “Unspeakable Things
Unspoken”—“such as “race,” “class,” “gender,” ...and “sexual orientation”—all terms whose meanings are
contested—and these concepts have entered [as I will demonstrate, anonymous] pedagogical discussions in
ways than challenge even revolutionary theories and practices” (9).
The rhetorical immunity provided by anonymity effects and affects the performative relations between
personal and impersonal writing, enabling the emergence o f seven major themes that I have identified in
students’ anonymous writing. It is the goal o f this chapter to analyze those themes o f the anonymous
function within the larger dialectical structures and dialogical functions out o f which composition-rhetoric
finds its pedagogical mission as a revolutionary theory and practice of subjectivity split between the
anonymous subject o f writing itself and the subject position o f the anonymous writer.
General Questions Guiding the Reading o f Anonymous Writing
Given the structure o f English Studies as struggling with a larger post-structural— performativity—
revolution, does my particular application o f the anonymous function as understood in previous chapters
enable other teachers to imagine through Peter Elbow, in his What Is English?, that anonymous discourse is
devoted to:
“Using language actively in a diversity o f ways and settings—...in a range o f social settings
with various audiences where the language makes a differencef?];
Reflecting on language use. Turning back and self-consciously reflecting on how one has
been using language—examining these processes o f talking, listening, writing, and reading

[?];
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Trying to ensure that this using and reflecting go on in conditions o f both nourishment and
challenge...[?] (Elbow 18; emphasis in original).
Given the function of composition-rhetoric within the structure o f English Studies, does my particular
application o f the anonymous function as understood in previous chapters enable other teachers to imagine
through Mary Louise Pratt in her “Arts o f the Contact Zone” that the contact zone o f anonymity is devoted

exercise in storytelling and in identifying with the ideas, interests, histories, and
attitudes o f others;
experiments in... the arts o f critique, parody, and comparison (including unseemly
comparisons between elite and vernacular forms);
ways for people to engage with suppressed aspects o f history (including their own
histories);
ways to move into and out o f rhetorics o f authenticity;
ground rules for communication across lines o f difference and hierarchy that go
beyond politeness but maintain mutual respect;
a systematic approach to the all-important concept o f cultural m ediation (40;
emphasis in original).
Finally, given the function o f the composition course within the larger structures o f composition-rhetoric
and English Studies, does my particular application o f the anonymous function as understood in previous
chapters enable other teachers to imagine through Henry Giroux and Roger Simon in their Popular Culture,
Schooling, and Everyday Life that anonymity as “critical pedagogy” is devoted to:
...critically appropriating] form s o f knowledge that exist outside students'
immediate experience" [?];
[making] the familiar strange and the strange familiar[?];
[taking]...risks and struggle with ongoing relations o f power"? (Giroux and Simon
3).
My personal interest in the anonymous function was in its reputation as a transgressive mechanism: was
its reputation as the contact zone for craven, injurious speech, invective, and malevolent threat, fully
justified? Or might it also stimulate the empathic imagination, where impersonation, rather than
denigration, o f the Other finds a fresh outlet in students' struggles with the politics o f identity? What would
be the discursive and dialogical crossover effect if both these voices and visions emerged under anonymous
writing conditions? How would these voices influence my authority in the classroom? What would be my
role—more vulnerable? — in mediating between the poignant and pointed invulnerability o f the identities
created by anonymous writing?
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These questions were stimulated by a close reading o f bell hooks’ Teaching to Transgress: Education as
the Practice o f Freedom. This chapter will try to answer these questions and others on the basis o f
classroom practice and experience o f the anonymous function.
Methodologies Guiding the Reading o f Anonymous Writing
My methodology for reading what I consider to be themes o f the anonymous function in students’
anonymous writings is informed by three central tenets o f expressivist, or authentic voice, pedagogy. We
haven’t the space here to (re)consider Elbow’s legacy o f autonomy, Macrorie’s and/or Coles’ concerns with
authenticity, or with M urray’s notion o f writing for discovery (or what he calls surprise). As we saw in the
first four chapters, Autonomy, Authenticity, and Discovery also happen to be critical to an understanding o f
the discursive regimes o f identity, authority, community—all o f which depend upon the subordination o f
anonymity for their dominant status in language life.
I have also very loosely adapted the methods o f case study for my close reading o f these documents. I
will be pointing up points o f conflict, struggle, and transformation in the writing. I will also be interjecting
my own notes on the class discussions o f these documents—what I call the “community o f anonymity.” My
weaving o f my notes on these discussions is a form o f autocritique, and is, in fact, "feminist" in its
methodology because, ironically, it does not recognize the anonymity o f an objective professor whose
evaluating "I" remains above or outside the revelations o f students. In asking that students take on
anonymity's cloak o f invisibility in order to make most visible the many faces of their identity politics, I as
teacher and researcher had to appeal to them (and to you, reader) not "as an invisible, anonymous voice o f
authority, but as a real, historical individual with concrete, specific desires and interests" (Harding, 9).
In teaching the composition o f gender and sexual identity, and also racial identity and identification, and
then re-searching that teaching experience, I realize that I, "the inquirer... must be placed in the same critical
plane as the overt subject matter, thereby recovering the entire research process for scrutiny in the results of
the research" (Harding, 9). That I was doing as much while teaching these courses, and was then placed in
that same critical plane by colleagues for their scrutiny o f the results o f the research I had reported to them,
leads me to conclude that my use o f feminist autocritique is meant to be a dis-placement o f authorship and
its claims on identification.
That this could be seen by certain feminists as another male-ordered appropriation or subversion o f
feminist knowledge is a risk I am willing to take, especially given my final, feminist conclusion: students
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need to write identification papers (rather, papers dealing with identification) without their nominal
identities attached. Why do they need to write anonymously? Because the authentic detachment of personal
identity from the subject position o f “college writer” honors an expressivist goal even as it argues for a
socially constructed view o f the student, her writing, her personal identity. Depending on who’s “feminism”
one decides to commit to, the point where expressivism and feminism meet in composition pedagogy is
generally agreed to be within a “contact zone” o f the personal and the political, the private and the academic,
and in the transgression o f these for empancipatory, educative effects.
The Structure-Function o f the Writing Assignments
In Chapter Five I will examine the roles o f writing, reading, and exchanging within an anonymous
“discourse community” I constructed and oversaw as part o f my general pedagogical approach and practice
in the teaching o f composition courses at The University o f New Hampshire from 1994-95. We will focus
on students’ anonymous writing within an otherwise conventional course in college composition. My
approach attempts to merge the objectives o f both an expressivist and a social constructionist approach to
teaching college writing. In seeking to take up the founding theme o f universal mediation, my courses are
devoted to the writing, reading, and discussion (the composition-rhetoric) o f identity politics gender,
sexuality, and race). What I mean by a “conventional course” in composition is that students write weekly
assignments on issues o f identity—gender, sexuality, race, class, etc.
One kind o f assignment is a reader response essay to assigned readings from either an edited reader I
require for the course, or from my own edited course packet comprised o f readings that I deem to be both
useful in terms o f laying out the social and ethical complexities o f particular identity enclaves, and highly
provocative in the way they examine in public what students might have believed are “private” matters
shared within their familial or peer group settings. *
Another kind o f assignment is a personal narrative about some aspect o f identity that students have either
responded to as readers o f assigned academic material, or as writers reflecting on some issue that has been
provoked or suggested by their reading and our class discussion of the reader response essays.
Between these two kinds o f assignments, both o f which are signed, I assigned anonymous essays that
would probe more deeply (and perhaps candidly) into the issues opened up by students’ nominally identified
writings. The idea was to weave (the literal meaning o f text) together different kinds o f
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“ discourse”— academic, autobiographical, and anonymous— so as to capture something like a total
composition o f identity.
The final writing assignment for both courses involved a “research essay” which could incorporate all
three kinds o f writing done during the course, together with additional library research and anonymous
survey work students could choose to conduct in the class, in their other classes, in their dormitories, and on
the larger campus.
I therefore suggestively titled my courses: “Identity: Reading It/Writing It/Revising It”; “Mediating
Identities”; “The Com position o f Gender”; “The Composition o f Identity.” These last two course titles
featured the anonymous writing I will present and analyze below according to several “emergent themes” o f
what I have been calling the “anonymous function.” I will closely read and comment on 20 pieces o f
anonymous writing from these two courses.^
In both courses, I made the following proposal to students. I had included it in the outline for both
courses and reproduced it above the specific prompts for writing anonymously in issues o f identity.
I am asking you to generate responses to privately held feelings and convictions
about gender and sexual identity. Anonymity is the best guarantee I can think of
for removing all obstacles from telling these particular "truths" while at the same
time ensuring protection o f your named identities. These documents will be
Xeroxed and distributed to the class and become part o f its public domain of
discussion and reference (Dansdill).
I constructed the actual prompts for composition that followed this guideline to be as open as possible. For
the Advanced Course in Composition (“The Composition o f Gender”), the first assignment prompt read:
"Please feel free to write on any issue o f gender or gender identity which you consider to be significant." For
the second assignment the prompt read: "Please feel free to write on any issue of sex or sexual identity
which you consider to be significant." For the First Year Course in Composition (“The Composition o f
Identity,”) there were four such prompts. The only change in wording was “ ...any issue o f [race, gender,
sexuality, class].”
Seven Emergent Themes o f the Anonymous Function
The Seven Themes I have identified as “emergent” properties o f the anonymous function arose from a
larger sample o f anonymous student writing (88 documents). Scope here permits only a reading o f 25
anonymous documents.
1. The Significance o f Unnecessary Anonymity
2. Relations o f Normal Reader Response to Anonymous Reader Response
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3. Patterns o f Impersonation
4. Identity Crises
5. Offenses o f Feminism/Defenses o f Men and/or Patriarchy
6. Indeterminable Gender
7. Transgressive Relations
Since I did not carry out any form o f control group analysis (for example, having m y students, or students
in another composition course, write on the same self-selected topic with their names attached), these seven
themes, and the content that supports them, cannot be said to represent anything like a "scientific" sampling
o f anonymous writing behaviors. Nevertheless, the themes or patterns that I have found can be understood
and applied to the more "normative" event and context o f composition teaching and learning—namely, the
universal expectation and presence o f students' nominal identities. Those o f us who are accustomed to
reading students' college writing under the normative event and context o f their signatures
The scope o f this dissertation does not permit a detailed analysis o f all seven themes across the 20
documents I have chosen for analysis. I have chosen to focus on Themes #3-7, with particular attention to
#3 and #7, because I believe that the acts o f Impersonation and Transgression I found in students'
anonymous writing constitute an important finding about the expressivist argument for authenticity in
students' nominally identified writing. The 20 documents cover writings in response to prompts dealing
with significant experiences o f gendered and sexual identity, as well as a separate group on racialized
identity.
My findings on acts o f Transgression (expected) and on acts o f Impersonation (unexpected) are
important because these point to a range o f empathy and antipathy that is only partially present under
normative expressivist conditions where students' names are part and parcel o f the demand/expectation for
sincerity or authenticity in writing about personally significant experiences. Despite my lack o f “scientific”
controls, it is fairly safe to assume that the absence o f their nominal identities—or rather, the presence o f the
anonymous function—is responsible for some sense or degree o f what Goffmann, in two studies, The
Presentation o f S e lf in Everyday Life and Stigm a: Notes on the Management o f Spoiled Identity, has
referred to respectively as the sincere/cynical performance, and "discrepant identities."
I will also try to make a larger case, however, that this finding o f anonymous
impersonation/transgression, or the empathy and antipathy o f anonymity, is worthy also o f the social
constructionists' claim to an epistemologically superior pedagogy. They make this claim because o f their
apparent attention to more "socially" or "politically" significant issues than those fostered by an
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expressivist regard for the merely

"personal." One o f the argum ents leveled against expressivist

composition by social constructionism is that it is full o f myopic ideological insights. It would be in the
constructionist interest to experiment with the rhetorical immunity that anonymity supplies so as to
determine whether or not the personal biases and self-absorbed values that are attached, fairly or unfairly,
to expressivist composition, are in fact underwritten by a larger discourse o f socially constructed
expression.
In making the claim that expanding the use o f anonymity in the composition classroom (being always
and already present in the form o f students’ anonymous course evaluations) can be used as a bridging
discourse between expressivist and constructionist approaches, I will also be trying to make the case for a
sense o f community—what Maurice Blanchot might call an "unavowable community"—that is unavailable
or not completely accessible under these two contending approaches. I contend that the sense o f community
through anonymity is both personally expressive and socially constructive because o f the passion—whether
empathic or antagonistic—its enclave o f concealed disclosure generates.
This sense of passion (or, in keeping with the idea o f community, o f "communion") is often missing
from both expressivist and constructionist approaches to generating and elaborating students' understanding
o f academic discourse. The views and opinions expressed anonymously are, by definition, done so because
they are not considered ethically normative or because o f a wish by the writer, for various reasons, to
protect a range of realms—from those privacy and reputation, to economic and even physical well being. As
we have seen, the range o f motives for using anonymity—from human rights to hate speech—is far reaching
in terms o f its possible sense o f discourse and o f the community it will variously convince, persuade,
outrage, entertain and, in general, become identified with.
Surely, all tried and true composition-rhetoricians—both expressivist and constructionist—will have
sufficient courage o f their convictions about what best passes for authentic and/or authoritative writing to
test those convictions against my claims for the anonymous function: that it subtends and extends their
ideas about community, discourse, and that most temporary and temporized o f all academic phenomena—
the discourse community o f a required course in college composition.
Before we analyze the five most important themes that emerged in my use o f anonymous writing in a
decidedly hybrid approach to teaching composition, we need to look, in a provisional way, at the other two
themes that emerged in my analysis o f 20 documents on race and gender issues.
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Anonymous Gender Identity

The Significance o f Unnecessary Anonymity
Given the contradictory, paradoxical, and performative mobility o f the anonymous function, the idea o f
anonymity as “unnecessary” is good place to open a discussion o f what might pass for anonymity’s
necessity. Despite the fact that the determination o f what passed for necessary or unnecessary sorts o f
anonymity was limited to my own intuitive standards o f interpretation according to Patterson and Kim's
operational definition o f anonymity within what they call "the cathartic process," I do think a clear line was
established as I began to recognize emergent patterns. 3
I have been maintaining that anonymity's necessary disputability is a function o f masking, and more
universally, o f impersonation itself. What is pedagogically useful about that? That is, why do we need to
test the meaning o f a persona—private and public~a meaning that is always a response to our conceptions
o f Self and Other, against the regime of impersonation o f which anonymity is a function, and quite possibly
a contributing cause?
In the first document and others to follow, what I am equivocally tracing as the function o f "unnecessary
anonymity" is my way o f constructing an "out group" that indicates and reiterates anonymity's necessary
presence. I will repeat, in a tiresome manner, I suspect, that all teachers value the medium (if not always the
message) o f students' anonymous evaluations o f our teaching, a document that becomes open to all, part o f
an anonymous institutional readership and record, a community discourse, and arguably, a discourse
community unto itself. That is, the anonymous course evaluation is necessary, rather than unnecessary,
(though most teachers and their evaluating peer committees, when they read them at all, take the unstable
range o f students' insights, opinions and assaults with huge "grains o f salt".)
In my determination to analyze anonymity's borderline or equivocal necessity, I hope to prepare my
readers for those documents where anonymity is clearly needed, and that there are pedagogical
opportunities~if not outright necessities—well before and beyond its present use as an institutional
evaluation tool and community exit document. The first exemplary document demonstrates, I think, the
usefulness o f anonymity as an entrance document, and o f continuing its presence within a given course as a
discourse o f recognizance. Such an allowance o f the anonymous within and around all the named writing
going on opens up the meaning and sense o f community within the composition class. If, therefore, there is
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a general suspicion o f what passes for "feminism" as a popularly received discourse by students entering
the academy, then it is not likely that that suspicion, and possible antipathy, is going to emerge in either the
expressivist or social constructionist approaches. And yet, any authentic conception o f authenticity in
students' voices and views would hope to account for antipathetic, as well as empathetic, performances.
To use a more familiar set o f concepts, the "private" and the "public" performances of composition are
in constant tension and contention. That is a normative situation because it is the function o f discourse to
transgress and blur the boundaries o f the private and the public. In parallel, the binding energy holding any
sense we have o f community is an open border between private and public. Because the anonymous
function, for better and for worse, protects the private realm in actions upon and reactions from a public
realm, the relation o f anonymity and community is not merely conceptual, but rhetorically actual.
Therefore, a working hypothesis o f the anonymous function in college writing as a performance o f identity
and identification assumes that what students really privately believe about the politics o f identity has a
place in our public reasons about what really matters about the politics o f identity as a vast set o f academic,
author-driven discourses.
Anonymity's relation to, and effect upon, the academic discourse community as envisioned by either
expressivist or constructivist assumptions are one not only o f literal transgression, or crossing, o f the lines
between the private/public. It is one also o f literal provocation—o f calling forth—o f voicing and witnessing
what is really important for students to leam about writing, about themselves and others as writers, and
what composition as the total process o f putting the writing subject and the subject of writing together
really means as an act o f community—o f shared and unshared values. The significance of an anonymity that
I deem to be unnecessary to the discourses o f privacy and publicity, o f Self-Other references, is that it
nevertheless points the way to significant relations o f social construction—o f important assumptions about
what we share in common and what we don't share (in the double sense o f both identifying and concealing
our differences.)
The numbers and frequency o f unnecessary uses o f anonymity are significant because they call attention
to our normative connotations o f the anonymous condition as one o f subterfuge or irresponsibility.
Unnecessary anonymity might also signal many students' resistance to the idea o f anonymity out o f
suspicion that their identities would not be protected despite the pains I took to make printing (random
fonts), distribution and return (in a box outside my office) secure and confidential. Moreover, it is quite
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likely that given the uniform age (18-20) and background (suburban middle class) o f my students, they did
not have anything in their views and beliefs—within their inherited ideological matrix—that could answer to
the paradoxical form and function o f anonymity: that is, they had nothing to "hide and seek", to reveal
under concealment. My finding about this particular "significance" o f the unnecessary use o f anonymity
points, most tellingly perhaps, to the sincerity/authenticity o f their performances as writers. I cannot,
however, delve too deeply into these issues and questions.
After reading through the 31 documents generated in the Advanced Course in Composition, I came up
with the following Breakdown according to the “General Subjects” covered in the anonymous writing.
A. Gender Roles and Rules: 12 documents
B. Hetero-Relations: 12 docs.
C. Sex and Sexuality: Calls and Responses: 5 docs.
D. Crises o f Identity and Identification: 2 docs.
I then determined and correlated the number o f documents under each general subject area in which
Anonymity is probably unnecessary according to the justification in the course outline and in my specific
guideline for each assignment prompt.
A. 7(58% )
B. 3(37% )
C. 0
D. 0
Total: 10 (32%)
Thus, roughly one third of all documents were unnecessarily anonymous, with well over h alf o f those
written about gender and gender identity (A.) falling into the unnecessary category. M ore interesting,
ultimately, is that fact that over 60% of those written under the prompt o f sex and sexual identity (B.)
required anonymity. More interesting still is t 68% o f all documents required anonymity. Still, a 33% rate
for unnecessary anonymity is significant. Another strand o f significance to be explored is the fact that, in
keeping with my hybrid approach to teaching both expressively and constructively, a num ber o f the total
documents had to be correlated to the decision by m any students to use a Reader Response mode to
assigned class readings, rather than writing anonymously from a pure expressivist standpoint.
In hindsight, I might have made a mistake in my prompt with the phrase "feel free" since it gave
students an out to write anonymously under the more neutralized and neutralizing contexts o f reader
response—as critics—rather than as writers themselves on these discourses of their identities. On the other
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hand, the use of anonymity by critics, especially in the 17th and 18th centuries, was widespread.
Presumably, the kind o f insolence, indignation, or vilification that accompanied the necessary judgment o f
the worthiness o f this writer, or that authority, required anonymity. I did not find this to be the case with
this group o f students. My open invitation probably diluted my expected expressivist results with more
social constructionist reactions as represented by reader response. And yet the finding is nevertheless not so
much an indictment or rejection o f anonymity, as it is an indication o f where anonymity best plays its part
in the discourse of identity—expressed and constructed.
The highest percentage o f unnecessary anonymity falls under the subject matter category of Gender
Roles and Rules, with the largest percentage o f Reader Response to academic discourse assignments
occupying almost half o f that total percentage o f unnecessity. Hetero-Self Relations, has a much smaller
percentage o f unnecessary anonymity, though its total appropriation through Reader Response, like that of
Gender Roles and Rules, is almost 50%. And yet the total percentage o f unnecessary anonymity for this
subject category remains stable at around 33% once Reader Response is factored in. By contrast, for the
other two remaining categories—"Sex and Sexuality: Calls and Responses" and "Crises of Identity and
Identification"—the convergence o f reader response in unnecessary anonymity is virtually non-existent.
My provisional conclusion on this score is that the more personal, private, or socially taboo the subject
matter, the more likely is the necessity o f anonymity. This is not a very profound conclusion, o f course. It
is, in fact, belaboring the obvious. Anonymity is, despite its scope and range, a phenomenon o f masking,
even as it unmasks the more personal and private parts o f identity politics. But listing numbers of
documents and relative percentages cannot usefully demonstrate the distinctions I found between necessary
and unnecessary anonymity. Here then, are some representative documents in support o f my
categorizations. I begin our close reading o f students’ anonymous writing with 15 documents from the
Advanced Course in Composition (“The Composition of Gender”) I taught in the fall of 1994. The first
two documents represent the equivocal range o f anonymity’s rhetorical “necessity” or non-necessity as
discussed above.
Document #1: Resistance to Anonvmitv—An Authentic Performance
The first document we will look at under the first emergent theme is significant because it is an
unequivocal— and ironically, highly provocative— example o f how and why anonymity might be utterly
unnecessary in composition instruction. The student is writing under the broad subject area o f Gender
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Roles and Rules. In the classic expressivist mode, the writer (whose real name has been repieced with a
pseudonym to protect her identity) is recalling a significant event from her childhood when, invited to a
friend's sixth birthday party, she determined that she was "not going to wear that "girlie" dress to the party."
I was determined to wear my very best, most flattering pair o f red Osh-Kosh B'Gosh
corduroy overalls. This wasn't just any family birthday party either. All the doctors' and
lawyers' children would be there. This was high class. I couldn't understand why I had to
wear that ugly piece o f femininity.... I had put my heat and mind into m aking the
decision. I knew what was right. The strength that my mother had created wasn't going to
fail. I did go to the party with my red overalls on.
It's rather funny how my mother had tried to prepare me to face the nasty looks and
teasing that I would receive for wearing overalls. I looked like a boy in those overalls,
and I didn't look "good" enough in those overalls. I didn't look fem inine in those overalls.
I looked the way I wanted to look. When I arrived at the party however, all o f the girls in
their "cute little pinafores" were jealous, and I felt sorry for them.
My mother was no "Eternal Feminine," but she wasn't any brute either.... She taught
me that there were no boundaries.
My parents were the main role models for what I believed is masculine or what I
believe is feminine. My mother and father shared all o f the household duties, and often
switched roles. M y father changed diapers without a wink, and brushed my hair, and
bathed us.
There were always waffly lines regarding gender roles in my household. All in all, in
my home, it didn't and still doesn't m atter if you are a boy or a girl, man or woman, it just
mattered whether you loved one another and were true to one another.
“Rood Christian”
The major point o f reference in this document is the family, with a passing reader response reference
to the "Eternal Feminine" which figured in many o f the readings I required for the course. Anyone reading
this, but particularly the expressivist teacher, would consider this a well-written opening attempt, or
"essay", that discloses something personally significant but which the writer could comfortably share with a
wider discourse community. Open-minded social constructionists—Bartholomae and Petrosky o f the early
days o f Ways o f Reading, for example—would also find potential in this essay, and would seize upon the
slightly arch reference to class distinctions, the permanent effects o f the feminist revolution, and the
dialectical—even dialogical—potential in the w riter's knowing academic reference to the "Eternal
Feminine."
If either type o f writing teacher were told that the essay was written in response to a prompt that
justified and required anonymity on the part o f the writer, I'm positive that both would agree that
anonymity wasn't necessary for recognizing or representing anything in the essay as written. Both would
assert, I think, that the writer's voice is "authentic" and the "authority" o f experience compelling. But the
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fact that anonymity is unnecessary in the writing o f this essay is more transparent: the writer printed and
signed her real name at the end o f the essay (which I have replaced with a pseudonym). When I asked her
about her reason for doing so at the beginning o f the second-class session, she replied, very directly: "I
have nothing to hide. I don't believe in anonymity."
I scheduled a conference so that we could talk more at length about how we might honor her right to
sign o ff on everything she wrote, while I proceeded with my experiment in a mix o f signed and unsigned
writings. Within minutes, and with the same openness and firmness—ingenuousness, really—that informed
her essay, she told me she was willing "to play along" since there was more than enough space for her to
nominally identify herself. I was prepared to cancel the anonymous component in honor o f her rights as a
dissenting minority. I f “Rood” believed anonymity was an unnecessary and possibly unnatural
interrogation of private/public speaking rights, then I would have to agree, since my own sense o f
anonymity, as a transgressive, equivocal discourse was sensitive to the contradictory nature of concealed
disclosure. She told me she thought the class was extremely interesting, and that as a matter of what I had
presented as "teacher-research," she would support our experiment with anonymity even if she didn't
believe she would "hold anything back" because o f her name.
Rood’s sense of her inherent accountability and responsibility—her fundamental authenticity—confirmed
one gnawing theoretical doubt I had about using anonymous writing: the premise behind Patterson's and
Kim's use o f anonymity in The Day America Told the Truth was that we generally don't tell the truth, to
ourselves or to others, about issues that really matter to all o f us. Rood was rightfully indignant that writing
anything in her name was at some level disingenuous, and that she—whatever defined her core sense o f
self—was to some degree the result o f an imposture, or at least that her personal sense was informed, and
performed, by a much larger function o f impersonation.
Mainstream expressivists would, I think, rush into the breach opened by Rood's disavowal o f
anonymity. It is a questionable ethical assumption, a suspect pedagogical appeal, and in general, bad public
relations, to relay to students that they are engaged in various acts o f deflection and indirection, imposture
and impersonation when they are required to write personal narratives that are by and large scripted by the
familiar discourses o f family, schooling, peer relations, and popular culture. Since composition is a
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required course, one approach is to require them to write from personal experience, another is to require
them to analyze others' writing. Now we have the prospect that students are required to tell the truth about
what they really believe about matters o f personal and social, cultural and moral significance, and the only
way to do that is to tell them that their nominal identities are masks that must come off.
“Rood’s” belief that she had nothing to hide—that she had in fact disclosed what she

really thought and

felt about gender roles and rules—could not be countermanded by my hypothesis that anonymous writing
would somehow plumb more authentic depths o f her identity politics. In other words, for better or for
worse, we need to take “Rood Christian” and all our students at their word, beginning with those words that
are arguably the most fundamental: their Proper Names.
As a tried and true teacher o f expressivist principles, I agree with my own imagined upbraiding. As
critical theorist, however, and one who takes seriously to heart the definitions and descriptions o f what
passes for "critical pedagogy," I am not satisfied with the tried and the true only, but with the unmarked
boundaries of possibility, o f what remains to be seen spoken and heard. I knew that Anonymous writing
was an all or none proposition for my composition courses, and for the sense o f community I was hoping to
open. Rood Christian rescued my situation while justifying her own. Her character, and the character o f her
first essay, openly tested the limits of my authority and my authenticity as a teacher and theorist. Satisfied,
from what I could discern, that my pedagogy and I were not in fact disingenuous, as she might have
suspected at first, “Rood” disappeared into the anonymous discourse community that then developed over
the rest of the semester.
I might be accused o f belittling and befuddling Derrida's ideas o f signature, event, and context, but I see
that conference with Rood Christian as a defining event in recognizing the complexities o f pedagogy itself,
never mind an anonymous pedagogy. More important, I see her signature o f her proper name in effect
underwriting, and literally undermining, the context o f my requirement of anonymity. H er real name, in
effect, reminded me that requiring anonymity might be utterly unnecessary to what I am contending about
some larger issues o f authenticity and identity, authority and community.
I now turn to two more documents from a much longer series o f documents that point up gradations or
"transgressions" o f anonymity's (un)necessity. Bakhtin might call these gradations "transgredient moments"
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in which the discourses o f identity, community, and authority might be said to (e)merge as functions o f the
anonymous. Like the openly self-identified essay by “Rood” these next two documents are written by
females— if their deployment o f pronoun reference is to be believed. There is no assurance that these, or the
next group o f documents that I am going to assume are written by “m ale” writers, can be identified
according to the writer’s gender identity. My assumption that they might be is to perform a double play
with the imaginative impersonation function that is anonymity itself. It is up to the reader to determine
whether it is important, given the anonymous function and the themes I have identified as emergent, to
know the “identity” o f the writers in what should be, in the most abstracted sense of anonymity, a
genderless zone of contact that always remains to be seen and heard.
I have been telegraphing, and by turns, short-circuiting my contention that the anonymous function,
when required all along the line o f composition's assignment structure, opens up expressivist assumptions
about authenticity, revealing its "discrepant identity,” to borrow a phrase from Goffman, and/or what
Robert Brooke, also adapting from Goffman, might have called authenticity's "underlife in student writing
instruction." Concurrently, I have promised to show that anonymity functions not only as a direct current
within expressivist notions o f the personally authentic, but manages an alternating current which
constructivists might tap into as "socially" authentic, enabling the kind o f author-driven analysis and
academic research that is said to distinguish it from the expressivists focus on "MEsearch."
The first document would seem to establish, however, an unequivocal basis for building a case against
anonymity and its putative function as a provocation of greater authenticity in student writing. Document
#2 falls into the same line o f unnecessity, but it begins to show an expressivist contour that skates close to
the kind o f Prohibited Speech Foucault alluded to in his “critical “ approach to language: the discourses of
desire and power, or o f sexuality and politics. It, and the next document, were shared and discussed in the
first class session I devoted to theorizing the pedagogical difference—if any— in creating a “community o f
anonymity.”
Document #2: Expressing the Social Constructs o f Desire and Power
I have a very close friend who is a man. There is no sexual tension between us, only
friendship. As I spend more time with this friend, whom I'll call Rich, I repeatedly see his
personality change when in the presence o f other males. When he is my room, rocking in
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a creaky old rocking chair that belonged to my grandfather, he becomes more thoughtful
and expressive. He has grown more and more comfortable with trusting me w ith his
intimate thoughts, and he talks until all the things that are confusing him are said and he
can take a deep breath and wait for some advice. I'm not certain if he needs "womanly
advice" or ju st someone to listen to him. Regardless, we all need support, and I'm glad
that Rich can be open with me and let me be his friend.
But when the discussion is ended, and he is done telling me why he has been so angry
with everyone, or withdrawn from his friends, or stressed, or feeling pressured by school
and roommates, we return to his house and an amazing change occurs. His male friends
are all at the, sitting around having one o f their "discussions" These "discussions" are
characteristic o f this group of men. It is what bonds their friendships. They speak with
authoritative and opinionated voices, and are often times moved to their feet as they
"discuss" the "benefits” of drug use, the "ridiculous" policies of the University and the
"ineffectiveness" o f the Durham police. These m en are educated and they do make some
intelligent statements, but usually it is a nondebate on hand. They validate one another's
statements and tell and retell stories about their personal experiences that serve to further
strengthen their shared opinion. Rich gets excited about these sessions in which he adopts
an argumentative voice (though no one ever disagrees with anyone) and becomes the
authority on whatever is the topic o f the evening.
I f I, or anyone else who hasn't conformed to the opinions o f this group, risk making
our opposing opinion known, we are faced with listening to five men validate each other
and agree that the independent voice is definitely wrong. Another reason why I have
declined participation in these discussions is that I have learned that the purpose o f the
talks isn't really to reach a conclusion, but to strengthen the ties o f friendship between
these men. I don't recognize the man I am friends with among these loud and opinionated
people, and I have learned to no longer look for him. Rich isn’t moody. H e isn't
necessarily weak; he is confused. I know I am not the only one who wonders who he
really is; he asks himself everyday. That is exactly why he spends those hours in my
room. He is too proud to let this inward side be shown to his male counterparts and he is
too tender not to express it at all.
The first thing I notice in this document is this young woman's wisdom well beyond her years. She is a
listener and an "empath," to borrow a coinage from Star Trek—The Next Generation. Her antipathy toward
this male bonding ritual is perfectly tempered by a fine sense o f irony. O f the documents covered by the
subject area o f Gender Roles and Rules, I see it as the epitome o f the theme o f anonymous empathy that
points up the constructive, "therapeutic" mode o f the anonymous function. Anonymity is necessary to cover
the identity o f her friend whom she'll call "Rich" (anonymity within anonymity) and, quite plausibly, to
safeguard her connection to that reference to "sexual tension” and its difference from what has come to be
misnamed as a "platonic" friendship.
My own attraction to this anonymous document is the exploration o f masculine identity, and o f her male
friend's identity, as a "confused" struggle between the reflective and the reactive self. There is a sense that
the writer is herself splitting the difference between male and female communication communities along
stereotypical lines and, in doing so, is canceling out any special vantage point presumably gained by
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becoming anonymous. Again, too, it is not at all unlikely that this writer would have touched on the
"otherness" at the core o f her friend's gender identity and identification with equal insight and poignancy if
she had responded to a standard expressivist prompt. And there is no reason why the writer wouldn't have
practiced one tangent o f the anonymous function—pseudonymity—to protect the identity o f her friend even
as she signed her own name to the essay. Certainly, the "Men Are From Mars, Women From Venus"
binarization would have emerged under her signature.
And yet, what I hear in this essay is a quality of voice that is intimate and distant—"impersonal”—a
quality that I identify with one o f anonymity's effects. But without a control group to prove my intuition, I
can only appeal to my readers' sense o f what I, thanks to Beckett and Foucault, am pointing to: "What
matters who is speaking?" What matters is what is being expressed'. "I have a very close friend..." The
distance that anonymity literally "provokes"—calls forth, from the writer's first person point o f view adds a
paradoxical proximity, even intimacy, that would not, I contend, emerge in this writer's obviously already
strong responsive understanding. Many feminist theorists and rhetoricians would o f course take me to task
on this question of rhetorical indifference. Thus, I can conjure my own well-developed feminist "other"
responding to my tiresome repetition o f the Beckett/Foucault interrogation in this way
It may not matter to males who have the luxury o f playing around with the sort of
invisibility and oblivion that a male ordered history o f language activity has, until
recently, visited upon women. But it matters very much who is speaking when women,
within that prison house o f language, have had to hide their identities with an anonymity
that wasn't existentially heroic or arch-ironic, but necessary to their literary and often
physical survival. Think o f the Brontes or o f "George Elliot." Anonymity has been the
enforced name o f women from laws barring their literacy to laws requiring they change
their names into those o f their husbands. Far from being an empancipatory function, your
use of anonymity in the composition classroom is an unwitting, and possibly perverse,
reassertion o f what Derrida has called Phallogocentrism.
My response to my internalized feminist Other is dogged, but not dogmatic. The anonymous is o f course
Iogocentric, but this writer's use o f it does not suggest the name o f the father and the signifier o f the phallus
penetrating a woman's "lack” o f reason. Or perhaps it is, in reverse. I f Cixous is correct, the laugh o f this
anonymous "Medusa" becomes more o f a knowing smile at the impotent posturing o f male dominated
discourse, a confusion that we can recognize at the end o f documents (not analyzed here), where the
daughter o f a father writes uncannily o f his identification with the Mother, and of the Mother not being
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there to hold his hand so that he might shed neither manly nor womanly tears, but simply cry in that
poignancy and passion that represents the "phallacy" o f men's communicative rationality.
The lingering question o f whether the present document, or any o f the others I have presented, is worthy
o f the term "academic discourse" from a social constructionist point o f view is, I believe, already answered
by the present document's hybridity of artistic expression and critical analysis which cannot be dismissed as
narcissistic, or even as essentially personal. It is itself a proto-treatise on the socially constructed reality of
gender and a narrative o f an acute listener in Burke's "parlor"--one who hears a deep confusion in its
"conversation o f mankind.''
The final document in this section o f anonymous women writers culminates a theme or pattern we saw
as a category or an Emergent Theme—defense o f men and anti-feminism. This theme alone is, I think, a
significant finding, for it means that many women are afraid to voice their real feelings and ideas about
what feminism means and what it has done or is doing for helping them define and redefine confusing
issues o f gender. I f only 30% o f women are afraid to speak up for what they sense is a politically incorrect
attitude in the supposedly liberal hot bed o f academia, it would seem to me we have a serious
communicative issue in composition studies alone.
I would think that even my scintilla o f documentary evidence would be o f interest to the feminist
teacher, to women's studies programmers, and to any one, male or female, who might wish to know what
students really think and believe about such critical issues o f culture and society as male and female roles
and relationships. It also seems to me that the functional hybridity I have been trying to link to
compositional anonymity also culminates a trend running through the previous documents. Moreover, the
uncertain and equivocal nature o f what motivates choice o f subject matter when anonymity is presented
(never mind required) to a young writer as a rhetorical position seems to settle itself decisively into the
utterly necessary range with this document.
Document #3: Reader Response and (TJnYNecessarv Anonvmitv
English 501, the one class that scares me. My biggest fear in this class is that I am not a
feminist o f any sort and I despise male bashing o f all kinds. I hope this will not make me
an outcast. I am trying to see both sides o f each argument and understand them as well.... I
just cannot agree with some o f the authors we have read so far that blame men for all o f
the problems o f the world. Not all men are sexist pigs, as was stated in The Utne Reader.
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Would it be fair to say that all women are radical feminists? Not all men are out to rape,
attack, and destroy the future o f women. Would it be fair to say that all women are
nurturing, baby-making housewives? What really drove me crazy was the idea, brought up
in The Utne Reader, o f m ating two eggs to eliminate the male gender completely. The
article stated that mothers did not want to raise sons who would most likely be potential
rapists and murderers. G et real. I've got a wonderful little brother, and a marvelous caring,
father. It sounds to me like that w e’ve have given up and lost all faith in human nature.
That was most upsetting. Humans cannot live a normal, healthy life if they are constantly
in fear. Sometimes women can be their own worst enemies.
I agree with the articles stating that communication is the key to a healthy relationship.
But that applies not only to romantic relationships but also to friendships, work
relationships, and m ere acquaintances as well. I also agree that women deserve equal
salary for equal work and that there should not be any limitations placed on women in the
work force. I guess I'm an advocate o f equality rather than the domination o f one gender
over another. Many o f the articles we have read seem to be arguing with each other over
who is the dominant gender when, in reality, it is neither. Both are fighting to hard and are
too blind to meet in the middle. How dare either gender say or feel that they are superior
to the other? Now the question is, if wither group is right, what do we do? How do we
remedy the situation o f inequality without starting another war?
The pattern o f using reader response to initiate and open a set o f personal beliefs and opinions was a
familiar one in the anonymous writing done in this class on issues o f gender identity. My present scope
does not permit the full range o f the relation between reader response and anonymous response. I assume
the writer is a woman, though, as with many o f the previous documents, the use o f pronouns is, I think,
deliberately neutral/neuter in order to m ake an ideological point, as well as ensure complete identity
protection. The anti-feminist edge becam e pronounced in many o f these documents, except that this
document sticks to a level o f generalized others, rather than introducing and sustaining a significant other
such as a father or mother, which was a feature o f many documents we can’t analyze here.
The fact that the class scares the writer is added rhetorical incentive, and pedagogical justification, for
the use of anonymity. I am not, o f course, advocating that students should be fearful in any class. The
writer’s fear reference is to her views regarding feminism, and the assumption is that in giving equal time to
women's as well as men’s movement readings (in sum, a complete gender studies course o f reading and
response)I may in fact be advocating feminism. The writer is afraid that if I knew his/her genuine views, it
m ight affect her/his grade. The reference to being "a social outcast" extends this fear of an instructor's
potential ideological bias and possible abuse o f power at the writer’s expense to how the writer’s views may
be taken by other class members. The writer is therefore using the mask o f anonymity to speak the truth, as
s/he understands it, about gender roles and rules, coming out as a mainstream liberal humanist.
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The writer's view o f gender relations, from what I could gather, represented the majority view of the
class, male and female, as we began our responses to these documents. I was tempted in this particular
discussion to point to the difference between different kinds o f feminists, working for very different kinds
o f equality—from pay/work equity and reproductive rights, to liberation from Disney stereotyping in
mainstream culture to our massive pomo-rape culture. I was tempted to point out that there are
pornographic feminists and there are eco-feminists. The discourse o f feminism, and the discovery and
recovery o f the detested and contested "feminine" is everywhere, in the inkling o f female representation in
Congress, in the glass ceiling o f corporate culture, on the screens and pages o f mass media.
But I did not. I was happy to point out that this writer's desire "to meet in the middle" o f the discourse of
gender justified the use o f anonymity, for the anonymous is itself a middling function: it both protects and
projects a writer's legitimate fears; it conjoins reader response and writer recognition; and it builds a
discursive bridge between the always confusing, contested concepts o f identity and community.
Whether or not the anonymity o f the writer is functioning in the way I am contending, that it structures
this sort o f hybrid, middling (literally, "mediocre") outcome, is o f course, wide open to argument. I cannot
begin to reproduce the class discussion o f this and the other documents. At the opening o f the course and
throughout the semester I underscored to students that their triple performative roles as named writers,
unnamed writers, and as named, face-to face reader/respondents, to both levels o f identity composition
amounted to an experimental discourse community. My reader will have to take my word that the
anonymity o f these texts opened up remarkable lines o f communal inquiry and reflection. This community
effect o f anonymity—whether the anonymity is purely necessary or not—is itself worth the experiment with
invisible writers/visible readers.
The next three documents I have chosen for discussion of the significance o f "unnecessary anonymity"
are written by “males.” Like the previous three documents, they demonstrate a mix of expressivist and
social constructionist “trace elements.” In short, I am proposing that these and other documents we have
analyzed re-present a personal plus textual potential—a transgredient moment—that expressivists and
constructivists will claim as both familiar and strange.
Document #4: Expressing One’s Social Construction as a “Male”
This is probably one o f the world's wonders. Why is it that women are unable to
make up their minds? They will say one thing, change their minds, and leave
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males to figure out what the hell they are really trying to say. This can be very
confusing for the male. W hat are his options? If he argues with her he is wrong,
arrogant. Yet if he acts the opposite then he is just trying to appease her so as not
to have a conflict—or is he really ju st guessing at what she really wants and
therefore not honestly interested in taking her feelings into account?
Perhaps much o f this is founded in our roles o f being males and females.
Scientifically, it has been shown that males change their minds more than females,
but once a male has chosen he will usually stick with that decision. Females, on
the other hand, will continue to waffle on issues right up to and sometimes beyond
the point of no return.
Now the question is whether this study reflects biological programming or our
socially programmed views. I f they are biological there isn't anything we can do
about it, but if social, there is something that could be done. I f tins one quality o f
males and females was changed there might be a significant upgrade in the
relations between the sexes. By this I mean that if males and females were able to
settle down and make decisions and perhaps stick with them, unless o f course the
circumstances change, the relationships of our sexes may improve, and there
would be one less battle to fight.
Document #4 is a more familiar expression o f gender identity's socially constructed estrangement and
engagement. Is its anonymity completely necessary? When compared to the overall rhetoric o f mixed
motives and equivocal effects of the previous documents, my intuition tells me, Yes: The writer, (“male”),
needs anonymity to safely make his stereotypical, almost loutish, but personally authentic views o f gender
roles and rules known. That these authentic views are o f questionable authority—a vague composite o f
personal plus textual experience—is precisely why and how anonymity becomes a general heuristic and
dialogical necessity.
I have attempted to headline a definitive interpretation of each o f these documents, and then find as I
transcribe them into the body o f my text, a closer reading occurs in the course o f "typing" my students
writing. Even in this document, which opens with what I called a loutish, or bigoted, male attitude
regarding women's putatively fickle nature, we can see a progressive movement toward a more responsive
understanding—toward an empathic imagination o f how and where the biological and the social might meet
and complete one another. The overt subject—male versus female decision-making—is a not so transparent
call for greater communication.
The writer's vague textualized appeals to scientific authority turn into rather more expressive appeals to
being "able to settle down." The social constructivist would jump on this as just another ill-conceived
expression o f personal bias: hasn't the writer read Deborah Tanner, for example? The expressivist might
equally jump on it as evading more specific elaborations of the writer's own gender role troubles: cut all the
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pseudo-scientific references to a pseudo-objective authority and tell your readers what's at issue personally
so that it can be better understood in broader terms o f general readability, if not social utility.
What I find compelling about this document is the either/or

and neither/nor status in terms o f its

narrative and analytical identity. Now, can I prove that anonymity produces this personal plus textual
hybridity (which I see as an opportunity for the writer and for his fellow readers as we discuss its strengths,
weaknesses, and discursive possibilities)? No, I can't. But given the potential freedom o f expression and
construction which anonymity can offer, I contend that the writer’s rhetorical equivocation (an initially
sexist voice and final communitarian vision) contains a personal and social vulnerability—a quivering of
gender roles, rules, and relations—that is an important part o f how anonymity reveals itself to a larger, and
largely unidentifiable, community.
Document #5: Tradition and Transgression
In Document #5, we see a nod toward the reconstructive effects o f a feminist consciousness nearly unheard
o f in “males” prior the last two generational cohorts (1960-1985) o f which this writer is a middle member.
She Paid
"Let me pay this time," she said. "When you ask me out on a date, you can pay," I
replied, not ever foreseeing that day. A couple o f weeks later I got a call. "Hi, it's me.
What are you doing Friday night?" "Nothing yet." "Good, I'm taking you to the movies,
my treat. Be ready for seven-thirty. I'll pick you up." Ha, I thought, she took me up on
my offer. At the time I told her that she could pay when she took me out, it sounded like a
good idea. Now, it didn't. It was almost as i f she was calling my bluff. What was I
supposed to do? I decided to play along with the whole thing. Yet, for a date with a girl I
had been out with a couple of times, I was more uneasy about the whole arrangement
then I should have been,
The date ended up being rather awkward for me. When I got home that night, I started
thinking about why it was uncomfortable. All she did was drive me to a movie and pay
for my ticket. That was it. It was a trivial experience, but it highlighted the importance o f
socially constructed gender roles we play. The role reversal had taken me out o f a
familiar role and forced me to play another. Her paying shouldn't have mattered, but it
did. It was a classic example of the complexity o f gender issues that are reinforced to the
point that we take them for granted. I know now that it wasn’t the date that was awkward,
it was making the choice between clinging to traditions o f old, or adapting to the everchanging social arena.
The title tells us much about the power issues involved in dating and in who bankrolls its experience. It
is possible that the writer's admission of feeling "awkward" and that having his socially "reinforced" role
reversed made him "uncomfortable" was sufficient enough to justify writing anonymously. As an example
o f what I have contending about anonymous discourse as a bridging discourse between expressivist and
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constructivist writing this text is exemplary of, if a bit thin in, its hybrid indications o f transgressing the
personal and social.
Nevertheless, the expressivist use o f dialogue to establish a sense o f his, and his woman's friend's,
personal character edges into a fairly sharp and analytically succinct analysis o f the "socially constructed
gender roles we play." It is this in the writing that caught my attention. Without resorting to reader response
(since there had been readings on gender roles and stereotyping), this writer manages to telegraph an
academic, analytical awareness in his preference for a more personal narrative approach.
It seems to me that both an expressivist and a constructivist teacher would be interested in the potential
this text offers to their pedagogical beliefs about what makes for authentic and authoritative composition.
The voice is reflective on the subject o f gender identity. The voice does not, however, reflect, necessarily,
an anonymous function. W hat is being impersonated here? Is there any hint o f code or content
transgression? What is significant about the disclosures made by this writer who could very easily have
signed his/her name to this writing? W hy should this piece o f writing be/remain unsigned? How does it
foster Forster’s sense o f an anonymous “atmosphere”?
As for my sense o f the "impersonal/impersonating power o f the anonymous function, there's no
assurance that I correctly identified the gender/sex of the writers in the first five documents (except for #1.)
But let's assume that their writers were female, and these last two writings were o f male origin. The
question remains: What matters who's speaking in matters o f gender identity? I will now entertain an
answer.
What matters is what the community o f writers, fa c e to face, will make o f these voices,
views and visions. What really matters is how these communal expressions o f gender
identity and identification will be socially re-constructed fo r the use by the community
created by a required course in composition. What matters is not the who but the what o f
the writing—what it teaches us about our sense o f Selfishness, o f Otherness, and their
communal expressiveness—constructive and destructive.
In trying to establish an equivocal sense of, and foundation for, the provocative possibilities of
anonymous writing about gender identity, I suspect that the contact zone wherein my theoretical sightings
and my documentary findings have long since transgressed the clear, pragmatic lines (if there any worth
redraw ing

and

d efending)

b e tw e en

a

n ecessary /u n n ecessary ,

and

appropriate/inappropriate use o f anonymity.
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even

perhaps,

an

Document #6: Androgyny meets Anonvmitv as Threat to Identity
The final document in this section on Gender Roles and Rules is interesting as a borderline heteroglossic
discourse because it responds to several different senses o f authority—class readings, a female classmate's
talking points in class, and to his girlfriend's views o f what she wants in a man. Taken together, there is a
sense o f responsive understanding in this anonymous document that points to, even if it cannot precisely
locate, a sense o f community "in this day and age with all o f the mixed signals that men are receiving from
both the females and the society in general?"
What does it mean to me, a male, in this day and age...? Does being male mean that one
is still supposed to be provider for the relationship, acting as the warrior for women, but
being chivalrous also? As we discussed in class, do women even know what they want
from their men? My girlfriend says she wants a man with good hands, teeth, eyes, and he
must be bigger than she is so she doesn't look like a whale. But, he also must be patient,
understanding, sensitive to her needs, and be able compromise so that the relationship
will work, be fun, spontaneous, compassionate, romantic, be one who will thrown in the
sweet little things, talk with her and share his thoughts and feelings, be honest and open
with her so that she knows that she is special. Yet, she does not need a male who is
demanding or selfish, but give her the respect she serves. Needless to say she has a pretty
good idea o f what she wants. I had to stop her so I might be able to write about it some.
So for the modem male, what is the boundary between being the chivalrous male,
doing the "old-fashioned" things, and being a male that is insensitive to her and her
feelings...This is very frustrating from a m ale's point o f view since their roles are
changing. Maybe we are in the transition into being the Androgynous Male. I think so.
After reading that article, I connected many personal thought into what the author was
saying about how males should be acting to make the world better. I agree that overall
males need to be less aggressive than they are at present, but I also strongly agree with
the woman in class who said that isn't the whole issue o f androgyny based on common
courtesy. Maybe both sides need to relax, and stop blaming each other for everything that
has happened in the past. It is time to move on and look to the future.
Most remarkable here, I think, is the anonymous reference to "a woman" in the class who spoke o f the
androgyny o f being polite to one another. This begins to suggest the possible “androgynous” function of
anonymity. Or is anonymous androgyny a fiction? Despite the sense of cyberspace and digital discourse
being “sexless” (so to speak!) it seems pretty clear thus far that the gender identity o f those writing
anonymously is rather trans-apparent. Conversely, the tenacity o f gender identity is opaque to the function
o f anonymity—resistant to its rhetorical possibilities. Whatever the reality, it seems indisputable that the
reality o f anonymity’s impersonal structure/function in theoretical, historical, and rhetorical terms is
becoming a possibility in writing that would otherwise not be unexpected under normal nominative
conditions. But that’s the question: Is the anonymity thus provided functioning in light o f what has been
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established in the previous chapters? No...not yet. But the underlife o f composition is coming to the
surface, is my sense—a sense I can’t imagine my reader doesn’t share.
Toward An Unavowable Anonvmitv
The necessity of teaching composition as a call/response to an unavowable community o f writing, not of
writers, is clear if anonymity does in fact function as dialogized heteroglossia. If it doesn’t then it is utterly
unnecessary to both composition pedagogy and to any sense o f an educative effect. Once we begin to
reflect on the collective information and communicative rationality represented in these 6 documents,
however, we see the countenance o f the kind of community problematized by Mason and Stamm. The
anonymous sense o f community suggested in these writings— and given their use in face-to-face
discussion—is more empancipatory than Mason and Stamm have found in the world. In other words, we
begin to see where and how Blanchot’s sense of community and Lunsford’s sense of ownership is
collected, copied and redistributed to each absent writer/present reader so that they can read, respond, and
have a sense o f common ownership of these texts.
Because they are anonymous, each text is written by some one o f them, but in a real sense, each is
written by any one o f them for all o f them. No one person stands out in these nominally unidentified
attempts at gender identity. This possibility o f anonymous composition as community property—and as the
communication of identity—is no mere conjecture. Its possibility is very real pedagogically. The reality of
anonymous composition as an act o f community becomes available to both the expressivist and the
constructivist. Imagine these documents not as pinned up on these sheets undergoing what amounts to a
variation o f the old New Critical approach to literary interpretation. Imagine instead them in the common
possession and discussion of those who wrote them, and then you will begin to see what really happens
when anonymity meets community in the composition o f gender.
I chose these documents to close out this first section of document analysis to point up what seems to
suggest a trajectory o f "masculine" versus "feminine" identification under cover o f anonymity. That is, the
men writing in this first round o f assignments were either drawn toward expressing the quintessence of
male identity through descriptions o f various defining rituals and codes o f masculinity. The women writing
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on condition o f anonymity seem to suggest a pattern o f desire for communication/ communion/ community
beyond the definitions o f their gender identities.

Anonymous Sexual Identity
The Emergence o f Anonymous Impersonation and Transgression
In this section I will be presenting and analyzing documents that cross the assignment and border line from
issues o f gender identity and identification to those o f sexual identity and identification. This does not mean
that these writings deal exclusively with sex, as in sexual intercourse. On the contrary, the concept I have of
"Heterosex-Relations" has little to do with sexual activity, and everything to do with its re-activity. These
documents were written in response to a very general prompting that replaced "significant issues o f gender
identity and identification” with "significant issues o f sexual identity and identification." As with the first
set of documents, I took fairly detailed notes on each class session involving response to students'
anonymous writing. For this round o f documents and discussion, I also had an audio tape player in the
middle o f the table to record these discussions. The sound quality o f these recording is often muddied to the
point o f being untranscribable. Many voices projected well, (mine, most audible, ironically), while others
were whispers eddying in a larger white and anonymous noise. The specificity o f my recall on what I
asked and lectured on in connection to the issues brought up in students' anonymous writing can be credited
or discredited by these tapes. But the documents, I believe, generally speak for themselves, in answer to
general questions of anonymity's necessity, hybridity, authenticity, etc.
As with the first group o f assignments, there was a variety o f modes and dominant nodes o f reference.
Some used reader response as a pretext for venting personal feelings and views that might not always get a
public airing; others used the platform of textual reference in order to launch into personal narratives. Some
locate themselves in the family unit, some in the college community, some in that "contact zone" that
Bakhtin refers to when trying to explain a writer's "dialogized heteroglossia" o f voices and their utterances
across "character zones.” Thus, in my interpretive scheme, heterosex-relations and heteroglossia are
complementary ways o f reading and thinking about the personal plus textual bridges that I believe get built
under cover o f anonymity.

222

R e p ro d u c e d with perm ission of the copyright owner. Further reproduction prohibited without permission.

As we saw in the anonymous documents o f gender identity, there was a questionable, equivocal sense o f
anonymity genuine necessity. I will no longer second-guess and belabor this question in this section o f
document analysis. I have several reasons for doing so.
First, students did what they were told to do and wrote anonymously. If their documents did not meet
some optimum or otherwise expected measure o f what might be thought o f as anonymity's "standards and
practices" they are nonetheless examples o f anonymous writing and some clear, even if ambiguous,
patterns and themes did appear to emerge. Second, no matter how open and liberated our culture has
become with regard to sex and sexuality, the openness is largely foreclosed to those who would continue to
tell the truth about its private/public identifications. That sex and sexuality research enjoyed a remarkable
opening that is only a half-century young—bom with the researches o f Kinsey, and Masters and Johnson in
the late forties and early fifties—is indisputable. Whether or not it has been allowed to grow up and become
authentically adult in that openness is another matter entirely.
During the months of late 1994-1995, the time I taught this course, the almost instant dismissal of
Jocelyn Elders, Surgeon General under President Clinton, severely stunted the mature growth o f sex
education. Dr. Elders resigned "in disgrace," for in effect, "prescribing" masturbation as a public health aid
in addressing our culture's repressive attitudes toward sexual desire and in drawing o ff sexual energy that
would otherwise find outlets in teen sex, disease transmission, pregnancy, and date rape. Given Elders' fate,
why the very idea o f sexual intercourse, never mind its status as an academically appropriate discourse, is
still very much "taboo." It remains, remarkably, a prohibited discourse, with a gaping double standard even
in academic sectors.
Thus, scientific and humanistic "sex researchers" explore every area and nuance o f the sexual, with their
findings open to the winds in terms o f being a discourse community and community discourse. Yet, in
pedagogical activity, the determination to read and write about sex and sexuality remains a remarkably
reactionary, inflammatory undertaking, as my own experience—not with m y students, but with colleagues—
will attest. The coupling (so to speak) o f anonymity and sexuality is no accident or mistake, o f course,
since the revelation of, and traffic in, anything considered taboo, sacrilegious, or even slightly deviant from
certain norms, has and will require anonymity—for better and for worse.
The final reason for ceasing my equivocations about the equivocal necessity o f anonymity in these
students' writings is that its equivocative function (literally, equally necessary and unnecessary) is
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ultimately exceeded by its provocative possibilities. The anonymous functions, that is, by literally "calling
forth" an otherwise unnamed range o f voices and visions which, in my standard Civil Liberties Union view
o f free speech rights, can—and should—be disclosed and deconstructed by whatever discourse community
arises or exists to respond to them. So no more equivocations, if you please. Composition-rhetoric—both
expressivist and constructivist—exists, in large part, as a provocation to more traditional areas o f English
Studies, and should therefore carry its provocative mandate as far as our students can understand and
respond within distinct, if untested, limits of free speech rights and standards of communicative rationality.
Document #7: Reader Response to Feminism’s Homosexual fMiOther
The following would seem to be a straight-ahead reader response to the authority o f an author and her text.
Like most o f the documents that feature reader response as either a nudge toward more personal
connections, or in order to express various levels of indignation (primarily against feminist discourse), this
student seriously (but not, I think, deliberately) misreads the author's (Constance Penley) analytical
intentions in an essay titled "Cultural Studies, Feminism, and Psychoanalysis." Penley analyzes the work of
certain feminist cartoon "slashers" who reverse the compulsory heterosexual roles o f the original Star Trek
characters—Kirk, Spock, and Bones—and depict them as homosexual comrades in explicit sex play on the
planets they visit in a nod to the work o f William Burroughs.
Penley is also careful to protect the identities o f these illustrators; their anonymity prevents
identification by those in our popular culture whose homophobia might take a threatening turn against
them. The writer ignores or misses this irony in making his/her? own anonymous case. The illustrations are
provocative, to say the least, and fascinating, if one can appreciate and apply the lesson of such a reversal
in heterosexual identity and hero identification.
The very idea that such strong men, exploring outer space, could be homosexual is not only
transgressive, but cognitively and emotionally dissonant: the double identification and indemnification of
Rock Hudson being precisely the sort of exception that proves our compulsory heterosexual rule.
Presumably, if these slashers were male and depicted Star Trek's heroic trio having sexual intercourse with
some o f the ship's female personnel (the ship's Communication's officer, Ahoura, comes to mind; has
anyone ever noted that her name is rather homynymically too close to "a whore ah"?) or with some alien
courtesans, the anonymous writer might have to consider the double-standard involved.
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"Kirk to Spock. Kirk to Spock, do you read me?" "Yes, captain, in fact, I am presently
directly behind you guiding my starship into your base."
Hello” ! Hmmm, let's see, today I could write about my garden, that book I ju st read,
life, or even death. Naw, on second thought, I'll just write about K irk and Spock's
intergalactic love affair. Is this the thought process behind the Star Trek slash magazines
as were talked about in Constance Penley's piece?
First, anyone who is such a huge Star Trek fan, or "Trekky", has problems. These
people are social outcasts, people who hide in fantasy....They dress like their favorite
characters, attend conventions, all because o f a television show. Let's face it, there's
fandom, and then there is fanaticism....It is this group that must be the writers o f the Star
Trek slash mags. So, to sum up, these people have problems. Taking it even further,
picture these people twisting the characters to meet their own wants and desires, serious
problems!
To use the title of Star Trek is misleading, instead something like, "Star Trek the
Homosexual Adventures would be more appropriate. It seems inconceivable to me that
anyone would sit down and start writing a Star Trek adventure, then decide, "Hey I think
I'll have Kirk and Spock humping each other!"
If some feminists think this is a media that they should further explore for the benefit
o f women's popular culture, I shudder to think what the future o f female entertainment
holds. Maybe Donahue will start having sex with Geraldo. Oh Phil. Phil. Next episode
let's get Oprah in on this!"
Constance Penley boldly goes where no woman has gone before, and I wish she
hadn't. The in-depth descriptions o f Spock's penis were humorous for a moment, but to
involve his or Kirk’s or Bone's genitalia in a Star Trek adventure is too much. Hey
Constance, you need to get out more kid! Try looking for an intelligent, insightful, more
artistic solution for women in poplar culture.
The composition teacher interested or willing to experiment with students' writing anonymously on the
politics o f sex and sexual identity, needs to have, I believe, a very liberal view o f free speech, o f ideological
bias, o f not only tolerating, but o f accepting whatever students write. Pre-set standards o f politically
(in)correct views on the part o f the teacher need to be reset toward the default margin o f "no fault." This
does not mean that the views expressed in writing, and especially in anonymous writing, should not
undergo open and honest critique. On the contrary, because o f the rhetorical immunity bestowed by
anonymity, the writer must expect that he or she will get as good or bad as he or she gives.
The element o f "backtalk" in this document shows up in many other documents, and is notable enough to
qualify as a sub theme o f my findings. One would expect that "backtalk" w ould figure even more
prominently than it did. In this case, the writer is talking back to the author—Penley. The academic worth o f
this is (u)questionable, (given anonymous course evaluations), but since we are all interested in how writers
respond to various texts—whether autobiographical or author-driven—anonymous backtalk should not be
ignored or discounted.
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Because we all encounter some degree o f such backtalk in students' anonymous course evaluations, in
those exit documents, there is often an interesting shift in writers' sense o f an addressee. Sometimes the
writer is addressing an equally anonymous official or group o f university authorities who are presumably
waiting to read what a given student really thinks about a teacher and a given course. Other times the writer
turns to address the teacher o f the course. The anonymous function o f the document enables this shift o f
addressivity as well as the freer use o f backtalk. That is, the impersonal form o f the document permits the
anonymous student to get more "personal."
Although the backtalk in this document was not directed at me, or at the course, it was getting
rhetorically personal with the author. I made the class to understand that as a community responding to
these documents they were to feel as free as possible in responding to the good, the bad, the ugly, and the
sublime. This writer's text was treated accordingly. (The attentive reader will note the implications o f
Miller’s findings as to the fault lines emerging in the particular contact zone I created in order to provoke
the very kind o f rhetorical situation he finds banal and ultimately useless because o f its fundamental ir
responsibility.)
In our discussion, the first issue was whether the writer was male or female. It was surmised that the
writer was male. This was inferred from the homophobic, and anti-feminist heat of the document. Others
made the point that heterosexual women can be equally homophobic, and anti-feminist, as we had already
witnessed in other documents, so it was more or less determined that the gender identity of the writer was
indeterminable, and that anonymity and the writer's own work to cover his/her gender trail was successful
enough, that perhaps the writer's gender identity didn't matter.
Many comments were made about the writer’s homophobia and double standard about pornographic
illustration. It seemed like it would be OK, two women said, if women were depicted having sex with other
women, even though the writer didn't actually assert that. One male said it wasn't at all clear that all
"trekies" were "social outcasts" as the writer said. Besides, he said, where's the writer's sense o f fun in
having imaginary relationships? Another student pointed out that the writer did seem a bit amused, at first,
but like the writer, she was mostly shocked at the pictures—so much so, she was unable to read Penley's text
very closely.
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I asked several questions: Why does the writer assume that Penley was writing this essay and
researching this popular cultural work by feminist artists for the exclusive use o f women, and o f feminists
in particular? W hat i f the artists were male and/or homosexual, without any allegiance to feminism? How
would that change the writer's sense o f w hat was going on and what Penley was analyzing? Doesn't
Penley’s analysis have a much broader audience and serve a vast number o f popular and academic
purposes, especially given her title? And w hat about the fact that Penley maintains the anonymity o f her
subjects and their work in the course o f her analysis?
I also was careful to praise the honesty o f voice and view in this writer's text, even if I found serious
fault with it. I said that the sharp, sarcastic tone, especially in the final, personal, first name basis assumed
by the writer ("Hey Constance...") was effective as a dramatic or rhetorical flourish. I wondered, however,
whether the w riter knew anything about Penley's personal life, where she went, etc., never mind if the
writer was familiar with her vast and impressive scholarship on a range of academic and social issues. For
all that, the writer’s right to respond as a reader in any way he felt necessary to advance what he deemed a
significant issue o f sexual identity could not be questioned.
This writer, and all other writers using anonymity for purposes o f immunity were ultimately not immune
to criticism o f their writing. They can listen to and consider what is being discussed by the community
formed by the class without having to be identified as the "butt" o f such criticism. If Penley were at the
table, it has to be assumed that if she wished to rebut the writer's positions she could do so with as much
conviction and force not knowing whom in the class actually wrote the piece. She could be assured that her
criticism would have an open ear and hearing even if the face-to-face nature o f dialogical interaction were,
in effect, closed.
I then repeated what would become an almost tedious point throughout the semester. That it is the
anonymity o f this w riter that should protect him or her from taking any criticism personally. The
"impersonal" status o f the writing helps us focus on the writing, what is written, and not on who the writer
is. If the writer does take anything said about his or her anonymous writing personally, then she or he has
the option o f revealing him or herself. I m ade the case that it would be better for them and for the whole
class, in terms o f criticism, that they not only remain concealed, but that they get into the act o f either
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defending or attacking their own work, since both lines are going to get represented and crossed by the
sixteen members o f the class, and no one is the wiser if you are the actual writer, or an interested readerrespondent.
This line, I was to remind them many times, between the personal and the impersonal—a wavy line o f
impersonation, which comes from persona, meaning "mask"—is a matter o f provocation and performance.
As we can see, I told them, there is a very fluid line between the personal and the social, between the
private and the public. It is not so much that the feminist slogan "the personal is political" is true, which it
certainly is, I said. It is more so the case, at least in the composition class, that the personal is academic
(which you should've learned in writing personal narratives in first year English); that the private is both
social and intellectual, personal and community property (which you will Ieam in this course). I said that in
the two documents we have already seen, the function o f the anonymous has much to do with how we are
composing the politics o f identity, and how that identity politics composes our anonymity, and that our
anonymity as writers paradoxically names parts o f our identities that we can identify with and write about
as a community.
I told them I was attracted to Penley's essay not for the provocative "shock effect" o f its pornographic
and sexually deviant, or "taboo" subject matter, but because o f Penley's decision to keep the artists
anonymous. If they (the students) decided to write about these artists' work, and Penley's work on them,
they would have to reappraise what audience means, since Penley's audience and those artists' audience
operate in two different communities o f discourse. My assignment o f Penley's essay makes these students
an audience o f two kinds o f authorship, with two very different senses o f authority.
Add to this the motives for anonymity. Penley, in her research, actually discovered the identities of these
artists but assured them she would maintain their anonymous cover. Whereas students come into a course
fully identified as students—their nominal identities being at least as important—and arguably more
important—to the university as are their actual privately lived/felt senses o f them selves. I require that they
assume anonymous identities in parallel with their named identities as writers. I have a clear interest in how
the motive o f rhetorical immunity works itself out in a composition course. But I also wanted not so much
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to protect as to project the privacy o f identity into yet another sense o f audience—that o f the class as
discourse community, rather than a discrete series; o f nominal identities.
Anonymous awareness, especially in college coourse, is duplicitous in, well, a double sense. There is the
reader's awareness o f the student not being there - (as one o f 16 names vaguely identified with a particular
face) and o f being very much there as a writer with a voice and view. There is also the speaker/writer
awareness o f being simultaneously present and : absent to community recognition. W hat is the effect on
composition when transgressing the law—or at leaast norm—o f the proper name, especially when the subject
o f anonymous writing—identity— is itself doublirng as an academic exercise o f textual authority, and as a
personal exercise o f being alive through languages experience? Is there any use in provoking students into
thinking about sexual identity as both a stable a ttrib u te and as a highly fluid performance; in showing them
that what passes for academic discourse is widaer and deeper than what they m ight have believed and
experienced in their time as college students; in Hhaving them respond in writing to identity's provocative,
evocative and equivocative energies?
Needless to say, the students in my class foundH these periodic disquisitions bewildering, impossible to
follow—"whoosh" as one student would exclaim a n d gesture with the flat o f his hand across the top o f his
head. I did not intend to lose them, as I have p ro b ab ly lost my present audience. I wanted to convince them-as I do you— o f the rhetorical exigency o f anonynmity. My enthusiasm for the personal plus textual identity
o f this essay was tempered by the realization that rthe writer o f Document #7 might have achieved virtually
the same hybridity as a named, known writer. Bunt as I have been reiterating to you, I reminded them too:
there are gradations to these transgredient relationss o f discourse.
Document #8: Anonvmitv as the Parody o f C atharsis
The following text takes the hybrid line b e tw e e n author-driven reader response and self-expressive
projection o f that response into far more personal (yet social, and therefore political) territory than did the
homophobic rant against Penley. It also contains: plenty o f backtalk, much o f it resem bling the kind an
instructor would expect to hear in the anonymous course evaluations required o f students. Never mind the
idea o f using anonymity to interrogate the privat*e and public curves o f identity's binding energy as it is
passed through acts o f composition. It seems to mne that the level of backtalk in this document should be
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continuously anonymously present in the course structure—from the very beginning o f the course, and not
at the end where the students' anonymous presence passes out o f pedagogical existence.
As for what some might object to as an extreme form o f the expressivist goal o f having students write
about personally significant experiences, I can only respond that the subject o f self-sexuality is, as former
Surgeon General Elders will attest, both a private part o f our social well-being, a personally cathartic
process, and a public and therefore political health crisis o f immense import. With this document we have
all these issues plus the issue o f impersonation, and quite possibly, a parody o f the cathartic process as
described by Patterson and Kim, and one I attempted to import and have students take seriously in the
course o f composition.
Originally, when I chose to take this course I was under the impression that it would be
similar to English 401, a five-page paper every week about whatever. Evidently it's not!
At first I was astounded by the idea o f a gender based reading and writing course. My
only impression about this course was sex, sex, and sex. I recall continuously showing
friends the bizarre Kirk and Spock illustrations found in the lengthy packets assigned to
me. I was humored by these pictures, at the same time confused as to how this will help
me with my skills as a writer. The thought o f how this is allowed to be course material
continually reappeared in m y head. Finally, I came to the realization that the issues will
require me to think about it continuously. Already this course has taken a toll on me.
As I read through the packet I found similar connection with m y own life. For
instance, in the beginning o f the Kipnis article she discusses an anti-pomography
documentary by a feminist author-poet who believes that masturbation promotes political
quietism., which I also find true. In today's society people tend to hide their sexuality.
Masturbation is a taboo practice, most everybody does it, yet you are not supposed to talk
about it or worst, get caught.
However through my experience I have come to a contradiction o f this belief. I was
presumably alone with my only companion, a copy o f Tracy Lord's "I Love You" that I
found in my mother's underwear drawer while snooping for her lace bra and panties that I
frequently wore. I got into uniform and inserted the movie. M oments later I found myself
engulfed in a fever o f cash fantasy, which at the same time m y 15 year old sister, whom I
have strangely attracted to, interrupted during the climax o f m y performance. At first I
was extremely embarrassed. I feared she would think o f me as an extreme pervert, or to
make matters worse, tell my friends and family.
The first paragraph amounts to a very candid (conservative university workers would say "damning")
appraisal o f the course. Looking past its content, the writer’s voice and perspective should be familiar to us
as long time readers o f the anonymous student evaluations o f our ow n teaching. Looking straight at the
content o f this first paragraph, we can see that the writer is shocked, confused, alive to the transgressive,
provocative and "taboo" nature o f som e o f the course material, and was therefore doubtful as to its
academic value, and was, in sum, amazed that such material (even though thoroughly academic in its
invention and circulation) "is allowed to be course material."
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More crucial, I think, is the pedagogical question by the writer as to how such material could be helpful
to his/her "skills as a writer." That question, o f course, rears its head continuously in the division between
expressivists and constructivists: which approach will best hone and expand students writing skills? My
decision to experiment with a hybrid approach, using anonymous writing as a hypothetical catalyst to
connect and refract our field's two dominant pedagogical strains or refrains would mean that Penley and
Kipnis were no less mainstream academic constructivist templates than are the essays of E.B. White or
George Orwell in standard composition "readers" for writing.
This first paragraph is itself a hybrid or heteroglossic discourse o f student course evaluation, reader
response and personal expression. It would be easy for a composition teacher o f a more traditional, less
experimental leanings to jum p on the last sentence o f this paragraph and conclude that the course is
provocative to the point o f harming students' psyches, their moral-aesthetic sensibilities, if not wasting time
better spent in truly improving their capacities and potentialities as writers. I can imagine such a colleague
asking something like: "Do we, as writing teachers—as not only skills-based instructors, but as ethical
gatekeepers of certain academic norms—really want to have our courses "take a toll" on our students?"
My answer is that acquiring and performing and earning a sense o f identity in all its private-public
complexity always already takes a toll; that toll is part of human consciousness itself. The assumption that
18-19 year olds aren't ready or able to stop and examine the costs and benefits of being on this "toll” road
that has already taken them on a journey past many entrance and exit ramps of identity and community is
an impoverished pedagogical vision, and just plain insulting to these late adolescent animals who are
driving in and driven by various composites of language consciousness writ large.
My colleague, still unconvinced, might point to the vague use o f the impersonal pronoun reference in
the sentence, "Finally, I came to the realization that the issues will require me to think about it
continuously. "Think about what,? my incensed colleague will ask. "Sex, sex, sex"?
No, I will answer. The "it" refers back, I believe, to "the course material."
"But if we take the writer on his or her (we don't even know the writer's gender, isn't this
important?) terms o f reference, isn't "the course material" thoroughly equated with SEX?"
No, if you read closely, you will see the phrase, "At first I was astounded...." And in the
next sentence: "My only impression was sex...." One o f my readings is that the student is
putting together a vast and confusing set o f discourses and attempting to move from the
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textual to the personal and beyond: where the private and the public can impersonate one
another.
"But for what pedagogical purpose—for what specific "help" with the student's "skills as
a writer"? my colleague will ask.
And I would respond: This writer doesn't need any help. The skill this writer is helping
him self or herself to is the skill o f impersonation, and more intriguing, to the skill o f
parody." The writer, I think, is teaching me something about composition, and doing it, like
he/she would do in the anonymous exit document, with the immunity o f anonymity—which
is, o f course, excruciatingly ironic, since the writer is using anonymity to disabuse me o f
my illusions about anonymity’s usefulness in composition.
But never mind, what other teachers might think or believe in (mis)reading this student's figuration o f a
"toll." We will get to the issue o f this student's parodic impersonation o f Patterson and Kim's idea o f
anonymity as a "cathartic process" in due course. We have been able to see the high profile that Penley’s
close reading o f those feminist slash illustrators has now assumed for at least two anonymous writers.
Unlike the other writer’s homophobic reaction to Penley's text, this writer simply reduces its message as
"sex, sex, sex" and that therefore this is what my course apparently is about.
To the writer’s credit as a responsive reader, he/she also mentions another essay I assigned from the
collection Cultural Studies (Grossberg, Nelson, Treichler,.) by Laura Kipnis titled "(Male) Desire and
(Female) Disgust: Reading Hustler." That essay is a Feminist-Marxist deconstruction o f H ustler,
Penthouse, and Playboy, with each magazine correlated to our notions o f "lower," "middle" and "upper"
class graphed upon a spectrum o f "hard" to "soft" pornographic denigrations o f women. Unlike the Penley
essay, Kipnis did not include illustrative examples. Instead, the anonymous writer seizes upon Kipnis'
reference to a now famous 1980's Canadian documentary on the effects o f pornography on its workers—
male and female.
In that film, one anti-pornography feminist speaks about the link between masturbational fanatasies and
political quietism. (Interestingly, Norman Mailer, no friend o f feminists, rages against male masturbation in
response to pornographic images, or to any imagined other, for that matter, as a destroyer o f the
"imagination" in his 1970 collection o f essays, The Prisoner o f Sex. More interesting still, is the
coincidence o f Surgeon General Elders' 1995 battle with conservative public opinion on the question of
practicing and advocating masturbation for reasons o f public health—rather than any fear o f political
quietism or aesthetic dissolution.)
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The anonymous writer in my course does something quite interesting in terms o f reader response to
academic textuality. First, the Penley and Kipnis references are conflated so that sex is itself pornographic
and sex with oneself is a narcissistic betrayal o f our social and political responsibilities. This, the writer
tells us, is "true" in his/her experience. More interesting, that experience "contradicts" what he/she is
defining as "quietism" Is the writer playing with the literal and figurative tangents o f "quietism" in
paragraph two?
On the personal level the writer is making reference to the fact that one must keep

quiet—not speak—

about the taboo subject o f masturbation, as well as be quiet in terms o f noise lest one get caught in one's
family or dormitory unit. On the political level is the writer also keyed into the contention that masturbation
pacifies our revolutionary energies to struggle against the injustice and exploitation o f pornography—that
pornography is the greatest o f opiates, and masturbation is this drug's most insidious delivery system? My
sense is that the writer is unaware o f Kipnis’ sense o f masturbation as political quietism.
The writer, however, has decided to share a personally significant experience that is "a contradiction o f
this belief." The writer writes that she/he came to this contradiction o f what seems to be a socially—and
academically—sanctioned belief about masturbation "through m y experience." The question before us is, is
the reference to "experience" only that which the writer then describes, or is it also standing for the writer's
experience as an anonymous writer. It seems safe to conclude, on the strength o f the writer's own
disclosures, that the she/he would never have written this document if anonymity were not a required
condition. The actual sexual experience o f masturbation as described by the writer does not, in the strict
terms o f Kipnis' reference o f political quietism, contradict it.
On the contrary, the writer’s experience resoundingly confirms it. The writer is only playing off the
literal meaning o f being quiet, not getting caught, and keeping his/her sister quiet about what she has seen.
Operating in, or underwriting, this object lesson about quietism is the more complicated issue o f the
private/public and personal/political lines that are, or should not be, crossed, pointing to larger moral issues
o f shame or lack thereof. Having implied that the writer is not canny to the multiple meanings inherent in
quietism, I am also open to the idea that the writer is uncannily aware of the "personal/political"
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consequences o f the sibling disclosing the writer's situation: "I feared she would think o f me as an extreme
pervert, or to make matters worse, tell my friends and family."
In other words, the writer is very sharply signaling to me, the instructor, and to the rest o f the
community, that anonymity as an imaginary stage for impersonating possible others, is both risky and
necessary for overcoming quietism. However, when we look at the narrative details— o f the pornographic
video belonging to the writer’s mother; o f the dressing up in the mother’s lingerie; o f the "cash fantasy"
reference (a complicated phrase combing the porno industry’s "money shot" and the sex worker's real
desire—not getting laid but getting paid), and last, but in effect, the opposite o f least, o f the incestuous
reference to th e writer's sister—we have to conclude that the writer is also poking fun at the idea o f
anonymous disclosure. That perhaps, we should all really quiet about what passes within the private realm—
particularly in our conscious wishes or desires.
Given the traditional linkage o f political disingenuousness with anonymity on one end, and of sexually
taboo, or normatively shameful, activity with anonymity on the other, I think a convincing case can be
made that the writer is: first, exercising the opportunity to imagine a private (and not, I think, unusual)
sexual experience as someone Other than who he or she really is; and second, is performing a remarkable
parody o f anonymous disclosure that satirizes the entire premise o f catharsis. As a knowing (or unwitting)
parody o f catharsis, the writer is making a point about anonymity as kitsch. Anonymous writing comes
cheap. Its shoddy artistic, or ersatz literary, value comes at the expense, ultimately, o f all composition and
its pedagogical aim.
The question o f this writer's gendered and genital identity is, as I said, indeterminable in the way the
she/he deployed pronouns o f personal reference. Still, I would hazard to guess that the writer is a man,
particularly given the reference to dressing up in a mother's lingerie, and the incestuous reference to a
younger sister. The real possibility o f this being a parody o f anonymous catharsis is increased when the
writer is hypothesized as male, but i f in fact the writer is female, the composition as kitsch category is not
at all diminished, and in many ways increases in ways that Penley, Kipnis, and other feminist academicians
might find as troubling as the anti-feminism running through many o f the documents heretofore.
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I think I have already indicated my positions on the compositional, community, and pedagogical value
o f this document I should be more explicit as we move into the territory opened by document #8.
First I believe backtalk to and about the instructor and his/her intentions is a good and healthy
discourse, with powerful pedagogical value, that is only an eleventh hour ritual at present with anonymous
course evaluations, whereas students should be able to chime in "hourly," as it were.
Second, I am firmly o f the opinion that Dr. Jocelyn Elders was run out on a rail for telling an important
public truth about sexual hygiene. Candid talk, writing and discussion about sex and sexuality—homoerotic,
autoerotic, heteroerotic—is a must in all sectors o f public service, particularly in the educational trajectories
o f adolescents. The "composition" o f sexuality is neither the be all or end all o f my courses on writing
identity politics, but it is pedagogic-all. Elders is one o f my pedagogical heroines. Her courage in what bell
hooks has called "teaching to transgress" was worth the loss o f her position as a powerful black woman,
worth even the obloquy that has followed her ever since—much o f it misogynist and racialized.
Third, on the possible phenomenon o f anonymous impersonation—o f the mask unmasked beneath a
mask; o f the suspect and susceptible depth o f its provocation o f other voices and o f voicing Others—I
believe its potential lies less in whether writers are being more or less (dis)ingenuous or (in)authentic, and
far more in how it opens up the academic discourses o f personal narrative and textual analysis to a larger
sense o f the community o f composition.
I cannot locate my notes on the class discussion o f this document, but I do recall that my contention that
the writer was being satirical and poking fun at the entire premise o f using anonymous writing was
considered quite possible. The "shock value" o f this document was an attempt to outperform what the
writer saw as mere shock value in Penley's essay, and presumably in my approach to composition. I also
recall taking the opportunity to apply what I had learned from bell hooks' Teaching to Transgress and
spoke o f how a teacher's real authority sprang from being open and vulnerable; that if this or any other
student felt that anonymous writing was ridiculous, or damaging, or even simply a playful waste o f time,
we could agree to stop it. No one took me up on the offer, nor did their anonymous course evaluations
indicate this.
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Document #9: Schutz. Foucault, and Blanchot—Anonymous Sex Face-to-Face
Here is a straight ahead personal narrative—no reader response. When set against some o f the am biguities
o f #8—the cynical/sincere, parodic presentation—one will say: "Nothing ambiguous or disingenuous about
this. This is an authentic look at what frat parties really look, sound, smell, feel, and are like- for many
women who venture there.
JOE COLLEGE
A bead o f sweat slides down the length o f my nose, clinging to the end for a momenit
before falling onto the beer drenched concrete floor. I pulled m y baseball cap fu rth e r
down on my head, hoping to cover my flushed cheeks and hair which was wet fro m
sweat and rain. Dancing in the glow o f a black light, I felt free from the stress o f m y
classes and let myself enjoy the music and the delirium o f drunkenness. I felt His h an d s
rest on my shoulder for a moment, and I turned around to look into His deep blue e y e s
that contrasted dramatically with His dark black hair. He is a friend o f a friend, am
acquaintance that demands a nod o f the head or a quick hello in passing.
With a quick smile, I fulfilled my obligation and turned my attention back to m y
roommate, who had acquired a dancing companion while I wasn't watching. The three=
o f us, and then four, moved in the freedom and confidence that a few drinks can g iv eMale laughter escalated and mingled with the softer tone of a female's as our d ancing
became less inhibited. Over m y partner's shoulder-I saw Him dancing slowly with a tallslender girl with long thin hair. I felt a pang o f jealousy tear at my heart, but for w h a t
reason I didn't know. I pulled away from my group and walked over to the couple. H e
turned toward me, and I suffered the loss o f words. I didn't know what compelled me to*
approach the two, so I laughed off a wiseass comment, punched Him on the arm like a n y
of his other buddies would do, and returned to my group.
When I rejoined my roommate, I was handed another beer from the seemingly
endless supply (the advantages o f knowing a Brother at the house) and tried to forget theunexplored feelings that were creeping into my mind. The hours passed and the dark:
room became less crowded. The eyes o f judgment and confusion had turned away from,
us, and He approached me. His arms wrapped around my waist as the tape began to
replay for the fourth time that night. My stomach turned as I asked m yself i f it was
wrong for me to be with Him like this, if I should forget the feelings o f excitement that
stirred in me, and go home. But then He laughed, and my laughter rose up to meet His.
This was a game, and though we both acknowledged that, we had both decided to play.
That night has been played and replayed silently in my mind in the weeks past since
then. I can barely remember the hardness o f His lips on mine, His hands holding m y
arms down, not allowing me to push him away. I have attempted to forget the events o f
that night on the third floor o f the fraternity, and I have hushed the longings to be with
Him again. We pass one another in the corridors and sometimes manage to exchange
more than the obligatory greetings, and other times a smile is barely manageable. It's
strange to continue our relationship as it was before that night, but there really is no
alternative. We sat across from one another at dinner tonight, our friends on either side
o f us. The girl he had a terrible crush on last semester captured his attention for the
duration o f the meal, and I managed to survive without feeling too embarassed.
Is this essay outside the normative range o f personal disclosure that a mainstream "expressivist'”
approach to composition can produce? Undoubtedly yes, and yet many o f us who have spent much* time
with students' personal narratives will recognize many o f the textual features that have come to be
identified with expressivism. Expressivist as it might be, it is a fairly safe bet that this essay w o u ld not
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be passed in with the writer's proper name attached. Does that mean that if we require/permit students
to write anonymously there will be an across the board increase in essays that are both revealing o f
difficult experiences and as powerfully written?
Given what I have presented above, there is no active correlation between anonymous writing and
"better" writing, and so the answer must clearly be, No.

The next question to answer is: what

pedagogical value would this essay have in either an expressivist or social constructivist course? As
with so many of the above documents, I believe it places a burden on both approaches to m eet in the
middle o f their contending premises.
That is, the expressivist teacher would have to admit that all writing is laden with identity politics
and ideological centers o f gravity, and that much o f what makes students' personal experience
"significant" is precisely this level o f the undisclosed. The significance of what gets concealed and
revealed in students' purely "expressivist" (and, for that m atter, in their purely "constructivist")
performances is vast and complex. There are both legitimate and unnecessary senses o f shame. There is
the tyranny o f internalized community standards o f conformity and decency that are often minefields o f
hypocrisy. More moderately, there seems to be a bright line, however wavy and thin in places, between
private and public discourse, with the discourse o f the personal, (which expressivism depends and
trades upon for its truth effects), making up the actually visible or written spectrum o f that line's
brightness. These and other socially constructed fields o f force have to be taken into account when
opening up the revealed/concealed binary that nests within the expressivist approach.
How should a social constructionist approach to composition handle the presence o f such utterly
social constructs as romantic/sexual mating games, alcoholically amplified, and other drug-infused
emotional states, never mind the possibility o f date rape in students' writing? It seems to me that those
who would dismiss this text because it is written from an autobiographical, rather than authorial and
analytical perspective, are both ignorant and arrogant as to the sources of that shibboleth—so cia l
construction—which is often used to silence any alternative approach as both theoretically naive and
pedagogically narcissistic.
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I see this essay as a model o f both compositional ideals: personally

and socially significant. Its

larger social significance—from the deleterious synergy o f men's "fraternal" association with free
flowing alcohol, to the necessity o f providing healthy, safe sites for romantic, erotic and, like it or not,
sexual mating rites, to the borderline prospect o f consensual sex versus date rape—is a set o f discourses
that the expressivist has little justification in ignoring. The expressive poignancy and authenticity—the
outright authority—o f its voice and view would be hailed as exemplary i f included by an academic
author pursuing and pushing the socially constructed limits o f what has come to be called autocritique
in which a mix o f the personal and textual get closely referenced and reflected upon.
My notes on the class discussion around this document divided over the question o f consensual sex
or date rape. The class tentatively concluded that my sense o f the writer's emotional confusion and
ambiguous sense o f her autonomy—particularly in the sentence: “I can barely remember the hardness of
His lips on mine, His hands holding my arms down, not allowing me to push him away”—was offset by
what followed: her longing for him; their awkward but discreet distance, especially given the presence
o f the "other" woman in "His" life. There seemed to be the sense that what happened to this writer was
what I grew up referring to as a drunken, lust-driven fling, not a rape.
When I tried to provoke a comparison between this and the defense o f men's sexual attitudes and
behavior based on an anonymous dormitory survey, there was a stunned silence. Eventually objections
arose that dorm life and frat parties were very different situations. I wondered what would be the result
o f that survey if taken in several fraternities. Many felt the situation in the essay was "complicated," but
that sex and sexual identity is always so. Plus, throw in a powerful drug like alcohol.... One woman
hoped that if the writer felt she had been raped, the LJNH rape crisis center is totally confidential (and I,
o f course chimed in that confidentiality is part and parcel o f the "anonymous function."). The next
week one young woman brought in the center's brochures and gave the center's location on campus—
"just in case."
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Document #10: Anonym ous Backtalk and Transgression o f Authority

In this document we see more o f what I have called student "backtalk" that is rhetorically aimed at me, the
instructor, and at the premises o f a course on the "composition" o f gender and gender identity. The
impudence is very direct—that is, it comes across without the performative or exhibitionist antics we saw
earlier—but is also quite artful. In this sense it should be recognized in any instructor's more memorable
reading encounters with students' anonymous course evaluations. As an act of resistance it is both highly
playful and deadly serious. (Like those before, these issues are o f the highest import for both social and
pedagogical analysis.)
The writing raises a grain o f voice and sharpened point o f view that I was hoping for as part o f my
hypothesis as to anonymity's higher yield of an authenticity that might be valued by both expressivists and
constructivists. Perhaps an instructor with thinner skin over his or her ego would have trouble with this
writer's response to a prompt to write about a significant issue o f sexual identity. I must admit, that on first
reading, I was startled by the sarcasm and the incisive reduction o f my overly complex presentation of
sex/gender identity (most o f which I learned from a book titled Paradoxes o f Gender.)
But then I remembered hooks’ principle of vulnerable authority or authoritative vulnerability. On
second reading, I was amazed and amused by this essay. I deeply respect its authentic sincerity, as I do the
others in this section. My respect for the “authenticity” o f the masturbation fantasy turns on the “sincerity”
o f its performative hybridity, not o f what I would call the authority o f its personal experience. But these
are artificial distinctions, prescribed by expressivist and social constructionist values, whereas I am
interesting in transgressing the authority of both these pedagogies in the interest o f forming an/other kind
o f (in)avowable community.
Suspicious as it seems to be o f me and of my intellectual premises for the course and for the specific
assignment prompt, I found it to be equally reconstructive as a hermeneutic response to its own suspicion
and not, as it turns out, to me as its key suspect, but to the question o f identity itself. Everything we do in
terms of negotiating all questions o f identity is a self-other transaction, and can therefore be considered a
performance along a basic script line running from true to false sincerity. In view o f this transgredience,
and of the transgredience o f expressivist and constructivist goals, it also a good idea to keep in mind this
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simple two part rule of all assignment heuristics: Be careful what you ask fo r; don’t be surprised when you
get what you ask fo r. SO: "Write about a significant issue o f sexual identity...."
Sexual identity. If I asked Sigmund Freud where my sexual identity came from, he would
say that it was determined even before my personality, around age six, and that the core
o f it lies in the subconscious. Sigmund Freud was a revolutionary in perceiving and
constituting what we know today in the field o f psychology, and I think he has much
ground about the only way to really understand my sexual identity, through the
subconscious.
Join with me now, then, in being hypnotized. To be hypnotized, one must trust in the
hypnotist and be willing.
Sexual identity is just like that. One really has to step away from oneself to try to
grasp the concept o f it, yet m ust try to recognize the influences that made us the way we
are today.
Unfortunately, I have no desire to delve into the depths o f my subconscious to
retrieve an inkling o f truth about m y sexual identity. If I had problems with my sexual
identity, I would seek professional help. But for the sake o f Reading Gender/*\Writing
Gender....
To step away from the subject for on brief moment, which really depends on how fast
you read, what is the symbol "/*
that has been appearing on our papers? M y theory:
the two opposing slashes are legs and the asterisk is a variable private part. Just a
thought.
Sexual identity, and what it means to me. That rhymes. Yes I do have a lot o f
sentence fragments, but I figured that was better than not using punctuation at all. I am
saving that for my next anonymous essay.
Sexual identity is the formulation o f the effects of gender on a person, therefore
creating a unique perception o f one's sex. The effects o f gender are cultural and therefore
are intensified by the parenting process, as parents are also products o f the cultural arena.
The cultural backgrounds pertaining to "sex" identity are important factors in one's
sexuality, the quality or state o f being sexual.
Essentially, gender identity and sexual identity are closely wed with slight
differentiation. One differentiation is sexual preference. Sexual preference is not
determined by gender or cultural suppositions as much as it is instinctive. Instinctively,
all humans are heterosexual. This does not state that all humans prefer the opposite sex,
but instead, states that the only w ay for humans to reproduce is through heterosexual
relations. This puts the heterosexual preference in the unique position o f being the only
preference that can procreate.
The reason that sexual preferences are partially removed from the cultural issue of
gender, is because many choose to go against cultural lines to protect their choice. Also,
sexual preference is not a direct result o f anyone's influence o f any sort. The truth in this
matter is shown when a heterosexual couple produces a child that is not o f the same
preference.
To venture further, sexual preference is the main constitution o f sexual identity, since
it is the purpose to which the identity serves. Identity is the form that serves the body in
pursuing one's sexual preference.
I am heterosexual. That does not tell you anything about my gender or parents, yet it
is the basis for my sexual identity. What makes my identity unique to other
heterosexuals?. That is where the influence o f parents comes in. But alas, I am where I
started, trying to portray the influence o f my parents on my sexual identity.
In closing, I pose the question: Is sexual identity a true replication o f one's uniqueness,
or is it the composition o f a form to which an identity should replicate?
The hectoring/lecturing side o f this voice is quite remarkable, I think. As a first attempt at an essay on
the sexual—whether it is one's physical, cultural, or psychic identifications—I thought it first rate, and said
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so. The bit about Freud's early experiments with hypnosis to access the unconscious was I said, correct, but
that the writer left out the truly revolutionary part: that Freud abandoned hypnosis for a discursive and
dialogical "cure." W hether psychotherapeutic talk can verbalize the contents—repressed or otherwise— o f
the unconscious continues to be debated.
More important, I said, was that the point o f all talk therapy was to help a client gain a distance on—to
begin to mediate— his or her immediately problematic situation. It was also a fact that many therapists
encourage to write down issues that come to them between sessions. I told the class that this was the case in
my experience as a client seeking psychoanalytic perspective on my problems with my father. I had also
discovered that many past students had confirmed that their therapists were asking that they supplement the
work o f talk by keeping a journal, both for venting and for analyzing issues that emerge in therapy sessions
or between them. I told them that one student in this very class had confided that writing was a part o f her
formal therapeutic sessions and that the therapist had encouraged cross over between the writing being
done for those sessions and for the classes in this course. If talking—and increasingly, writing—are
considered part o f a cure for what ails and assails us in our quest for and questions about identity, I saw no
reason to dismiss it as hypnosis, but more toward a discursive diagnosis and prognosis, and an essential
part o f what all three o f these words share at their root: the ancient Greek word gnosis: literally knowledge,
the process of knowing.
That the writer conveniently left this notion of talking or, in the present case/course, o f writing about
something o f significance to the writer in terms o f sexuality was interesting to me. It seemed as if the
connection to be made in this document, though not made directly by the writer, was that I was trying to
use anonymous writing to have or help students access their unconscious desires in sexual terms. The
present writer would have none o f it. That act o f principled—and more or less informed—resistance was to
be congratulated, I felt. But I strongly disagreed with the writer’s premises and conclusions.
This wielding o f professorial power on my part, this determination to inject the full energy o f my
responsive understanding o f students' writing using the full measure o f my experience as an emotional,
social, and academic creature two and half decades their senior, is a mix o f vulnerability and authority that
could not, I believe, work without the shield that anonymity provides between teacher o f writing and
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writing student. As I have contended above, anonymous evaluation can and should travel in alternating
currents between students and teacher throughout the semester, and not just at the end, when students use
that shield on the final day o f class. If used in this alternating way, the anonymous’ function’s discursive
current opens up, rather than closes down, responsive understanding. Ever attuned to the contradictory
status o f the anonymous, I nevertheless am convinced that the absence o f students' names and their
presence as persons writing creates rather than dissipates the possibility for communion and discursive
community.
I was also pleased to admit that the writer had used anonymity in order to speculate—correctly—about
the meaning o f /*\ in my course title Reading Gender/*\Writing Gender. The genital level o f sexual
identity is fairly telling in determining biological differences in human sexuality. I included this
provocative/evocative symbol to telegraph my sense that the line between sexed and gendered identity was
genital and cultural—and therefore both highly personal and decidedly impersonal or textual. I was not out
to offend anyone with this symbol, but trying to defend and add to the paradoxical condition o f identity in
general. In responding to the document in this way, I also lauded the phrase" "variable private part” for its
correspondence, in my view, to the variable public parts" o f our presentation o f se lf or identity
performance. I then reread the following paragraph.
To venture further, sexual preference is the main constitution o f sexual identity, since it is
the purpose to which the identity serves. Identity is the form that serves the body in
pursuing one's sexual preference.
I said I thought this summed up the paradoxical and nearly enigmatic condition o f identity politics at
large, whether we focus one o f its "embodied" indexes such as the genital level o f sexuality, or moved
progressively out of the body into the "body politic" where sexuality and gender not only move and merge
discursively but cross into and over racial and class based discourses o f identity. Where does consciousness
end and body begin? Can we "walk" and "talk" this boundary? Where does the body o f one self end and an
Other body begin, and what does the "social" as opposed to the "personal" have to do with this
demarcation?
I liked the confidence in this paragraph that reduced the question o f identity to that o f an embodied
condition, and a biological one at that. Perhaps the writer was aware that Freud argued that "biology is
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destiny" and that the "ego is always a bodily ego." The idea that identity is a form that serves the body is
elegant and compelling, I said, but did the writer, or anyone else in the class have the sense that this wsas
only half the loaf—that the body is a form that serves the discourses o f identity as both a personal and socLal
performance?
I ended by wondering about the final question — “Is sexual identity a true replication o f one's uniqueness,
or is it the composition o f a form to which an identity should replicate? Was it sarcastic or serious—sincere or
cynical? I reminded the class that many readings would touch on the idea o f essential versus culturaHIy
constructed and socially reinforced differences. I mentioned what Adrienne Rich has called a cultural regiime
o f "compulsory heterosexuality" even in the wake o f birth control and other reproductive technologies whiich
create a purely "recreative" rather than solely "procreative" feature o f sexual identity.
The ensuing discussion was not what I expected. Many students felt that the writer had evaded the originial
question, and had actually distorted it by deciding to link sexuality to one's parents, and then deciding not to
"go there." The influence o f parents was one possible point o f departure but there were many others- I
interjected that Freud did go there—back to the mother and the father, I said, in brilliant and not so brilliaHit
ways,

a hundred years ago. All sorts o f analysts have returned to the family as the site o f sexuxal

identification ever since Freud combed literature and decided—how?—to map the murder/incest themes oof
Greek tragedians onto the coordinates o f sexuality. And, as we saw, cynically or not, the w riter in tthe
pornographic fantasy had gone there, straight into his or her mother’s bed and lingerie drawer. It's all right tto
go there, I said—on any terms o f (dis)ingenuity. It seemed to me that the writer o f the final document wsas
saying: "I will go there via strict definitional terms, as I understand them." And that was okay too, I said.
I said I found the question o f sexual identity to be a tough, literally, “hidebound” one, and one that
couldn't begin to be answered by a course in writing, but that that didn't mean we shouldn't try. If—as it seem s
to me— the answer to the writer's final question has to do with a positivistic endorsement o f heterosexualitty
as a procreative force left to scientific thinking, then the writer is correct in maintaining that all Identity is thae
result o f an egg and sperm interaction and "composition"—in vitro or in vivo. This is a "significant" issui-e,
and it pretty much consigns all my transgression theory o f a gender/sexual border discourse to a dustbin. I
also wondered if this part o f the writer's essay needed to be anonymous? All parts featuring back talk to thae
instructor parts did, because no matter no matter how vulnerable I m yself might be, I was still an authority,
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with power over students. I felt that the impudence or strong conviction wouldn't have shown up in a named
essay. The students felt this was also true.
Anonymous Sexfuall fdentitv—Dialopical or Diabolical?
Given the range o f revelation and reference in the documents in between these, I felt that I had confirmed two
sides o f the anonymous function. One side is the reception o f anonymity as socially and rhetorically suspect:
a space for deviance, discontent, and demagoguery. The other side is anonymity as a space for empathically
exploring, compassionately considering the problem o f a gendered/sexualized se lf and concomitant others. In
between these expected and unexpected poles, we saw the emergence—and confirmation really—o f a
Goffmannesque view o f representation that might travel from his concern with face-to-face interactions into a
nameless/faceless, but certainly not an aimless, or purely reckless, discourse o f identity politics.
We saw sincere and cynical provocations in these anonymous presentations o f self that should give all
teachers some sense that anonymous writing is neither a reversal or a mere repetition o f either expressivist
notions o f authenticity, or o f constructivist notions o f author-ity.

The presence o f transgressive and

prohibited discourse has risen with the inclusion o f the anonymous function in the composition course, but
not with anything like the virulence or violence one might envision and therefore conclude that anonymous
writing is too pedagogically hot to handle and too "politically" risky in terms o f its "incorrectness." I have
tried, all through these many pages o f analysis, to err on the side o f making a case against the "necessity" of
anonymity by pointing to content that might very well have found its way into signed essays.
But for a document on masturbation not included here, these six documents comprise my evidence for
themes o f impersonation and transgression. 7 out o f 33 writings doesn't exactly conform to, or confirm,
one's worst expecations and connotations o f anonymity. Even 3 of the 16 documents written explicitly on
the topic o f sex and sexuality is remarkably low. Because I did not worry about a larger statistical sample at
the time o f trying out my ideas, and because I have all along made the case for the performative variety and
textual hybridity o f anonymity's concealment/catharsis function, I am neither disappointed nor surprised by
this finding. Even when we hitch the wagon o f m y tiny experimental course to the star o f such a large study
using anonymous surveys as Patterson's and Kim's The Day America Told The Truth: What We Really
Believe About Everything That Matters, we can nevertheless begin to see that w hat students really think is
worth writing about under anonymous conditions is hardly shocking.
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Anonym ous Racial fdentitv

First Year Composition
The required first year composition course at The University o f New Hampshire I taught in the spring o f
1995 followed the advanced course in composition (English 501, Fall 1994) in which I first tried out the
idea o f anonymous writing. In the first year course I decided to try to cover four major bases o f identity
politics. Instead o f a writing/reading course in gender/sexual identity, I titled this course "The Composition
o f Identity: Race, Class, Gender, Sexuality." I used a reader edited by Virginia Cyrus titled Experiencing
Race, Class, and Gender in the United States. My course outline was more or less identical to that o f the
advanced course. The passage from Patterson and Kim's The Day America Told the Truth: What We Really
Believe About Everything That Matters was also a part o f that outline. In addition to the named writing
assignments involving reader response to the essays in Cyrus' text, and a long final essay o f personal plus
textual research on an issue o f identity politics, I required that students produce two separate anonymous
essays on issues o f race, gender, sexuality, and class identity.
Ten students were enrolled in the course—8 women, 2 men. The 80 documents they produced both
repeat, and in many cases, radically extend my general findings o f impersonation along lines o f empathy
and antipathy toward the class-based and race-based position o f the Other. Because all ten students in the
course were from "white" middle class backgrounds, (not surprising given that New Hampshire's race/class
breakdown is one o f the least diversified in the country), it was relatively simple to identify and analyze the
concept of "generalized otherness."
The scope o f this dissertation does not permit an analysis o f the 20 anonymous documents on class
identity. Though these exhibit a similar "cathartic" authenticity regarding "the poor” along an empathic and
antipathetic spectrum, I have chosen to focus on ten o f twenty anonymous "race" documents. They are
more dramatic in their transgressive and transgredient moments o f self/other identification. The high degree
o f personal/private disclosure in terms o f gendered and sexualized identity which we saw in the 501 course
are, if anything, more in evidence behind the racialized mask o f anonymity. But as we saw in the previous
analyses of gender and sex identity, the mask o f anonymity "falls" in strange and unexpected—impersonal—
ways when writers exercise the rhetorical immunity granted them for the exploration o f race consciousness.
The first assignment prompt was as follows: "Please write an essay on any issue o f race or racial
identity/identification that is o f private—or public—significance to you." As with the advanced course, I let
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students choose whatever mode o f response they felt would best serve the opportunity o f immunity
provided by anonymity. Some used reader response modes to the authors they were reading in Cyrus on
Race and Racism; others looked into the depths o f their ideological hearts to what they really believed-, and
others, as I have alluded to above, and throughout this study, used anonymity to explore acts o f
impersonation similar to what we saw in certain documents in Section Four: Anonymous Sexual Identity. I
analyze the ten documents produced under this prompt in separate subsections below.
In addition to using Patterson's and Kim's passage on anonymity as a "cathartic process" to help students
structure and justify the use o f anonymous writing, I included one o f the surveys it used in its national
study: "Are You a Racist? In the second round o f anonymous writing, I asked students to take this survey,
reminding them that it was taken by thousands of their fellow citizens under conditions o f anonymity
similar to their own. I then asked them to respond anonymously to the results o f this survey. My scope
permits only two of those local, pedagogically anonymous responses to an anonymous survey o f our
national racial attitudes.
Document #1: Anonymous Reader Response to Racism
This first document uses the mode o f reader response to one o f the essays in Experiencing Race, Class, and
Gender in the United States. I remember being impressed by its equivocal use o f the collective, communal,
(and reconstructively anonymous) "We" which is most familiar to Americans in the opening words o f the
U.S. Constitution: "We the People, in order to form a more perfect Union...."
"White People"— We are what is considered to be the- "norm" according to the article
entitled "White Privilege: Unpacking the Invisible Knapsack” and when you stop and
think about it white people are the norm and we do have what you would call an invisible
sack. Lets think about it for a minute.
*We can speak to the public without putting any race on trial.
*We can do well in a challenging situation without being called a credit to our race.
*We can also be pretty sure that if you ask to talk to "the person in charge" you will be
facing a person of our race.
T h e se are just a few points that many black people cannot count on.
Peggy McIntosh [the author o f the above essay] speaks o f how white women find white
men oppressive because o f their unacknowledged privilege and this, on the other hand, is
how black- people view white people; oppressive. They find it discomfiting to be with us,
but yet we don't feel it because it is an unacknowledged privilege. A majority of our daily
lives that we take for granted, black people are fighting for. It is a form o f racism that
most o f us are not aware of. The whites were made to feel superior while the blacks made
to feel inferior. As Peggy McIntosh stated, is this really a privilege?
Note that * means taken from text
Though I don't wish to return to the questionable theme o f anonymity's necessity, it is worth noting
that as an act o f reader response Document #1 is act o f summary and paraphrase, lacking even the
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expressivist threads o f indignation or righteousness we observed in other documents in this mode. Any
yet, because o f the sensitive subject o f historic "white privilege"—a reality that almost always manages to
disappear in most debates on the need for affirmative action—I sense that the writer is relieved to have the
rhetorical immunity to address the issues raised by McIntosh. The writer would rather not be nominally
identified in her/his identification with the "politically correct" position o f recognizing that "white"
privilege transcends particular socio-economic differences o f class and represents an always-already
symbolic and discursive advantage over being "black."
This sense o f caution, and the pointed use of "we" as standing for a particular kind o f "people"
originally privileged by constitutional decree (over and above an original lack o f citizenship status for
white women, children, and white men without property) makes for an odd poignancy in the writer’s
voice. Addressed to one's fellow white people, this sense o f "we" is shot through with guilt, and projects
an empathy for those excluded by its sense o f a collective identity.
Given the "whiteness" o f the class members, I continually imagined how and whether I could have
4
run this course if a single "person o f color” or if any number o f "nonwhite" people were enrolled. As we
saw above in documents where attacks on feminist discourse were frequent enough to qualify as a theme
o f anonymous w riting, this sense o f necessary im m unity with regard to issues o f "political
(in)correctness" should never be taken lightly w hen we ask students to write honestly and
straightforwardly about any issue that genuinely qualifies as "academic discourse” in the hybrid sense I
have o f that highly contested descriptor. As we will see below, the writer's need for some sense o f
immunity was as justifiable as for those of his/her classmates who strongly opposed such sentiments
about "white privilege.
Document #2: Forster’s Empathic Imagination
Here the writer continues the mode o f reader response, but chooses to look up the word "prejudice" in the
dictionary. His/Her reader response to the word's two denotative fields, ideological and legal, is a
connotative tour de force that is both personally and socially significant—its hybridity stylized to the
point that it qualifies as a lyric "confessional" poem.
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I FELT SUPERIOR TO THAT
Prejudice: An unfavorable opinion formed beforehand or without knowledge.
I am guilty o f the first and o f the second. By the definition relating to law I have
damaged and injured in some form and have not been punished but in essence have
punished the opposite.
I saw a man in ragged jeans and a dirty coat and I said '"poor" and I stayed away
because for some unknown reason I felt superior to that.
I saw a woman in the grocery store with two children buying her groceries with food
stamps and I said the children will have a sad life and will have a hard life and I stayed
away because for some unknown reason I felt superior to that.
I saw a women working in a broken down factory and I said I will never work in a
dirty place like t-hat and I stayed away because for some unknown reason I felt superior
to that.
I saw two black men with baggy jeans and shirts and I said ’Ghetto" and I stayed away
because for some unknown reason I felt superior to that.
I drove down the street and saw a family living in a shack and I said I will never live
in an awful place like that and I stayed away because for some unknown reason I felt
superior to that.
One day I was seen by an individual and they thought unapproachable and said
challenge and became m y friend. And for some unknown reason she was not superior to
that. She was not prejudiced and for that reason I was lucky because I gained something
in which a value could not be placed.
In shame I must say, I am guilty o f the first and o f the second.
This writer is actually merging the complex interlocking prejudices o f class and race consciousness. I chose
it for the second document to be discussed because I felt it carried forth many o f the feelings o f Document
#1. The notion of "invisibility" which Peggy McIntosh analyzed in the essay that Document #1 responded
to became big topic in this class. I felt that that the repeated emphasis on seeing in Document #2 was a fine
amplification of the paradoxes o f white invisibility and privilege and the continuing visibility o f AfricanAmerican disadvantage. White people don't think o f their whiteness as invisible, but often respond to the
high visibility of a "black" person, especially one in their all white community. Generally, whites are most
visible and "blacks" are virtually invisible in both historical and popular terms o f what really matters
socially, economically, politically. The lines between appearance and disappearance, between blindness
and insight are taken up in Document #2 in interesting ways. The sense o f "white" guilt in this document is
palpable and is also part o f "white privilege" part of what we carry in our invisible knapsacks.
Because I do not have space to consider the anonymous writings on class-consciousness, I thought this
document might suggest some o f that identity relation's borderline with race consciousness. Mainly,
however, I used it to open a discussion about the sources of how and w hy "we" feel superior" and whether
the structures o f prejudice (bewilderingly complex constructs o f familial, educational and mass cultural
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inculcation) can turned into the kinds of shame that often—wrongly—accompany American's feelings about
sexuality. The fifth stanza is the only explicitly racial reference. The struggle to understand the reason or
emotion o f "white" racial and community superiority is repeated in the phrase "because for some unknown
reason."
By linking up the two repeated phrases, "I saw..." with "for some unknown reason" I tried to open a
discussion about the deep-seated, almost invulnerable irrationality o f prejudice as an ideological apparatus-a "natural" part o f being human. The final anecdote holds out something more than hope that such
intractable constructions within one's sense of, and defense, o f identity. The operation o f the empathic
imagination, o f an Other's attempt to rationally communicate despite the writer's antipathetic sense of
his/her self as superior, asserts a parabolic force upon the entire poem, so that the feeling o f superiority
curves back and collapses upon itself. The illogical nature o f pre-judgment is judged through an act of
passionate communication. Not only the medium o f prejudice, of hate speech, we see in this document that
the anonymous functions equally in favor o f love and its "unknown reason."
My notes show (I had dispensed with the audiotape for technological and pedagogical reasons) that I
began to praise the creativity o f this writing, that it reminded me o f the grand, vatic voice that Whitman
made famous, with its repetition and passionate cataloguing o f experience. I wondered if such a text would
have appeared under signature, or if somehow the anonymous function made it possible. I still wonder.
Because this course met at 8:30 in the morning, I had a difficult time getting my students to wonder with
me.
Because o f my own long and passionate undergraduate training in the reading and writing o f poetry, I
was stunned to find three writers who consistently used the rhetorical opportunity provided by anonymity
to respond more "artistically" than academically. As a matter o f expressivist or social constructivist
identification, these "poetic" responses to the prompt to write about racial identity helped considerably to
fill out what I am maintaining is the unexpected thematic finding o f anonymous impersonation.
This practice o f trying out other voices and visions—o f trying to become a person other than the self of
the writer—was especially evident in this 401 class. We saw its parodic extreme in the 501 class. In this
class, we see it at its optimal reach as vatic —oracular, prophetic—in the next two Documents. (I had stated
in the introduction that I would follow the sequence I originally determined for class discussions. I make an
exception here because I want to register my passionate, but improvable, contention that anonymity, as
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much as the predilection o f a given writer, stimulated these voices that could be fro m any one and no one.)
I find them to be examples o f Bahktin's "transgredient moment" where the compos-ition's expressivist and
constructivist objectives address and transgress one another across the embattLled lines o f academic
discourse. I suppose I am going to show and fold early here, since I have always beecn more o f a poet than a
prose writer.
With these next two documents, I would wish to make a case for teaching com position as an epidemic —
not just academic—discourse: one that affects many persons—both internally and exrtemally present—at not
only one time, but throughout a student's lifetime. The reader will therefore need to rtake the subjectivity o f
my analyses as a barely contained assault upon the whole idea o f treating student's wjriting as objects that I,
as teacher-researcher, can dissect with the tools o f my trade and training. I still "Iistesn" to these anonymous
voices in much the same way I did when I first heard them and helped to orchestrate. and conduct them with
the class once they all had each other’s scores in front o f them.
Document #3: The Vatic/Epidemic Voice
Like #1 and #2, this document uses mythology to revoice white privilege, prejudice,: and the passions of
their unknown reason. It suggests that the passionate sense o f otherness sp e cu la te d by Natanson and
extended by me, could be redirected into empathy and community action in the com position course.
My name is Daphne. If you haven't heard o f me before, I am a character from Gireek mythology.
According to the myth, I am a nymph who is transformed into a Laurel tree= to escape thepursuing Apollo who is out to rape me. If the myth were to be rewritten today, I • would probably
be the "typical" American; white, young, and moderately attractive. Instead o f tuying to escape
from Apollo, it would be minorities that I am running from.
As time goes on and the minority populations are rising, the white population ris leveling off.
Soon, whites will be the minority in America. These are facts that scare a lot o ff people, myself
included. The idea that minorities will take over is one that many try to ignonre. Just like we
shouldn't cross the street when approaching a black man, we also shouldn’t run fb-om the truth.
Because our country is so diverse, we are faced with many problems that we c=an only
overcome as a society. What will happen to our country? Should we have an offilcial language?
Why not an official religion while we're at it? I f we dictate what language is to b e used then we
might as well dictate religion too, since they are intertwined. If we do this, we=re taking away
the freedom that we have all been fighting for. We could always do what I did iln my myth and
try to escape the problems by hiding. When we do this, we don't get to do what we really want
and the problem is left for someone else to take care of. Our other option is to edducate ourselves
to be more diverse and more accepting o f others. This would be the better choiice. Although it
would take more work and effort, the result would be a better society and a bettear understanding
of the people we're sharing the Earth with.
Again, the writer’s open and authentic use o f "we" refers to "white people" such as hear self. (I am assuming,
which I shouldn't given the variability o f anonymous transgression and transgredienoce, that the writer is a
woman because o f the choice o f "Daphne." There is no overt sense o f shame or guailt, as in the first two
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documents, with regard to what amounts to a mythification o f an historical and hysterical white flight from
"minorities. The rather unmitigated sense o f white civilization being chased and under threat o f cultural
(and actual?) "rape" is o f course one o f the more excruciating ironies o f all history, since it was a "white"
European civilization and its enclaves which chased down "black" civilizations and murdered, raped, and
enslaved them physically and culturally. This "white" fear o f minority others ("blacks" remain the main
worry, but "browns" and "yellows" are bringing up the massive rear o f this privileged, irrational fear) is
laughable to black Americans, o f course, whose entire historical awareness is punctuated by fear o f white
persons—from the rape o f black girls and women during slavery, to the beating and lynching o f black boys
and men for the crime o f "raping (that is, "looking at") white females.
This document takes a curious turn, however, with the last sentence o f the second paragraph. The
question is whether the writer’s sense o f the ethical ("we shouldn't cross the street...we.._s/zow/d/« 't run from
the truth") can overcome the open admission that she and other white people have been educated to fear
"black" and other persons o f color. The next two paragraphs lose the poetic imposture, and the
metaphorical voicing. The expressivist tenor fades in favor o f a more constructivist vehicle o f analysis.
"[HJiding, which drops the feminist logic of the Daphne and Apollo myth, is out o f the question it would
seem. White people can't be hiding from, they must be "sharing the Earth with", those they once pursued
and are now fleeing. This document, though not as "vatic" in its expressive totality as in Document #2, nor
as static in its constructivist mimicry as in #1, is a curious hybrid o f "white" conservative fear and liberal
hope. That is, the politics o f its identity, as well as the identity o f its politics, it is an "epidemic" reflection
o f "white" norms o f identity, authority, and community.
I was careful not to launch into a deconstruction o f the writer's reckless use of one o f many Greek tales
o f rape. After all, anonymity not only functions as a scene for immunity but for creativity. In essence
ungradeable, students sense, consciously or otherwise, an opportunity to do things with words they would
not otherwise attempt under either official regime o f named/graded writing. Unnamed and "trans-graded"
writing is for common and communal response and evaluation. I noted the attention to an "official religion"
and to an "official language" in the third paragraph. What I found interesting was the mix o f languages in
this essay—one experimental and expressively risky, the other much more recognizable as officially
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academic, a construction o f socially sanctioned, politically correct views that had to somehow rescue the
authentic, but nevertheless racist fear o f historically white self-understanding.

Document #4: White in Night’s Satin
Here the idea o f "white self-understanding" is taken to its poetic limit, recapitulating and concentrating the
forces o f guilt and shame we saw in various densities in the previous three documents.
As I walk along the winding road
(beside me dusk has settled on wild flower and oak tree)
And think o f how we came to be
Such powerful figures in society
I wonder to whom this blame is ode.
The infinite sounds of chirping crickets
And whispering winds
Knock my conscious self into the realization
That the color o f my skin is all to blame.
Pinkish beige that turns to royal red under Summer's sun
Then fades to a light, regal brown
Only to be swept away with Winter's first snow.
I walk alone.
Our color is like the seasons
fading, blossoming then regressing.
Why can't we see that all colors follow that same pattern?
As I walk, the night has settled
The light has gone
And I embrace the blanket o f darkness that now covers us all.
And I am as Black as can be.
Throughout all seasons,
When night tip-toes gently to each doorstep
We welcome in the darkness that allows bonfires,
City lights and a romantic mood.
Yet when the embers die,
The city sleeps
And the romantics turn out the lights
We are faceless
Bodiless
And as black as night.
All of us.
One nation.
One world.
One universe.
I see this.
I know this
And because o f this
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I walk alone.
I walk alone.
The point where a course in composition must recognize both critical and "creative" writing is not
always explicit, and often not expected. Certainly, a portfolio-based composition course can produce
"creative" writing from students, but as a general rule, the mandate o f the required course in college
composition involves "non-fiction." Fiction and poetry writing are offered in an English Department's
upper level courses, as are those courses devoted to the non-fiction genre of "literary analysis."
Composition is traditionally confined to a rather narrow swath o f writing: personal and impersonal essays
and a longer cross-disciplinary paper of "academic research."
My contention that anonymity opens up the discursive lines between the personal and the textual should
logically extend to the somewhat blurry genre distinctions between fiction and non-fiction, as well as
creative and critical writing. In this particular class, at least, the opportunity—rather than immunity—o f
anonymity revealed at least three students who were most comfortable writing in a poetic mode. It might be
argued that the mask provided by anonymity was not trusted enough by these students, and so they opted
for a lyrical—rather than personal— voice and vision. Anyone opposed to anonymous writing on
pedagogical, never mind ethical, grounds might also point out that Document #4 could have been written
under the writer’s name. There is nothing remotely transgressive or shameful in its content.
Neither personal narrative nor reader response to the question of racial identity and identification,
Document #4 is an "ode" meditating on and mediating the sense o f "blame" all "white" people carry in the
invisible knapsack o f their historical privilege. The gender o f the writer is indeterminable. The voice
speaking to us is operatively androgynous and striving for a vatic, yet thoroughly embodied and complicit,
presence as its "I" (anonymously "all o f us" "faceless") walks alone, yet encompasses an ultimate
constitutional sense o f "We" the people in order to form a more perfect union "embrace" an existential
"darkness that now covers us all." I thought it brilliant and recall celebrating its explicit insistence that
"Black" is the color o f human consciousness; on its call for colorblindness given the mortal darkness we all
must bear.
My notes suggest that, witting or not, this text is tuned into a hermeneutics o f "reconstruction" rather
than one of "suspicion" about Self-Other relations. Its sincerity is so thoroughgoing it creates a powerful
253

R e p ro d u c e d with perm ission of the copyright owner. Further reproduction prohibited without permission.

sense o f an opposing cynicism about racial harmony. I believe the authenticity o f its cathartic
progressivism arises not in spite o f but precisely because o f the anonymous function, and is as palpable as
that o f earlier documents on sex and sexuality, whose cathartic parody was unequivocally transgressive. In
preparing the order o f documents for class discussion, I could not but help follow its empathic vision with
another "creative" attempt, but one that operates at the sincerely antipathetic end o f rhetorical pathos.

Document #5: Pravinp for Racism
This next document concentrates all o f one’s suspicions of anonymity as a haven for hateful cowards. This
“prayer” acts in the same way that the white hood o f the Klan has to conceal hatred under the mask o f a
twisted Christianity.
To the Big Man Upstairs,
I am writing this letter because I really need your help. You see,
the problem is that I am sick o f living in a place where everyone around me is either
Black, Asian, or Puerto Rican. I don't think it is fair for them to drive me from my home.
I want to know why these people are allowed to take our jobs, steal our money, and go to
our schools.
Come on, why did you even create them anyway? All they do is cause trouble.
They kill, steal, cheat, and lie- just to name a few. If that isn't bad enough, they stand
around with their hands out begging for more. Don't they get enough?
I am so sick o f all these minorities running my town. Just look at their area- it
makes the whole city look like a dump. Then they have the nerve to walk out into the
street without even looking. We should start giving community service awards to the
people who hit the most.
Look, all I'm asking for is a little help on your part. What do you say big guy? It
wouldn't be that difficult for you to think up a disease that would get rid o f them and end
our misery. So, can you do me a little favor?
Thanks in advance—I'll owe you one.
Sincerely,
A Devoted Believer Downstairs
I recall that the linkage o f religious devotion to white supremacy in this m ock letter to "God" stunned the
class, particularly since we had had ju st marveled over the spiritual spectrum o f Document #4: over its
sense o f "white" as a reddening, browning, and blackening tow ard som e greater awakening o f
responsibility. (If I had thought o f it then, I might have typed out the lyrics and played the song by Johnny
Cash, "Man in Black," for comparison to the writer's sense o f aloneness in service to a greater sense o f
community.)
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Exceeding the sexually transgressive documents we have seen, Document #5's o f racial identification
opens up what we commonly mean by a taboo subject. By combining religious praise with racial hate
speech, this profane letter o f prayer-anti-epistle, really—is transgressive in the sense generally used by
religious believers: it "sins" against the law of love thy neighbor as thy self. Lacking only "nigger" and
other ethnic slurs to drive home its emotionally and politically divisive point, it is a scary reminder that the
heterodoxical discourse o f such online hate groups as "The World Church o f the Creator" is real, is binding,
is doctrinal.
My notes show that my first question to the class was originally: "How should the Big Man Upstairs
answer this Devoted Believer in White Supremacy"? Given the class’ stunned silence, my journal shows
that I extemporized, grasping at the rationale I had supplied to the class from The Day America Told the
Truth. I asked instead: "Do you believe that the writer is really expressing what he/she believes about
people who are "other" than "white"? Or do you think that the writer is impersonating a white supremacist
in order to provoke a reaction from us?'
M y notes showed an interesting mix o f horror and outrage from some class members —that it didn't
matter whether the writer was trying on a persona or not—and a more tempered reaction from others: we all
know racism is out there; if you ask for it, you'll get it, since anonymity protects it." "This is very bad shit,"
one particularly outspoken female student concluded. Another woman said: "The only way this could come
out is through anonymous writing. But what good does it do us, now that it's out?" That set o ff a discussion
about keeping a lid on hate speech or letting it out. I said that not only anonymity protects this kind o f
speech, but the U.S. Constitution does as well. Several class members shook their heads, as i f in disbelief.
I weighed in with some o f the ongoing debates over free speech. Some o f us take the position that such
speech, and such groups should be outlawed, their ability to write and speak in public banned. This was
clearly a violation o f our Constitutional guarantee that loads the freedoms o f religion, assembly and speech
together into one very complex and dense legal decree. At the other end o f the absolutist spectrum, some o f
us argue that corrosive as it is, such racial hate speech needs to be out and in the open, lest it fester and
grow under repression.
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I told the class that I was a Civil Libertarian in this regard, and that crying out "Fire" in a crowded
theater was clearly speech that could cause physical harm and that it was not so much "speech" but
tantamount to an "action." The Supreme Court had ruled on such speech and found it in violation o f our
rights to free speech. Similarly, writing "nigger" on an African-American Church door, or scratching Nazi
and its identifying swastika in a Jewish cemetery, was a violation o f free speech and a punishable crime.
There was a spectrum o f "injurious" speech, however, that was in fact protected by the Constitution, and
that "fiery speech" was different than the speech that screamed "Fire!"

Like it or not, this letter to one

person's sense o f God was protected by our freedom of speech, and my take on it was: Now that it's out in
the community o f this class, what do we do with it? What can it teach us; what can we teach its writer?
I found it impossible to get down everything said and explored during the discussion o f this document.
My teaching journal is also o f little help as I was trying to cover the entire class discussion, not just
individual documents. One observation I made was that every one— all ten students— participated in the
discussion. That means that the writer—whoever he or she was—was comfortable enough with the immunity
provided by anonymity to discuss the document. Obviously, that writer in his/her role as face-to-face,
public speaker did not reveal his/her identity by defending the sentiments in this document. I can only
conclude that within the well-reasoned position o f several students that emerged during the discussion—
that racists exist and that tolerating, rather than repressing, them was the ultimate "Christian" response—one
could find our "Devoted Believer Downstairs."
In presenting the opportunity o f anonymity on the first day o f class, I had been careful about what I
called standards and practices. I suggested that writers mix fonts and sizes o f text from document to
document. I urged them to strive for gender neutrality or androgyny, particularly since there were only two
males in the class. I also underscored the importance of participation in discussion o f all our reading and
writing and reading—named and unnamed. 15% o f their grade was based on class discussion—on talk, on
being there in speech—and that covered their talk about anonymous writing that was itself, paradoxically,
"ungradeable." Besides, I said, with such a small class, anyone who remains silent is liable to be identified,
rightly or wrongly, with the writer o f a particular document. I think all these reminders and urgings
motivated and fascinated the students. Between students' invisibility as anonymous writers and their
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visibility as named writers and as speakers in class, we had a very complex circulation o f disclosure and
concealment, I said. It was up to them how their intertwined roles as persons—and personaes—worked out
over the course o f the semester.
Looking back at Document #5 now, six years later, I remain pi l l ed by the answer to the question I
asked the class. Is this writing an act o f impersonation—o f performing and in some sense authorizing what
the writer imagined to be the role script o f a white supremacist? Or is it a true reflection o f a student's
ideological beliefs who took seriously the opportunity o f rhetorical immunity provided by anonymity? In
terms o f the idea o f "authenticity" is the apparent sincerity expressed by this "Devoted Believer" in "God"
as some "Big" White Redeemer o f a Master Race any less authentic i f in fact, the writing is an imposture?
If Document #5 is a cynical performance—that is, if the writer is privately quite liberal in his/her positions
on racial and religious tolerance—then what does this tell us about the writer's "expressivist" intention to get
"personal" and to achieve an "authentic" voice?
It is quite possible, as we saw in Document #19 above, that the writer is responding creatively to the
methodological mandate o f the "cathartic process" o f anonymity as described by Patterson and Kim. That
writer's satirical imagination was given free reign under anonymity, free enough, we saw, that the
sincere/cynical binary does not—can not—on one level o f expressivist premises—hold. I had said that this
hybridity of expressivist motive and constructivist effects produced a parody o f anonymous catharsis in
Document #19.
In the present Document # 5 ,1 am wondering whether or not the writer isn't also exercising the parodic
or satiric side of the imagination, as if to say:
Listen to this bigot. I know you recognize this voice and script o f the hateful hypocrite.
Remember how easily "white" religious belief and white supremacist hatred can serve one
another. "I" —the writer—do not believe this; the "I" o f this person speaking here is not
"Me" but just between your metonymic I and mine there is an anonymous "We" the People
who believe and speak this way. What matters who—you, me, anyone—is speaking? This
letter, for all I know, could be written by too many o f Us.
Once the trope or turn of expressivist authenticity is opened outward by the centrifugal, social force o f
anonymous writing, its social constructivity along lines o f sincerity and cynicism, o f authority and
appropriation, and o f mimicry and masquerade, realizes new kinds o f spin. Thus, as with the performative
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hybridity we saw in some of the texts in “advanced” anonymous writing on sex and sexuality, Document
#5 is difficult to identify as either a text of: personal expression, social construction, or something o f both
in terms o f racial identification. It is this both/and quantity o f private and public discourse, the density of
absent identity and o f community presence that is carried in anonymity's invisible knapsack.
Document #6: The Voice of the Native American (TvDOther
In this document we see one more example o f impersonation, as well as a return to the "vatic," yet
decidedly embodied, voice o f a mother keening for her child. Document #5 calls forth—"provokes"— the
vatic voice and vengeful vortex o f "God" to answer a profanely racist prayer (enacting a terribly sardonic
twist on the Old Testament Psalms which beseech an unpredictable God to deliver His Chosen People from
their oppressors). Document #6, by contrast, is vatic in that it impersonates the sacred bond between a "red"
mother and her "red" children. In the voice o f an American Indian, a m other in her Mother Country
keening over the loss o f her son's cultural and personal identity under the anonymizing force o f "white"
civilization.
They have taken my children away, the government. They say that my children will
become civilized. What is this civilized, I do not know civilized (pg. 304).
The pain hurts me so. I can't sleep, I can't eat, I can cry no more. My body is numb
and I've stopped talking. People say that I am turning into a crazy woman. I think I am.
They have taken my children away. I hold my son's hair in my hands, they cut his braids
off, he has white man's hair now. I can't hear any voices no more, no children playing, no
laughing, no singing. It is a quiet place now. It is death and I am like a dead woman. I
close my eyes and I see my children boarding a train, I see their eyes., so lost, so afraid,
this haunts me. Their eyes do not leave my head. The government says they will be better
off. They will learn many things. They will grow to be better people—they will become
white people. Who is the government to say how my children should be raised. What
about, me, I am their mother. W hat about, their culture, who they are, where they have
come from. What about the future, the Indian future? They turn my children to white
people. I spit on the government for what they have done. They had no right to take my
babies. There are no voices now, no laughing, no singing, no nothing. They leave me a
dead woman—as dead as my husband, father, brothers—"red" men, their red blood on the
snow. Red as the blood o f the white man.
My love o f poetry has perhaps forced the notion o f a "vatic" voice into greater prominence than a
literary analyst would accept. The anonymous voices we have heard are foil o f pathos, bathos, are ironic,
sardonic, and some might say idiotic (and they would correct, given the literal meaning o f "idiot", from
idiom, meaning one’s "private sense or meaning" making idiots o f us all. But vatidi These documents don’t
have anything like the prophetic reach o f Keats, Whitman, Dickinson or o f Yeats, Eliot, Auden.... But the
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etymological density o f vatic, comprising sight and madness, prophecy and frenzy does fit into or behind
anonymity's mask.
As in Document #4’s lyrical yet philosophical treatment o f humanity's shared darkness, in Document #6
we see the multiple exigency o f anonymity as a rhetorical function. The Indian mother is unnamed; her
unnamed children are taken away by anonymous bureaucracies o f white civilization who will ban their
language, change their names, erase their identities; her anonymous kith and kin lie dead and bleeding in
the snow; and the w riter has assumed this persona under the prompt that one write anonymously about a
significant issue o f racial identity or identification. The rhetorical density of anonymity as an exigent
situation o f impersonation is both subjectively transparent and objectively opaque: we see and hear through
the writer’s self-concealment the disclosure o f an Other’s suffering. The anonymous antipathy— and
profound alienation— o f Document #5 is countered by the anonymous empathy of #6.
One might seize upon the writer's opening paragraph, and the reader response reference—"(pg.304)" —as
a howlingly false note. Quoting three sentences from an essay in Cyrus' Experiencing Race, Class, and
Gender, when the m ode and mood requires a pure "expressive" form o f discourse, is a Personal plus
Textual miscue, ruining the performance, one might say. The writer's provocation o f what Bakhtin would
call an "internally persuasive discourse" is betrayed by an amateurish and inauthentic disclosure of
"authoritative discourse."
Without going into an inter- and intra-textual bender, I would castigate both the creative writing teacher
and the critical writing teacher whose respective devotion to one kind o f monological purity or another
blinds them to this writer’s attempt at dialogical imagination. The writer is trying to telegraph as subtly as
possible a very genuine sense o f performance to the reader, as i f to announce:
The following sentences are from an essay I read about concerning the fate o f the Indians at
Wounded knee. This essay quoted an unnamed Indian Mother's cry that was translated into
English and used by another writer for her critical purposes. For my creative (and critical)
purposes, I am appropriating the voice/image of that anonymous Native American Person because
I "hear" and "see" what else she might have cried out to the world, or inside her head, "crazy" with
anger and grief. I do not claim to have invented this Person. I am only trying to imagine—to
impersonate—her suffering in continuing her speech.
This, any way, was the way I approached this document in class discussion, as I was particularly keen at
the time on hybrid textuality and discursive impurity. I thus found this piece of writing to be a fascinating
exemplar.
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My notes show that I was also trying to get the class to understand the "vatic" or prophetic quality o f
this impersonation compared to the voice o f the "Devoted Believer Downstairs." The idea that the voice in
that writing was also prophetic—an equally authentic way o f seeing and hearing a significant issue o f racial
identity politics—had the students pretty much shaking their heads in disbelief, cognitive dissonance,
emotional overload—it is difficult to know or to transmit to a reader outside one teacher-researcher's way of
holding and beholding the students in one’s class.
My motive in treating these documents this way, however, and my overall compositional goal for
having students write anonymously, did seem to register more clearly. They seemed to appreciate the fact
that these writings were community property over which we could all communicate, and even use—for
purposes o f contestation or communion— in the longer essays o f personal plus textual research to which we
would sign our names. Keep in mind, too, that along with these essays distributed as common property, I
distributed my own written responses to these documents, so that everyone would have not only their own
and everyone else's unnamed writing, but would have one named writer responding to what he saw and
heard in those anonymous voices and visions.
The last four documents took up two class sessions. I might have saved Document #5 above to include it
in this group, but was more interested to use it as poetic and vatic contrast to the empathic yearning
evidenced in the other four documents. Document #7 resembles several documents o f the first group in that
it continues a yearning for a "yellow” Other, and attempts to serve as a warning about the pervasive politics
o f white supremacy. Documents 8-10 are less about yearning in hooks' direct sense, than they are burning
in their role scripts o f "white" racial identity and identification.
Given the white supremacist voice we heard in Document #5, it might be said that any positive or
reconstructive sense o f "yearning" in hooks' sense is sardonic and perverse. But I think she kept her
definition deliberately wide open to permit identity mobility, impersonation, and transgression. I keep
going back to her exhortations in Teaching to Transgress, wherein she writes forcefully about getting to the
authority of students' experience. If anonymity does help toward the goal o f teaching to transgress by
getting to some o f the communal sources authorizing "white" identity, (what she calls "a pervasive politic
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o f white supremacy" in Yearning), then we can't suddenly turn away from the discovery that there is a
taboo "yearning" for white supremacy.
Composition-Rhetoric has its own split pedagogical identity along these lines. Social constructivists
often write w ith an air o f "academic" supremacy over expressivists. Composition should be about
constructing competencies, o f learning to write using the rules and tools o f the academy: authors and
sources—primary and secondary. The expressivist approach believes that composition should be about
yearning to write, o f opening up innate powers o f curiosity using the roles and tales from one's personal
experience. That both approaches depend upon the pervasive discourse o f the "social" doesn't in the least
grant a superior or supreme stature to the constructivists. Both approaches also traffic in non-fictional
writing. Writing as a mode o f learning is going on in both approaches. But which approach best fits into
hooks' definition o f yearning as we move to these last four documents?
"Yearning,” hooks writes, “is the word that best describes a common psychological state shared by
many o f us, cutting across boundaries of race, class, gender, and sexual practice (27). Both fit, because
compositionists should be devoted to putting both approaches together in the service o f learning to yearn
and yearning to learn through writing. This both/and, rough and ready sense of textual and performative
hybridity means that identity politics cannot be ignored by the expressivists nor secured by the
constructivists.
Once finished with these documents, completing our final round o f anonymous writings on race
consciousness, I looked around the table and realized that half o f us were yearning toward white supremacy
and half were yearning toward that color blinded and blended darkness o f human identity itself. This was a
community o f writing worth learning about. What matter who was writing? Did the writers identify with
each other or with their texts?
Document #7: Reader Response and Writing for Discovery
In this document we return to the mode o f reader response in which a writer reminds us o f ju st how
important authors are. As a form o f reminiscence, this writer represents the case for a social constructivist
approach to teaching composition, with its claim to a greater sense o f author-ity as a non-solipsistic,
historical consciousness o f claims and warrants already received and responded to by a tradition o f other
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nameless readers long before and long after this particular response. And, to repeat: Given the power o f
precedence which social constructivism gives to authorship, what matters, outside o f grades and credit
identification, who is summarizing and reminding us o f John Hershey's important work?
THE NISEI SCANDAL
John Hersey's B ehind Barbed Wire positively shocked me. I am not proud to admit my
ignorance o f this piece o f World War II history, but it is the god's honest truth, I was
completely oblivious to this scandal.
It is hard to swallow that our government again allowed such barbaric treatment of
another class o f the human race within our own shores. It was an outright defiance of
everything the Constitution stands for. Actually, considering the history o f this country's
treatment o f the black class, I don't know why I am so shocked. Perhaps it is because
our high school history books have given us so little, if any, attention to this piece of
WWU history.
Over one hundred thousand Japanese American citizens were sentenced to
concentration camps within the U.S. during WWII in a half-assed attempt to protect our
country from any further attacks or espionage aimed at the homeland. Many o f the
incarcerated Japanese American citizens had family members who were part o f the US
troops risking their lives overseas. Nonetheless, if an individual was from the Japanese
American class o f people in selected sections o f the country they were sentenced to a
concentration camp, stripped o f their homes, their worldly possessions, their dignity,
and maybe, some part o f their "identity."
Led by an obsessive Army Lieut. John L. DeWitt and his cronies, "The War
Relocation Authority," one o f the worst crimes in American history was committed.
They actually wrote the laws as they went along to justify their actions. Furthermore,
upon releasing the evacuees, our country still rem ained inhumane. Absolutely
astonishing and frightening stuff.
This document returns us to the nagging question o f anonymity's necessity, particularly when anonymous
response or reaction is linked to the generic academic mode o f commentary. A very slender case can be
made for using the mask o f namelessness in the writer's admission o f ignorance o f Japanese internment
camps. The writer is "not proud" o f being "oblivious " o f American malfeasance, yet we can not sense that
she/he is really ashamed, particularly when a legitimate case can be made, as the writer suggests, for
historical disinformation and noninformation—censorship by omission—in public school textbooks.
The fact is that many students, as we have seen, either do not trust or believe in the
immunity/opporutnity offered by anonymity. Others, it would seem, do not have anything personally
"significant" to speak about in terms of racial identity. Being "white, middle class, etc.," is an ideological
norm that is so effective, I believe, that it makes for a sense o f identity—o f literal self-sameness-which can
not imagine a sense o f difference as a source o f economic, political or psychological discontent. But the
writer needs to come up with something to write about. Having left open the anonymous reader response
option, I surmise that students can more easily avoid or evade the politics o f their own identities or the
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discourses underwriting their role scripts. I respected this option now, and I did then (even though I would
eliminate the reader response option in future anonymous experiments in the interest o f expanding the
possible instances o f impersonation or transgression.)
My notes show that I commented on this writer's revelation o f American evil in the form o f racial
identification. I complimented the writer’s sense that a "white" structure o f identification made it as easy to
stereotype suspicion and fear o f "yellow" and "slant eyed" citizens, as it did "black ones. I did point out that
the writer’s use o f "class"—as in "another class o f human being" and "the black class" was interesting and
revealing. The suggestion in this use o f class as in "classification" was that "the white class”, o f which the
writer was a member, had the power and privilege o f classification.
Two students made much o f the writer’s sense that this internment o f Japanese-Americans affected their
sense of identity—that part o f it had been stripped. One made a connection to this writer’s reference to a loss
o f identity loss and the writer o f the Indian mother’s "cry from the heart.” A good discussion opened up on
the subject of racial oppression as not just a "black thing," as one student phrased it. It seemed to be "a red,
yellow, and brown, thing." I reminded them o f the anonymous writer who wrote "I Walk Alone” and
his/her attempt to displace the supremacy of whiteness and return us all into, ironically, a common sense of
our darkness.
I concluded by saying that for the writer responding to Hershey’s book, his/her intellectual discovery as
a reader that the Unites States Government had identified a portion o f its citizenry as Other, then alienated
them physically and socially, was a personal plus political discovery. I said it didn't matter if the
significance o f this writer’s identification o f racial consciousness was not overtly personal since it was clear
that the writer's intellectual discovery and disclosure o f its significance was powerful and useful to us all.
The writer states that she/he wasn't surprised to discover this sorry story as part o f American history given
the alienated history o f "black" people. Yet it was clear to me, at least, that the writer's own w hiff of
alienation upon discovering that a democratic government and later, those educational authorities
responsible for constructing students' sense o f history, might be complicit in preempting a truly democratic
sense o f empathy and solidarity based not on "white" identity politics but on, ideally, a politics o f our
common, genetically anonymous, humanity.
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Given the revelations awaiting the class in the next three documents, I think I was trying to gird myself
as much as them with some rather shaky and increasingly suspect liberal pieties which I pushed pretty hard
in 1995: reading and writing about the "politics o f identity" I exhorted them, should place a higher profile
on the meaning and action o f "empathy" and "compassion," o f "solidarity" and "community." Six years
later, I am out o f work under a President elected not by a popular majority o f the people, but by a
conservatively appointed Supreme Court who mindlessly repeats his campaign oxymoron: "Compassionate
Conservatism."
Six years later I am reading a book by George Lipsitz titled

The Possessive Investment in Whiteness:

How White People P rofit from Identity P olitics. Any yet, despite Lipsitz's convincing expansion of
McIntosh's "invisible knapsack" into an total "economy" o f white privilege, including the academic
commodification o f "identity politics," which I so eagerly bought into as empancipatory for my "white”
students, I think my pedagogical use o f anonymity easily tapped into what he calls the "unconscious
racism" o f white people. It is unconscious, Lipsitz claims, because o f the historic linkage between property
and whiteness. Actually, the next three documents strongly suggest that there's no need to recapitulate
Freudian dynamics for this racism. It is quite near many white people's discursive surface.
That is the lesson o f the race survey in

The Day America Told the Truth.

Americans need only the

guarantee o f anonymity and they will tell the truth about the politics o f identity. That I then had these same
students take that survey and write about the results in terms o f racial identification in order to compare
themselves with, and identify themselves with, the thousands of anonymous Americans who also took that
survey, was intended to experiment with the anonymous function "squared"~to square ten students'
anonymous identifications of race with a much larger community o f "white" America. I had no idea at the
time I presented the last three documents o f the first round of anonymous writing, that 50% o f these white
students would, by the logic o f the survey, be considered "racist." My immediate challenge was to square
the clear evidence in some o f the previous documents o f a compassionate impersonation o f the Other in
order to educate for empathy with these three documents.
Like the letter from a "Devoted Believer Downstairs," these three writers were either impersonating the
unconscious role script o f America's pervasive "White Supremacy," or they were expressing a genuinely
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personal—and "possessive investment"—in "white" alienation and hatred. My class notebooks show that I
seized upon the idea I had in response to Document #19 in my 501 Class involving a parody o f anonymous
sexual transgression. Perhaps these racist writings were "experimental"; the writers were trying on the
persona o f the white racist or supremacist. Perhaps they were playing with fiery speech, impersonating
hate.
If there is no politically correct dialogical place for hate, anonymity is a monological space for its
projection (as well as for the selfs yearning for connection and communion.) I also reconnected the idea o f
McIntosh's "invisible knapsack": that white privilege was carried in it, but so was the fear and hatred o f
others who represented the opening o f that privilege. Thus, the invisibility o f the anonymous writer and the
idea of white privilege being invisible to those o f us who wear whiteness as easily as clothes so favored and
familiar that we forget they cover our nakedness and its construction o f shame enables what is otherwise an
unconscious sense o f supremacy (and the suspicion that accompanies all superiority) to come into view.
In other words, I did m y best to "accept" these writings for what they clearly seem to be: uniformly
authentic expressions o f racist hatred. At the same time, I used them, if memory serves, to confront head on
the socially constructed nature o f racism, that it was not innate, that its underwriting by familial and
communal forces could be over-written and re-written. (Or, to return to clothing and metaphors o f cloaking
and covering, the knapsack can be cast off, the color o f mastery finally seen in its invisibility to be
unsuitable, and the immunity o f anonymity—its invisible nakedness paradoxically responsible for a change
in one's moral wardrobe.
As a performance o f identity, the racist role script could be reexamined and recomposed. Depending on
how the community o f the classroom handled them, the writers o f these scripts could decide within the
same secrecy that created them, to never replay them in any context—public or private; the last word in the
composition o f any one's identity was never said, written, or done until the body that mobilized it had itself
decomposed. But when you read these, the first questions that will come to mind are rather more
pedagogical: Would I want to teach this class? What can I do with these compositions in light o f teaching
writing? The subject is writing, after all, and not identity politics, right? Is it possible to hold a class in
which persons o f "color" are in possession o f these investments in white supremacy? Let's look at the
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documents and close out our analysis with some extended reflection on some possible answers to these
questions.
Document #8: What “WE” Really Believe about Affirmative Action?
I think that the passages we read about different races and cultures were primarily focused
on minorities. Very seldom was there an article about a white man and i f there was it was
ju st about how well that he had it. Right now, statistically, white middle class males are
discriminated against more than any other nationality. Now that there have been all o f these
minority quotas recently passed by congress, workplaces and schools need to meet these
numbers and it leaves the white male population standing in the background. Workplaces
should hire on the ability and efficiency o f the worker, not their ethnic background or the
color o f their skin. I kind o f think that some stuff that they do for minorities is almost unfair
to white people. I feel that there are a lot o f things that minorities can say or do and get
away with, but if a white person does it is being racist. For example, the black Ms. America
pageant. There is no way whites could get away with having a white Ms. America pageant.
Also, there is no white history month to recognize the developers o f this country and the
people who made it what it is today.
Reader response mode turns instantly into a personal reaction o f the embattled white male now familiar
in a changed and highly charged landscape o f diverse feminist, ethnicist, and nationalist discourses that
appeared to be silent, even non-existent a generation ago. The continuing preponderance o f white males in
control o f legislative government, industry, and media would seem to be more o f last waltz to this young
white (man?). O r perhaps this is a white woman defending men o f her color, aware that feminism and its
original impetus in affirmative action policies has both benefited her identity space and endangered her
embattled counterpart?
What I find most dramatic about this text—and most useful as an expressive opening for a more complex
textual construction involving academic research for the class as a whole—is the resistance to the readings.
The investment in white privilege, the capaciousness o f that knapsack is seen as wholly earned, achieved
without any denial o f access or opportunity to those bound by an other color. This resistance is deep and
ingrained, alm ost required if we think o f identity itself as purely a set o f individually acquired
characteristics that are now being unjustly appropriated and redistributed to those who didn't create or
accumulate them. Attached to the investment in whiteness is a vast capital flow whose freshets are political
and cultural as much as they are economic. No exhortation to the contrary, even when it might pry open the
eyes o f the invisible watcher/writer, is going to easily deactivate ideological circuitry hardwired and
strapped to one's back.
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The last two examples the writer uses are genuine, if disingenuous, logical yet irrational, serving better to
prove the very point she/he is trying to disprove: that whiteness is not a source of privilege or a power but
one of historical grievance, one on the verge of erasure. Never mind that the Ms. America Pageant and all
its local precedents were devoted to and maintained an all-white flesh parade until the 1960's. Never mind
that "white history" doesn't need the sop o f a month when it can tap the sap of some two millennia. (My
memory is returning as I return to these documents. I was careful but ample in the historical heat and light I
brought to my critique o f these documents.) Whereas Document #3 uses the figure o f "Daphne" to
dramatize the retreat o f whiteness from a molesting minority horde, but in the end rescues itself by
counseling some form o f solidarity through communication, Document #8 uses the desperate o f trope o f
reversing the mythic fortunes. Daphne is chasing down Apollo, God o f light and Reason, reducing him to
darkness, obscurity, oppression—aiee, the rapine o f reverse discrimination!
I did not become this sardonic in handling this first (and second overall) example of white supremacy
coming to the fore under the cathartic process o f anonymity. I was vehement but not inclement. It turned
out that other members o f the class took up the cause and responsibility o f empathy. Class notes quote one
student saying: "The writer seems to have no sense o f history at all-w hite, black, red, brown, yellow, or
green. You'd think the discovery that there's a history o f everyone and everything, but some of it never gets
taught, would make us humble, like that writer about the Japanese internment—amazed not angry." Silence.
One long enough that it seemed best to move on to Document #9.
Document #9: The National Sickness with No Pedagogical Cure?
"ANOTHER VERSION"
I'll admit it. I am a White Supremist. My father was one, my grandfather was one, and
so were my great grandfathers before them. They were good men, every one o f them.
They knew what an honest days' work meant. They knew what it meant to be a proud,
responsible, God fearing American.
But the damn niggers and the 'Ricans and now the gooks. They are milking us dry
while they are taking advantage o f us. It is no small wonder why this country has such a
huge deficit. Hanging around the welfare office with their eight plus babies. Whining "I
can't work, I have no one to tend to my babies during the day." By the time they leave,
they've perked up though, with their supplies o f welfare checks and food stamps. Mind
you, paid for with our hard earned money.
Then drive o ff in their shiny new Cadillacs. They got their tinted windows rolled up,
and their air conditioners on, AND THEIR RAP MUSIC BLASTING! My pickup starts
to vibrate when I pull up beside o f them.
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And the black boys nowadays all belong to those gangs. They spend their time
heisting drugs and gun money by breaking into our homes and our stores, and by "trying'
to harrass good honest people on street comers by sliding some dirty old rag over our
windshields, while poking their noses and their long fingers into our wallets.
The Cubans and the 'Ricans are hauling all the drugs into this country. They're the
ones pushing them in the schoolyards on poor innocent children. Last year I had to pull
my girl and boy out o f one school and put them in another school on the other side o f
town. They told me what was really going on in that first school. Thank God, I'd taught
them right. They got no help from their teachers, they said their teachers feared for their
lives.
And now we got those slant-eyed gooks opening restaurants and stores in every other
part o f town. I'll bet they're hauling in drugs too.
We have got to put an end to all o f this and soon. Wake up America! We have no time
to waste, I've been noticing their attitudes are getting more uppity everyday. I just don't
know where they are getting it from. W e are certainly giving them everything they need.
Is this a parody o f white supremacist racism? Is it another ironic impersonation that perfectly levels all
the real Archie Bunker's o f the world at the sam e time that it deftly cavils with the serious intentions o f an
instructor obsessed with identity politics?

Is the writer using the mask o f anonymity to fulfill an

assignment and a rationale that headlined a methodology of catharsis, and in desperation to come up with
something "authentic"—short o f attempting to capture some galling, bewildering sense o f the problem and
its scope in "true" personally significant terms—decided to socially construct and impersonate a bigot while
leaving plenty o f ironic clues that it is all travesty: both the suprem acist attitude and the writing
requirement? Yes. I want to say yes.
The final paragraph is particularly revealing as a winking at the reader, as i f to say, "Are you with me
reader? I would not identify m yself as a white supremacist. But the metonymic "I” I have created is my
way o f identifying the type for an interested community." This becomes all the more plausible when we
review the clever equivocation o f the title. I f I am correct, if anonymity creates this double mask—
"Another," or even an animad-"Version" for writers, so that the goal o f catharsis beyond the expected
parameters o f expressive significance is generally elusive and often and especially allusive not to the self
but to an almost unimaginable otherness in emotional and social terms, then the satirical imagination is to
be prized for its own sake. O f course the pragmatic instructor could weigh in with this suggestion: "Why go
to all the trouble and risk o f anonymity and simply ask students to impersonate a bigot, or a slave, or a
dying native American, etc.?"
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My answer is that I wasn't after impersonation or the satirical imagination. I was after some privately
held convictions or prejudices whose public consequences are clear to anyone who believes that the reason
racism or sexism or classism exists and persists is because identity itself is in constant flux, a barely stable
consortium o f contending voices and authorities. And o f course, there is always the possibility that this
document is what the writer really believes. Either way, whatever the truth o f this text's expression or social
construction, its hybridity and performative fluidity should be o f interest to those who weigh the benefits
and drawbacks o f one approach to teaching composition over an other.
It is also important to remember that these documents are community property—both for talking over
and writing over in the named documents they will produce under a pedagogy o f double-voiced discourse.
So perhaps it doesn't matter who is speaking and why, under what degree o f authenticity or performativity.
What matters is who is listening and for what purpose. Anonymous writing, because it reduces the author
and writer both to an other, is keen to the reality o f an audience and/or a readership as totally other as well.
What matters who is listening or reading? But if someone—anonymous, endlessly second person singular
and plural that You are—is listening/reading then the text that "I" have become is all that matters.
Composition: putting the anonym ity o f You and I, o f Us, together again in the image o f a text.
Document #10: Admitting Racism or Opposing Race-Based Admissions?
“You have no respect for me ju st because I'm black." "You won't hire me because I'm
black." "You won't let me get into your college ju st because I'm black." These are
phrases which strike a strong feeling in me. I have a problem with people who blame
other people, especially whites, for all o f the bad things which have happened in their
life. I don't see how affirmative action can right the wrongs o f the past. How can it better
our society today?
So you didn't get into the college that you had your heart set on. Do you blame it on
the white man who is head o f admissions? Maybe you blame it on the great grandson of
the man who owned your great grandfather. It's probably due to the fact that your SAT
scores -weren't as good as those o f your peers, regardless o f their color. Maybe you didn't
have any extracurricular activities.
You probably wouldn't have this problem if affirmative action had placed quotas at
the college o f your dreams. (Unless your dream college was UNH where they'll take any
minority in order to diversify the "most white college in America.") So you are now
attending "Quota U." Are you proud that you got into this college? Chances are there are
probably students who did not get into Quota U. who have better GPA's and SAT scores
than you. They're sitting at home after their classes at a community college only because
a set o f numbers kept them out o f their dream college. I ask you, do you think this is fair?
I sure as hell don't.
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Document #10: an anonymous "white" "I"—male or female—addressing an equally anonymous "You"—a
"black" male or female. The "I" is angry, indignant, and despite its rabidly unfair, vulgar reduction o f
"affirmative action" to "Qouta U", it is attempting some kind o f dialogical reality by imagining what this
"black" You is thinking and saying about an affirmative "action" that was created in response to the
negative action against and reaction to "blackness" as an identity and a legacy in history.
This text opened a discussion into how the wrongs of the past 300 hundred years can be redressed today.
When will equality o f opportunity be a reality and how will we do it in a colorblind way? Is affirmative
action really "reverse discrimination"? Whose responsibility is it to create educational opportunity for all of
us? Does the quest for diversity in a university really deny certain "white" students an opportunity they
once enjoyed when there was no diversity (in other words, total discrimination and segregation, a short
generation ago?)
I asked all these questions. I had scribbled them down in my class book. I exhorted the class to use this
document and these questions that it is underwriting in anger and research the answers if that is where their
signed essays should take them. The emotion in this writing is totally legitimate, I said, but where is the
information which supports the source of its reasoning? Is there information that reduces this document to
an unfair and uninformed analysis of the reality o f affirmative action? I said it was my sense that blind rage
rather than focused reflection controlled this writing, but that that was all right. True believers against
affirmative action are as socially constructed as those who truly believe that if it is eliminated we will see
the reason why it was implemented in the first place: racism is a negative action with continuing
consequences. Is the writer's rage against affirmative action, I wondered, or is it against a racism that made
such action finally necessary?
It did not seem to me that this writer was impersonating or parodying anyone. In this case, anonymity
was unmasking and unmuffling an identifiable sense among "white" people that it is not their privileges or
power being taken away by such policies as affirmative action, but their rights. I said I didn't see it this way
and told them a story o f my friend Gregory, a black man whom I shared m any classes with at The
University o f M assachusetts in 1983-4 when we were both working tow ard our secondary teacher
certification.
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We became very close, discussing all issues o f education, and comparing our appointments as student
teachers in the Boston Public School system. We gave each other encouragement and ideas. We were both
aghast at some o f the conditions we encountered, and amazed at how few black teachers there were—"a few
pepper specks in a big old salt shaker," he said, and I couldn't but agree with both the reality and the power
o f the metaphor.
When we had our certificates and went out to seek the two jobs that opened in the Boston Public Schools
we both got interviews. Gregory got one o f the jobs. I didn't get either. One white administrator who I had
interviewed called me in a clear violation o f policy to tell me that I had to accept the realities o f affirmative
action. He said it with a half conspiratorial, half sympathetic slant in his voice for the white guy left out in
the cold. I told him, with tears o f indignation or dignity springing into my eyes and voice—it is still hard for
me to trace out, that if he were referring to my friend Greg, or to the Hispanic woman who got the other
post, then I had let him know that I was supremely happy for both o f them. That perverse as it might sound,
the superior candidates, the best people overall, given all things considered, got the job. "Hmmm, well.
yes...good luck in your future, etc, young man." And that was it.
I told the class I still felt that way after ten years, even more so. That I was honored to lose out to those
two people; that we needed them not only for their training at my—at our—institution—but they needed their
identities in a school population vastly underrepresented by non-white American citizens. I didn't feel
wronged at all. If I lost out on that teaching job because of my white skin, then it was nothing compared to
the centuries o f lost opportunity for Greg's black skinned predecessors. I felt ennobled, not negated,
enraptured, not enraged.
"What do you think?" I asked them. "Is that a legitimate way to feel about affirmative action and
quotas? Should my attitude be a model for how all whites should feel about the issue?" The silence was
long. And I'll never forget the two responses that finally came. One student said: "No." Another student
then answered: "Yes." And with that neat line drawn down the middle o f our discussion, I initiated the
second round of writings on race: Anonymous writings on the anonymous survey "Are You a Racist?"
Conclusion: Roads Not Taken and the Possibility o f “Anonymity Squared”
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Perhaps I should have started and ended with that second round o f documents, particularly given the
anonymous convergence o f 10 American white students at The University o f New Hampshire with
thousands o f Americans, white and black, whose anonymity was guaranteed when they answered the same
survey. The sense o f community —o f alienation—or something o f both they felt in writing up their reactions
to these results is ultimately more telling as justification for using anonymity than what I have presented
above.
The doubling or squared effect o f anonymity—between local student discourse and national citizen
discourse; between academic and socially constructed approaches to significant issues o f our American
experience and what we personally, privately—really— feel and believe about them; between our sense of
identity and our sense o f community as a text open to all—lent an impersonal, objective, and com posing
atmosphere to the class. We took it in stride that half o f us were, if the survey was an accurate measure,
"racists." I think this finding provoked the class into a stronger sense o f what the "politics" part o f identity
really means.
After that round o f papers, the last document I will present below showed up in the papers on gender
identity. It is, I think, an attempt to come to terms with happened in that second round o f race papers. I
reproduce it here to suggest the use o f anonymity as an ongoing evaluating tool that reveals for the class, as
well as the teacher, the personal and social—the total academic- discourse underwriting a composition
course throughout the semester. In this way, the exclusive exit document of anonymous evaluation, that last
day of identifying what "they" really think about us, and more important, about “academic” writing can
turn into, and turn us toward, a reasoned reconsideration o f the composition of anonymity itself.
ANONYMOUS WRITING
When we talk about the readings on race, in class, all I have to go by and discuss with the
group, is what I read. I do not know enough about race and racial issues to go into a big
discussion on it. I have a fear and a blindness o f the unknown. I live in a life where I see
people o f all different kinds o f races wherever I go, but that is all I can go by, is what I
see. I never had the chance to talk with a black person in depth, where I could ask
questions about their life and culture and about other things that I am curious about. This
is because I do not work with them, live with or near them, or deal with them in my
everyday life. I wish I knew more information about different ethnic groups and races,
and I wish I knew more people from different ethnic backgrounds.
W hen I came into this English class I did not know what to expect, especially when I
got my book and it said, "Experiencing Race, Class, and Gender in the United States." I
thought that this class was going to be very confusing to me because I did not know a
whole heck o f a lot about race, class, and gender. But after we read the sections in the
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book and started to discuss them, I was not confused about the subject as much and I am
beginning to enjoy our discussions in class more and more. This class, to what appeared
to be boring at first, is not boring at all but actually interesting and makes you think and
analyze subjects and topics that you normally would not even give a second thought
about because it may not even be apart of your life or our lifestyle.
When we have class discussions, it is interesting to find out what people have to say
and think about on the topics that we talk about. Listening to other students views on
racial issues, gets me thinking about the topic more and in depth myself. I am amazed
that I never even thought about most o f the racial issues that we talk about, before, until I
came to class and started reading about race and started to read about things that are
always happening around me and are a part of life.
But I never took notice or gave a thought about them before because I do not deal with
the prejudice and hard life o f acceptance that others may feel. But I do know that even
after this class is over, I will never be that blind again to the racial issues and things that
happen in this world that I was oblivious to before.
I don't know how much love there is in this class compared to the hatred. I guess
there's a lot o f both in all o f us. I never thought we could write and talk about both at the
same time., but I think it is best to keep on doing it.
In this document we encounter what I believe hooks means by “yearning” — a desire for the Other, a
knowledge o f Other. I believe this document unveils and clarifies what Natanson meant by a passion for the
Other which the anonymous enclave provides. I believe we have traced this sense of yearning and passion
in many o f these documents, even those, and perhaps especially those, whose possessive investment in
“whiteness” expresses itself as a fear and loathing of racialized Otherness. Aside from the expressive SelfConsciousness o f this last document, we begin to see that anonymity is a public shelter for private
reflection. Free from the law o f the Proper Name and its controlling discourse of Identity, this writer is
writing about, reflecting on, the politics o f her identity for the first time. Anonymity augments and
amplifies the distancing effect o f writing, provoking or calling forth a self that might imagine others, desire
others, recognizing the blindness o f the self and the insight that otherness may in fact underwrite selfexpression.
I have a fear and a blindness o f the unknown. I live in a life where I see people o f all
different kinds o f races wherever I go, but that is all I can go by, is what I see. I never had
the chance to talk with a black person in depth.... I wish I knew more information about
different ethnic groups and races, and I wish I knew more people from different ethnic
backgrounds.... But I do know that even after this class is over, I will never be that blind
again to the racial issues and things that happen in this world that I was’ oblivious to
before.
This is really what expressivism is supposed to do—or at least, this is what anonymous expressivism can
do. It bridges traditional expressivist writing and social constructivist writing as reconfigured and realized
in what should be a continuous use o f anonymous discourse in teaching composition. This document serves
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as segue to a consideration o f whether the documents produced under an anonymous pedagogy fulfils the
premises and promises o f a “critical pedagogy.” After taking stock o f 20 documents across two classes, my
readers may remain unconvinced that anonymous writing in a composition classroom does what I argued it
would do in Section One o f this chapter.
In a projected sixth Chapter, titled “Toward an Ethics o f Anonymity,” I would reproduce the passages
from students’ formally anonymous course evaluations commenting on the use o f anonymity—what they
really think about anonymous writing. These texts, functions o f double voiced discourse, o f anonymity
squared, might lend greater “authority” to my admittedly nascent claims about the composition of
anonymity as a critical pedagogy o f prepossessed identity politics and a hopeful, never to be possessed,
discourse o f community yearning for mediation o f se lf and other.
All that I can do at this point is to ask, once again:

What matters who is writing ? No theory, history, or

pedagogy o f writing can any longer ignore the composition of anonymity in forming an answer to that
question. I can hear the critical, still suspicious reader begin to howl that I am running a composition class,
not an anonymous survey counseling service.
My response is that composition is like no other course in the university in that it permits students to
cross between the established discourses o f their families and home communities, and the emerging
discourse communities they encounter at college—never mind, for a moment, the academic discourse
communities which certain o f us are so worried about as somehow not getting their fair share of student
exposure and inculcation.
Composition has the opportunity, and literal response-ability, to take on the social and political aspects
o f the personal and the private as these are re-presented in the hybrid, ever-changing intellectual act of
writing. The genderist, feminist, realist, idealist, textualist, and yes, expressivist and constructivist,
demands placed upon this single required course places composition instructors—particularly those who are
devoted to using the writing conference— in a role that is part institutional archivist and part lay therapist.
The former speaks to and directs a student to sources such as the library or the world wide web or to other
professors and other courses; the latter listens to and connects a student to sources within the student and, if
need be, to confidential others. I have had to do this kind o f connection countless times—from admissions
o f homosexuality, to eating disorders, to substance abuse, to rape. Students' own unbidden confidences
reveal that many are already using various therapeutic sources both on and off campus.
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I see nothing whatever problem atic in students identifying with the ways I identify with and evaluate
issues in their anonymous w ritin g . Personal and private issues have clear social and public avenues and
outcomes. If their therapeutic >character reveals itself under textual representation, then I deal with the
textual first and last as an acad em ic matter. Students, not teachers, should be the ones to make the
personal/private an academic maatter —and vice versa—and they do with surprising frequency. Anonymous
writing is simply one more asp-ect o f discourse that, already a part o f public interchange, can be made to
operate beyond its present use ass a largely ceremonial exit document.

Chapter Notes
* Anthologies by both Cyrus antd Rothenberg are both academic in the depth, and popular in the scope, o f
the writers and analysts they H ave chosen for their presentations o f identity politics. Please see my
Bibliography for information on their books.
- 16 students, 8 female, 8 male, ’-were enrolled in an English 501/Advanced Composition course, titled "The
Composition of Gender" in the F-all o f 1994. Two assignments guaranteeing anonymity, were given to these
students, totaling 32 documents (£1 missing).
10 students, 8 female, 2 m ale,, were enrolled in an English 401 first year required course in Composition,
titled “The Composition o f Ideentity: Race, Class, Gender, Sexuality. Four assignments guaranteeing
anonymity, were given to these sstudents, totaling 80 documents.
Because of space limitationas I have 10 documents from the 501 course to reflect Seven Emergent
Themes that I believe followed cBirectly from the anonymous condition o f the writing. I chose only the first
10 o f 20 documents from the R a c e component of the second course. The present scope o f this study does
not permit a full study o f all diocuments. I have scanned the original documents into the body o f this
chapter’s text. I then cleaned inp spelling and grammar errors, but otherwise did not alter the surface
features o f these texts. For reasoons o f space and reader attention, I have excerpted passages from some o f
the longer writings. I have indicated this with a series o f ellipses. The font for these documents (New York
10) is consistent with the rest o f rthe dissertation. Originally, students were encouraged to mess around with
fonts and sizes to strengthen anomymity’s general masking effects.
3James Patterson and Peter K im . conducted a massive study o f Am erican attitudes and beliefs in the early
1990’s titled, The Day Am erica "Hold The Truth: What People R eally Believe About Everything That Really
M atters. In the foreword they a^sk rhetorically why they or the people who responded to their questions
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about ethics, race, sex and sexuality, class, money, and community should believed. Their answer was
significant enough I felt, to reproduce for my students as way to situate and justify the use o f anonymous
writing in a course devoted to identity politics.
It all started with this simple observation, a fact o f research life: Most people want to tell
someone what they really believe and w hat they really stand for. But that desire is
tempered by the realistic fear that telling the truth will get them into trouble with their
spouses, their bosses, their parents, their friends, or their neighbors. So, people rarely find
anyone they trust enough to let all o f their precious defenses down (4).
Readers will recall our extension of Foucault’s discussion o f the rarity o f discourse as a “fellowship” in
which there is an ambiguity between secrecy and disclosure. We will also recall his focus on Prohibited
Discourse in which not anything by anyone can be said, though the desire may be there, particularly in the
face of the p o w er o f truth regimes to not wish to hear the truth about how politics is actually conducted
across private and public lines. For Patterson and Kim this desire to speak to the truth, however much
prohibited by various sites o f authority, could only be performed by what they call “the cathartic process.”
The m ost crucial technique we used in our testing is known as the cathartic process. We
allowed people to unburden themselves with total anonymity. Once granted that, people
were willing to truthfully answer questions o f even the most intimate nature.
We guaranteed to the people we interviewed that no one who read their replies would
know th eir identities—no one w ould know their names or addresses. In these
circumstances, people felt that they could tell their secrets and share true feelings (4
emphasis added.)
Although I could not guarantee “total anonymity” to students, one has to assume that they—like the
adults interviewed by Patterson and Kim—w ant to tell the truth about the politics o f identity and of their
identifications. T heir fear o f teacher, peer, and the larger sense of authority represented by the university
community has to be accounted for in the same way that these researchers accounted for it. This, anyway,
was my rationale in proposing anonymous writing to students writing about their identities. To really get to
what one really thinks o f gender, sexual, and racial identity, identities have to become concealed as they
are begin disclosed/opened to scrutiny by a given community.
In Patterson and Kim’s term of ‘the cathartic process” we can trace the Ancient Greek dramatic
innovation o f using masks or “personae” in their performances. We can also begin to understand Schutz’s
phenomenological sense o f private provinces o f meaning getting crossed and a “shock experience” arising
there from. Furthermore, in the notion o f cathartic process, we can see what Natanson was getting at in his
notion o f passion in the enclave that Otherness provides, since anonymity provides the opportunity to speak
or write about issues that always present an otherw ise capacity depending on the realm— private or
public—in which it is being disclosed. And finally, in this sense o f anonymity as a cathartic process, we
understand Forster’s sense o f anonymity as an ultimate act of imagination in which author/authority
disappear. Transferred to the writing process o f composition -rhetoric, this sense o f imagination is cathartic
in ways, perhaps, that expressivism hasn’t yet imagined, yet might logically encourage, but which the
social constructionist will most certainly disparage.
4

At The University o f Massachusetts/Boston, where I was also a composition instructor, the "racial"
composition o f classes was far more diverse. I was under the influence o f Goffmann's "stigma theory" at
the time o f my final course there, and was astonished to find two students spontaneously using anonymous
writing to describe the stigma o f being handicapped in response to our reading o f Nathaniel West's Miss
Lonelyhearts. N o one else, where 50% o f the students were African-American or Latino, responded
anonymously to the stigma o f "race" in a course that I had titled "The Composition o f Self." I have avoided
the political/pedagogical mess I would encounter i f one or more o f UNH's rare students o f "color" had
shown up in the class devoted to writing anonymously on racial identity. The question o f anonymity’s
ethics and the problems o f political correctness cannot be treated in this writing.
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